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This thesis problematizes the role of Islam in maintaining and challenging the 
existing power relations, class structure and forms of domination in Turkey. Based on 
the Gramscian theoretical framework, it seeks to find answers to the question of how 
Islam has been used as the site of cultural hegemonic struggle in the post-28 February 
process in Turkey. The period studied runs from the coup d’état on 28 February 1997 
until the end of the Justice and Development Party’s (JDP) third term of office on 7 
June 2015. Concentrating on this period enables us to understand how the laicist 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc constructed a hegemony on the terrain of Islam to ensure that 
its values, beliefs and world-view could be internalised as natural, universal and 
common sense. Moreover, it also enables us to comprehend how the JDP challenged 
that cultural hegemony after 2002 when the Party came to power. 
The ‘how’ question directs us to explore the mechanisms of consent manufacture 
on the religious terrain. Within this field, two mechanisms – the textbooks of the 
Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (RCMK) lessons and the legislation regulating 
the area of religion and religion-related issues – are analysed by means of Critical 
Discourse Analysis. The RCMK textbooks, as the instruments for the construction and 
dissemination of particular discourses, reveal the discourses which have dominated both 
the education system and other spaces of the state as a whole. Legislation, with its 
discursive dimension, is important for constructing discourses related to religion and the 
daily lives of Muslims, and for disclosing the clash of laicist and Islamic values within 
both political and civil society. They are also significant tools for the maintenance of the 
existing class structure in which the Kemalist bloc was historically dominant, and for 
the challenge to the class structure by the JDP after 2002. 
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Religion, and more specifically Islam, constitutes the starting point of this thesis, 
which aims at comprehending the influence of the terrain of Islam on the cultural 
hegemonic struggle and on efforts to establish a consensual relationship with the 
opposing groups in Turkey. In the most basic sense, religion is “a belief in the God or 
Gods” (Giddens & Sutton, 2013: 720). Beyond its theological or spiritual meaning, 
religion is significant for being able to direct its believers to particular political or social 
objectives (Haynes, 2005: 248). The functionalist approach claims that religion, through 
its doctrines, myths and ceremonies, provides explanations about the origins of life and 
offers a justification of existing social systems. Together with morality, religion can 
have a cementing and unifying function in a society (Grelle, 2017: 69). A religion might 
also form the ideological foundation of dissent in a society (Calvert & Calvert, 2001, 
cited in Haynes, 2005: 251). It can also play a revolutionary role against the established 
social and political order, as in the example of the revolution in Iran in 1979 (Haynes, 
2005: 248). 
More importantly for discussions on cultural hegemony, Gramsci (1971: 326) 
stated that religion corresponds to “a conception of world”. That is to say, religion is an 
important creator of meaning in every area in the world. It provides a significant source 
of fundamental value orientations (Haynes, 2005: 248). Considering that cultural 
hegemony is based on the ability to ideologically control subordinate groups by 
producing and disseminating dominant values, beliefs, and views, to determine conduct 
and meaning, to draw the boundaries of discourse and common sense, and finally to 
present dominant views as universal and natural (Giroux, 1981: 94), it becomes difficult 
to neglect the role of religions in the creation of meaning. A dominant group which 
seeks to produce and disseminate a meaning for the establishment of cultural hegemony 
will inevitably conflict with religion, which is another meaning producer. Gramsci 
(1971: 204) regarded the Church as an important element of civil society among the 
social institutions through which a cultural hegemony is exercised. For him, the 
dominant class can use the Church to maintain its monopoly by means of the Church’s 




mainly on Christianity, his thoughts on religion can also be applied to contexts in which 
another religion is dominant (Fulton, 1987: 198). 
In the light of the discussion about religions in general, Islam also provides a 
significant challenging to the global neo-liberal establishment or to any kind of central 
value system, since it possesses a particular world conception and political ideology, it 
determines social norms on nearly every issue, it symbolises a very unique and 
sophisticated tradition of faith, it offers a philosophical method to its followers, and it 
has the advantage of vast membership power (Evans, 2011: 1752-1753). Islam is an 
extensive religion which shapes the discourse on nearly every topic, both worldly and 
unworldly. It has a standpoint about the issues which are directly related with class 
structure and class struggle, such as the economy, distribution of wealth, working life, 
trade, justice, politics and the exercise of power. It can therefore be argued that Islam is 
a religion which constructs a specific world conception similar to that which Gramsci 
pointed out for Christianity. So since Islam constitutes a reference point of a distinctive 
value system, any group which envisages a hegemonic strategy takes the risk of a 
cultural and discursive battle with Islam. 
Islam also provides a disciplining and unifying instrument for the Muslims in the 
hands of Muslim intellectuals and Muslim political leaders (Evans, 2011: 1757). It 
therefore provides a remarkable organisational capability for Muslims which is able to 
direct them to a common ideal and to organise their collective action. In conjunction 
with this organisational power, Islam also provides a self-sufficient and independent 
Islamic political ideology which is capable of handling and offering solutions to all 
kinds of contemporary issues which Islamic societies face (Butko, 2004: 50). Butko 
(2004: 42) detected a relationship between political Islam and the Gramscian theory of 
hegemony in terms of both tactics and goals and pointed out that Gramsci’s contribution 
to Islamist politics stemmed from his guidance regarding the necessary conditions for 
the birth of a successful revolutionary challenge to the hegemonic elites and against the 
socio-political system by which they were maintaining their legitimacy and power. 
Moreover, Islam possesses a comprehensive law system, called Shari’ah (seriat 
in Turkish), which tells Muslims how to perform the obligations of Islam and which 
guides them in their daily life. It regulates the behaviour of Muslims in both the private 




rule maker which transcends the domain of positive law, since it comprises and 
influences the spheres of both the worldly and the divine. A tension between Islamic 
Shari’ah law and laic
1
 positive law is therefore inevitable. In order to cope with this 
tension, a laicist ruling group must produce and disseminate a particular interpretation 
of Islam which restrains the scope of Islam to the individual level of worship and faith. 
In the light of the discussion so far, it might be difficult to comprehend cultural 
hegemonic struggles without taking into account Islam’s organisational and ideological 
power, its unique value set and its own world conception in the cases of Muslim 
majority countries
2
 in general and in the case of Turkey specifically. Turkey, whose 
administration is based on the principle of laicism (Official Gazette, 1982a), is a 
Muslim-majority country
3
 ruled by single-party governments of the Justice and 
Development Party (JDP)
4
 since 2002 (Panebianco, 2007: 179). Following the 
establishment of the Republic by Ataturk in 1923, an authoritarian social engineering 
project was led by Ataturk and his followers, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc, to 
modernise Turkish society from the top down and to shape the values, perceptions, 
beliefs and thoughts of the society in accordance with those of Kemalism (Sofos, 2000: 
244). Islam has also been affected by the modernisation project in Turkey. Laicism has 
been an important factor of Turkish political life in order to create a national Turkish 
                                                          
1
 In the current study, the word ‘laic’ is used to describe the feature of the state institutions. For a more 
detailed discussion about the issue, see the sub-section ‘The Fundamental Principles of Kemalism’ in 
Chapter 1. 
2
 In 2010, 49 countries around the world were grouped as Muslim-majority countries; 1.2 billion Muslim 
people, which corresponds to 74% of the total Muslim population in the world, live in these countries 
(PEW Research Centre, 2011: 155). 
3
 There are a variety of empirical studies which have researched the religious tendencies of people in 
Turkey. Those studies can give us idea of the place of Islam in people’s lives. In an empirical study 
carried out by GALLUP (Burkholder, 2002), Turkish people were asked about the significance of having 
‘an enriched religious and spiritual life’; 41% responded ‘essential and cannot live without it’, 37% 
responded ‘very important’ and 17% responded ‘useful but can live without it’. In a study conducted by 
the MAK Public Opinion Research Company, the percentage of the people who declared that they 
believed in the existence of God was 86%. Moreover, 6% of the respondents declared that they believed 
in the existence of God but did not believe that God intervenes in everything in the universe. Only 4% 
declared that they did not believe in the existence of (a) God (MAK, 2017: 4). In the same study, Turkish 
people were asked how important the piousness of a candidate in a political election was to them: 51% 
responded ‘very important’, 24% responded ‘somewhat important’ and 20% responded ‘not important’ 
(MAK, 2017: 26). 
4
 Three different abbreviations are used to refer to the Justice and Development Party, namely the AK 
Party, the AKP and the JDP. The official abbreviation of the party is the ‘AK Party’, whilst ‘AKP’ is also 
used in the literature. However, the usage of both abbreviations might cause bias in research since the 
term ‘AK Party’ is generally used by researchers who are sympathetic to the party, and ‘AKP’ is used by 
those who are antipathetic towards it. In the current study, the ‘JDP’ is preferred as the abbreviation for 




culture and identity since the 1930s (Karpat, 2009a: 239). A conflict between Kemalism 
and Islam was inevitable in such a culture-building process. It might therefore be 
beneficial to go deeper into the case of Turkey in order to reveal why the terrain of 
Islam is so significant for comprehending the cultural hegemonic struggle better.  
Islam has always been a significant source of collective action by pious Muslims 
in Turkey. It has provided a common religious identity for Muslims to be organised 
under various organisations, such as the political parties of the National Vision 
Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi), associations, Islamic foundations, tarikats (religious 
orders) or cemaats (religious communities), to act collectively and to produce a 
common attitude towards the state and the ruling groups. Muslims have found that 
tarikats and cemaats increase their capability of acting collectively. They establish 
companies which directly influence their class position. Islam was therefore a terrain for 
the Kemalist hegemonic bloc to produce a discourse which limits the collective power 
of Muslims by bringing an individualist interpretation of Islam to the forefront. It was 
also a terrain for the JDP to develop the collective power to challenge the Kemalist 
hegemony. 
Islam is a terrain on which the top business associations and syndicates have 
been fractionalised. It was the principal factor which differentiated the Islamic-based 
business association MUSIAD (Yankaya, 2009: 2) from the laicist Kemalist business 
association TUSIAD (TUSIAD, 2013). Similarly, whereas HAK-IS represented an 
Islamic workers’ syndicalism (Duran & Yildirim, 2005: 228), DISK favoured a left-
wing workers’ syndicalism (Dereli, 1992: 469). Thus the attitude towards Islam was a 
significant determinant of economic rivalry. 
Islam is also a terrain where people’s class positions in the social hierarchy are 
determined and where vertical mobility opportunities for them are manifested. For 
instance, wearing a headscarf, which was directly related to the extent of pious women’s 
religiousness, was a sufficient reason for them to be deprived of secondary and higher 
education (Official Gazette, 1981a) and of working in the public sector (Official 
Gazette, 1982b). Similarly, having an intensive religious education became an obstacle 
to continuing university education (Official Gazette, 1981b; Dogan & Yuret, 2015: 201) 




working as an unskilled worker. As a consequence, the positions for white-collar 
employees were dominated by people who had a secular
5
 lifestyle.  
Islam is also a terrain where the tensions stemming from lifestyle differences 
emerged and reciprocal threat perceptions of both the secular and the pious segments 
rose to the surface in the history of Turkey. The laicist policies and attitude of the 
Kemalist regime caused conflicts from the very beginning. Considerable uprisings even 
occurred for this reason in the early years of the Republic (Carkoglu & Toprak, 2007: 
32). Moreover, Islam, as an important determinant of people’s lifestyle, shapes their 
attitudes to issues such as drinking alcohol, adultery, gambling, pornography, flirting, 
homosexuality and ways of dressing. Most of the protests in recent years can be seen as 
signs of the JDP’s cultural hegemony crisis originating from the diversity in terms of 
lifestyle. For instance, the JDP’s intervention in lifestyles was a frequently voiced 
discourse during the Istanbul Gezi protests in 2013 (Altun, 2016: 171). Consequently, 
persuasion of the opposing groups on the terrain of Islam became a vital issue for both 
the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. 
 
1. Research Question and an Introduction to the Basic 
Elements of the Thesis 
So far, we have discussed the reasons why Islam should be taken into account in 
this study of the cultural hegemonic projects in Turkey, which is a Muslim-majority 
country. At this point, it might be beneficial to turn our attention to the thesis itself. It 
should be noted that this thesis neither discusses whether religion, and particularly 
Islam, is good or bad, nor does it intend to problematize whether Islam is human-made 
or God-made. In other words, it does not involve a theological discussion. Religions, 
and particularly Islam, will be approached as a terrain on which particular hegemonic 
projects take place for the manufacture of Muslims’ consent. 
The aim of this study is to research Islam as a site of hegemonic struggle 
between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. In this context, ‘Kemalist 
                                                          
5
 In the current study, the word ‘secular’ is used to describe a cultural stance. For a more detailed 






 can be interpreted as a coalition between three agents which are 
united under the umbrella of the same ideological goals and of the same attitude 
regarding the place of religion in political and civil society. These three agents were 
determined as the Kemalist military, the Kemalist state bureaucracy and the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie with the additional support of Kemalist intellectuals. The fundamental goal 
of the study is therefore to explore the maintenance of domination, the sustainment of 
intellectual leadership and the establishment of hegemony through discourse 
construction. In the light of these aims, the following research question arises: 
How has Islam been used as a site of cultural hegemonic struggle in 
Turkey in the post-28 February process until 2015? 
This question raises two interrelated points. First, it problematizes the 
hegemonic project of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc on the terrain of Islam in the post-28 
February process. The research focuses on the efforts of the Kemalists to gain the 
consent of the pious Muslims for the laic Kemalist regime and the Kemalist domination 
within this regime. For this, the pious Muslims must accept the values, beliefs and 
world-views of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc about Islam as natural, common and 
universal rather than as a threat. Since Islam is regarded as an area of persuasion, the 
study investigates how particular discourses on the terrain of Islam are constructed and 
disseminated with the aim of creating a common understanding of Islam with pious 
Muslims and persuading them to accept such a common understanding. 
Second, the research question directs the researcher to investigate how the JDP, 
in its first three terms of single-party government, responded to the hegemonic project 
of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc on the terrain of Islam. The intention is to comprehend 
the hegemonic project of the JDP by emphasising the challenges, nullifications and 
continuities regarding the Kemalist discourse on Islam and Islam-related issues. 
With the term ‘a site of cultural hegemonic struggle’, we approach Islam as a 
terrain of hegemonic projects on which hegemonic activity takes place. In other words, 
we regard Islam as an area of activity where the hegemonic struggle can be detected. 
                                                          
6
 It is also possible to see the term ‘Kemalist hegemonic bloc’ in other studies in the literature which 
have been focused on the case of Turkey (Jung, 2008; Kurc, 2013). In his use of the term, Jung (2008: 
127) pointed to the military together with the new elites of the Kemalist laic state, such as public 
bureaucrats, professors, teachers and jurists, as the hegemonic bloc of Kemalism. Kurc (2013: 8) used 
the term interchangeably with the concept of ‘historic bloc’ to mean the three pillars of institutions, 




The terrain not only involves Islam itself, but also Islam-related issues such as Islam’s 
political, social, economic and organisational roles, the Islamic lifestyle and symbols, 
Muslimness, and the influence of Muslim identity on pious Muslims’ class position.  
Moreover, the period explored in the study was determined as the post-28 
February process until 2015, since it was not possible in a single PhD thesis to analyse 
the cultural hegemonic projects over nearly 90 years beginning from the establishment 
of the Republic in 1923. The post-28 February process started with the 28 February 
1997 post-modern coup d’état and continued to first few years of the JDP government 
when the outcomes of the 28 February process were still being felt. On 28 February 
1997, Turkey was exposed to a post-modern coup d’état in which the Turkish Armed 
Forces (TAF) forced the Welfare Party (WP) to resign. Unlike the previous coups d’état 
in the history of Turkey, the TAF sought to organise and mobilise the opposition and by 
this means succeeded in putting pressure on the officials of the WP to resign, rather than 
seizing governmental power directly (Jenkins, 2007: 345-346). This key difference was 
also the main reason for using the adjective ‘post-modern’ in respect of the 28 February 
coup. The post-28 February process is also important for corresponding with the last 
peak point of Kemalist hegemony just before the long-term single party governments of 
the JDP began. Furthermore, the period between 2002 and 2015 is also important for 
being the longest uninterrupted single-party challenge by Islamists/conservatives to the 
Kemalist hegemony in the history of the Republic. There are also two sub-questions 
which the research will address: 
What are the differences between the cultural hegemonic projects of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP on the terrain of Islam? 
This sub-question brings a comparative research character to the study. The 
hegemonic projects of both sides, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP, will be 
analysed separately under each topic. In Chapter 5, the Religious Culture and Moral 
Knowledge (RCMK) textbooks used in the post-28 February process will be compared 
with those being used in 2015. In Chapter 6, the laws, regulations, and bylaws which are 
valid in the post-28 February process will be compared with the amendments made until 
2015. By means of these comparisons, the differences in the discourses and the 




identifying the strengths and the weaknesses of each hegemonic project. The second 
sub-question, which is directly related to the first, is: 
To what extent has the JDP government established an alternative 
cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam between 2002 and 2015? 
By exploring this second sub-question, we shall seek to understand the extent of 
the success of the JDP’s hegemonic project in challenging the Kemalist cultural 
hegemony and in creating its own cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam within its 
three terms as the single-party government from 2002 until 2015. In order to evaluate its 
success, we shall concentrate on the extent to which the JDP could nullify the 
fundamental paradigm, mainstream values and discourses, and the common sense 
framed by the Kemalists about Islam in both political and civil society. We shall also 
seek to comprehend whether the JDP could shape the fundamental paradigm, 
mainstream values and discourses, and the common sense with its own values and 
world conception. 
Consequently, as Van Dijk (2001: 352) pointed out, analysis using Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA) will enable the researcher to comprehend how the relations 
of hegemony/dominance and power are constructed, approved, reproduced, justified or 
challenged by the structures of discourse in society. The main motivation of this study is 
therefore to critically address the dominant discourse structures on the terrain of 
religion, and specifically on the terrain of Islam, and to unveil the processes of 
construction, approval, reproduction, justification and/or challenge of the power and 
hegemony/dominance relations in Turkey. To achieve this, we shall endeavour to 
examine the use of social engineering to contrast the hegemonic/political goals on the 
terrain of religion and make a humble contribution to the struggle of the subordinate 
classes/groups against the dominant classes/groups which exploit them. 
 
2. Outline of the Thesis 
The thesis follows a route moving from a general introduction to the historical 
background of the case of Turkey and a discussion of the fundamental constituents of 
the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony, passing through an exploration of the 




together with the data collected, and then to the operational chapters of the thesis which 
are about education and legislation. 
Chapter 1 presents a brief history of Turkey emphasising particular elements of 
it which are vital for understanding the dynamics of the hegemonic projects and main 
characteristics of the hegemonic actors. The chapter begins with two prominent aspects 
of Ottoman society, the centre-periphery cleavage as the historical basis of cultural 
hegemonic struggle and the millet system as the indication of a radical shift in the main 
signifier of identity from the Ottomans to the Republic. The chapter continues by 
presenting the fundamental principles of Kemalism and showing the Kemalist 
modernisation and nation-building processes and discussing its enduring power in the 
multi-party period with reference to coups d’état and the tutelage regime. The chapter 
will end with a consideration of the historical roots, ideological position, main 
characteristics and key policies of the JDP.  
In Chapter 2, the theoretical framework of the thesis, which hinges on Gramsci’s 
theory of cultural hegemony, is drawn. The chapter starts with a discussion of critical 
realism, which constitutes the ontological and epistemological base of the thesis. Then a 
detailed evaluation of the Gramscian theory of cultural hegemony is presented. Taking 
into account Gramsci’s (1971: 12) thought about the need to gain the consent of 
subordinate classes in parallel with the values of the ruling class, Chapter 2 emphasises 
the particular concepts which have a guiding role in understanding the manufacture of 
consent and encourages us to rethink those concepts in the light of the Turkish case. 
Those concepts include the ones related to the organisational aspect of hegemony such 
as the state, political parties and historic bloc; the ones related to the ideational aspect of 
hegemony such as ideology and intellectuals; the ones related to hegemonic strategy 
such as war of position, war of manoeuvre and passive revolution; and finally the ones 
related to the types of hegemony such as structural hegemony and surface hegemony. 
The chapter will end with a theoretical discussion of the relationship between religious 
and cultural hegemony based on the ideas of Gramsci. It should be noted that the 
theoretical discussion is not limited to Chapter 2. Chapter 5 begins with a theoretical 
discussion regarding the relationship between education and cultural hegemony and 
Chapter 6 starts with a theoretical discussion of the effects of legislation on the 




Chapter 3 reviews the literature which has explored the issue of hegemony. It 
starts with a discussion regarding the class-based understanding of the Turkish case 
with reference to prominent studies which have considered the class structure shaped 
through cultural and religious identities. Following this discussion of class structure, the 
attention turns to the literature on hegemony-based studies about the case of Turkey. 
The chapter ends by reviewing the literature which reports studies of the political, 
ideological and hegemonic aspects of Islam and Islam-related issues with special 
reference to studies ranging from instances of other Muslim-majority countries around 
the world to examples in the case of Turkey. 
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a discussion of the RCMK textbooks and the 
legislation and the data which they provide on the concept of discourse, which is the 
focal point of this study, and to a justification of using CDA as the research method of 
the study. The concept of ‘discourse’ is approached with reference to its meaning in the 
CDA by taking into account its influence on power and hegemony relations. Finally, 
CDA is discussed with reference to its role in comprehending the functions of discourse 
on power relations and political/hegemonic struggles. The chapter ends by explaining 
how the research method will be conducted in the operational chapters of the thesis. 
Chapter 5 and 6 are the operational chapters of the thesis. In Chapter 5, the 
textbooks used in the RCMK lessons are analysed by means of CDA in order to 
comprehend how particular discourses on the terrain of Islam were constructed and 
disseminated. For this aim, textbooks used in the post-28 February era and those used in 
2015 are selected and their prominent discourses on the terrain of religion are compared. 
The topics analysed in this chapter are the State, the Military, Economic Differences, 
the Image of Ataturk, Laicism, Tarikats and Cemaats, Family and Alevism. In Chapter 
6, the legislation which regulates the terrain of religion is selected and analysed by CDA 
in order to investigate its discursive dimension, its restrictiveness on the alternative 
religious/Islamic discourses, its role on the determination on pious Muslims’ class 
position, and its effect on the organisational power of Islam. The topics analysed in this 
chapter for actualising these aims are the Religious Everyday Life; the State; the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs; Political Parties; Associations and Foundations; the 






CHAPTER 1: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY 
OF TURKEY 
 
This chapter is dedicated to a brief presentation of the basic information about 
the history of Turkey beginning from the Ottoman period. The content and scope of this 
presentation, however, is determined by the research question of the study, which is; 
How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015? 
In order to realise both continuities and discontinuities in the social, economic 
and political structure of newly established Turkey, the chapter will begin with a brief 
presentation of the social and political structure of the Ottoman Empire which will help 
us to understand the Republic of Turkey better. Comprehending the centre-periphery 
cleavage is significant for this study since the cultural hegemonic struggle emerged 
along the axis of the cleavage. On the one side, there was the hegemonic centre which 
needed the consent of the periphery and on the other side there was the periphery which 
was exposed to the hegemonic projects of the centre and was where the JDP 
endeavoured to construct a counter-hegemony. A discussion of the millet system will 
highlight a very deep structural shift in terms of the fundamental constituents of identity 
in Turkey, from a religion-oriented definition of identity to nationality-oriented 
definition of identity, from the Ottoman period to new Republic (Sogutlu, 2010: 50). 
The effect of this shift can be seen in the strong emphasis on Ataturk’s principle of 
nationalism in both RCMK textbooks which will be discussed in Chapter 5 and in 
various legislation texts which will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
Exploring the cleavage between hegemonic centre and periphery, this chapter 
will introduce the two sides of the hegemonic struggle, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
and the JDP. The section on Kemalism will reveal its fundamental principles which are 
frequently presented as mainstream values in the RCMK textbooks and the legislation. 




discuss how the Kemalist hegemonic bloc sustained its dominance and found 
opportunities to carry out its hegemonic project in the multi-party period. The chapter 
will end with a discussion of the history of the JDP. The roots of the party will give 
some explanation of how its hegemonic strategy differed from those of the former 
Islamist parties. The presentation of its position in the political spectrum will reveal the 
ideological base of its hegemonic project, and its principal characteristics and key 
policies will clarify the peculiarities of its hegemonic project. 
 
1. The Basic Features of the Ottoman Empire and Ottoman 
Society 
1.1. Centre-Periphery Cleavage 
Mardin (1973: 170) remarked that the main characteristics of the social and 
political structure in Turkish history were formed by the centre-periphery dichotomy.
7
 
In contrast with Western European countries in which society was characterised by a 
horizontal and functional structure of the socio-economic classes, the structure of the 
society in the Ottoman Empire, succeeded by the Republic of Turkey, was hierarchical 
(Narli, 2000: 107). One of the most distinctive features of the Empire was that its centre 
was strengthened by a system of institutions. This centre was based on rigorous control 
of the fiscal system and land administration and by the dominance of the religious 
sphere (Mardin, 1973: 169). The Sultans in the Ottoman Empire maintained the 
traditional social divisions of the Middle East. At the top, there was a small ruling class 
composed of the Sultan and his officials (Shaw, 2009: 283). A significant feature of the 
Ottoman Empire was this sultanate system. The Sultans were the rulers of the Ottoman 
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 Giving reference to the centre-periphery dichotomy has always been a key approach to analysing the 
political and social structure of Turkey (Mardin, 1973; Tuncel & Gundogmus, 2012: 139). Shils (1961: 
117) suggested that every society has a centre. This central area does not refer to a spatial place, it is 
located within the boundaries of the specific territory which the society inhabits but cannot be described 
as a geometric centrality or has little to do with geographic centrality. This central area is described as the 
domain of beliefs, symbols and values which rule the society. Each organisation within the sub-systems 
of the centre, such as bureaucracy and the economy, is administered by an elite whose decisions are made 
in accordance with particular values and standards. These values and standards which are acknowledged 
and followed by the elites constitute the central value system (Shils, 1961: 117-118). In every society, 
even in the most egalitarian and liberal societies, there is a tendency to interiorise the central value system 
of the established authority. The central authority is appreciated as a consequence of the sanctity 
attributed to it. The authority is exercised over the people by means of symbols or positions which 




Empire, the largest Muslim country, and were heads of the Islamic world by courtesy of 
their title of caliph (Kedourie, 1968: 20). The word Sultan refers to meanings of 
authority and power in Arabic and since the tenth century it meant ‘power holder’ 
(Turan, 2009: 251). As subordinate subjects of the ruling class, on the other hand, there 
was the reaya class, in which people were divided according to their religion (the millet 
system) or economic activity (guilds or esnaf) (Shaw, 2009: 283). 
Although the elites of the new Republic had a completely different view of 
society and the identity of society, they maintained the administrative tradition of the 
Ottoman Empire (Erdogan, 2001: 17). So the gap between central and peripheral forces 
was sustained in Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a result of the 
efforts of the bureaucratic and military official elites of the newly established Republic 
(Narli, 2000: 108). Since the laicist world-view of Kemalism became successful in 
dominating the centre after the establishment of the Republic, Islam was compelled to 
continue its life on the periphery, among the lower classes and in the small towns and 
rural areas. An important consequence of this was the disappearance of the sophisticated 
religious tradition inherited from the elite of the Ottoman Empire. Eventually, Islam 
became a cultural element of the less-educated segments of society and being a Muslim 
who practises regularly was associated with being a peasant (koylu) in the eyes of the 
upper-class Kemalist Turks (Akyol, 2011: 206-207). A negative image was therefore 
attributed to devout Muslimness and being modern became equal to being laicist 
according to this discourse. 
Although analysis of the political structure of Turkey from the Ottoman Empire 
to the present shows that the centre-periphery cleavage continued, it did undergo some 
changes. The Democratic Party’s (DP) accession to power in 1950, the establishment of 
the National Order Party (NOP) in 1970, the Motherland Party’s (MP) accession to 
power in 1983 and the government formed by the Welfare Party (WP) and the True Path 
Party (TPP) in 1996 were all significant challenges by the periphery to the centre of 
Turkish society. During this period, the free market economy increased the economic 
power of the periphery. The 2002 general election, on the other hand, was a turning 
point in terms of centre-periphery relations. As a consequence of the election of a name 
from the JDP cadre as president in 2007, the constitutional amendments after 2010, and 




Gundogmus, 2012: 139). An important outcome of the centre-periphery cleavage which 
continued in the new Republic was the hegemonic struggle on the terrain of Islam. On 
the one hand, the centre dominated by the Kemalist elites endeavoured to establish its 
hegemony over religion so that the views, values, beliefs and perceptions of the 
periphery would become compatible with the views, values, beliefs and perceptions of 
Kemalism. On the other hand, the actors on the periphery sought to challenge the 
hegemony of the Kemalist oligarchy in order to emerge as a counter-hegemonic power 
on the terrain of Islam. 
 
1.2. The Millet System in a Multi-ethnic and Multi-Cultural 
Empire  
The religious identity of the Turkish Ottoman dynasty was characterised by 
Sunni Islam (Ochsenwald, 2016: 28). The Empire was, however, a multi-ethnic empire 
comprising 75 different ethnicities and a multi-religious empire composed of different 
religions with various denominations and sects under each religion (Toprak, 2005: 28). 
The religious communities, from the most populous to the least, were the Muslims
8
, the 
Greek Orthodox, the Armenian Gregorian, the Bulgarian Exarchate (Orthodox), the 
Jews, the Catholics, and the Protestants (Shaw, 1978: 332). Despite its multi-ethnic and 
multi-religious social structure, the Empire accepted diversity and acknowledged the 
plurality of customs and the similarity of experiences among the various groups 
(Barkey, 2012: 15). The multi-ethnic and multi-religious social structure did not result 
in any maltreatment or suppression of the non-Muslim population (Alkhateeb, 2014: 
162). Braude and Lewis (1982: 1) commented that it was the social structure of the 
Ottoman Empire which enabled it to rule one of the most diverse societies in history for 
more than five centuries. Various religious communities worshipped freely and worked 
without any restrictions. The Ottoman state respected and actively supported the judicial 
traditions and practices, especially on issues of inheritance, marriage and burial, 
peculiar to each religious community. All subjects of the state had opportunities for 
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social mobility and prosperity (Braude & Lewis, 1982: 1). As a consequence of its 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious society, another important aspect of the Ottoman 
Empire was the existence of nations (millets) which stemmed from the diversity of the 
religious groups. The term millet signified a ‘religious community’ in the history of 
Islam. The origin of the word was millah, a canonical word which refers to religion in 
the Holy Qur’an. In the period of Ottoman Empire (1299-1918), the meaning of millet 
widened to comprise the non-Muslims religious communities too (Hess, 2009: 5): a 
person was a Muslim, a Jew, a Protestant, a Catholic, a Gregorian or an Orthodox 
before being an Arab, a Turk, a Bulgarian or Greek (Davison, 1954: 844).  
The Empire had established a social structure which enabled these diverse ethnic 
and religious groups to cohabit without any direct coercion (Barkey, 2012: 13). The 
millet system in the Ottoman Empire was “a political organization which granted to the 
non-Muslims the right to organize into communities possessing certain delegated 
powers, under their own ecclesiastical heads” (Abu Jaber, 1967, 212). Barkey (2012: 
21) similarly defined the millet system as “the Ottoman version of indirect rule vis-à-vis 
different confessional communities”. The internal affairs of those religious communities 
were regulated by their own members or by their elected, hereditary or appointed 
leaders (Abu Jaber, 1967: 213; Alkhateeb, 2014: 162).  
After the Empire collapsed in 1918 and was divided into separate nation-states, 
the term millet gained its contemporary meaning of ‘nation’ (Hess, 2009: 5). Following 
the abandonment of the millet system in the new Republic, religions lost their position 
as determiners of identity in society and their power as sources of law. Identity based on 
religious affiliation was replaced with Turkishness and Islamic identity had no meaning 
apart from being an individual choice. This new position of religion was compatible 
with the interpretation of religion held by the Kemalist elite. It was therefore an 
important step in establishing a hegemony in order to direct people to accept the official 





2. Kemalism: an Ideology of Nation-State Building and 
Modernisation    
2.1. The Fundamental Principles of Kemalism 
A special section is dedicated here to a discussion of Kemalism since the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc is one of the two sides of the hegemonic struggle on the 
terrain of Islam in Turkey. Seeking to reveal the main features of Kemalism is a key 
step in this research towards comprehending how the Kemalists sought to construct a 
discourse on Islam for gaining the consent of the devout Muslims to its long-term 
domination. 
First, it should be noted that Kemalism is not a systematic ideology which was 
created consciously by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk; it was propounded by his followers 
with reference to his practices and principles (Hanioglu, 2012: 32). In other words, 
Kemalism is comprised of Ataturk’s principles and ideas which directed the practices 
which he performed during the period of the War of Independence and the period of 
modernisation and westernisation. It also shaped the official ideology of the state 
apparatus in Turkey (Tuncay, 2009: 310).  
The principles which shaped Kemalism and constituted the official ideology of 
the state apparatus in Turkey are statism (in terms of economic policies), republicanism, 
laicism, populism, reformism and nationalism (Ataov, 1980: 28). Kemalist statism 
(devletcilik), or state capitalism, was defined as the control and participation of the 
government in the economic development of the country (Azarian, 2011: 76). The main 
goal of this principle was “to develop the national economy by liberating it from 
dependence on foreign capital and by supplementing and encouraging locally owned 
private industries through state action” (Karpat, 1959: 85). The principle of reformism 
(inkilapcilik), on the other hand, referred to the education and reconstruction of society 
by the state-bureaucracy from the top down (Yegen, 2009: 56). The principle of 
populism (halkcilik) should be understood as an attempt to translate Kemalism’s ethnic 
nationalism, authoritarian centralism and radical laicism to society so that the ideology 
could be embraced by civil society and a consent-based relationship with society could 
be created (Yegen, 2009: 61). The principle of republicanism (cumhuriyetcilik) did not 




in 1789, it referred to the rejection of privileges stemming from status and monarchy 
(Tuncay, 2009: 311).  
Among these six principles of Ataturk, laicism (laiklik) and nationalism 
(milliyetcilik) are the ones which have had a direct impact on the discourses regarding 
Islam. These two principles will therefore be analysed in more detail next. Although the 
concepts
9
 of ‘secularism’ and ‘laicism’ are regarded as synonyms in a limited sense, 
they possess different etymologies, normative theoretical implications and institutional 
histories (Davison, 2003: 333). Davison (2003: 333) explained that secularism “derives 
from the Latin saeculum, meaning generation or age, and originally meant ‘of the 
world’ as opposed to ‘of the church’”. Secularism is “a belief that religion should not 
intrude into secular (worldly) affairs, usually reflected in the desire to separate church 
from state” (Heywood, 2012: 285). According to contemporary usage, the aim of 
secularism is to separate the affairs of state and of religion by creating autonomous 
spheres (Ulutas, 2010: 390). Laicism, on the other hand, “derives from the French word 
lai (or laïque, in contemporary usage), meaning ‘of the people’ as distinguished from ‘of 
the clergy’” (Davison, 2003: 333). Lacisim is based on the “state control of religion” 
(Dressler, 2011: 189). As Ulutas (2010: 391) observed, laicism is “theoretically a better 
choice than secularism in the Turkish context”. Dressler (2011: 188) also used the term 
laicism to define the Turkish version of secularism by explaining that the Turkish word 
laiklik originated from the French word laïcité. He added that the discourse on laicism 
in both the Turkish and the French contexts rhetorically targeted the former regime or 
order, and currently otherised political systems which placed religion at the centre of 
arrangements regarding both state affairs and social life (Dressler, 2011: 188). In both 
contexts, the state interferes in religion (Ulutas, 2010: 390). Ataov (1980: 32) described 
the main goal of Ataturk’s understanding of laicism as “emancipation from the dungeon 
of thoughts in which Ataturk believed his people were imprisoned”. Unlike secularism, 
which seeks to create autonomous spheres for religion and state affairs (Ulutas, 2010: 
390), Ataturk’s laicism sought to realise the same goal through a social engineering 
project by means of the state apparatus by using a top-down method. In the light of this 
aim, “laicism disciplines the religious by subordinating it to a modernist-secularist 
framework” (Dressler, 2011: 188) and thus the Turkish model of laicism is 
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characterised by the desire to shape society by interfering in the terrain of religion, 
rather than ensuring the reciprocal independence of the terrains of the state and religion.  
In the current study, the adjectives ‘laic’, ‘laicist’ and ‘secular’ are used in order 
to refer to different aspects of the individual/religion relationship. This is a similar 
conceptualisation to that of Atay (2013: 42), who made a distinction between a cultural 
stance and an elitist official ideological position. So the term ‘secular’, which can be 
regarded as a cultural stance, is “etymologically derived from the Latin word saecularis 
as an opposite to the term ‘sacred’, it refers to ‘this-worldliness’” (Atay, 2013: 42). 
Therefore, the term ‘secular’ is used in the current study in order to describe a personal 
state of being distanced from the ‘sacred’ or ‘religious’. In other words, being ‘secular’ 
means having a way of living in which religion is not a significant determinant. Since 
the term ‘laicism’ possesses “more resonance as an ideological stance relating to official 
control over a religious culture” (Atay, 2013: 42), the term ‘laicist’ refers to a conscious 
ideological stance regarding the state/religion relationship. Throughout the current 
study, the word ‘laicist’ is used to describe people who consciously favour Ataturk’s 
principle of laicism in addition to having a secular lifestyle. Moreover, the term ‘laic’ is 
used to refer to the features of the state and its institutions which were established in 
accordance with the Kemalist principle of laicism. Therefore, being secular is about the 
self, whereas being laicist is about the society and politics. 
Laicism has played a key role in Turkey’s modernisation process. Kemalism’s 
views about religion and the public sphere influenced and shaped the Kemalist 
understanding of laicism. Ataturk himself was a member of the second generation of 
Young Turks, a movement composed primarily of low-ranking bureaucratic cadres, 
officials and college students. The majority of the members of this movement were 
under the influence of a German philosophy named Vulgärmaterialismus which had 
existed in the mid-nineteenth-century (Hanioglu, 2012: 38). Hanioglu (2008: 138) 
defined this philosophy as “a peculiar mixture of materialism, scientism and social 
Darwinism”. Ataturk accepted the raw version of science as a cure-all for all the 
illnesses of the Ottoman Empire and regarded the ‘vulgar materialist’ doctrine as the 
only way to design an affluent, irreligious and rational contemporary nation-state.  
As a consequence of Ataturk’s reforms, laicism became the basis of Turkish 




several times, the place and importance of this principle was maintained in all those 
versions (Mardin, 1991: 35). Especially after the 1930s, the concept of laicism (laiklik) 
was introduced into the vocabulary of Turkish politics as a result of endeavours to 
create a Turkish culture and a Turkish identity (Karpat, 2009a: 239). Carmikli (2011: 2) 
argued that there were three reasons for the central role of laicism among the principles 
of Kemalism. First, Kemalism blamed Islam and the world perception of the Ottoman 
Empire for the backwardness of Turkish society. Second, for the Kemalists the West 
symbolised the universal standards of modernity and the Ottoman heritage of Turkey 
and Islam together posed an obstacle to Turkey’s advancement. Third, the Kemalists 
endeavoured to legitimise themselves through insurrection against the Ottoman 
administration in Istanbul and the Ottoman political order in general, since there was no 
possibility of democratic legitimation.  
 Kemalist laicism caused a schism between the governing western-oriented elites 
and the governed traditional populace, since it could not manage to completely dissolve 
the Islamic social bonds and replace them with a civic culture approved by the whole 
population (Tuncay, 2009: 311). As Tuncay (2009: 311) pointed out, “Although the 
official formulation was content to separate the worldly from the divine and to oppose 
the exploitation of religion for political purposes, in reality Kemalist laicism became an 
instrument for control and supervision of Islam by the state.” 
The main goal of the reformations based on the principle of laicism was to create 
an identity of Turkishness as opposed to the identity of Muslimness (Celik, 2009: 85). It 
is therefore possible to argue that the identity of Turkishness played a significant role in 
the secularisation of society and the purging of the identity from any Islamic elements. 
Nationalism therefore emerged as another of Ataturk’s principles which is of vital 
importance for the current study because it reflects the tension between Muslimness and 
Turkishness as the main defining element of national identity. When the Republic was 
established in 1923, Islam was perceived an obstacle for the founders of the Republic to 
the construction of a new order and national identity (Celik, 2009: 86-87). Thus the 
definition of ‘Turkishness’ did not include any elements of Islam (Cagaptay, 2004: 86). 
In the 1930s, ‘Sun Language Theory’ and ‘Turkish History Thesis’ were introduced in a 
series of official publications and conferences, focusing on race as an element of the 




Some of Ataturk’s best known statements about Turkishness are;  
 The unique fabulousness about my birth is my descending to earth 
as a Turk
10
 (ARC, 2013). 
 My only pride and wealth in this life is Turkishness11 (Bozkurt, 
1955: 95).  
 How happy is the one who says ‘I am a Turk’12 (Zeydanlioglu, 
2008: 162). 
 One Turk equals the whole world13 (Zeydanlioglu, 2008: 162). 
 One language, one people, one flag14 (Zeydanlioglu, 2008: 162). 
 This motherland was Turkish in history, it is still Turkish and it 
will remain Turkish
15
 (Toros, 1981: 23).  
The first of these statements associates Turkishness with birth and grants 
Turkishness an ontological role which emerged as the main constituent of the national 
identity. In the second and third statements, Turkishness is presented as a source of 
pride, wealth and happiness. There is a strong emphasis on the supremacy of being a 
Turk by comparing it with all the other identities around the world. This discourse can 
be interpreted as a challenge to the discourse about the supremacy of Islamic identity. 
The fifth statement constructs a homogeneous nation discourse by underlining the 
oneness of language, flag and people. The sixth statement aims to depict Turkishness as 
the fundamental constituent of identity right from the indefinite past and can be 
regarded as an effort to reconstruct the identity of the Ottoman period. The replacement 
of the Muslim identity with a Turkish identity in these statements was intended to break 
with the Ottoman past and construct a completely new identity which had no religious 
elements. 
Within the frame of nationalism, an organic society was one of the politico-
psychological principles on which Kemalism based its understanding of modernity 
(Keyman & Icduygu, 2003: 196). Kemalism’s national will was based on ‘the 
Rousseauist concept of general will’. The national will was embodied in the will of 
Ataturk, so his political actions such as the decisions of the cabinet and legislative 
regulations were seen as a reflection of the people’s demands (Tuncay, 2009: 311). In 
terms of citizenship, duty, rather than right, was prioritised (Keyman & Icduygu, 2003: 
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198). According to the Kemalist nationalism, the state apparatus was the expression of 
the nation. Religion was not one of the elements which defined Turkishness as the 
national identity (Celik, 2009: 84). The discourse of Kemalist nationalism projected a 
relationship between state apparatus and nation. Within this scope, state and nation 
became the raison d'être for each other (Celik, 2009: 85). 
 
2.2. The Emergence of Kemalism as a Modernisation Project 
Efforts to modernise the state and society in Turkey go back to the nineteenth 
century to the Rescript of Gulhane (Tanzimat Fermani) (1839) and the Edict of Reform 
(Islahat Fermani) (1856). Those decrees were important steps to recomposing the 
political and partially the social structure of the Ottoman Empire (Erdogan, 2001: 17). 
Despite the fact that the reform attempts to modernise the state and society were from 
above and were introduced without broad social foundations, they still influenced 
social, political and economic life in the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century 
(Sofos, 2000: 244). Efforts to modernise politics and society were continued by the 
Kemalist elites after the establishment of the Republic as the reconstruction of Turkish 
society (Erdogan, 2001: 17). Sofos (2000: 244) observed that the modernisation project 
led by Ataturk was much more repressive and dirigiste than the modernisation attempts 
in the nineteenth century Ottoman Empire.  
The minds of the Kemalist elites were dominated by ideas of renouncing the 
heritage of the Ottoman Empire, breaking with the past and constructing a new nation-
state (Erdogan, 2001: 17). The Kemalist modernisation project did not just seek to 
create a new political system, but a new society (Onbasi, 2011: 70). Dodd (1988: 13) 
stated that “modern Turkey placed major emphasis on the creation of a modernizing 
authoritarian regime; liberal-democratic processes were not, or could not be, encouraged 
though formal and democratic institutions were established”.  
In its efforts at “reaching the contemporary level of civilisation” (muassır 
medeniyet seviyesine erismek), the modernisation project was implemented by the 
nation-state rapidly and from above without offering any alternative other than directly 
imitating the West (Zeydanlioglu, 2008: 158). From this point of view, an important 




manner. Symbols were more important than substance according to the modernisation 
and westernisation interpretation of the Kemalist westernisers (Cizre-Sakallioglu & 
Cinar, 2003: 310). Modernity was interpreted as a movement to reach to the Western 
world and to imitate the ways of dressing and thinking and the lifestyle of Western 
people (Karpat, 2009a: 240). However, de facto modernisation was an ideological 
evolution which ran parallel to the preferences of the state and the overwhelming 
majority of the ruling elite thought that the most significant element of modernisation 
was laicism (Karpat, 2009a: 240).  
Removing diversity from the society and constructing a homogeneous Turkish 
society were important features of the Kemalist modernisation project (Barkey, 2012: 
25). Unlike the Ottoman Empire which had been characterised by the recognition of 
identity diversity, the newly established Republic relied on the ‘indivisibility of the 
state’ and ‘national unity’ (Sofos, 2000: 250-251). The discourses of ‘national unity’ 
and ‘indivisibility of the state’ have been constantly misused by the bureaucratic and 
military elites in Turkey. The organisations and institutions of Islamic segments, 
cultural and ethnic minority groups and political parties opposed to the Kemalist elites 
have always been perceived as a threat to ‘national unity’ (Sofos, 2000: 251). From this 
point of view, the conditions of the ideal citizenship determined by the state could be 
met by only a small proportion of the people in Turkey. In order to be compatible with 
the Turkish national identity based on the official discourse, three identities had to co-
exist at the same time: Turkish, secular and Muslim (Bilici, 2009: 26). In terms of Islam 
in the official discourse, there were two important points regarding those three 
identities. First, it was necessary to be Muslim without being religious. Similarly, it was 
necessary to be secular, but individuals also had to favour state-sponsored Islam (Bilici, 
2009: 27).  
Assimilation and social engineering were the means of this modernisation 
project (Atasoy, 2011: 90). According to the paternalistic Orientalist standpoint which 
was followed by the Kemalists, the ethnic, rural, tribal and Muslim others who were not 
within the boundaries of Western modernity needed to be educated by the Kemalist 
elites who regarded themselves as eligible teachers of society (Zeydanlioglu, 2008: 
159). The homogenisation project led by Ataturk to build a secularised nation-state 




official national identity could not be challenged by these groups. Since the public space 
was dominated by the secular state-centric national identity, the Muslim religious 
groups were compelled to be organised outside the realm of the state apparatus and 
relying on their conventional ties (Yavuz, 1997: 64).  
 
2.3. Kemalism’s Enduring Dominant Position in the Multi-
Party Era of Turkey: Coups d’état and the Tutelage Regime 
For anyone researching the struggle between centre and periphery in Turkey, 
how the Kemalist centre maintained its political power and privileged position in the 
multi-party era is a significant point which required careful attention. Although the 
Republican People’s Party (RPP,) the ideologically Kemalist political party established 
by Ataturk, could not manage to win elections for a long time after 1950, the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc, which was composed of the military, bureaucracy and the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie, continued to dominate Turkish politics and maintained its position as the 
dominant group in Turkish society and sought to determine the values, perceptions and 
beliefs of the subordinate groups on the terrain of Islam. This was achieved by two 
ways: coups d’état and a tutelage regime. 
Roughly three decades of single-party rule led by the RPP ended with the 1950 
election which was the first free general election in the history of the Republic (Atasoy, 
2011: 89). As a consequence of 1950 election, the DP of Adnan Menderes and Celal 
Bayar came to power and pushed Ataturk’s RPP into opposition (Karpat, 1972: 349). 
The new multi-party period, however, was not able to bring an uninterrupted democratic 
regime to Turkish political life (Demirel, 2005: 246). The primary founding actors of 
the Republic, who had lost their power to control the society and political institutions 
following the 1950 general election, regained that power by means of the 1960 coup 
d’état (Kaya, 2013b: 492). Starting from 1960, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) 
directly intervened in politics four times (27 May 1960, 12 March 1971, 12 September 
1980 and 28 February 1997) and overthrew four different civilian governments 
(Jenkins, 2007: 341-346) and published an e-memorandum on 27 April 2007 (Gol, 
2009: 797). The interventions of the Turkish military in politics were seen as a necessity 




(Cizre-Sakallioglu & Cinar, 2003: 312) and “to clean up the mess created by 
politicians” (Heper & Guney, 1996: 620).  
The Kemalist elites of the Republic needed a tutelage system to keep the 
politicians under their control, since on the one hand it was not possible now to overturn 
democracy completely and on the other hand politicians’ position as the only people 
responsible for the policy-making process was anathema to the bureaucratic elites 
(Sogutlu, 2010: 62). The tutelage regime can be defined as the domination and control 
of society by specific organs of the state with a centralist, elitist and authoritarian 
mindset (Kaya, 2013b: 492). The main goal of the tutelage regime was “to check the 
powers of the elected agencies and to narrow down the space for civilian politics” 
(Ozbudun, 2012: 42). The tutelary mechanisms were constructed by means of 
constitutions made following the various coups d’état (Sogutlu, 2010: 50). The 1961 
Constitution, prepared in a tutelary mindset following the coup, was the instrument for 
the codification and imposition of a tutelage regime on society (Kaya, 2013b: 492). 
Three constitutions (1924, 1961 and 1982) were written from the establishment of the 
Republic in 1923 to the present. The 1924 Constitution was the product of the single-
party regime led by Ataturk. Both the 1961 and 1982 Constitutions were made by the 
Turkish military following the coups in 1960 and 1980 (Ozbudun, 2012: 40).  
Coskun (2013: 104) stated that “A tutelage regime’s efficient functioning 
depends on elected governments’ compliance with tutelary actors’ demands. The regime 
remains intact so long as elected officials regard the guardians’ demands as 
unquestionable orders and strive to meet their expectations”. In the periods when 
political organisations had shown signs of becoming uncontrollable, the TAF undertook 
the mission of giving instructions and even drastically warning the political 
organisations (Momayezi, 1998: 6).  
Consequently, the Kemalist elites maintained their cultural dominance over 
society even in the periods when the Kemalist parties were not in power. This 
dominance was guaranteed by the constitutions made by the TAF following the coups 
d’état. Taking into consideration that the main reason for the military interventions was 
protecting the principles of Ataturk with a special emphasis on laicism (Cizre-
Sakallioglu & Cinar, 2003: 312), cooperation between the Kemalist military, 




Islam. The tutelage regime with its laws, regulations and institutions controlled and 
supervised civil politics and insulated politics and society from the emergence of any 
counter-hegemonic challenge. By this means, the Kemalist elites maintained their 
opportunity to monopolise the interpretation of religion, especially Islam, compatible 
with the views, values, beliefs and perceptions of their regime.  
2.3.1. The 12 September 1980 Coup D’état 
The coup d’état on 12 September 1980 was a turning point in the social and 
political history of Turkey and it also brought significant outcomes for the period on 
which the current study has concentrated. Following the coup, the Islamist NSP was 
closed down and Necmettin Erbakan and his administrative cadre were banned from 
active political life (Rabasa & Larrabee: 2008: 41). The interim regime following the 
coup can be seen as the re-establishment of Kemalist control and the restoration of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc’s power over the state apparatus. The coup regime designed a 
model in which the state was at the centre and society was at the periphery (Insel, 2003: 
294). Such a model created the means by which the Kemalist hegemonic bloc could 
perpetuate its hegemonic project without winning an election. 
As Insel (2003: 295) pointed out, “the only breach in the authoritarian state-
centered view occurred through the economic liberalization attempt under Ozal’s 
masterly leadership”. The liberal economy policies in the 1980s resulted in a decrease in 
social welfare expenditure and a decline in the welfare state. Islamic organisations 
sought to fill the gap in the welfare state by initiating projects for the poor (Ayata, 1996: 
51). However, the rising impact of Islamic organisations in the 1990s within civil 
society crashed under the 28 February 1997 coup d’état, which closed down 21 Islamic 
foundations for being the focuses of reactionary Islamist activities (Vatan Gazetesi, 
2013). It is therefore possible to detect a shift in the attitude of the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc towards Islamist movements and claim that the 28 February process was a 
significant milestone by which the Kemalist hegemonic bloc began a deliberate 
hegemonic struggle in the sphere of civil society against Islamist movements. 
Moreover, the Turkish Constitution, which formed a significant part of the data 
analysed in Chapter 6, was drawn up under the shadow of the 12 September military 




of one of the pillars of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc, namely the Kemalist military. 
Article 24 of the same Constitution made religious education compulsory for pupils in 
primary and secondary schools (Official Gazette, 1982a). The 12 September coup 
regime laid the foundation of the RCMK lessons which were discussed in depth in 
Chapter 5. 
2.3.2. The 28 February 1997 Post-modern16 Coup D’état 
Among the coups d’état in the history of Turkey, the most attention will be 
given here to the 28 February 1997 post-modern coup because it forms the period on 
which the current study is focused. The pre-coup process had begun in the first half of 
the 1990s as the WP, led by the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan, became a significant actor 
in a very short time. In the 1994 election, the WP held 19.1% of the total votes and won 
the mayoral positions in Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and Ankara. In the 1995 
general election, the party won 21.4% of the total votes and became the largest party in 
parliament by gaining 158 of the 550 seats (Delibas, 2015: 2).  
The 28 February process began when the Islamist WP formed a coalition 
government with the centre-right TPP and Erbakan became Prime Minister on 28 June 
1996 (Daily Sabah, 2016). During the National Security Council meeting on 28 
February 1997, Erbakan was compelled by the TAF to sign a decree which targeted the 
devout segments of society on the pretext of securing laicism (Ekinci, 2016). The 
prominent articles of this decree were as follows (Kilic, 2012): 
1- Laicism must be carefully protected; for this, current laws must be 
enforced; if they are not enough, new laws must be made … 
2- Private dormitories, foundations and schools which belong to tarikats 
(religious orders) must be kept under inspection and handed over to the 
Ministry of National Education (MNE). 
3- a) Eight-year compulsory primary education must be promulgated. 
b) Qur’an courses must be under the responsibility and control of NME. 
4- The number of national education institutions which produce 
enlightened religious officials must be kept in accordance with needs.  
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5. Newly constructed religious facilities must not be a means of exploiting 
religion.  
6- Tarikats must be closed. 
… 
9- Radical Islamist segments must be prohibited from infiltrating public 
institutions and organisations, especially universities, bureaucracy and 
judiciary institutions. 
… 
11. The activities of radical Islamists which can cause polarisation in 
society must be prohibited by judicial and administrative means. The 
activities of radical Islamist segments must be controlled under the 
provisions of Turkish Criminal Law and Anti-terror Law, and the 
authorities must be warned about the prohibition of those activities. 
… 
13. Practices against the Dress Code must be prohibited. 
… 
17. Attempts to solve the problems of the country with the concept of 
ummah (Muslim community) must be prohibited. 
As can be seen from these key articles, the 28 February coup directly targeted 
various dimensions of civil society from schools and Qur’an courses to foundations and 
religious facilities. Turkey entered a process during which laicist discourses, secular 
values and lifestyle completely dominated every part of state institutions and 
organisations as well as whole of civil society. Thus the atmosphere created by the coup 
constituted the main characteristics of the post-28 February process.
17
  
The coalition government composed of the WP and the TPP was obliged to 
resign on 18 June 1997 (Daily Sabah, 2016). The 28 February coup had significant 
outcomes in terms of the hegemonic struggle in Turkey. It was led by the military to 
redesign Turkish politics for the consolidation of the centre with the Kemalist laicist 
world-view and continued after the resignation of the WP government (Cinar, 2006: 
472). In a speech regarding the post-28 February process, Huseyin Kivrikoglu, the Chief 
of the Turkish General Staff, stated that “This will continue even for a thousand years if 
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it is necessary” (Ekinci 2016). Such a statement can be interpreted as an expression of 
the goal of long-term structural hegemony.  
Moreover, the 28 February coup also became a turning point for the Islamist 
movement in Turkey in terms of its strategy, since the movement comprehended that a 
direct clash with the laicists, especially the military, in order to pursue an Islamic 
agenda would end in failure (Rabasa & Larrabee, 2008: 44-45). So as a response to the 
atmosphere created by the 28 February coup, the Islamist movement tended to think 
about the idea of a gradual challenge, in other words a war of position in Gramscian 
terms, against the Kemalist hegemony by making changes in the discourse on the 
terrains of religion and politics. This idea became apparent in the debates within the 
umbrella of the Virtue Party (VP) between the traditional wing and the reformist wing 
and ended up with the establishment of the JDP by the reformist wing in 2001 (Rabasa 
& Larrabee, 2008: 45-46). 
 
3. The JDP  
Explaining the entry of Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma 
Partisi; abbr. JDP) on to the stage of Turkish politics and seeking to draw the frames of 
its position in the political spectrum are crucial for understanding how the Kemalist 
hegemony was challenged in the three terms of JDP government between 2002 and 
2015. 
3.1. Roots, Establishment and Challenges to the Party 
Turkish Islamism took its roots from the National Vision Movement
18
 and 
turned into a political party, the National Order Party (NOP), for the first time in 1970 
on the initiative of the Islamist leader Necmettin Erbakan (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009: 3). 
After the NOP was closed down for being against the principle of laicism, the National 
Salvation Party (NSP), the Welfare Party (WP) and the Virtue Party (VP), as the 
successors of the NOP, suffered the same fate by being closed down for violating the 
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principle of laicism (Hale & Ozbudun, 2009: 3-5). Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s political 
life began in the NSP as the youth branch chairman of the party’s Beyoglu branch in 
1976 (Daily Sabah, 2014). He served the WP as the provincial chairman of the party 
and as the Mayor of Istanbul between 1994 and 1998 (Perekli, 2012: 13). Following the 
closure of the VP in 2001, the National Vision Movement was divided into two political 
parties. On the one side, the Felicity Party (FP) was established by the traditionalist 
wing on 20 July 2001, and on the other side the JDP was established by the reformist 
wing on 14 August 2001 (Cizre-Sakallioglu & Cinar, 2003: 323). 
The JDP has been the ruling political party dominating Turkish politics as a 
consequence of general election victories in consecutive elections since 2002. In the 
2002 general election, the JDP won 34.29% of the votes and 363 deputies out of 550 
(SCE, 2002) and came to power without the support of a coalition partner.  In the 2007 
general election, the JDP consolidated its power by increasing its votes to 46.58% and 
341 deputies (SCE, 2007). In the 2011 election, the party won 49.80% of the votes and 
327 deputies (SCE, 2011).  
The party faced significant challenges during its first three terms of office. 
During the presidential election in 2007, the TAF published an e-memorandum against 
the JDP government on the website of the Turkish General Staff. In this e-memorandum 
released on 27 April 2007, the TAF declared its discontent about the candidacy of 
Abdullah Gul, the JDP candidate for the presidency, and its concern about the principle 
of laicism (Hale & Ozbudun, 2010: 91). In 2008, the JDP faced a closure threat when its 
alleged anti-laicist activities were under consideration by the Constitutional Court 
(BBC, 2008). Six members of the Court voted for the closure of the JDP; four members 
discerned that the JDP had revealed some signs of activities against laicism but 
remarked that those signs were not enough for the party to be closed down. 
Consequently, the Court’s decision deprived the JDP of financial aid from the Treasury 
rather than closing it down (Hurriyet, 2008). 
The JDP was also challenged by two mass-scale protests within its first three 
terms of office. The first was the laicist Republic Rallies (Cumhuriyet Mitingleri) which 
took place in 2007 (BBC, 2007). The tension stemming from the presidential election in 
2007 between the JDP and the Kemalist laicists caused massive pro-laicism protests in 




the most seen banners which protestors carried read ‘Turkey is laic and will remain laic’ 
(White, 2013: 62). The second large-scale mass protest was the Gezi Protests which had 
started as a local-scale environmentalist protest with the aim of preserving the trees and 
public park in Taksim Square from destruction and spread to 80 provinces of Turkey; 
they took place on 31 May 2013 (Onbasi, 2016: 273). A prominent discourse of the 
Gezi protestors was about the JDP’s ‘interference with lifestyles’. The JDP government 
was criticised by the Gezi protestors for its complete lack of understanding regarding 
the diversity of lifestyles in Turkish society (Altun, 2016: 171).   
 
3.2. The JDP’s Position in the Political Spectrum 
The party officially defined its position as “a conservative democratic mass party 
which situates itself at the centre of the political spectrum” (JDP, 2012: 4). The JDP 
claimed that the local dynamics and socio-cultural features of Turkey characterised the 
conservative understanding of the JDP, although it had significant similarities with 
different forms of conservatism across the world (JDP, 2012: 4). In the party’s official 
documents, there is a special emphasis on the statement of ‘the will of the people’, 
which underlines the importance of gaining political legitimacy. The ‘conservative 
democracy’ is associated with the will of the people and socio-cultural characteristics of 
the society (JDP, 2012: 4-5). 
At this point, it might be beneficial to explore the views of Yalcin Akdogan, the 
theorist and the deputy of the JDP. Akdogan (2004: 8) asserted that the JDP preferred to 
be a completely new political party on a new line rather than the reformist inheritor of 
the National Vision Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi). According to Akdogan (2004: 
104-107), the JDP differentiated itself from the Islamist National Vision Movement in 
three areas: its executive cadre, the elector organisation and the party grassroots. First, 
the executive cadre had become diversified as a result of the involvement of politicians 
from other parties such as the Motherland Party (MP), the Nationalist Movement Party 
(NMP) and the True Path Party (TPP). Second, the electorate of the party had expanded 
to different segments of society beginning with the 2002 election. This situation reveals 
that the target group of the party was not limited to the electorate of the National Vision 




neighbourhood representatives, provincial, and sub-provincial heads and administrative 
body, shared the fundamental political parameters of the party and supported its 
policies, values and red lines. 
Heywood (2012: 299) described the JDP as a “moderate successor” of the WP. 
According to him, the JDP has endeavoured to blend moderate conservatism stemming 
from Islamic values with the principle of laicism by accepting the state’s fundamental 
laic democratic character. Yavuz (2009), on the other hand, argued that the JDP is not a 
party based on identities, but instead is a service-based party which gives prominence to 
public services.  
The JDP has been criticised by both laicists for having a hidden agenda to 
transform Turkey to an Islamic state ruled by Islamic Law (Baran, 2008: 59) and by 
anti-laicist Islamists for being pro-Western (Donmez, 2010: 370). This basically 
stemmed from the JDP’s flexible discourse regarding religion and laicism. In the party’s 
official documents, it was highlighted that the party understood laicism within the frame 
of fundamental laws and human rights by defining the concept as “the impartial stance 
of the state toward all religions and beliefs”. Laicism was also presented as the 
guarantee of freedom of religion which was regarded as a prerequisite of democratic 
order and it was expressed that the state apparatus cannot be hostile to any religions or 
to irreligion. According to the party’s own interpretation, laicism should enable all 
believer and non-believer groups to organise their beliefs and lives freely and any 
pressures on religions and religious practices under the name of laicism are rejected 
(JDP, 2012: 23). 
The JDP is still regarded as an Islamist party by a vast number of analysts, 
although the party itself denies any kind of connection to political Islamism or Islamist 
groups and it insists that it is a political party that defends laicism (Shafiq, 2009: 33). 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan attributed the identity of being laic to the state apparatus and 
took the standpoint that people cannot be laic but that states can (HDN, 2013a). In a 
diplomatic visit to Egypt in 2011, Erdogan made a speech in which he recommended a 
laic constitution for Egypt. He expressed that laicism is not atheism and it does not 
mean anti-religion (Karagoz, 2016). His effort to differentiate laicism from anti-religion 
can be regarded as a criticism of the Kemalist understanding of laicism and as a 




Islam and the state/religion relationship revealed that the JDP also maintained the 
interventionist attitude of the Turkish state on the terrain of religion. For instance, he 
declared one of the missions of his party to be “raising devout generations” and asked 
“Do you expect the conservative democrat AK Party [JDP] to raise atheist generations? 
This may be your business and objective but not ours. We shall raise a generation which 
is conservative and democratic and embraces the values and historical principles of its 
nation” (HDN, 2012a). 
According to Kucukali (2014: 206), labelling the JDP as a ‘political Islamist’ 
party is misleading for comprehending its policies. He defined the position of the party 
as “rather pragmatic” and added that “religious discourse can be instrumentalised or 
simply neglected according to different policy issues”. In this current study, a similar 
standpoint is taken to that of Kucukali in taking into account the JDP’s pragmatic 
position, since accepting the JDP as a precise Islamist party might lead to overlooking 
its efforts to lower the threat perception of the laicist segments of society and its steps to 
construct a historic bloc with other disadvantaged religious groups such as the Alevis. 
 
3.3. Main Characteristics and Key Policies 
In its second term following the 2007 election, the JDP started a process of 
‘democratic openings’ (demokratik acilim) regarding different ethnic and religious 
groups such as the Alevis, Kurds, Assyrians, Armenians and the Rum Orthodox 
Christians (Ozkul, 2015: 81). The JDP’s approach to the Alevi question was the most 
contradictory one among the Party’s approaches to those groups. In 2008, the JDP 
initiated ‘Alevi openings’ (Alevi acilimi) which included organising workshops and 
putting forward the names of Alevis for the deputyship (Ozkul, 2015: 83). In the 2011-
2012 academic year, Alevi-related topics were added to the curriculum of Religious 
Culture and Moral Knowledge lessons (Ozkul, 2015: 87) and this will be analysed and 
discussed in detail in Chapter 5. However, as can be seen from Erdogan’s statement that 
is “What does being Alevi or Sunni mean? If being Alevi means loving the Caliph Ali
19
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I am a perfect Alevi. I am trying to live the way he did” (HDN, 2013c), the JDP 
endeavoured to monopolise the interpretation of Alevism by expressing the dominant 
Sunni point of view about Alevism and by ignoring the diversity of interpretations 
among the Alevis themselves. In a similar vein, Bekir Bozdag, the Deputy Prime 
Minister, repeated the dominant Sunni discourse on Alevism by stating that “The place 
of worship for all Muslims around the world is the same; their common house of 
worship is the mosque.” (HDN, 2012b). 
A significant divergence between the Kemalists and the JDP was on the concept 
of nation and the principle of nationalism. The concept of nation was equated to ummah 
(global community of Muslims) by the National Vision Movement, from which the JDP 
cadre grew (Akyol, 2011: 215). The JDP regarded the nation-state project and Kemalist 
nationalism as the main causes of the identity-based problems (especially on the area of 
the identity of Kurds) in Turkey (Donmez, 2010: 369). The homogenisation of society, 
a significant element of the Kemalist modernisation project, was substantially 
challenged in the JDP period. An important feature of JDP rule was the recognition of 
religious and ethnic ‘diversity’ and ‘difference’ (Onis, 2013: 105). Many reform 
packages were passed in parliament to expand the language and cultural rights of the 
Kurdish population in Turkey, although there were some problems regarding the de 
facto practice of those rights (Onis, 2013: 106). The opposition of the JDP to the ethnic 
homogenisation of Kemalism can be interpreted as an effort to highlight the Islamic 
ummah understanding or the millet understanding in the Ottoman Empire and to restore 
the honour of Islam in society. 
There were also differences in the interpretation of ‘social change’ between the 
Kemalists and the JDP which are worth a closer look. Unlike the Kemalists who 
favoured top-down revolutions, the JDP declared that the party desired gradual change. 
According to the JDP, cutting the link between the past and the present was 
unacceptable because it would wipe out the gains of the past in terms of experience, 
historical improvements and the accumulation of information. The JDP defined 
‘conservatism’ as the denial of social engineering and radicalism. So protecting the core 
values and building on the gains of the past were key features of the ‘change’ perception 
of the JDP (JDP, 2012: 6). This can be interpreted as a reaction to Kemalism’s 




transform society in line with Western secular values. Here, the discourse ‘protecting 
the core values and building on the gains of the past’ refers to the restoration of Islam’s 
honour in society and the reestablishment of Islamic identity as the main element of 
society. It can therefore be claimed that the JDP implicitly reacted against the policies 
of the Kemalist elites to establish cultural hegemony in order to secure the values and 
world-views of their new Republic. 
After the 2002 general election, one of the first acts of the JDP government was 
to seek to accelerate the negotiations for membership of the EU (Akdogan, 2004: 10). 
Ahmad (2009: 415) argued that JDP had designed a project to moderate the party image 
by prioritising Turkey’s accession to the EU and by introducing laws to adapt the 
country to the criteria for EU membership. For Akca (2014: 34), the JDP’s enthusiasm 
for EU candidateship served as a hegemonic instrument to construct a consent-based 
relationship with the subordinate classes and disadvantaged groups. By means of the EU 
candidacy process, moreover, the JDP found an opportunity “to reorganize the dominant 
state project and the mode of political legitimation embodied in Kemalist principles” 
(Hosgor, 2015b: 210) and to strengthen its political power vis-à-vis the laicist 
establishment and the military (Akca, 2014: 34). In their third period of incumbency, 
however, Erdogan and the JDP government “abandoned their enthusiastic and assertive 
approach to the EU integration process, reducing EU reforms to technical adaptations 
and sometimes turned into a typical centre-right party, resorting to an anti-Western 
populist discourse” (Oztan, 2014: 89). 
Turkey in the 2000s has witnessed very significant and extensive institutional 
and legal reforms to limit the political power of the TAF. The EU membership process 
was the main trigger for this (Sarigil, 2012: 9). Akca (2014: 35) commented that the 
JDP was “engaged in a ‘war of position’ against the military, to use Gramsci’s term, 
especially by using Turkey’s EU candidacy for leverage” between 2002 and 2005. On 4 
February 2010, the EMASYA Protocol which had authorised the military forces to 
disempower the civil authorities when intervening in civil incidents was annulled by the 
JDP government (Guzeldere, 2013: 231). On 13 July 2013, Article 35 of the army’s 
Internal Service Code, which had been used for the justification of the coups d’état in 
the past, was changed (HDN, 2013b). The efforts of the JDP to decrease the influence of 




Kemalist hegemonic bloc which sustained Kemalist dominance when the Kemalist 
political parties were not in power. By this means, the JDP had created an opportunity 
to emerge as a counter-hegemonic force and to implement its own policies in different 




CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Drawing a theoretical and conceptual framework is important since it provides a 
map for understanding the key concepts which are the basis of this research. The 
theoretical framework of the study mainly hinges on the theories of Antonio Gramsci, 
the Italian Marxist thinker, and his concept of cultural hegemony. As the central themes 
of Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony are culture and culture’s relationship with 
politics, political struggle and social dominance (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 29), his 
concept will be a useful tool for our research which aims at understanding the cultural 
and religious dimensions of political struggle and dominance in Turkey. This chapter 
begins with a consideration of the ontological and epistemological basis of the 
theoretical framework. After introducing  Gramsci’s theory with reference to his 
concept of ‘cultural hegemony’, the chapter will go deeper by explaining the distinction 
between political society and civil society and by drawing the frame of the key concepts 
in Gramscian theory such as intellectuals, historic bloc, political party, ideology, war of 
position/manoeuvre, and passive revolution. The discussion on cultural hegemony will 
then be taken deeper by considering the distinction, made by Joseph (2000; 2001; 2002; 
2008), between structural hegemony and surface hegemony. The chapter will end with 
an investigation of the reflection of the theory of cultural hegemony on the terrain of 
religion.  
 
1. Ontological and Epistemological Basis of the Theoretical 
Framework 
Outlining the ontological and epistemological stance of this research is 
important since it provides the basis for understanding the conceptual and 
methodological claims. The ontological stance is informed by critical realism which at 
the same time corresponds to our epistemological standpoint. In order to clarify what is 
at stake in the ontological and epistemological stance, it is necessary to begin with the 
philosophical definitions. Blaikie (1993, 6) explained ontology as;  
claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social (or, by 




political) reality – claims about what exists, what it looks like, what units 
make it up and how these units interact with one another.  
In terms of social ontology, the main point is whether or not there is an objective 
social entity which is real independently from actors in the society, or whether there are 
socially constructed entities which are the result of people’s acts and intuitions 
(Bryman, 2012: 32). There are two main camps which each have a different response to 
this significant point. In the one camp there are realism, objectivism and 
foundationalism which claim that there is a real world which exists independently from 
our knowledge, and in the other camp there are constructivism, relativism and anti-
foundationalism which claim that the world is a social construction (Furlong & Marsh, 
2010: 185).  
Ontological realism acknowledges the existence of a world which is independent 
from the subject who knows it (Smith, 2006: 255). The significance of critical realism, 
which reflects our ontological standpoint in this current study, stems from its response 
to the noticeable bifurcation between realism and anti-realism which is based on the 
question of whether there is a world independent from the awareness of human beings 
(Danermark et al., 2002: 5). The response of critical realism to this question is that there 
is such a world which is independent from the awareness of human beings, but that our 
understanding of it is socially mediated. Therefore, the distinctive position of critical 
realism is that it accepts that human knowledge about reality is shaped socially through 
different social practices and institutions (Danermark et al., 2002: 5-6).  
For this current study, it is important to underline that religion can be accepted 
as a social structure which must have a reality independent from the different actors 
who engage with it. By seeing religion as something real and separate from particular 
groups, it becomes possible to identify how knowledge of that religion is manipulated 
by different groups in society. If one does not accept the independence of such a reality 
from the agents who engage with it, it becomes impossible to understand how 
knowledge of a particular phenomenon is manipulated and to what extent knowledge 
about reality is shaped socially. 
Epistemology refers “to the claims or assumptions made about the ways in 
which it is possible to gain knowledge of this reality, whatever it is understood to be; 




epistemological stances. Objectivism refers to the existence of meaning independent 
from the operation of mind. According to objectivist epistemology, it is possible to 
know reality objectively (Crotty, 2003: 8). According to interpretivist epistemology, 
however, daily meanings and concepts are accepted as the basis of knowledge. The 
social researcher seeks to comprehend the meaning which is socially constructed within 
daily life and then those meanings are reconstructed in the language of social science 
(Blaikie, 1993: 96).   
Furlong and Marsh (2010: 205) argue that the critiques of interpretivism have 
substantially affected the modern version of realism, namely critical realism. A 
significant factor in the emergence of critical realism is the criticism of positivism 
which has been the dominant approach in the social sciences since the 1930s 
(Danermark et al., 2002: 4). According to the positivist stance, reality is precisely 
reflected in the conceptualisation of scientists. According to critical realism, on the 
other hand, the conceptualisation of scientists is only one of the means of possessing 
knowledge of that reality (Bryman, 2012: 29). Bhaskar (1989: 2) highlighted the way of 
comprehending the social world by stating that:  
We will only be able to understand and so change the social world if we 
identify the structures at work that generate those events and discourses. 
... These structures are not spontaneously apparent in the observable 
pattern of events; they can only be identified through the practical and 
theoretical work of the social sciences.  
Language, in the critical realist approach, is regarded as “constructing our 
realities”. Nevertheless, the opportunities and boundaries embedded in the material 
world restrain such constructions (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007: 102). Whilst 
the existence of social phenomena is independent from how we interpret them, our 
understanding and interpretation of them influences the outcomes. Structures are 
therefore not the determiner, but the restrictor and facilitator. The agents which interpret 
and alter the structures are within the study area of the social sciences (Furlong & 
Marsh, 2010: 205). Realist and constructionist stances are combined by critical realists 
and it is suggested that although meaning is the outcome of interaction, it is also 
influenced by non-discursive factors (Sims-Schouten, Riley & Willig, 2007: 102). This 
means that critical realism recognises a reality independent of our understanding of it 




(1989: 4) suggested that “social practices are concept-dependent; but, contrary to the 
hermeneutical tradition in social science, they are not exhausted by their conceptual 
aspect. They always have a material dimension”. An important feature of our 
knowledge about the world is that it is fallible and theory-laden (Furlong & Marsh, 
2010: 205). Accordingly, Furlong & Marsh (2010: 205) stated that “we need to identify 
and understand both the external reality and the social construction of that reality if we 
are to explain the relationship between social phenomena”.  
In short, “critical realism claims to be able to combine and reconcile ontological 
realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality” (Archer et al., 1998: xi). 
However, critical realism also points out the risk of mere relativism which might result 
in the loss of the basis of the epistemological benchmark to decide what the truth is and 
thus to be unable to make judgments about diverse knowledge (Sumner, 2006: 94). It 
thus advocates judgmental rationality – namely that there are good grounds (based on 
the nature of reality itself) for preferring one theory or explanation over another. In the 
current study, losing the basis of the epistemological benchmark to make judgments 
about knowledge might compel us to regard all kinds of interpretation of Islam as valid 
and equally acceptable. This prevents us from detecting the domination and power 
dimensions of constructing discourse about Islam. 
Based on the epistemological assumptions of critical realism discussed above, 
legislation will be one of the concerns of this thesis since legislation prevents some 
classes and groups from constructing reality on the terrain of Islam and grants the 
authority to construct the discourse to specific classes and groups in society. 
Consequently, legislation will be analysed for providing uneven opportunities among 
different classes and groups in the society to construct and shape the reality. Second, 
education has always been a way of shaping the minds of new generations in the history 
of Turkey. Because education was regarded as an important instrument for constructing 
reality by the Kemalists, compulsory Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge (RCMK) 
lessons were introduced into the curriculum in the 1982 Constitution. As we shall see in 
Chapter 5, Turkey’s education system entered a new phase with the JDP’s coming to 
power in 2002. To what extent this instrumentality was being challenged by the JDP 
and how the JDP has attempted to construct its own reality regarding Islam are the other 




2. Cultural Hegemony: a Gramscian Perspective  
The concept of ‘hegemony’ can be traced back to Ancient Greece as having a 
close meaning to leadership and dominance in the use of the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) With a similar concept to hegemony, dating back to ancient China, 
‘personal leadership’ was widely regarded (Joseph, 2008: 110). In the most general 
sense, the concept refers to two different meanings. On the one hand, the concept has 
been used to refer to domination, as hegemonism. On the other hand, it has been used to 
refer to leadership which hinges on gaining consent (Sassoon, 1991: 229-230). Within 
the scope of the IR literature, the concept is used to mean the domination of one country 
by means of particular resources which it has (McKeown, 2002).  
In the Marxist literature, the concept of ‘hegemony’ was used by Marx and 
Engels (1970: 64) who pointed out that the views of the sovereign class are always the 
sovereign ideas. The class which emerges as the dominant material force which rules a 
society is also the ruling mental force of that society. They argued that the class which 
controls the modes of material production also possesses ascendancy over the modes of 
intellectual production. For this reason, the views of the ruling class ideally express the 
material relations in a society. Compared with Gramsci’s stance, however, classical 
Marxism has never put enough emphasis on the non-economic elements such as culture 
and ideology when explaining how social relationships are reproduced (Adamson, 1980: 
175). 
In his theory, Marx introduced ‘economic structure’ as the underlying aspect 
which explains all the other aspects in the society (Howard & King: 1985: 5). Marx 
(1859: 2011, cited in Matravers, 2000: 250) stated that 
Relations of production constitute the economic structure of society, the 
real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of 
production of material life conditions the general process of social, 
political and intellectual life. 
Marx therefore underlined the dependence of political, judicial, intellectual, 
religious, psychological and artistic reality on the economic infrastructure. Thereby, a 
political system which encourages slavery, a judicial system which legalises it and a 




slavery is the base of the economic infrastructure (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 98-99). 
Gramsci, however, was highly critical of economic determinism (Hoare & Sperber, 
2016: 99-100). Gramsci (1971: 407) stated that “the claim, presented as an essential 
postulate of historical materialism, that every fluctuation of politics and ideology can be 
presented and expounded as an immediate expression of the structure, must be contested 
in theory as primitive infantilism”. It was obvious to Gramsci that the superstructure is 
not determined by the base in a uniform and straightforward way (Hoare & Sperber, 
2016: 105). He was aware of the importance of culture and its correlation with the 
production process and human labour. For him, the material infrastructure does not 
determine the cultural superstructure of the society, rather those two levels codetermine 
each other (Fulton, 1987: 198).  
Gramsci (1971: 12) propounded two main superstructural levels of society in his 
well-known work Prison Notebooks. One of these levels is the ‘civil society’ which is 
the gathering of individuals referred to as ‘private’. The other level is the ‘political 
society’, which can be also called the ‘state’. Two functions are realised by these two 
levels: the first is the ‘hegemony’ function which is exercised over the society by the 
groups which dominate it, and the second is the ‘direct coercion’ function which is 
carried out by the juridical authority or the state.  
Hoare and Sperber (2016: 119) underlined three innovations which Gramsci had 
brought to the concept of hegemony. First, Gramsci went beyond using the concept for 
merely the struggle of the working class vis-à-vis the bourgeois class and enlarged the 
scope of the concept to cover any cases of a group politically directing other groups in 
the society’s history.
20
 Second, in his use of the concept, he directed attention to the 
cognitive, ethical and cultural dimensions of leading other groups. Third, whereas Lenin 
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 It should be noted that what Gramsci meant by hegemony evolved in his writings from his early 
works through to his Prison Notebooks. Explaining how the hegemony of the proletarian class can be 
achieved, Gramsci (1978: 443) explained that the proletariat can lead and dominate insofar as it 
becomes competent to create an order of alliances which makes them competent to organise the vast 
majority of workers against the bourgeois state and the capitalist system. For Gramsci (1978: 443), the 
success of the proletariat hinged on its capacity to gain the consent of the peasant population, as in the 
case of Italy. This was the first time that he associated the alliance of different classes with the concept 
of hegemony and emphasised the significance of political, ethical and mental needs for establishing 
hegemony (Mouffe, 1979: 178). However, Gramsci innovated his thinking about the concept of 
hegemony in the Prison Notebooks by applying it also to the explanation of how the dominant class 





approached the concept as a means in the process of revolution, Gramsci reinterpreted it 
as an end.  
Hegemony, in Gramsci’s understanding, is not a unidimensional concept, but is 
composed of different dimensions ranging from a carefully balanced coexistence of 
consent and coercion as the main sources of power to the reshaping of the cultural and 
ideological terrain, the political leadership of one group over others, the design, 
manifestation and manufacturing of a political project in a moral and universal sense, 
the processes of education and the transformation of consciousness in terms of 
cognition and morality (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 132).   
According to Gramsci (1971: 12), the subaltern classes can be ruled in two ways. 
One way involves gaining the ‘spontaneous consent’ of the subordinate groups in the 
direction of what the dominant group determines. Consent is defined as the “expression 
… of intellectual and moral direction through which the masses feel permanently tied to 
the ideology and political leadership of the state as the expression of their beliefs and 
aspiration” (Gramsci, 1958, cited in Femia, 1975: 32). Consent is a psychological 
situation in which people, explicitly or implicitly, accept political and social order fully 
or particular key aspects of it (Femia, 1981: 37). Such a consent, as Gramsci (1971: 12) 
underlined, stems from the historical prestige of the dominant class which is the result 
of its positional and functional role in terms of production. The second way is the use of 
the ‘coercive power’ which is the legal power of the state. Coercive power is used on 
the groups who do not give consent in an active or a passive way. It is a way of 
controlling the society when there is a crisis in commanding and directing it (Gramsci, 
1971: 12). In order to ensure a normally exercised hegemony, the force and consent 
need to be combined with each other and a reciprocal balance between them should be 
guaranteed. Consent should not be exorbitantly predominated by force (Gramsci, 1971: 
80).   
Gramsci attached more importance to consent than to coercion for the control of 
the masses. For him, long-term peace in a society composed of antagonistic classes 
cannot be explained by Marx’s perspective of the state as the sole coercive tool of the 
dominant class (Butko, 2004: 44 [fn. 5]). In this sense, Gramsci used the term ‘dual 




giving reference to the ‘centaur’ analogy of Machiavelli (Ransome, 1992: 135-36).  
Gramsci (1971: 169-70) asserted that: 
The dual perspective can present itself on various levels from the most 
elementary to the most complex; but these can all theoretically be 
reduced to two fundamental levels, corresponding to the dual nature of 
Machiavelli’s Centaur – half-animal and half-human. They are the levels 
of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and 
civilisation, of individual moment and of the universal moment.  
By considering Gramsci’s reference to the dual perspective, we can deduce that 
he attributed a positive meaning to hegemony by correlating the concept with the human 
side of the centaur and he attributed a negative meaning by correlating the authority 
with its animal side. It is therefore possible to interpret that Gramsci prioritised 
hegemony over authority, and thereupon consent over force.  In this sense, “power and 
domination are sought not only by controlling what people do but, more importantly, by 
how people think” (Butko, 2004: 47). 
The important question at this point is how the consent of the masses can be 
gained by the dominant class. This significant question directs us to the concept of 
cultural hegemony.
21
 From a Gramscian perspective, Artz and Murphy (2000: 1) 
defined the concept as “the process of moral, philosophical and political leadership that 
a social group attains only with the active consent of other important social groups”. 
The key point about Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony is the persuasion of other 
groups in the society to approve the cultural, ethical and political values of the ruling 
group. The success of the ruling group in persuading other groups will decrease the 
need for the use of force (Joll, 1977: 99). We can therefore deduce that a dominant 
group is hegemonic insofar as it can persuade the members of other groups in the same 
society. Giroux (1981: 94) brought a comprehensive definition to the concept of 
‘cultural hegemony’ as:  
... ideological control by the dominant class in which dominant beliefs, 
values, and social practices are produced and distributed throughout a 
whole range of institutions such as schools, the family, mass media and 
trade unions. As the dominant ideology, hegemony functions to define the 
meaning and limits of common-sense as well as the form and content of 
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 Although there is no specific definition of the term ‘cultural hegemony’ in the writings of Gramsci, his 
explanations regarding ‘hegemony’ as ‘spontaneous consent’ clarify the main characteristics of the 




discourse in a society. It does so by positing certain ideas as natural and 
universal. (Giroux, 1981: 94). 
In parallel with the definition of Giroux, Howarth (1995: 124) pointed out that 
“hegemonic operations are a special type of articulatory practice in that they determine 
the dominant rules that structure the identities of discourses and social formations”. In 
other words, he underlined the linguistic aspect of hegemonic operations which provide 
meaning to and draw boundaries of discourse and society. Howarth (1995: 124) 
highlighted the significance of the discursive dimension of cultural hegemony by stating 
that “The concept of hegemony centres on who is going to be master. That is to say, it is 
about which political force will decide the dominant forms of conduct and meaning in a 
given social context”. So the extent to which a class or a group is hegemonic is directly 
related to its capacity to construct its leadership in order to be able to determine the 
meaning and conduct, and accordingly the discourse, in a particular context.   
Lenin regarded hegemony as solely a class-oriented issue based on class 
alliances. According to Gramsci, however, for successful national leadership and 
hegemony, a class should not limit itself to solely class-based interests. Gramsci 
expanded the scope of hegemony by introducing a new national-popular dimension to 
involve democratic and popular struggles and the demands of individuals, which are not 
the products of class-oriented or production-oriented relations. The struggles for 
women’s rights and minority rights and the popular demands of young people are 
instances of such national-popular struggles and demands (Simon, 2015: 20). Unlike the 
previous right-wing political parties, when the JDP came to power in 2002 it initiated 
policies and developed discourses about minority rights, a process which was referred to 
as ‘democratic openings’ (demokratik acilim) (Goner, 2017: 175). As the analysis in 
Chapter 5 will show, the JDP sought to respond to the demands of particular groups 
which did not possess a class character, such as the Alevis, religious orders and 
religious communities, by reconstructing the religious discourses in RCMK lessons.  
In his analysis of a society, Gramsci sought to comprehend what constrains 
people from reaching their ‘true consciousness’. People are substantially impressed by 
the views of the hegemon in power and accepting such an impression, which is 
projected by the hegemon as common sense, is usually an unconscious act for the 




the world, the people are hindered from recognising their true consciousness and from 
defending their personal basic interests (Butko, 2004: 43). What Gramsci meant by the 
term ‘common sense’ (senso comune)
22
 is “all those heterogeneous beliefs people arrive 
at not through critical reflection, but encounter as already existing, self-evident truths” 
(Crehan, 2016: X). So the so-called truth of common sense is taken for granted by the 
masses. Gramsci (1971: 419) underlined the most basic feature of common sense as 
“fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social and cultural 
position of those masses whose philosophy it is”.  
In Gramscian theory, the cultural life of an historical moment is constituted by 
both high philosophy and common sense (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 87). Gramsci (1971: 
419) defined common sense as the “philosophy of non-philosophers”. It is therefore not 
possible to comprehend the cultural reality of a particular moment of history solely by 
emphasising the high culture (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 87).  For Gramsci, the 
communist revolution should aim at revolutionising common sense, in other words, 
everyday philosophy (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 88). 
This point brings us to another significant component of Gramscian 
understanding of hegemony: ‘moral and intellectual reform’. Transforming people’s 
consciousness, influencing how they feel and think, shaping their ‘conception of the 
world’ and determining their understanding of the criteria of moral behaviour are the 
only ways of constructing a hegemony as an alternative to the capitalist hegemony 
(Simon, 2015: 22). For Gramsci (1985: 41), the revolution of the proletariat necessitates 
a new psychological state, new modes of sensing, reasoning, mentality, and a new set of 
standards which should be the own  products of the proletariat, in addition to new 
means of production, labour and distribution. The proletariat needs to be dominant in 
those areas after it has become the dominant class. He pointed out the significance of 
possessing intellectual power in addition to the possession of economic and political 
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 On this point, it is useful to underline the differences regarding the meaning of the term ‘common 
sense’ between what is understood in the English usage and what Gramsci meant by the term. The term 
‘common sense’ in English usage has a positive connotation by contrast with its more neutral usage 
‘senso comune’ in Italian. In the English usage, the focus is on the aspect of the ‘sense’, whereas in 
Italian usage the aspect of ‘common’ is emphasised (Crehan, 2016: X). The term common sense, in 
Gramscian theory, refers to “the uncritical and largely unconscious way of perceiving and understanding 
the world that has become common in any given epoch”. Alternatively, Gramsci used the term ‘good 
sense’ to refer to “the practical, but not necessarily rational or scientific attitude that in English is usually 




power as follows: “together with the problem of gaining political and economic power, 
the proletariat must also face the problem of winning intellectual power. Just as it has 
thought to organize itself politically and economically, it must also think about 
organizing itself culturally” (Gramsci, 1985: 41). Whether the JDP, in the case of 
Turkey, has been able to construct a discourse which reflects its own ‘conception of the 
world’ is a significant question. Considering that religion is a significant constituent of 
the conception of the world for Gramsci (1971: 326), Islam, as the source of perceptions 
and values in various terrain from politics and economy to ethics and lifestyle, provides 
a significant point of reference in terms of the conception of the world. Chapter 5 will 
therefore offer an analysis of the RCMK lessons which reflect the JDP’s efforts to 
achieve a paradigm shift on the terrain of Islam.  
 
2.1. State, Political Society and Civil Society 
After identifying the need to combine consent and coercion for the establishment 
of cultural hegemony, we now direct our attention to the state apparatus as the primary 
instrument of the dominant class. Gramsci’s (1971: 258) emphasis on the ‘ethical state’, 
or the ‘cultural state’, is important when endeavouring to comprehend the Gramscian 
concept of cultural hegemony. According to Gramsci, a state can be called as an ethical 
state to the degree that it can succeed in raising the masses in the country to a particular 
cultural and ethical level which serves the requirements of the forces of production for 
progression, and by this way to the benefits of the ruling group. He propounded the 
courts and schools as the sites of the most significant state actions for designing an 
ethical state. He attributed a positive educatory role to schools and a negative educatory 
and oppressive role to the courts (Gramsci, 1971: 258). 
Gramsci (1971: 244) defined the state as a complete composite of the theoretical 
and practical actions which are exploited by the dominant group for justifying and 
maintaining its domination as well as for gaining the active assent of the groups which 
are ruled. According to Gramsci (1973: 204),  
the state which is usually thought of as political society – i.e., a 
dictatorship or some other coercive apparatus used to control the masses 
in conformity with a given type of production and economy – [is] a 




hegemony of one social group over the entire nation, exercised through 
so-called private organizations like the Church, trade unions, or schools.  
According to Gramsci’s (1971: 263) view, a state is composed of the sum of 
civil society plus political society, that is to say, hegemony has been secured by means 
of the shield of coercion. Gramsci defined civil society “as the political and cultural 
hegemony of a social group on the whole of society, as ethical content of State”.  The 
domain of civil society covers the unofficial connexions, groupings, associations and 
movements organising the utilisation of space, individuals’ connection to the economy, 
and everyday life (Tugal, 2009: 28). Various hegemonic projects contest on the terrain 
of everyday life (Tugal, 2009: 29). 
Tugal (2009: 25) reconceptualised political society “as the sphere where society 
organises to shape state policies but also to define the nature of the state and political 
unity”. Elected mayors and local branches of political parties form the political society 
at the local level. The mission of a political society is to provide a connection between 
the state and society, to realise the integration of individuals with the state and to 
transform people into citizens (Tugal, 2009: 25).  
Gramsci denied the total separation of state and civil society, but he highlighted 
that those two spheres complement and reciprocally reinforce each other. Such a 
relationship between the civil and political spheres was denominated as an ‘integral 
state’ by Gramsci (Grelle, 2017: 19). Adamson (1980: 215) explained civil society vis-
à-vis the state as follows: 
On the one hand, civil society must be somehow distinguishable from the 
state so that it can be independently conquered; otherwise the tactic of 
creating an alternative hegemony would make little sense. But, on the 
other hand, civil society must be linked to the state at least to the degree 
that its conquest will be guaranteed to have political ramifications. 
Gramsci (1971: 159-160) pointed out that the distinction between the two 
spheres of state, namely civil society and political society, is not organic but is solely 
methodological. As Forgacs underlined (2000: 224), Gramsci opposed two types of 
reductionism: First, liberal reductionism regards civil society simply as the site of free 
individuality by completely extracting the state from the terrain of civil society. Second, 
functionalist and statist reductionism perceives that the state possesses and gains interest 




reductionism better, we can direct our attention to his views about the impossibility of a 
purely laissez-faire economic model. He rejected the viewpoint which attached 
economic activities to the domain of civil society and which objected to the intervention 
of the state in the economy with the aim of regulation. According to him, civil society 
and political society correspond to a single and same thing in real life. The state uses 
coercion and legislation in order to carry out and sustain a laissez-faire economic model 
so this type of economic model also comprises state regulation (Gramsci, 1971: 160).  
 
2.2. Historic Bloc 
It is important to question whether the ruling class or group is able to maintain 
its hegemony on its own or whether a collaboration with other groups in certain 
circumstances is required. Such a question directs us to the notion of historic bloc 
introduced by Gramsci (1971: 137) who briefly defined it as the “unity between nature 
and spirit (structure and superstructure, unity of opposites and of distincts”. What 
Gramsci means by such a unity in his definition is the combination of the leadership 
over social forces in the sphere of civil society with the leadership in the sphere of 
production (Simon, 2015: 24).  
Gramsci (1971: 160) underlined that hegemony requires that the preferences and 
interests of the subordinate groups which are targeted by the dominant class for 
hegemony should be taken into consideration. He added that equilibrium of compromise 
is needed; that is to say, the dominant group needs to sacrifice something in order to 
achieve this compromise with other allied groups (Gramsci, 1971: 160). As a 
consequence of such sacrifices and compromise, various allied groups can come 
together and unite within a social bloc, which was termed an historic bloc by Gramsci 
(Sassoon, 1991: 230).  
Gramsci (1971: 60) presented the Moderates in Italy as an example of an historic 
bloc because the Moderates managed to powerfully and spontaneously attract 
intellectuals from all the other social groups in the country. After 1848, within the scope 
of their hegemony, they formed a national bloc as a part of their hegemony with two 
important figures, Garibaldi and Mazzini, leading the Action Party by using the motto 




managed to establish a national bloc, Gramsci (1971: 77) quoted the following 
statements of a Sicilian pupil: “Whatever we desire – whether it is despotism or republic 
or anything else – let us not seek division among ourselves; with this guiding principle, 
the world can collapse and we will still find the way again”. Mazzini, one of the leaders 
of the Action Party, also advocated and preached the enduring and uninterrupted unity 
of the country (Gramsci, 1971: 77). In this instance, we see ‘national unity’ as the 
unifying principle and people from other groups regarding the Moderates as the 
defenders of their own interests by means of this principle. 
Historic bloc corresponds to an endeavour to diffuse the hegemony to other 
classes in the society by means of class compromises (Adamson, 1980: 176). On the 
other hand, Adamson (1980: 177-178) also pointed out the relationship between historic 
bloc and hegemony by stating that:  
Hegemonies always grow out of historical blocs, but not all historical 
blocs are hegemonic. A social group or class which establishes an 
‘intellectual and moral bloc’ will by definition be hegemonic vis-a-vis 
itself, but its political alliances with other such groups may or may not 
develop into a hegemonic relationship 
Various blocs and compromises are formed within a society but only a limited 
number of those blocs and compromises result in long-term domination. It is not always 
possible to detect a completely direct relationship between an historic bloc and 
hegemony. The establishment of the leadership by a group within a bloc becomes a key 
factor for the success of a remarkable change (Ransome, 1992: 137). The leadership 
hinges on the extent of the cohesiveness and purposefulness of the class compromise or 
historic bloc of social classes. Moreover, an emerging historic bloc can hold power 
insofar as it possesses a common stance which goes beyond the specific self-interests of 
its constituents (Ransome, 1992: 136). If a non-hegemonic bloc or compromise comes 
into power (for instance, by a coup d’état), the order which this non-hegemonic 
compromise or bloc creates is characterised by fragility and instability (Ransome, 1992: 
137). 
 The collaboration of the JDP with different groups provides a good example of 
the role of an historic bloc to challenge the dominant group, to come to power and to 
maintain the power. The JDP successfully based its hegemony attempt on the sacrifices 




the benefits of the rising medium-scale capital and unifying the democratic and political 
demands of social forces such as Kurds and liberal intellectuals with the political and 
religious demands of its conservative grassroots (Hosgor, 2015b: 201). Similarly, the 
JDP introduced many reform packages on the Alevi issue (Ozkul, 2015) to broaden and 
strengthen its historic bloc in the sphere of civil society against the historically 
dominant Kemalist hegemonic bloc. In Chapter 5, we shall analyse how the JDP sought 
to construct a discourse on Alevism within the textbooks of RCMK lessons with the aim 
of building an historic bloc with the Alevis, one of the disadvantaged groups affected by 
the Kemalist nation-building process.  
 
2.3. The Intellectuals 
 The term ‘intellectuals’ has a significant place in the theory of Gramsci (1971: 5-
23; 2000: 300-322). Gramsci (1971: 9) asserted that “all men are intellectuals, one could 
therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals”. When a 
distinction is made between non-intellectuals and intellectuals, a reference, indeed, is 
made to the different social roles of the work of intellectuals. In other words, this 
distinction explains whether the specific function of the intellectual reflects the form of 
muscular-nervous force or the form of purely intellectual activity. Since he rejected the 
existence of non-intellectuals, he argued that it is impossible to refer to non-intellectuals 
even though it is possible to refer to intellectuals. According to him, each person, apart 
from vocational activity, conducts a kind of intellectual activity, that is to say, a person 
might work as a thinker, an artist, or a gourmet, but he takes part in a specific perception 
of the universe, reflects a deliberate type of ethical behaviour, and thus makes a 
contribution to maintaining a perception of the universe or to altering it, in other words, 
to creating new types of world-view.   
Gramsci divided intellectuals into two groups. The first category is composed of 
traditional intellectuals who professionally perform intellectual work, such as artists, 
litterateurs or thinkers, who are not attached to the formation of an historical class 
(Gramsci, 1971: 9). Gramsci remarked that a new type of intellectual, organic 




not an extrinsic and instantaneous impellent of emotions and aspirations, but are active 
participants in practical life who work in any occupation (Gramsci, 1971: 10).    
Gramsci (1971: 12) defined intellectuals as “the dominant group’s deputies 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government” and 
added that intellectuals have two secondary roles in the processes of political 
government and social hegemony. Intellectuals serve the dominant groups as the 
exercisers of secondary functions of political government and social hegemony. For 
him, those functions included the “spontaneous consent” expressed by the society and 
the discipline provided by the legal instruments of the state. Creation and dissemination 
of particular world-views form a vital role of intellectuals. By means of organic 
intellectuals, dominant classes possess the capacity both to exert political power and to 
lead society morally and intellectually by forming alliances with subordinate classes and 
by ensuring leadership over the society within the legitimate boundaries (Billings, 1990: 
6). 
According to Gramsci (1971: 60), there is no independent intellectual class 
which has an independent existence, but each class in a society possesses or at least 
seeks to form its own intellectuals. On the other hand, only the intellectuals who belong 
to the historically progressive classes are able to attract the intellectuals of other social 
classes. Those intellectuals can subjugate the intellectuals from different social classes. 
This situation reveals itself spontaneously in the periods when a social class truly aims 
at the entire society progressing beyond being solely concerned its own existential 
interests (Gramsci, 1971: 60). When this feature of the dominant class is weakened, the 
ideological bloc is inclined to be fragmentised, and finally ‘constraint’ might subrogate 
‘spontaneity’ in more explicit and more direct forms, peaking at a coup d’état and/or 
police intervention (Gramsci, 1971: 60-61). 
The case of Turkey provides a good example of Gramsci’s concept of ‘organic 
intellectuals’. The Kadro movement,
23
 which can be regarded as an example of organic 
intellectuals of Kemalism, manifested its views about the Kemalist revolution in 1932 
as follows: (Alpar, 1979: 3, cited in Dincsahin, 2015: 31-32). 
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Turkey is now in the process of a revolution. This revolution possesses the 
theoretical and intellectual elements that constitute the revolutionary 
principles giving consciousness to those who will survive the revolution. 
… Explaining the ideas and principles inherent in the nature of the 
revolution is one of the most urgent and honourable works that awaits the 
Turkish revolutionary intelligentsia. 
Many laws and regulations were introduced by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc on 
the intellectual sphere, such as the headscarf bans, significant legal restrictions on 
specific religious/Islamic discourses in society, and the change in the Student Selection 
and Placement Examination (SSPE) for university education. Even though many of 
these were amended in the period of the JDP, new laws and regulations were not 
introduced by the JDP to ensure a comparative advantageous position for its own 
organic intellectuals vis-à-vis the Kemalist intellectuals. In this study, we shall analyse 
how the Kemalists, with all their class interests, sought to design civil society so that 
they could prevent organic intellectuals of other groups from possessing the function of 
intellectuals. We shall also seek to understand how the JDP governments between 2002 
and 2015 sought to amend the existing laws and regulations which targeted its own 
organic intellectuals and how the Party attempted to re-regulate the intellectual sphere. 
 
2.4. Ideology 
 Ideology was one of the concepts, like the intellectual or philosophy, to which 
Gramsci brought his own redefinition by applying it to a wider context (Hoare & 
Sperber, 2016: 90). As Gramsci (1971: 376) emphasised, the concept of ideology 
possesses a negative connotation in Marxist thinking. Marxist understanding of 
ideology referred “to a distortion of thought which stems from, and conceals, social 
contradiction” (Larrain, 1991: 248). Ideology gained a new meaning under Lenin who 
took into account the class struggle. In addition to the ideology of the bourgeois class 
which serves the interests of the ruling class, the concept began to refer to the critique of 
the ruling ideology which became a significant instrument for the subordinate classes in 
their class struggle against the ruling class. Thus the concept gained a neutral meaning 
signifying the political consciousness of the subordinate classes (Larrain, 1991: 250). 
 Gramsci was also affected by Lenin’s approach to the concept of ideology 




composed of “a distorted reflection of social and material givens” was equal to 
neglecting its historical autonomous capacity. Alternatively, ideology, as an active 
element of political praxis, can serve for both progress and reaction, varying according 
to the goals of the groups which advocate it (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 92). 
 Ideology is vital in terms of unifying heterogeneous social alliances under the 
flag of common and universal demands and mottos (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 92). 
Gramsci (1971: 328) regarded the preservation of “the ideological unity of the entire 
social bloc” as a vital goal. The fundamental role of ideology, according to Gramsci 
(1971: 328), is “to cement and to unify”. He made a distinction “between historically 
organic intellectuals” and “ideologies that are arbitrary” (Gramsci, 1971: 376-377). 
Gramsci (1971: 377) explained that; 
 To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary, they have a 
validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organise’ human masses, and 
create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their 
position, struggle, etc. To the extent that they are arbitrary they only 
create individual ‘movements’, polemics and so on. 
 In addition to its politically unifying role, ideology was also seen by Gramsci as 
the site of struggle in a cultural world. This point is directly connected with Gramsci’s 
understanding of organic intellectuals as a perpetual persuasive force and with his 
conceptualisation of civil society as a terrain where persuasive acts occur. The organic 
intellectuals of the proletarian class have the mission to generate, intensify and 
disseminate the ideology of revolution in an environment of class struggle against 
opponent ideologies (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 92-93). 
 Kemalism, as the official ideology of Turkey, has always aimed at unifying and 
cementing the society under the flag of the founding principles of Ataturk. Considering 
the roles of ideology discussed above, it will be shown in Chapter 5 that Kemalism, 
with its most significant elements of laicism and nationalism, has been constructed as a 
unifying ideology with its particular discourse on the terrain of Islam in the textbooks of 
RCMK lessons.  
 Moreover, Islam, as the source of political ideology, possesses the capacity to 
autonomously and self-sufficiently tackle and provide solutions to the current problems 




political ideology has therefore always been intimidated by the legal structure in 
Turkey. Legislation on the areas ranging from political parties and schools to 
intellectuals, as the analysis in Chapter 6 will show in detail, has targeted potential 
sources of such an Islamic ideology. 
 
2.5. Political Party as the ‘Modern Prince’24 
A consistent and united organisational structure was a significant element of 
counter-hegemony in Gramsci’s understanding. He idealised his understanding of 
revolutionary organisational structure under a political party, which he termed the 
“Modern Prince” (Butko, 2004: 51). He introduced the political party as the 
fundamental organisational tool of counter-hegemony since it provided political 
education and functioned as an umbrella organisation under which the counter-
hegemonic forces could be coordinated (Adamson, 1980: 207). Gramsci (2000: 121) 
emphasised that “Politically, the broad masses only exist insofar as they are organized 
within political parties”. For him, the ideas of masses which alter under the oppression 
of ascendant economic forces are evaluated by the parties by first being bifurcated into 
tendencies and then being transformed into political parties. Gramsci (1971: 132) 
expected the Modern Prince to dedicate itself to the issue of ‘intellectual and moral 
reform’. He laid the burden of the proclamation and organisation of such an intellectual 
and moral reform on the political party to create the ground to encourage “the national-
popular collective will” and to realise “a superior, total form of modern civilisation” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 132). 
Gramsci (1971: 152-153) introduced three basic elements for the political party 
to exist. First, the “mass element” consisting of average, ordinary people. Those masses 
can only emerge as a real force for the party as long as they are centralised, disciplined 
and organised by a cohesive force. The second element was “the principal cohesive 
element”, in other words the political leadership, which manages centralisation at 
national level and leads to dispersed forces which are not able to create a power bloc on 
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their own (Gramsci, 1971: 152). Gramsci (1971: 88) described the significance of such 
a political leadership which possesses the capacity to lead masses as follows: 
The question of political leadership becomes even more complex and 
difficult in wars of position, fought by huge masses who are only able to 
endure the immense muscular, nervous, and physical strain with the aid 
of great reserves of moral strength. Only a very skilful political 
leadership, capable of taking into account the deep aspirations and 
feelings of those human masses, can prevent disintegration and defeat.  
 Finally, the third element is the “intermediate element” which plays an 
intermediary role between the masses and the political leadership, ensures the 
articulation of the former with the latter and provides communication between the two 
in both physical terms and moral and intellectual terms (Gramsci, 1971: 52). 
 Considering those three elements, the Welfare Party (WP) of the 1990s 
possessed a large membership network, and efficient and meticulous party organisation. 
Its grassroots were competent and well-organised. Its activists visited all parts of cities, 
collected data about every household, determined their needs and endeavoured to find 
solutions for the problems of each voter (Ayata, 1996: 52). Necmettin Erbakan, the 
leader of the WP, was also an important figure in terms of charismatic political 
leadership (Tugal, 2009: 46). It is therefore not possible to investigate the cultural 
hegemonic struggle in Turkey without taking into account the Islamist parties’ potential 
to create a counter-hegemonic bloc.
25
 The Islamist legal parties have been the most 
effective tools in terms of challenging the laic hegemonic system in Turkey (Tugal, 
2009: 42). Considering this situation, the Kemalist regime imposed many constitutional 
and legal restrictions on the actions of Islamist political parties. Two Islamist parties
26
 
were closed down by the Constitutional Court after 1983 for posing a threat to laicism 
(Smith, 2007: 271). So a significant part of the hegemonic struggle in the post-28 
February era was shaped at political parties’ level.  
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2.6. War of Position and War of Movement  
Gramsci supported his theory of hegemony by using the analogy of military 
strategies, stating that “every political struggle always has a military substratum” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 230). His views on political strategy and especially his distinction 
between ‘war of position’ and ‘war of manoeuvre’ have emerged as very significant 
constituents of Gramscian theory (Egan, 2014: 521). War of manoeuvre refers to frontal 
attack (Gramsci, 1971: 238-39), whereas war of position refers to trench warfare 
(Gramsci, 1971: 234) 
Gramsci pondered the practical issues of revolution and emphasised how the 
organisation and modes of revolution should work. He sought to understand why the 
successful 1917 revolution in Russia did not spread to the West (Ransome, 1992: 144) 
and why the West necessitated a different revolutionary tactic from the East (Hoare & 
Sperber, 2016: 58). To explain the appropriateness of different strategies for East and 
West, he detected different state and civil society structures between the two, stating 
that: 
 In Russia the state was everything, civil society was primordial and 
gelatinous; in the West, there was a proper relation between state and 
civil society, and when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil 
society was at once revealed. The state was only an outer ditch behind 
which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks. 
(Gramsci, 1971: 238).  
In Gramsci’s (2000: 229) understanding, ‘war of position’ was attributable to the 
West and ‘war of manoeuvre’ to the East. Tsarist Russia had almost completely 
centralised the power within the state. It was therefore possible to seize all the power in 
a comparatively short time. However, in Western European countries which possessed a 
developed civil society, a different political strategy, namely war of position, was 
needed. In this strategy, the proletarian class seeks to expand its hegemony by 
constructing a new historic bloc. Such a strategy is not a sudden transition of power 
from one group to another (Simon, 2015: 26). The process of a war of position is 
intensive and tough and requires patience (Gramsci, 1971: 239).
27
 In his warfare 
                                                          
27
 Gramsci (1971: 108) questioned the relationship between passive revolution and war of position in 
the Prison Notebooks by asking “does there exist an absolute identity between war of position and 
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metaphor, Gramsci (1971: 235) pointed out the inadequacy of frontal attacks and the 
significance of civil society in the emergence of counter-hegemony by stating that: 
The superstructures of civil society are like the trench systems of modern 
warfare. In war it would sometimes happen that a fierce artillery attack 
seemed to have destroyed the enemy’s entire defensive system, whereas in 
fact it had only destroyed the outer perimeter; and at the moment of their 
advance and attack the assailants would find themselves confronted by a 
line of defence which was still effective. 
Gramsci (1971: 239) stated that “in politics, the ‘war of position’ once won is 
decisive definitively...” and explained that “the war of manoeuvre subsists so long as it 
is a question of winning positions that are non-decisive”.  Which one of the two 
strategies, war of position or war of manoeuvre, is preliminary in a revolutionary 
practice is a significant point. As Ransome (1992: 147-48) stressed, an historic bloc 
must lead the process of revolutionary practice even though all state organisations with 
military forces are defeated. So war of position is important to guarantee the decisive 
revolutionary practice. Since possessing the steering of the civil society, which is the 
site of political and ideological hegemony over the bourgeoisie, is more time-
consuming, war of position should precede the concluding and comparatively shorter 
step of military attack (Ransome, 1992: 148). 
Political strategy in the West not only depends on controlling the government, 
but also on winning the ideological terrain (Grelle, 2017: 19). This brings us to the 
importance of being hegemonic before coming to power, as in the instance of the 
Moderates in Italy (Gramsci: 1971: 59). Femia (1975: 34) explained that; 
diffusion and mass acceptance of radical ideas about man and society,  
the creation of a proletarian counter-hegemony, is a precondition for 
revolution.  Without prior success in what Gramsci calls the ‘war of 
position’ on the cultural front, a seizure of state power would only prove 
transitory if not disastrous. 
In the Western context, a proletarian revolution can only be achieved by 
persuading a significant proportion of the masses for the superiority of their own world 
concept vis-à-vis the world concept of the bourgeoisie (Femia, 1981: 41). So the main 
                                                                                                                                                                          
again becomes a war of manoeuvre?” He responded to his own question by correlating Cavour, the 
leader of the Moderates, with the advocacy of war of position/passive revolution, and Mazzini, the 
leader of the Action Party, with the advocacy of war of manoeuvre in their struggle with each other 




goal in the process of ‘war of position’ is to penetrate civil society by disseminating 
ideas and ensuring the cultural and intellectual preparation of the terrain for the struggle 
for revolutionary attack on the dominant power (Butko, 2004: 57).  
This point brings us to a significant aspect of Gramsci’s cultural hegemony, 
namely ‘intellectual and moral leadership’. For Gramsci (1971: 57-58), there were two 
ways for a group to maintain its superiority: by “domination” and “by intellectual and 
moral leadership”. In this process, allied groups are led by the dominant group and 
contrarian groups are dominated. The leadership which hegemony comprises and 
necessitates is not a result of spontaneity but is the result of an active creation 
(Ransome, 1992: 136). Such a dominant group can take on, and in fact must take on, the 
leadership before possessing the governmental power. As a matter of fact, leadership is 
one of the main requirements for possessing power. Even if a group holds governmental 
power, it still needs to maintain its leadership or hegemony (Gramsci, 1971: 57-58). The 
Moderates in Italy had been exercising hegemonic activities before coming to power 
and they did not merely rely on the effectiveness of the material force which is the result 
of the power required for exercising influential leadership (Gramsci, 1971: 59).  
Gramsci (2000: 65) regarded the historical period before the French Revolution 
as a ‘war of manoeuvre’ and the liberal epoch in the nineteenth century as a long 
version of a ‘war of position’. He also gave the passive resistance of Gandhi as an 
example of a war of position and argued that it became a war of movement in particular 
stages (Gramsci, 1971: 229). He named strikes as war of movement and boycotts as war 
of position and the process in which combat troops and armaments are secretly prepared 
as underground warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 229-30).  
In Turkey, the structure of the civil society compelled the JDP to follow a 
similar strategy to that in the west. In the pluralist atmosphere of the 1980s, Islamic 
organisations, which were active in various issues from education to economy, also 
emerged as an alternative in civil society (Caha, 2001: 41). As a result of the 
atmosphere of post-28 February process, however, the country experienced a deep 
struggle between the Kemalist and Islamist sides in the sphere of civil society. The 
Islamic/conservative civil society suffered from the actions of the state apparatus, such 
as and the closure of 21 Islamic foundations for violating the principle of laicism in the 




foundation assets (Calik, 2012). Even, the military intervention against the Islamist WP 
in 1997 was legitimised by the support of the labour unions Turk-Is and DISK and the 
business associations TUSIAD, TOBB and TISK (Cicioglu & Bayraktar, 2017: 57). In 
2007, TUSIAD, as the most significant representative of the Kemalist bourgeoisie, 
published a notice against the JDP government with the discourse of protecting the 
unity of laicism and democracy (TUSIAD, 2007). When the comparative advantage of 
Kemalists stemming from the legislation within the sphere of civil society was taken 
into account as it will be emphasised in chapter 6, a war of position within the civil 
society was a significant and essential step of developing a counter-hegemony for the 
JDP. Therefore, to what extent the JDP achieved this is an important question which is 
addressed in this current study. 
 
2.7. Passive Revolution 
The concept of communist revolution was defined by Marx and Engels (1970: 
55) as “the overthrow of the existing state of society” and “the abolition of private 
property which is identical with it”. In this regard, revolution is a “cataclysmic leap” 
from one epoch to another as a consequence of an aggregation of conflicts which take 
place between the dominated exploited and the dominant exploiter classes in the 
previous order (Kiernan, 1991: 476). A new version of revolution was introduced by 
Gramsci with the concept of passive revolution. Gramsci particularly meant the 
bourgeois type of revolutions/transformations which do not possess the cataclysmic 
character of the French Revolution (Persaud, 2001: 42). When he explained the concept 
of passive revolution, the starting point for Gramsci (1971: 106) was the following two 
main assumptions of political science which he borrowed from Marx:  
1. that no social formation disappears as long as the productive forces 
which have developed within it still find room for further forward 
movement;  
2. that a society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the necessary 
conditions have not already been incubated … 
Gramsci (1971: 106-107) stressed that these assumptions should primarily be 
treated critically in every different aspect and rescued from fatalistic and mechanistic 




hegemonic position of the landowner classes, other European countries could not 
experience similar revolutions (Persaud, 2001: 42). Considering the assumptions of 
Gramsci (1971: 106) discussed above, the reasons for the lack of a cataclysmic 
revolution in those countries were that the production structure of the pre-capitalist 
society had still possessed room to expand and that the social forces within such a 
structure had still possessed the power to withstand a radical disengagement from the 
existing order (Persaud, 2001: 43).   
The concept was described by Gramsci in his significant work Prison Notebooks 
in two different ways. First, he explained the concept as “a molecular social 
transformation which takes place as it were beneath the surface of society, in situations 
where the progressive class cannot advance openly” (Hoare & Smith, 1971: 46). 
Second, he referred to a revolution without the participation of the masses, as in the 
instance of the Italian Risorgimento (Hoare & Smith, 1971: 46; Gramsci, 1971: 109).  
Passive revolution is a process during which the bourgeois class establishes a 
hegemony by neutralising and incorporating with the social forces which have the 
potential to challenge its domination (Shields, 2012: 41). It refers to the “incorporation 
of revolutionary movements in existing systems” (Tugal, 2009: 32). Passive revolution 
is “revolution without a revolution” (Gramsci, 1971: 59), that is to say, it is “any 
historical situation in which a new political formation comes to power without a 
fundamental reordering of social relations” (Forgacs, 2000: 428). 
In a country where there is even a partial hegemony, it is not enough to solely 
take control of the state to successfully conduct a socio-political project (Tugal, 2009: 
31-32). In such a situation, the terrains where the hegemony is exercised need to be 
conquered gradually and political society and civil society need to be unlinked and re-
linked by the movements which are striving to challenge an existing hegemony. In the 
instances where a strong hegemony has already been achieved, the movements which 
do not take the risk of undertaking such a gradual path can easily be disassembled by 
the power holders or they fail to catch the support of the masses. The projects and 
organisations of those movements do not culminate in a revolution. On the contrary, 
they are absorbed by the existing hegemony. This is especially the case for the 




It might be beneficial to emphasise how Gramsci made a distinction between the 
bourgeoisie revolution in France and the passive revolution in Italy. On the one hand, 
Gramsci assessed the French Revolution as a sudden change by which the aristocratic 
regime was displaced by the bourgeoisie and which peaked with the Jacobin 
dictatorship between 1792 and 1794 (Forgacs, 2000: 246). On the other hand, Gramsci 
assessed the Risorgimento – an effort to achieve national liberation for Italy which 
peaked with the unification of Italy in 1860-61 – as an unutilised chance to achieve a 
revolution similar to the Jacobin revolution in France (Forgacs, 2000: 247).  
According to Gramsci (1971: 53), the Italian bourgeoisie failed to unify the 
people around themselves, therefore the bourgeoisie was defeated and its progress was 
interrupted. During the Risorgimento, this identical selfishness hindered a fast, 
rapturous and effective revolution like the Revolution in France (Gramsci, 1971: 53-54).  
In the process of becoming a state in the period of the Risorgimento, what the 
innovatory groups which aimed at uniting the Italian state needed was the subordination 
and elimination of the former and the acquisition of the passive or active assent of the 
latter (Gramsci, 1971: 53). Gramsci (1971: 53) highlighted the processes of becoming a 
dominant and hegemonic group from a subordinate group: the first phase was gaining 
autonomy against the enemy group which the innovatory forces needed to overthrow, 
and the second phase was obtaining assistance from the groups from which they gained 
passive or active assent. Thus, in Gramsci’s theory, passive revolution referred to “a 
process whereby a social group comes to power without rupturing the social fabric (as 
in France) but rather by adapting to it and gradually modifying it” (Forgacs, 2000: 247).  
Gramsci (1971: 59) presented what the Moderates did in Italy as an example of 
passive revolution. The success of the ruling class framed by the Moderates following 
1848 hinged on “the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which 
varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups – and 
even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 58-59). Gramsci (1971: 57) explained the advantage of the Moderates, 
in comparison with the Action Party, in terms of leadership with reference to their 
capacity to attract other social groups in the process of passive revolution. The social 
group that the Moderates were based on was comparatively homogenous, therefore the 




other hand, the Action Party did not rely on any specific historical group. As a 
consequence, the Moderates succeeded in leading the Action Party (Gramsci, 1971: 57). 
Moreover, Gramsci (2000: 264-265) pointed to the liberal regimes in the 
nineteenth century and fascism in the twentieth century as different forms of passive 
revolution. He regarded the transformation from the individualist economic model to a 
planned model (or a command economy) which occurred in a reformist manner as a 
form of passive revolution. An intermediate economic model emerged between the 
solely individualist model and the planned model, and thus the process of passing to 
more advanced cultural and political models was actualised without any radical and 
devastating catastrophe. He propounded corporatism as the intermediate economy of a 
‘passive’ feature (Gramsci, 2000: 265). 
Tugal (2009) explained the JDP’s rise to power by reference to Gramsci’s 
‘passive revolution’ concept. As we will see in chapter 5 and 6, it can be claimed that 
the JDP came to power and consolidated its power gradually rather than realising a 
cataclysmic leap from the 1997 post-modern coup d’état conditions to its positioning in 
the centre. We therefore need to understand the gradual move of the JDP from the 
periphery to the centre by reference to its regulations aimed at civil society and its 
education policies. 
 
3. Structural Hegemony and Hegemonic Projects 
After introducing the Gramscian understanding of cultural hegemony with its 
fundamental elements and concepts, it is important to emphasise the distinction 
propounded by Joseph (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) between underlying structural 
hegemony and surface hegemonic projects. Such a distinction helps us to understand the 
variance between the hegemonic strategies of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the 
JDP, since the hegemonic projects of both sides of the hegemonic struggle have been 
constrained by different deeper structures. 
Joseph (2000: 179) highlighted the need to question “how different social groups 
achieve dominance through constructing discourse” when seeking to understand 




that hegemony cannot be limited to those aspects. Focusing only on those aspects brings 
the risk of understanding a one-sided inter-subjective dimension of hegemony and 
totally neglecting the structural side of the hegemony issue because of explaining the 
world only with reference to human action (Joseph, 2000: 179). Joseph (2000: 191) 
distinguished the “deeper, structural hegemony which refers to the unity and 
reproduction of society and its structures and institutions” from “the agentially based 
hegemony of a specific hegemonic project”. In other words, he pointed out the 
distinction “between hegemony’s basic material necessity and various forms of its 
actualisation through concrete projects and intentional agency”. 
As we shift our attention from agency to structure, how hegemonic projects can 
be possible vis-à-vis the determination of structure becomes a key question. Joseph 
(2001: 273) responded to this question as follows:  
… it the necessity of hegemony in the structural sense – that the 
reproduction of social structures and their combinations is not automatic 
but needs to be socially secured – that allows for the possibility of 
hegemony in its conscious or agential form. Actual hegemonic projects 
are possible because of the open nature of the social totality and the 
basic structural requirement to secure the reproduction of the social 
formation. 
In this sense, as Joseph (2002: 131) remarked, both structural and surface 
hegemony are dependent on each other for their existence. He gave the example of 
political expression and its deeper fundamental conditions by explaining that the former 
hinges on the underlying conditions whilst the latter counts for nothing without being 
politically expressed to some extent. Although causality provides a supremacy to 
structural hegemony, he underlined that surface hegemony possess an emergent nature, 
in other words “they are not predetermined but have their own specific dynamics.”  
Joseph (2002: 131) defined the two aspects of hegemony, structural and surface 
hegemony, as perpetual processes. Structural hegemony is about “the deep, underlying 
conditions within society and the unity of the social formation” whilst surface 
hegemony is about “the actual hegemonic projects that arise out of this situation, it 
represents a manifestation of the underlying conditions, albeit with its own character 
and dynamics.” Structural hegemony is functional as it reproduces the structural 
ensembles and social structures. Within the limits determined by such functions of 




hegemony refers to active and more conscious political acts and projects whereas 
structural hegemony refers to a more unconscious mechanism reproducing social 
structures and social cohesion (Joseph, 2002: 131). At this point, Joseph (2002: 132) 
underlined that; 
Hegemonic projects and struggles develop their own dynamics which 
need to be analysed in their specificity. Although they are dependent on 
the underlying structure of society (and structural hegemony), they are 
not reducible to it, but have their own irreducible set of mechanisms, 
properties and powers. Because they are emergent out of the underlying 
structural hegemonic conditions, these projects ultimately cannot escape 
these conditions, but they can at least develop in their own individual way 
and may come into conflict with these conditions in a dialectical 
overdetermination.  
Joseph (2002: 132) exemplified this situation with the rise of fascism as a 
particular political project which could be associated with a deeper structural hegemonic 
crisis of the bourgeois social order. Although the rise of fascism could be explained 
with reference to the distinctive crisis of bourgeois society in fields such as cultural 
hegemony or capital accumulation, such explanations are not sufficient to provide a full 
explanation of the phenomenon. Fascism’s own dynamics, such as its political goals, its 
action plans and its relations with large entrepreneurs, should also be studied.    
As we direct our attention to the case of Turkey, it is possible to detect multiple 
deep structures which have been restricting and mapping out a route for the hegemonic 
projects of Kemalism and the JDP. First, the global economic order, which influences 
the state apparatus and shapes the social formation in accordance with the global 
neoliberal capital accumulation, is a significant determiner in Turkish politics 
(Kucukali, 2015: 9). Second, Islam also constitutes a very deep cultural structure 
embedded in Muslim societies. Such a deep structure restrained the laicist Kemalist 
hegemonic project by compelling it to introduce a social formation which could not 
neglect Islam’s effect on society and to find a middle way between the pious Muslims 
and Kemalist ideals.  Finally, the legal structure draws the boundaries of acceptable and 
unacceptable actions for the agencies of hegemonic struggle. The legal structural aspect 
of Kemalist hegemony also answer the question of why the JDP could not achieve a 
sudden and radical paradigm shift in its struggle for hegemony against the Kemalist 
establishment. Studying legislation therefore becomes vital for comprehending the 




4. Hegemony and Counter-Hegemony on the Terrain of 
Religion 
Understanding the role of religion in the establishment of or resistance to 
cultural hegemony is essential for our research to uncover the role of Islam in the 
cultural hegemonic struggle in Turkey. In this study, Islam is regarded as a field of 
operation for cultural hegemonic forces to gain the consent of both pious Muslims and 
secular people by means of hegemonic efforts to shape people’s understanding of Islam 
in parallel with their hegemonic interests and ideological, religious and cultural stance. 
Religion possesses both a spiritual and a material meaning. The spiritual 
dimension of religion manifests itself in three dimensions. First, it is related to being 
transcendent, it is about the supernatural reality. Second, it is related with the sacred, in 
other words, religion is a system of utterance and practice organising the worldly 
according to the holy. Third, it targets the ultimate; that is, it directs the believers to the 
ultimate status of existence (Haynes, 2005: 250-251). In this sense, with Gramsci’s 
(1971: 326) definition of religion as “a conception of the world”, religion provides a 
meaning to its believers’ lives. This makes religion a terrain which has to be conquered. 
In terms of the material dimension, religion is the source of motivation for the 
actions of people and groups of people in line with political and social objectives. It is 
very difficult to find religious groups which are completely uninterested in political and 
social matters (Haynes, 2005: 251). Calvert and Calvert (2001: 140, cited in Haynes, 
2005: 251) described religion as “a mobiliser of masses, a controller of mass action” 
and depicted it as “an excuse for repression [or] an ideological basis for dissent”.  
For Gramsci, religion could be both a significant element of the establishment of 
hegemony and an instrument for resistance and struggle for the development of a 
counter-hegemonic movement (Worth, 2009: 29-30). On the one hand, Gramsci 
criticised the role of religion in the emergence of existing class relations and on the 
other he was interested in religion’s potential contribution to the agenda of socialism 
(Worth, 2009: 30).    
Gramsci’s views on civil society are an important starting point for 




superstructural levels and is also the domain of hegemony (Gramsci, 1971: 12). He 
propounded the Church as one of the social institutions within civil society, with a role 
similar to those of schools and labour unions, which are spheres of the dominant 
group’s hegemony over the whole society (Gramsci, 1971: 204). He stated that the 
Church can be “an integral part of the state, of political society monopolised by a 
specific privileged group, which absorbs the Church in order the better to preserve its 
monopoly with the support of that zone of ‘civil society’ which the Church represents” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 245). Gramsci (1971: 342) also saw the Church as well as the 
education system as exemplifying the cultural institutions which “keep the ideological 
world in movement within a given country”. 
Gramsci (1985: 212) highlighted the significance of intellectuals’ function in 
shaping people’s interpretation of religion by arguing that both Catholic intellectuals 
and secular intellectuals were responsible for people’s narrow-mindedness and their 
indifference to and lack of bright divine life. He suggested that a distance had emerged 
between religion and the people since the Catholic intellectuals were inadequate and 
unsuccessful in their literature. Since secular intellectuals were impotent, on the other 
hand, religion could not go beyond being a mere superstitious belief and it could not be 
changed by an advanced laic and humanist moral system. 
The position of the Islamic/conservative intellectuals as compared with the 
Kemalist intellectuals in the process of hegemonic struggle is an important aspect of this 
research. Based on Gramsci’s (1971: 10) argument which accepts education as a tool for 
creating intellectuals from diverse strata, we aim to understand how the intellectuals 
were educated with a particular interpretation of religion in schools. To achieve this 
aim, we shall analyse the textbooks of RCMK lessons and the legislation which 
influences or restricts intellectual activities, such as the laws about freedom of speech. 
Gramsci’s concept of intellectual and moral reformation, which originated from 
Christianity (Fulton, 1987: 199), should also be emphasised in order to understand his 
views on religion. Gramsci (1971: 132-133) asserted that;  
The Modern Prince must be and cannot but be the proclaimer and 
organiser of an intellectual and moral reform, which also means creating 
the terrain for a subsequent development of the national-popular 





Gramsci (1971: 132) associated the “question of moral and intellectual reform” 
with “religion or worldview”. For him, such intellectual and moral reform has been 
realised by religions in various cases throughout history (Fulton, 1987: 199). Such an 
intellectual and moral reformation is needed for the sake of socialism in countries where 
an abrupt revolution is impossible (Fulton, 1987: 199). Gramsci respected the Roman 
Catholic Church for its organisational success and long-term hegemony and underlined 
the points in it which Marxist praxis can imitate. However, he regarded religion as an 
opponent of socialism, since religion itself is “a form of total social praxis” (Fulton, 
1987: 202). It can be claimed that religion has a significant role in shaping people’s 
perception of the world. Therefore, a hegemonic struggle in the terrain of a religion is 
also a war in people’s perception of the world.  
As feudalism developed, the feudal classes used the Christian theology as an 
instrument to legitimate their class interests (Portelli, 1974: 69ff, cited in Mansueto, 
1988: 273). For Gramsci, this hegemony was structural because of the historic bloc 
composed of the Catholic Church and the aristocracy. It was, at the same time, a cultural 
hegemony since the interpretation of religion and culture was in harmony with the 
interests of the dominant class (Fulton, 1987: 209). The Protestant reformers were 
successful in rupturing the Catholic-feudal bloc and creating an alternative counter-
hegemonic bloc with proletarians, peasants and the bourgeoisie (Mansueto, 1988: 273). 
Gramsci (1971: 394) argued that Calvinism and the Lutheran Reform achieved the 
construction of a “higher culture” and struggled with the crusade of Catholicism. Its 
effect even diffused to non-Protestant countries. On the other hand, as Weber (2002: 28) 
suggested, “the inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism first produced a capitalist 
ethic”. In particular, Calvinism had a strong effect on the creation of “the spirit of 
capitalism” (Weber, 2005: 10).  
Nasr (2009: 247) pointed out a similar role of religion in economic life and class 
interests in Turkey. He argued that the understanding of Islam in Anatolian cities was 
combined with working hard and an economically innovative culture similar to the 
mind-set of the northern European Calvinist burghers and named it “Islamic 
Calvinism”. Such an Islamic Calvinism has influenced the class struggle in Turkey, 
since the interpretation of Islam in this way provided an advantage to the Anatolian 




work, praying for wealth, saving money and investing within the city created significant 
economic development, as an example of this Islamic Calvinism. 
As a more recent instance, Semmes (1995: 8) also underlined the cultural 
hegemonic characteristic of European Christianity on Africans and asserted that “God 
as an objectification of self and religion as a projection of the natural order of things 
become extraordinary tools for cultural hegemony because the imperialist group uses 
religion to extend legitimacy to its exploitative and hegemonic designs”. He associated 
the Christian dominance in South and North America, Asia and Africa with the 
economic and political exploitation of the West (Semmes, 1995: 8). 
In addition to its role in the establishment of cultural hegemony, religion can be 
used as a means of opposition (Billings, 1990). In his Gramscian analysis, Billings 
(1990) researched the role of religion in the emergence or retardation of resistance and 
highlighted the contribution of religion to the creation of oppositional practices and 
discourse in a society. In the case of Appalachia, where long-term labour struggles took 
place, religion had an important role for the miners in challenging the authority of coal 
operators. Religious statements were interpreted in conformity with the contrarian 
stance and labour struggles were religiously legitimised by the considerable assistance 
of clergy members and unauthorised miner-ministers (Billings, 1990: 20). Billings 
(1990: 18) associated these clergy members and unauthorised miner-ministers with the 
function of organic intellectuals in the theory of Gramsci. According to him, creation of 
a contrarian religious culture among miners working in Appalachia is an instance of 
passive revolution. After analysing the letters sent to the Journal of the United Mine 
Workers and the local press, Corbin (1981: 163, cited in Billings, 1990: 18) argued that 
the mine workers scanned the Bible and tried to find biblical support for unionism, and 
he stated that “the miners found God’s presence in anything that enabled them to win a 
strike and recognition of the union”.  
Moreover, the main strength of religion as a source of opposition in the process 
of passive revolution stems from both non-discursive facilities such as financial sources 
and the spaces which enable people to come together (Billings, 1990: 4) as well as 
discursive facilities such as “the Sunday sermon and [of] official pronouncement” 
(Westhues, 1976: 304). Westhues (1976: 304) asserted that “if the Church controls 




hospitals, or other organizations, these are resources potentially mobilisable toward 
dissident goals”.  
Here, Turkey provides a significant case to see the role of religion in the 
emergence of oppositional movements, discourses and practices. The main focus of this 
current study is the religious oppositional movements against the Kemalist cultural 
hegemony in the terrain of Islam in the process of the JDP’s move from the periphery 
towards the centre. However, Islam has also been used as the source of opposition 
against the JDP government, such as in the instance of Anti-Capitalist Muslims which 
emerged as an oppositional group against the JDP during the Gezi protests in Turkey 
(Yinanc, 2013). 
In the final analysis, as Fulton (1987: 198) emphasised, it is not true to claim that 
the views of Gramsci about religion are solely applicable to those contexts which are 
traditionally Catholic. Concepts such as moral and intellectual reformation, coercion 
and hegemony, intellectuals and historic bloc reflect, stem from and are shaped by his 
views about religion. More importantly, Gramsci underlined the function of religion as 
a source of political power and detected a direct relationship between religion and 
socialist revolution and with any other forms of revolution in the most general sense 
(Fulton, 1987: 198). In this sense, Turkey also provides significant cases which embody 
the fundamental constituents of Gramsci’s theory about cultural hegemony on the 
terrain of Islam.  
Although there was no a single divine religious authority such as the Papacy or 
the Church in the case of Turkey, the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) was 
established as a state institution regulating issues of religious belief, worship, morality, 
Islamic education and the administration of religious facilities on behalf of the state 
following the abolition of the Caliphate inherited from the Ottoman Empire and the 
Ministry of Islamic Law and Foundations
28
 in 1924 (Ulutas, 2010: 389). As the 
prominent characteristic of Turkish laicism has been the interference of the state in the 
terrain of religion (Ulutas, 2010: 390), Islam has become a site of hegemonic struggle 
between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc which designed a hegemonic project with the aim 
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 The Ministry of Islamic Law and Foundations (Ser’iye ve Evkaf Vekaleti) was established on 3 May 1920 
following the establishment of the Turkish Grand National Assemble (TGNA) on 23 April 1920, as a 




of gaining the consent of pious Muslims in favour of the laic regime and the JDP which 
designed an alternative hegemonic project with the aim of reversing its subordinate 




CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
In the previous two chapters, the historical and political backgrounds of the 
Turkish case have been introduced, the ontological and epistemological basis of the 
research has been presented and the theoretical framework has been drawn. This chapter 
is dedicated to identifying the gaps in the literature and determining the place of the 
current research in the wider literature. Since Turkey is distinct from Western countries 
in terms of its class structure, we start by bridging the gap between Gramscian theory on 
cultural hegemony and the case of Turkey by explaining the peculiarities of the class 
structure in Turkey. In order to identify gaps in the literature and determine the 
contribution which this research can make, we shall focus on the literature reporting 
hegemony-based studies of the case of Turkey. We shall then consider the literature 
which has emphasised the hegemonic, ideological and political use of Islam, 
Muslimness and Islam-related topics. 
 
1. Bridging the Gap between the Theory and the Turkish 
Case 
Discussing whether the chosen theoretical framework fits the context of the 
current study is very significant for bridging the gap between the theory and the 
research. The aim is to understand whether a class-based analysis of the Turkish case is 
possible or not. To achieve this, it is important first to comprehend, given the 
importance of Gramsci to this research, what the concept of class refers to in the context 
of Turkey. We shall reveal the existence of a class struggle by explaining who those 
classes are composed of in Turkey, noting that the class structure has peculiarities in 
this case. 
Class and class-based explanations are included in most of the studies which 
focused on the political struggle in the Republican period of Turkey (Keyder, 1987; 
Yavuz, 1997; Bugra, 1998; Yavuz, 2003; Nasr: 2009; Tugal, 2009; Warhola & Bezci: 




On one side of the class struggle was the Kemalist bourgeois class which was 
the product of the statist policies of the Republic referred to as the Kemalist bourgeoisie 
(Gurcan, 2010; Zubaida, 2017), secular bourgeoisie (Gumuscu, 2010; Atay, 2013), 
Istanbul capital (Tanyilmaz, 2015) or Istanbul bourgeoisie (Aybar & Lapavitas, 2001; 
Kurtulus, 2011; Cinar, 2013). The Kemalist economic strategy hinged on a highly state-
centred model in the early Republican period. The economic policies of Kemalism 
aimed at fostering the accumulation of private capital and ensuring a rigid checking 
mechanism over economic activities and large-scale industries. An important goal of the 
state was to create its own national bourgeois class and entrepreneurs who were 
significant for the accumulation of capital and economic growth (Parla & Davison, 
2004: 125). In this context, the late 1920s in Turkey witnessed state intervention in the 
economic realm with the aim of constructing the economic base of the Turkish nation 
by encouraging capital accumulation by Turkey’s local capitalists (Berberoglu, 1982: 
24), which laid the foundations for the Kemalist bourgeois class as a consequence of the 
statist economic policies of Kemalism. The representatives of Istanbul capital who had 
an advantageous position as a consequence of support and concessions supplied by the 
government created a coalition with the Turkish military and the Kemalist elite and this 
coalition became the symbol and motor of Turkey’s modernisation process (Gultekingil 
& Bora, 2009 cited in Warhola & Bezci, 2010: 442). Parla and Davison (2004: 118) 
emphasised the relationship between the discourses on laicism and on national 
economic progress and the education system played a key role in this relationship (Parla 
& Davison, 2004: 119). The 1931 programme of the RPP stated that the method applied 
in education and teaching is vital in order to use knowledge as a means of succeeding in 
material life. It was also stressed in the same programme that education should be kept 
away from superstition and alien thoughts and be shaped by the principles of 
superiority, nationalism and patriotism (RPP, 1931: 35). In that programme, 
‘superstition’ referred to thoughts which oppose the Kemalist understanding of Islam 
(Parla & Davison, 2004: 120). The emphasis on scientific knowledge is important 
because it is associated with material progress, in other words, economic progress (Parla 
& Davison, 2004: 121).  
It can be argued that the principles of Kemalism, namely statism, nationalism 
and laicism, are complementary. On the one hand, imposing the laicist discourse on the 




interest of material progress, in other words, the economic targets of Kemalism. On the 
other hand, nationalism would be the basis of the statist policies of Kemalism in order 
to defend the interests of its own bourgeois class base. This point can be seen in the 
Kemalist discourse which places the political Islamist cadres, subversive and separatist 
movements, as well as globalisation, privatisation policies and a free market economy, 
in the treachery camp against the republic, nation and Ataturk (Erdogan, 2009: 587). 
The current study is focused on the hegemonic strategies of the Kemalists which 
targeted religious lessons in schools and endeavours to comprehend how the Religious 
Culture and Moral Knowledge (RCMK) lessons were designed to shape the minds of 
students in parallel with the Kemalist understanding of laicism, nationalism and statism. 
The emergence of a new and alternative bourgeois class in the late 1980s has 
been recognised by many scholars (Yavuz, 1997; Onis, 1997; Duran & Yildirim, 2005; 
Demiralp, 2009; Tugal, 2009; Gokariksel & Secor, 2009; Gumuscu, 2010; Heper, 2013; 
Cinar, 2013; Hosgor, 2015a; Tanyilmaz, 2015; Ozturk, 2015). This newly emerging 
bourgeois class has been named differently by different scholars: Anatolian bourgeoisie 
(Yavuz, 1997; Tugal, 2009; Cinar, 2013), Islamic bourgeoisie (Onis, 1997; Gokariksel 
& Secor, 2009), green capital (Duran & Yıldırım, 2005), Islamic capital (Demiralp, 
2009; Tas, 2011; Hosgor, 2015a), Islamist capital (Tanyilmaz, 2015; Ozturk, 2015), 
devout bourgeoisie (Gumuscu, 2010) and the conservative/Islamic entrepreneurial 
middle class (Heper, 2013). Likewise, this current study emphasises the emergence of 
an Islamic/conservative bourgeoisie as an alternative to the Kemalist bourgeoisie. 
Therefore, the Kemalist bourgeois class, as one of the pillars of the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc, and the newly rising Islamic/conservative bourgeoisie, represented by the JDP, are 
significant agents of the hegemonic struggle on the terrain of Islam, which is the main 
topic of this thesis. 
Yavuz (1997: 72) stated that the main features of the petty bourgeoisie and 
small-sized entrepreneurs in metropolitan areas was their support for open-market 
policies and the economic liberalisation process and their opposition to state 
interference in the economy. For him, the ideological position of this Anatolian 
bourgeois class was to be Islamic in the social area and liberal in the economic area. 
Muslim morality and symbols were the means of getting the support of the masses 




used the term conservative/Islamic entrepreneurial middle class for the peripheral 
forces which shifted towards the centre in the periods of Turgut Ozal and Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan. Under Erdogan, who grew up in Kasımpasa, a neighbourhood composed of 
conservative lower-income classes, the religious periphery had managed to position 
itself at the centre and become an alternative in the political, economic and social areas 
to the preceding dominant classes (Heper, 2013: 154). 
Yavuz (2004: 270) stated that “in Turkey, the economic reforms were welcomed 
and embraced by Islamic movements that appropriated Islamic symbols for the 
marketplace to encourage the production of religious interpretations, values, and 
meaning through business and patterns of consumption”. Nasr (2009: 247) described the 
understanding of Islam in the Anatolian cities where the Anatolian capital had its roots 
as “conservative but pro-European, pro-democracy, and above all pro-capitalism. 
Anatolian businessmen combine religion, hard work, and economic innovation ...”. As 
the Islamic entrepreneurs began to possess more economic power, a new Islamic elite 
emerged with its own consumption preferences which differed from those of the secular 
elites. This situation was accompanied by an increase in the number of leisure and 
popular culture products, summer residences, hotels and self-care centres specifically 
for devout Muslims (Craciun, 2017: 50). This new type of Islamic consumption 
triggered the emergence of new companies which became an alternative for devout 
consumers and a new consumer segment willing to spend money in this new market 
(Sandikci & Ger, 2007: 194). These newly introduced tastes, consumption choices and 
fashion preferences became the means of challenging the cultural hegemonic position of 
the Kemalist bourgeoisie and characterised the hegemonic strategies of this rising 
conservative-Islamic bourgeoisie. 
Warhola and Bezci (2010: 443) argued that the interpretation of laicism faced a 
significant challenge from the rising Anatolian bourgeoisie. In this process, the 
traditionally dominant Kemalist capitalist class became strongly opposed to the Islamist 
Welfare Party, since with the emergence of the capitalist class of the periphery it feared 
losing its traditional dominant role in the Turkish economy and the privileged class 
status which it had acquired as a result of state incentives (Erdogan, 2007: 25). 
A way of explaining the class struggle in Turkey is to refer to the rivalry 




society (Yavuz, 1997; Bugra, 1998; Bugra, 2002; Nasr: 2009; Yankaya, 2009). The 
rivalry between two main professional associations is important for this research for two 
reasons. First, this rivalry gives clues about the hegemonic struggle on the terrain of 
Islam since it is primarily characterised by religious/cultural elements. Second, the 
activities and discourses of these associations, as elements of civil society, were 
influenced or restricted by the legislation which forms one of the case studies in this 
research. 
On the one side, there was TUSIAD, founded in 1971 and composed of very 
large companies mainly located in Istanbul (Bugra, 1998: 526). Bugra (1998: 526) 
argued that the main aim of TUSIAD was to enhance the social status of the bourgeois 
class which had been created by the state apparatus. In Article 2 of its charter, there is 
special emphasis on the Kemalist principle of laicism. In the same article it is clearly 
stated that the activities of the association are determined in conformity with the 
principles and goals of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with the target of reaching and 
exceeding the level of modern/contemporary Western civilisations (TUSIAD, 2013).  
On the other side, MUSIAD was the Islamic-based business association founded 
in 1990 (Yankaya, 2009: 56). Yavuz (1997: 67) explained that MUSIAD, as the 
representative of the newly emerged conservative bourgeois class, was founded by 
small-scale companies which supported privatisation and wanted to be integrated into 
the European market and which objected to the state’s assistance of the large 
industrialists unified under TUSIAD (Yavuz, 1997: 67). MUSIAD also aimed at going 
beyond the nationalist targets of domestic economic activities and demanded to be 
integrated into the global economy of the West (Straw, 2013: 112). Most MUSIAD 
members were enterprises with fewer than 50 workers and were evenly distributed 
across the different geographical parts of the country (Bugra, 1998: 529). For Bugra 
(1998: 522) MUSIAD, as the rival of TUSIAD, utilised a particular interpretation of 
Islam as a significant element of its ideological functions and as a source of attraction 
for its own businessmen. Yankaya (2009: 4) argued that the association underlined the 
importance of being religious in social and private life and of approaching the economy 
from the ethical perspective of Islam. This professional association was therefore 
perceived as a potential threat to the Turkish military, Kemalism and the principle of 




officials suspected of supporting Islamic movements and groups were identified and 
deprived of public procurements for bids such as food purchases for the military (Bugra, 
1998: 534). 
The same cleavage can be seen among the trade unions of the working class. On 
the one side, as Duran and Yildirim (2005: 228) explained, HAK-IS endeavoured to 
create ‘Islamic unionism’ or “a unionism based on national values” as an alternative to 
left-wing worker syndicates. The support of HAK-IS for the JDP can be seen in many 
current political debates. For instance, HAK-IS signed the declaration of the National 
Will Platform (Milli İrade Platformu) with MUSIAD in order to support Erdogan in the 
2014 presidential elections (Karakus, 2014). On the other side, we see labour syndicates 
such as Turk-Is and DISK siding with TUSIAD in supporting the interference by the 
Turkish Armed Forces in politics on the pretext of defending laicism in the 1997 coup 
(Cicioglu & Bayraktar, 2017: 57). It can be argued that the class struggle can be seen 
between the different religious/cultural camps of the same classes as well as between 
the upper and lower classes. The point that religious/cultural elements played an 
important role in the class struggle is very significant for this current research to 
comprehend the role of religion in the hegemonic class struggle.  
Consequently, as the literature about the class structure in Turkey introduced 
above shows, different classes in Turkey are characterised by different cultural and 
religious identities. Nasr (2009: 248) suggested that “Turkey today hosts little in the 
form of class warfare, poor versus the rich; all that has been replaced by the clash of two 
middle classes, their tastes and habits, political preferences, and their contending visions 
of society and the economy”. Therefore, the main issue for these rival classes is getting 
the consent of the masses in accordance with their own religious and cultural values, 
beliefs and discourses to maintain their class dominance in society. Thus, rival classes 
need to determine hegemonic strategies for their class dominance and it is these which 
are the main concern of this current study. Within the context of this hegemonic 
struggle, the Gramscian theory of hegemony provides the appropriate theoretical tools 
for us to research and comprehend how these rival classes sought to gain the consent of 




2. A Review of the Literature 
2.1. The Literature on the Hegemony-based Studies about 
the case of Turkey 
So far in this chapter, the literature which has depicted the structure of social 
classes and the class struggle in Turkey has been presented with the aim of bridging the 
gap between theory and practice. By this means, we have determined the class-based 
understanding of society in Turkey on which the current research is constructed. We can 
now go beyond the detection of class struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
and the rising Islamic middle class and consider the literature which has detected the 
efforts of those dominant classes to gain the consent of the subordinate classes for the 
sustainable maintenance of dominance in the long term. To achieve this, hegemony-
oriented studies of the case of Turkey will be presented and discussed next. 
Although they have focused on different periods of Turkish politics, there are 
significant studies in the literature which have explored the efforts of the Kemalist bloc 
to establish cultural hegemony in society in Turkey’s history (Erdogan, 2009; Yalman, 
2002a; Yalman, 2002b; Parlak, 2005; Yegen, 2009; Celik, 2009; Dogan, 2011; Damar, 
2012; Ciftci, 2013; Ciftci, 2015).  
Among those studies, Yalman (2002a; 2002b) approached the issue of 
hegemony from an historical perspective by going back to the early period of the 
Republic. Yalman (2002a; 2002b) studied economic development strategies as the 
designs of hegemony for reconstructing social integrity throughout the whole history of 
the Republic. He asserted that the etatism (statism), which was based on the creation of 
an historic bloc in power to realise economic development and create an organic 
society, was a hegemonic project in Gramscian terms (Yalman, 2002a: 10). His 
significant contribution to the literature was his remark that we should not restrict the 
issue of an historic bloc to only democratic capitalist state types and particular 
economic policies (Yalman, 2002a: 11).  
Another significant contribution made by Yalman (2002a: 14) was his emphasis 
on the prevailing authoritarian characteristic of the state from the early days of the 




shift from a one-party system to a multi-party system in 1950. He explained that “this 
change of government hardly involved any change in the balance of forces either within 
the Turkish power bloc or between the latter and the masses” (Yalman, 2002b: 32-33). 
This observation is significant for the current study since it warns against equating the 
change in the government with a change in the deeper control of the state apparatus 
when seeking to understand the process of the transition from a war of position to war 
of manoeuvre. In Chapter 6, which is about legislation, we shall seek to understand the 
extent to which the JDP was able to challenge the structural constraints stemming from 
legislation on the terrain of Islam. Chapter 6 will therefore form a test for understanding 
the extent of change in the power balance of the hegemonic bloc. 
Erdogan (2009) made a significant contribution to the literature by exploring the 
efforts of the Kemalists in the 1990s to encircle the civil sphere in order to further the 
consensual relationship between the Kemalist state apparatus and society. This is 
significant for the current study because the post-28 February process was determined 
to be the most appropriate period to study in order to understand the Kemalist 
hegemony. However, he separated neo-Kemalism from Kemalism and presented neo-
Kemalism as the hegemonic version of the Kemalism which emerged in the 1990s and 
attached more importance to producing consent in civil society. We agree with Erdogan 
that Kemalism attached special importance to the sphere of civil society in the 1990s. 
As Damar (2012: 48) pointed out, however, manufacturing consent was a deliberate 
goal to ensure a laicist Kemalist hegemony even in the most authoritarian phase of the 
single-party period. In Chapter 6, the use of legislation in the post-28 February era will 
be discussed in order to show how Kemalism became unrivalled in the sphere of civil 
society in parallel with how the goals of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and Kemalist 
civil society began to initiate the civil society dimension of the Kemalist hegemony.  
According to Erdogan (2009: 585), the deepening of Kemalism in society was 
only possible through popular-consensual sources and civil society organisations such 
as the Association of Kemalist Thought (Ataturkcu Dusunce Dernegi) and the 
Association for the Support of Contemporary Living (Cagdas Yasami Destekleme 
Dernegi) which provided civil support for the Kemalist restoration led by the state 
apparatus. How the Kemalist discourse reached the religious families which had no 




which needs to be answered. More comprehensive attention to this point is needed in 
order to understand the diffusion of the official discourse. 
Erdogan (2009: 586) also pointed out that neo-Kemalist discourse divided the 
political sphere into two antagonistic camps as laicist/anti-laicist, pro-Republic/anti-
Republic, modern/reactionary and nationalist/separatist. The Kemalists were positioned 
on one side of this dichotomy and radical Islamists, Kurdish nationalists and second 
republican liberals were positioned on the other. The current research makes a 
significant contribution to the literature by tracing the reflection of this dichotomy on 
the terrain of religion within the textbooks of the RCMK lessons and revealing the 
evolution of the dichotomy in the JDP period. 
Erdogan’s (2009: 585) study was also important for highlighting the efforts of 
neo-Kemalism to create a civil pedagogy to accompany the modern state pedagogy of 
Kemalism. As he commented, support for eight years of compulsory education, 
campaigns for education and bursaries served that civil pedagogy. Those efforts for civil 
pedagogy cannot be thought of separately from the education policies of the state in the 
post-28 February process. This current study is designed to reveal the legislation which 
contributed to the dominance of Kemalism over civil society in order to realise civil 
pedagogy. 
Ciftci (2013:149-154) gave a direct reference to Gramsci’s concept of cultural 
hegemony and approached the issue of Kemalist cultural hegemony from an historical 
perspective by discussing the social and political events sequentially, starting with the 
era of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire until the 2010s. Although he did not refer 
directly to the distinction between structural hegemony and hegemonic projects 
underlined by Joseph (2002), he did depict Kemalist hegemony as a structural 
hegemony by arguing that the JDP and similar political parties can “function merely as 
interim period parties in the democratic system”. He added that “This is because the 
historical experience and social dynamics verify the Kemalist ideology and its 
practices” and according to him, the state structure and social dynamics of Kemalism 
will always find an opportunity to remain permanent and re-exist more powerfully 
following each retreat (Ciftci, 2013: 169). Ciftci’s conclusion could be strengthened by 
applying the theoretical discussions of Joseph (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) regarding the 




a detailed assessment of hegemonic projects will be offered by considering the limits 
determined by deeper structural hegemonies. 
Ciftci (2013; 2015) reached a similar conclusion to that of the current study in 
terms of categorising the Kemalist hegemony as a structural cultural hegemony. 
However, he justified this conclusion by relating it only to the qualifications of 
Kemalism and by pointing out the success of Kemalism in solving the problems of 
society with examples from the historical processes. He did not present empirical data 
on how the consensual relationship was established between the Kemalists and Turkey’s 
devout Muslim-majority population. The persuasive efforts of the Kemalists and the 
cultural hegemony instruments used in the process of persuasion therefore need to be 
analysed in detail beyond simply noting the existence of the Kemalist cultural 
hegemony. This current study is designed to fill this gap by focusing on the construction 
of consent in the late 1990s when the Kemalist hegemony was at its peak.  
Unlike the studies discussed above which confirmed the Kemalist cultural 
hegemony, Yegen (2009: 56) approached the discussion of Kemalist hegemony with 
scepticism by questioning whether or not Kemalism had displayed the performance of a 
hegemonic ideology in the history of Turkey. According to him, there was no sign in the 
early period of the Republic to show that Kemalism had referred to a national-popular 
collective will (Yegen, 2009: 59-60). However, the state bureaucracy was aware of the 
gap between society and the radical laicism, ethnic nationalism and authoritarian 
centralism of Kemalist ideology. Community Centres (Halkevleri) and Village Institutes 
(Koy Enstituleri) could be regarded as an attempt to close this gap (Yegen, 2009: 61). 
According to Yegen (2009: 65), following the failure of Kemalism and the 
victory of the Democrat Party in the 1950 general elections, Kemalism became a loose 
and less systematic set of ideas, rather than a comprehensive rehabilitation and 
construction project until the 1990s. Yegen (2009: 67) claimed that 
Kemalism/Ataturkism had not constituted the basis of the programmes embraced by 
Turkish society from 1950 until the mid-1990s. 
In the mid-1990s, however, Kemalism, with a strong emphasis on the symbol of 
Ataturk, became a significant element of a systematic regeneration and construction 




study is designed to show empirically the Kemalist symbolism based on the image of 
Ataturk by focusing on the mid-1990s. Yegen (2009: 70) argued that Kemalism revived 
in the mid-1990s as a response to the challenges by political Islam and Kurdish 
separatism to its modern, national and secular state-society model. This process also 
provided momentum for popular support for the 28 February 1997 coup d’état. 
Although Kemalism was embraced by civil society and was able to be diffused 
throughout society in a consent-based relationship, Yegen (2009: 71) was still sceptical 
about whether Kemalism was hegemonic or not. The current study will reveal the 
comprehensive and systematic process of discourse construction for the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc as a response to whether or not the heterogenic character of the 
Kemalists prevented them from being hegemonic. 
Damar (2012: 48) studied the development of Kemalist laicism and endeavoured 
to show the uniqueness of the Turkish model with reference to two periods: the early 
period of the Republic and the post-1990s. Damar (2012: 30-31) introduced the term 
‘Orientalist Fantasy’ to explain the discursive and ideological power which maintained 
the antagonism on which the Kemalist laicism was constructed. He analysed the laicist 
discourse of the Republic elites regarding the Hat Law enacted in the early Republican 
era by the method of post-structuralist discourse analysis. He also discussed the 
Orientalist fantasy with reference to the laicist discourse of Kemalism regarding the 
veiling issue as the liberator of Muslim women after the 1990s. He sought to understand 
how the feelings of harassment and fear regenerated the Orientalist fantasy. In the 
opposite way to Damar (2012) who focused on the antagonisms between Islam and 
Kemalist laicism, we emphasised the efforts of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc to find 
common ground with the pious Muslims and to reconcile Kemalist values with Islam.  
In a similar way to Damar (2002), Celik (2009) also approached the issue of 
hegemony by discussing the discursive dimension of Kemalism beginning from the 
foundation of the Republic. She discussed how the discourse on each principle of 
Kemalism was constructed. However, she did not position her study in relation to the 
wider discussion about the power relations and class struggle taking place in Turkey. 
Understanding cultural hegemony also necessitates understanding how consent for the 




current study, provides the opportunity to discuss the discourse regarding Kemalist 
principles with reference to their role on dominance and the class struggle. 
In the literature, it is also possible to find studies which focused specifically on 
the relationship between hegemony and education (Parlak, 2005; Dogan, 2011). By 
applying the theories of Gramsci, Foucault and Althusser to the context of Turkey, 
Dogan (2011) studied how the idea of ‘state’ was constructed within school textbooks. 
He concentrated on the period from the Ottoman Empire era to early Republican era. 
The main shortcoming of his study, however, was its brevity, which meant that the 
textbooks could not be analysed in detail. Moreover, although he detected the efforts of 
the dominant class to provide legitimacy to the state apparatus by using Islamic 
references in political texts (Dogan, 2011: 2086) and school textbooks (Dogan, 2011: 
2087), he did not use a specific method and did not provide a detailed analysis of the 
discourses about the role of Islam on how the state perception was constructed in those 
texts. The textbooks of RCMK lessons might give more detail in order to reveal the 
attempt to legitimate the state apparatus by instrumentalising the Islamic discourse. This 
current study, which dedicates one chapter to the analysis of the RCMK textbooks, 
provides a detailed insight into the construction of the Islamic discourse about the state 
for the legitimation of the state. 
In addition to Dogan’s (2011) investigation of discourse construction in the 
textbooks in general, Parlak (2005) studied the same period of the Republic but 
concentrated on a specific lesson. Parlak’s (2005) findings made a significant 
contribution to the literature by emphasising the construction of Kemalist cultural 
hegemony in the History and Civic Knowledge lessons in the early period of the 
Republic between 1928 and 1946. As a research method, he applied the content analysis 
method to the textbooks of History and Civic Knowledge lessons. In those textbooks, 
Parlak (2005: 180- 441) analysed contents such as Kemalist principles, nationalism, 
state, nation, homeland, democracy, domestic and external enemies, Kemalist 
revolutions and the margins of the Republic by means of Gramscian lenses. 
First, the current study differs from that of Parlak (2005) in terms of the period 
studied. The 1990s were significant in terms of the rising identity politics in the society 
as it was the period of the Islamic and Kurdish revival (Erdogan & Ustuner, 2002). 




Republican period. It can therefore be argued that a tougher hegemonic struggle has 
taken place since then.  
Among those studies which sought to comprehend the political history of Turkey 
in a hegemony-oriented understanding, those which concentrated on the period of the 
JDP (Tugal, 2009; Akca, 2014; Hosgor, 2014; Kucukali, 2014; Hosgor, 2015b; Ciftci, 
2013; Ciftci, 2015; Kucukali, 2015; Cinar 2016) are also very significant for the current 
study to identify the gaps and locate this research and its findings in the literature. 
Akca’s (2014) study, which traced hegemonic projects in the post-1980 period, 
is important for evaluating the success of the JDP’s hegemonic project. He stated the 
criteria for accepting that a hegemonic project is successful as unifying different 
factions of the bourgeois classes, gaining the consent of the subordinate classes 
excluded in economic and political terms, and ensuring the articulation of socio-
political topics to its hegemonic project. Based on those criteria, Akca (2014: 31) 
claimed that the JDP was successful in uniting different factions of the dominant classes 
ranging from the Istanbul-based, large-scale bourgeois class to the medium- and small-
scale bourgeoisie with urban conservative Muslims and a secular middle class which 
had upward social mobility opportunities. However, it is not easy to argue such a linear 
and sustainable success for the JDP when we consider the attitudes of TUSİAD, as the 
representative of the secular Istanbul bourgeoisie, and of the chairmen of large-scale, 
Istanbul-based companies to the situations and events arising from the disagreements on 
the issues of lifestyle and religion. For instance, Mustafa Koc, the chairman of Turkey’s 
largest-scale company, criticised the JDP government severely for causing religious-
oriented disputes and questioned the JDP’s commitment to laicism in 2006 (Boland, 
2006). Similarly, TUSIAD released a press statement expressing deep concern about the 
conservation of the principle of laicism due to the JDP’s desire to nominate Abdullah 
Gul, one of the founders of the party, as a candidate for the Presidency of Turkey and 
the businessmen’s association urged the JDP government to call an early general 
election in 2007 (TUSIAD, 2007). As can be seen from these examples, the conflict 
which required a special focus originated from religion and lifestyle. 
Second, Akca (2014: 31) argued that the JDP was “particularly successful in 
gaining the consent of the most unorganised and informal sections of the working class, 




word ‘unorganised’ is key here, since the JDP was not able to unite all organised 
subordinate classes as can be seen from the instance of workers loyal to DISK. At this 
point, the main distinction between different organised subordinate classes was their 
ideology and their attitude towards religion. Therefore, under the same neo-liberal 
policies, what differentiated the attitudes of different subordinate classes to the neo-
liberal policies of the JDP governments was their distance from the values and 
religiosity of the JDP cadres.  
Akca (2014: 32) also acknowledged the success of the JDP in articulating 
matters originating from identity politics to its hegemonic project, to gain the assent of 
the devout-conservative Turkish and Kurdish populations. On this, the current study 
complements that of Akca since it provides an empirical opportunity to test the success 
of such an articulation of matters on the terrain of Islam to the hegemonic project by 
constructing a unifying Islamic discourse for the disadvantaged groups, namely devout 
Turks and devout Kurds, affected by the secular nation-building process. 
Ciftci (2013; 2015) was another scholar who evaluated the success of the JDP’s 
hegemonic project just as Akca (2014) had done. He presented the JDP as the first actor 
in the history of Turkey to have the capacity to create a counter-hegemonic challenge to 
the Kemalist hegemony in Gramscian terms. To explain how the JDP sought to 
construct a cultural hegemony, he chronologically sorted the incidents from 2002 and 
subjectively interpreted them without explaining how they served the obtaining of 
consent, and equated the establishment of hegemony only to seizing control of specific 
state institutions. Equating hegemony to the seizure of specific state institutions is 
problematic since it does not explain the “moral and intellectual leadership” needed for 
the establishment of hegemony according to Gramsci (1971: 57).  Moreover, Ciftci 
(2013: 168-169; 2015: 30) ended both of his studies with the argument that Erdogan and 
political Islamism would retreat, without explaining the re-shifting of hegemony from 
the JDP to Kemalists and without presenting the reasons for such a retreat.  
Hosgor (2014) studied the crisis and discussed the shortcomings of the JDP’s 
hegemonic project starting with the conditions which had brought the JDP to power. A 
significant contribution of Hosgor’s study was the discussion which it brought to the 
literature that the success of the JDP’s hegemonic project did not follow a stable 




(2014: 299-301), political and economic reforms following the economic crisis in 2001 
and the JDP’s ability to reconcile the interests of different economic actors resulted in 
an increase in its hegemonic capacity. She also underlined the influence of the EU 
membership process on the construction of the party image to gain the consent of 
different segments of society (Hosgor, 2014: 301). As the reformist and pro-democracy 
image of the JDP became eroded and its enthusiasm for membership of the EU began to 
decrease, however, the party faced severe criticisms from left-liberal circles and pro-EU 
intellectuals (Hosgor, 2014: 322). Hosgor (2014: 313) insisted that the JDP’s hegemonic 
project could not succeed in unifying different segments of society. Instead it was based 
on the polarisation of society and the consolidation of its own grassroots. When the 
social and political tensions in Turkey’s recent history, especially in the post-28 
February era including the period of the JDP governments, are taken into account, it can 
be seen that such a polarisation emerged because of the varieties in lifestyle and 
religiosity. The current study therefore provides a detailed explanation of the limits of 
the JDP’s hegemonic project and the shortcomings of its culture construction by 
emphasising the issue of Islam which constitutes the main cleavage axis in society.  
Similar to Damar (2002) and Celik (2009) who emphasised the discursive 
dimension of Kemalist hegemony, Kucukali (2014; 2015) studied the discursive 
hegemonic strategies in the JDP period. He analysed ministerial speeches, party group 
speeches and election rally speeches given between 2011 and 2012 using the discourse-
historical approach (DHA), a type of CDA. Although he considered the religious 
discourse used by the JDP in those speeches, he did not focus solely on religious 
discourse. Kucukali (2014: 206) also discussed the pragmatic character of the JDP’s 
religious discourse and argued that the party could instrumentalise and even neglect 
Islamic discourse in different situations. Unlike Kucukali’s studies, the current study 
puts the terrain of Islam at the centre of the analysis and seeks to understand the shift in 
the discourse over a longer period, from the 28 February 1997 process to 2015. 
Differing from the Gramscian understanding of hegemony in the hegemony-
based literature, some studies have also attempted to explain the maintainability of the 
JDP’s position as the incumbent party by referring to the concept of ‘electoral 
hegemony’ (Keyman, 2010; Muftuler-Bac & Keyman, 2012; Keyman, 2014; Keyman 




hegemony’ in the JDP period as “the increasing gap between the incumbent party and 
opposition parties in terms of their capacity to win elections and govern Turkey” and as 
“the increasing frustration of the supporters of the opposition parties, especially the 
secular-urban-educated middle classes voting for the CHP [RPP]” (Keyman, 2010: 
101). In this definition, Keyman put more emphasis on the despair of the opposition 
groups and neglected the consent of the allied groups. Cinar (2016: 1216) similarly 
described the JDP as a hegemonic party after specifying the criteria for succeeding in 
‘electoral hegemony’ as winning the majority of seats in parliament in consecutive 
elections, gaining the ability to shape the national agenda with specific public policies, 
possessing bargaining power in the system and having authoritarian tendencies. 
From the definitions in these studies, it is possible to detect two significant 
shortcomings of the concept of ‘electoral hegemony’ compared with the Gramscian 
understanding of cultural hegemony when seeking to comprehend the hegemonic 
struggle in Turkey: First, the concept neglects the distinction between winning an 
election and seizing power over the state apparatus. Second, it puts no emphasis on the 
construction of discourse, which is a necessary condition for sustainable long-term 
hegemony. 
As can be seen from the most prominent hegemony-oriented studies which 
focused on the case of Turkey, the terrain of Islam is often neglected in studies which 
sought to understand how the Kemalist hegemonic bloc managed to persuade the pious 
Muslims and how the JDP sought to challenge the Kemalist cultural hegemony and 
construct a new social and moral system. Islam has a significant capacity to challenge 
any political orders with its large number of members, social mores and political 
ideology, philosophical methodology and distinct perception of the world (Evans, 2011: 
1752-1753). Islam therefore has the power to challenge the common sense and to 
construct an alternative to the dominant paradigms. A significant contribution of the 
current study to the literature is that it locates Islam at the centre of the analysis. In the 
next part, the place of the current study in the literature which included Islam and Islam-





2.2. The Literature on Hegemony-based Studies of Islam 
So far in this chapter, studies tracing the efforts of two main actors, the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc and the JDP, for the production of consent and the establishment of 
cultural hegemony in a general sense have been reviewed. The need has been stressed 
for special emphasis on the terrain of Islam in the production of consent, which was 
overlooked in previous hegemony-based studies investigating the case of Turkey. In this 
section, attention will be directed more specifically to the elements of Islam, Islamism 
and Muslimness in the literature reporting the hegemonic/ideological/political use of 
those elements. The starting point is the hegemony-based Gramscian approaches to the 
topics of Islam, Islamism and Muslimness across the world. Attention will then turn to 
the case of Turkey in order to identify the gaps in the literature which this current study 
is designed to fill. 
One of the prominent studies in the Gramscian literature is that of Butko (2004), 
who traced the rise of political Islam and brought a Gramscian approach to Islam as a 
counter-hegemonic force. He emphasised that contemporary Islamic theorists gained 
inspiration from Gramscian theory to develop an Islamic revolutionary and counter-
hegemonic ideological system which had the capacity not only to challenge and 
overthrow the existing secular systems, but also to construct a new social and moral 
system and a different type of human being (Butko, 2004: 42).  
After setting three prerequisites for the construction of a successful Gramscian 
counter-hegemonic bloc, ideology, organisation and strategy, Butko (2004) set out to 
find those prerequisites in the views of the key Islamic thinkers who had a significant 
influence on the ideological background of the Islamist movements. Pointing out the 
importance of the construction and dissemination of Islamic discourse and of educating 
the masses as examples of the Gramscian war of position (Butko, 2004: 57), he 
introduced jihad (holy struggle) as the ultimate phase of the revolutionary process, in 
other words as the phase of ‘war of manoeuvre’ (Butko, 2004: 59-60). Butko’s findings, 
however, are not fully applicable to the case of Turkey. Although such an ultimate goal 
can be valid for cases such as Egypt and Iran, specifying the ultimate goal of the JDP in 
the case of Turkey as the jihad is disputable taking into account the position and 
discourses of the party in the fifteen years of its incumbency period. In those fifteen 




Cinar, 2003: 327) and the Turkish laicist hegemony successfully absorbed Turkish 
Islamism (Tugal, 2009: 235). Second, unlike the current study which regards Islam as 
an area of operation by both laicists and the JDP, Butko (2004) depicted political Islam 
solely as an active ideology of counter-hegemony which guided the Islamists in their 
struggle against the laicist hegemons. 
Like Butko (2004), Evans (2011) also investigated the counter-hegemonic 
dimension of Islam. Evans (2011: 1772) suggested that the fear of Islam which is seen 
in neo-liberal societies does not stem from a fear of violence, but from concern about 
Islam’s capacity to create a counter-hegemonic challenge to the neo-liberal system. The 
most significant point for the current study is that Evans (2011: 1752-1753) identified 
the exceptional position of Islam within resistance groups against the neo-liberal world 
order as “its vast membership, its potential as a global mass movement, and its 
distinctive and complex tradition of religious belief, political ideology, social norms, 
world outlook, and philosophical method”. This confirms the significance of Islam in 
the construction of a total paradigm which covers every aspect of the material world and 
the creation of an alternative conception of the world with its own norms, ideology and 
methodology against the common sense of hegemonic neo-liberalism. On the other 
hand, it is difficult to apply Evans’s findings to the case of Turkey since the JDP does 
not have an exact resistance to neo-liberalism. On the contrary, the party maintains the 
neo-liberal policies and supports the Anatolian bourgeoisie.   
Ayoob (2007) traced the anti-hegemonic capacity of political Islam within the 
issue of the north/south divide on the international level and considered the influence of 
Islam in terms of both ideology and political action. Similar to socialism, Islam is able 
to mobilise the Muslim people on behalf of God and by this means to challenge the 
domination of the north (Ayoob, 2007: 631). Ultimately, he claimed that political Islam 
also has the capacity to be an anti-hegemonic alternative for non-Muslim southern 
countries if the hegemonic policies of the north continue as they are now (Ayoob, 2007: 
641-642). The current study focuses on the domestic level by investigating the capacity 
of Islam to mobilise the pious Muslims and the efforts of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
to minimise this mobilising power of Islam. 
Of studies which shifted their attention from the international level to the 




Brotherhood in Egypt from 1928, when the movement was born, until 1953, when 
Egypt achieved independence from British colonial rule. He argued that the Muslim 
Brotherhood became an instance of Gramsci’s theory by developing a counter-
hegemonic project in four areas. First, the Muslim Brotherhood introduced an Islamic 
model of national governance and a constitution shaped by Islamic principles (Simms, 
2002: 579). Second, it designed an education system in line with the Qur’an which 
would liberate people from the mental oppression of the status quo (Simms, 2002: 580). 
Third, by creating an Islamic theology, the Brotherhood raised an ideational reference 
point to question the existing socio-cultural order in Egypt which had dominated people 
(Simms, 2002: 580). Finally, he argued that the Brotherhood determined jihad, which is 
defined as holy war in Islamic understanding, as the measure of last resort when it is not 
possible to defend the faith with non-violent methods. Simms interpreted the strategy of 
the Brotherhood as a contribution to Gramscian theory, since Gramsci neglected the 
possibility of overthrowing the state by force which would emerge as a result of the 
mobilising power of Islam in the counter-hegemonic struggle (Simms, 2002: 580-581).  
Simms’s (2002) findings might not be applicable to the case of the JDP since the 
JDP had not endeavoured to create a sharp break from the existing hegemonic values 
from the beginning. Rather, as Chapters 5 and 6 will show, the party preferred a gradual 
change and even maintained the existing elements in some cases in the official 
paradigm. More importantly, overthrowing the existing regime by force has never been 
an option for any of the Islamist movements in Turkey. 
Like Simms (2002), Kandil (2011) also focused on Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood 
between 1982 and 2007. Discussing the reasons for the Brotherhood’s failure to come to 
power, however, he sought to show the shortcomings of the Gramscian approach to 
counter-hegemonic strategies inspired by many Islamist movements (Kandil, 2011: 55-
59). He suggested that the Brotherhood had successfully transformed the viewpoint of 
the masses and gained their support (Kandil, 2011: 55-56). According to him, however, 
the result was the state’s use of coercive and disciplinary instruments against them, 
especially within the sphere of civil society (Kandil, 2011: 56). Similar coercive 
methods were applied against the Islamist movement in Turkey in the post-28 February 
era, such as political bans against the administrators of the WP and the closure of 




movements in the history of Turkey have never been to clash violently with the state 
apparatus. Moreover, it can be argued that the JDP was partly successful in the war of 
position within its three terms in office. It is therefore not possible to test Kandil’s 
(2011) findings regarding the shortcomings of Gramscian theory in explaining the 
counter-hegemonic movements. 
In the case of Turkey, significant studies in the literature have sought to 
understand Islam, the concepts related to Islam or Islamic institutions as an element of 
ideological, cultural and political domination (Gulalp, 2002; Akpinar, 2007; Tugal, 
2009; Dressler, 2011; Basdemir, 2011; Damar, 2012; Moudouros, 2014; Lukuslu, 
2016). It should be noted that Tugal’s (2009) study among those reviewed under this 
topic is the only one to have brought a Gramscian approach to the topic of Islam (Tugal, 
2009).  
Tugal’s (2009) was one the most prominent studies which had a hegemony-
oriented understanding of Turkish politics. He used ethnography as a research method 
and made systematic observations in Sultanbeyli, an Islamist-conservative district in 
Istanbul (Tugal, 2009). He analysed “the transformation of Islamists in a previously 
radical district” (Tugal, 2009: 2) and by this means sought to understand “the transition 
from Islamism to (economically) liberal and (culturally) conservative Islam” in this area 
(Tugal, 2009: 10). 
Although Tugal (2009) detected the existence of the Kemalist hegemony, his 
study focused primarily on the rise of Islamism and the power shift from the Kemalists 
towards the JDP. According to Tugal (2009: 36), a strong laicist hegemony was 
established in the Republican era through the state apparatus to obtain the consent of 
citizens. The goal was to construct an urbanised, secular culture, to assert Turkishness 
as the most significant identity and to de-emphasise the economic differences by 
emphasising loyalty to Ataturk. On the other hand, he argued that Islamists were 
absorbed by neo-liberal laicism and the laicist bourgeoisie (Tugal, 2009: 51-56). He 
referred to the shift from radical Islam to a moderate, pro-western and pro-neoliberal 
model of Islam as a “passive revolution” (Tugal, 2009: 51-56).  
First, in contrast to the focus of the current study which considers the whole 




on the Islamist segments of society. Also, whereas Tugal sought to comprehend the 
transformation of the Islamists, the current study is designed to understand the 
transformation within the mechanisms and instruments of cultural hegemony and 
therefore targets the structures within which the individuals, Islamists and laicists, act. 
The current study also differs from Tugal’s work in terms of research method 
and case studies. Unlike Tugal’s study, those individuals who do not have an 
ideological affiliation yet, such as the students who attend RCMK lessons, are also 
within the scope of the current study as a part of the population which is affected by the 
cultural hegemonic policies. Moreover, CDA, the research method used here, enables us 
to understand how the transformation of the mechanisms and instruments of cultural 
hegemony is related to the class struggle in Turkey. 
Gulalp (2002) investigated Islam’s role as a political ideology and sought to 
understand the variations of this Islamic ideology which emerged from the nineteenth-
century Ottoman period through the history of Turkey. Young Ottomans, realising the 
need for a modernisation process in the late Ottoman period, endeavoured to 
instrumentalise Islamic discourse for the articulation of Western ideas. This was 
because Islam was perceived as the requisite for social cohesion within the Ottoman 
society which was composed of a significant proportion of Muslim Arabs (Gulalp, 
2002: 25). Accepting Islam as an element of social cohesion necessitates a detailed 
analysis of how the discourse on Islam is constructed so that it can achieve such a social 
cohesion. The current research provides a detailed explanation of the construction of an 
Islamic discourse as the guarantor of social cohesion. 
He also argued that the Kemalists perceived Islam as a political threat and 
believed that it should be kept under control by the state after the establishment of the 
Republic (Gulalp, 2002: 28). However, the Kemalists’ instruments for controlling Islam 
are not explained. The current research provides a detailed analysis of how the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc sought to construct a discourse about Islam to minimise the threat 
which it posed to Kemalist values.   
Gulalp (2002: 31) introduced a modernist Islamist opposition which followed 
the same modernist goals as the Kemalists but was against the secular nationalist way of 




rejected modernism in an era when modernity had lost its momentum and become 
regarded as outdated globally and when authentic native culture was regarded as an 
important challenge to the hegemonic west. Gulalp approached Islam’s role as a 
political ideology merely with reference to its standpoint towards modernisation and 
westernisation. In other words, the ideological dimension of Islam was explained with 
reference to what it opposed rather than what it defended. That study therefore did not 
provide a detailed explanation of the different ideological elements which can be 
derived from Islam.  
Moudouros (2014) analysed ‘conservative democracy’ as the ideology of the 
JDP and traced the role of Islam and local values in the wider economic and political 
agenda of the JDP’s conservative democracy. He stated that “the strategic role of Islam 
is traced in the dialectic relation developing between the de-secularization of capitalism 
and its legitimization within the wider masses” (Moudouros, 2014: 844). He regarded 
Islam and other local values introduced by the JDP as instruments for ensuring the 
permanence of the principles of globalisation (Moudouros, 2014: 844) and for 
consolidating and expanding capitalist values on Anatolian land with an ideological 
cover called ‘conservative democracy’ (Moudouros, 2014: 847).  
In order to show how the party differed from the counter-hegemonic Islamist 
movements which, Butko (2004) and Evans (2011) pointed out, across the world aimed 
at challenging the neo-liberal order, and from the previous examples of Islamist parties 
in Turkey such as the Welfare Party, Moudouros’s identification of the JDP’s neo-
liberal position is significant. However, reducing Islam merely to an instrument for 
legitimising capitalism might result in ignoring Islam’s meaning as an end in itself for 
the JDP and the Islamic segments of the society. Moreover, Moudouros (2014) 
neglected the relationship between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and capitalism and 
Western values and depicted the JDP as the first pioneer and the only advocate of a 
global capitalist system. The intention of the current study is to reveal the Kemalists’ 
efforts to create an individualistic understanding of Islam in the RCMK textbooks used 
before 2002 to create Muslim individual customers for the market. The argument of 
Moudouros also ignored the JDP’s rising conflicts with the West in general and 




In addition to the studies discussed above which considered Islam as a political 
ideology, some of the studies in the literature traced political projects on the terrain of 
Islam by focusing on the issue of education (Lukuslu, 2016; Akpinar, 2007; Basdemir, 
2011).  
Lukuslu (2016) concentrated on education in order to understand the emergence 
of a ‘devout youth’ myth, a political and cultural project of the JDP in its third term 
between 2011 and 2014. Although Lukuslu’s (2016) study did not have a Gramscian 
theoretical framework, she did make significant observations about the transformation 
of national identity from a secularly defined one to an Islamicly defined one. She 
analysed the transformation under three sub-titles: the devout youth myth in political 
discourse, youth policies and education policies. She traced the discourse on ‘devout 
youth’ in several speeches given by Erdogan at different times (Lukuslu, 2016: 640). On 
the other hand, there is a need to research the extent to which the goal of ‘generating a 
devout youth’ in those speeches was actualised in the education system. The current 
study provides an opportunity to test the realisation of this goal by investigating the 
Islamic discourse in RCMK lessons. 
As youth policies, Lukuslu (2016: 641-642) cited events commemorating three 
historical battles, the Malazgirt victory, Sarikamis and Gallipolli, organised by the 
Ministry of Youth and Sport. Under the subtitle of education policies, Lukuslu (2016: 
643-644) very briefly discussed the reorganisation of middle and high schools, the 
reopening of Imam-Hatip schools and the FATIH project to integrate computer 
technology into public schools. In the current study, a more detailed investigation is 
carried out regarding the reorganisation of schools by critically analysing its effects on 
power relations.   
Similar to Lukuslu (2016), Akpinar (2007) also examined Imam-Hatip schools 
as the instrument for creating “good citizens and conscious Muslims”. To explore this 
instrumentalisation, she conducted several individual interviews with principals, 
teachers and students, and group interviews with students. The focus of her research 
was how the principals, teachers and students felt and thought about a variety of issues 
such as morality and relations with the opposite sex; how they perceived the social 
world, how they differentiated Imam-Hatip schools from other school types; and how 




sought to understand the main discourses of Imam-Hatip principals, teachers and 
students, rather than how the education system was designed. An Imam-Hatip school is 
a special school type which provides an intensive religious education and is generally 
preferred by devout families. It therefore provides very limited information about the 
content and extent of religious discourse in other school types. The current study, 
however, considers the education system itself using an holistic approach by going 
beyond the Imam-Hatip schools and seeking to understand the paradigm of education 
which all children face, regardless of their family’s stance on religion. 
Basdemir (2011: 59) studied religious education, which is one of the current case 
studies, with a special emphasis on how the topic of Alevism was treated in the 
curriculum. Basdemir (2011: 61-70) compared Turkey’s model of religious education 
with various models around the world and analysed the topics related to Alevism within 
the education curriculum. He found that the case of Turkey depended on education in 
the Sunni Hanafi school of Islam. The religious education based on the perspective of 
the official ideology accepted Islam as a homogeneous structure and endeavoured to 
standardise Muslims in Turkey, including the Alevi population, while differentiating 
them from the Muslims outside Turkey (Basdemir, 2011: 71).  
Basdemir’s study was successful in terms of reflecting the fundamental 
mentality of religious education in the case of Turkey, which can be summarised as the 
standardisation of the religious discourse and the creation of a single Muslim identity in 
order to close the gap between the different interpretations of Islam and the 
interpretation of the state, and thus the interpretation of the dominant class. However, 
there is a gap in the literature in terms of showing the standardisation of religious 
discourse within the education system, since Basdemir’s study presents only a partial 
explanation of the standardisation of religious discourse by focusing only on Alevism. 
Moreover, taking into account that the topic of Alevism was included in RCMK lessons, 
a more recent and detailed analysis of RCMK lessons is needed in order to understand 
how Alevism has been regarded as a target for the creation of an historic bloc. The 
current study fills this gap by critically analysing the texts related to the topic of 
Alevism in RCMK lessons and showing why the new curriculum failed to initiate a new 
historic bloc between the JDP and the Alevi population as the historical victims of the 




Similar to the discussion about legislation in Chapter 6, Dressler (2011) analysed 
the legal discourse on religion in Turkey but with a special emphasis on Turkish 
Alevism. Dressler (2011: 194-196) focused on the judicial process of the Cultural 
Association of the Union of Alevi and Bektasi Organisations (CAAB) over the closure 
issue. He showed how Alevism was defined in the Turkish courts and how the discourse 
on Alevism was constructed by the Turkish legal system. He also discussed the petition 
presented to the Prime Minister by the CEM Foundation about the issues regarding the 
Alevi population, such as the recognition of Cemevi as facility for worship (a specific 
prayer room used by Alevis) and the share for the Alevis from the budget of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. In the response to that petition, it was stated that 
Alevism was accepted as a part of Islam and thus special treatment for it was rejected by 
the Ministry (Dressler, 2011: 197). Finally, Dressler discussed the decision and the 
theological investigation of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) about the 
issue of Alevism with its historical roots and its relationship to Sunni Islam. The ECHR 
reached the decision that Alevism is regarded as within the Islamic tradition, influenced 
by particular Sufi figures, but possessing different religious practices from Sunni Islam 
in terms of pilgrimage, fasting and prayer. The ECHR, as a secular judicial authority, 
contributed to the construction of knowledge about Alevism, and by this means about 
religion (Dressler, 2011: 199). Dressler (2011: 200) defined this process as ‘religion-
making’.    
Although Dressler’s (2011) study was not hegemony-based, it is nevertheless 
very significant for revealing how the legal system, as a part of laic state organisation, 
constructs the discourse about religion. Therefore, Dressler’s concept of ‘religion-
making’ explains the process of intervention in the discourse on a religious belief from 
outside that belief. A Gramscian framework, on which the current study hinges, can be 
more useful for understanding the influence of religion-making on the creation of 
‘common sense’ and the construction of consent. By treating Islam as a whole, 
moreover, the current study seeks to fill the gap stemming from Dressler’s 
concentration on Alevism. We shall trace the official discourse of the state about Sunni 





After reviewing the prominent studies in the literature regarding the hegemonic 
and ideological dimensions of Islam and Islam-related issues, it might be beneficial to 
discuss the contributions of the current research to the literature in the light of the 
research question, which is; 
How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015?  
The current study treats Islam as the terrain/site of cultural hegemonic struggle. 
Treating Islam as ‘a site of cultural hegemony’ provides this research with two 
advantages. First, directing our attention from the actors of hegemonic projects, namely 
Islamists and Kemalists, to the site of the struggle will enable us to study on a larger 
population. Regardless of their religious or political stance, we investigate the whole 
population who are under the effect of cultural hegemonic projects. By this means, for 
instance, we can include pious Muslims who are under the influence of the hegemonic 
project of the laicist Kemalist hegemonic bloc. Similarly, we can also include secular 
people who are under the influence of the JDP’s hegemonic project. Moreover, we can 
also include people who have no ideological affiliation, such as school children and 
apolitical individuals. 
Second, the hegemony-based studies in the literature have concentrated only on 
the counter-hegemonic role of Islam (Simms, 2002; Butko, 2004; Ayoob, 2007; Tugal, 
2009; Evans, 2011; Kandil, 2011). In those studies, the discourse on Islam is not 
constructed from outside, but is determined from within by the Islamists themselves. 
Islam itself is therefore a challenger with its own perception of the world, rather than 
passively being challenged by the values of the hegemon. However, as the current study 
regards Islam as the site of hegemonic operations, it also becomes possible to identify 
interventions on the understanding of Islam from outside. It will also be possible to 
analyse the process of laicist discourse construction on Islam and Islam-related issues. 
The current study therefore provides an outlook for comprehending the efforts of 
both the laicist/Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP for the establishment of a cultural 
hegemony on the terrain of Islam. By examining the efforts of both the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc and the JDP, this study provides an opportunity to follow the evolution 
of the discourse on the terrain of Islam and to make a comparison between two different 




significant strength compared with other research methods to analyse how particular 
discourses are manipulated, consent is manufactured and dominance is legitimised on 
the terrain of Islam.29 
Moreover, to fill the gap caused by relatively shorter studies which have not 
provided detailed empirical data, this current study is expected to contribute to the 
literature by analysing a significant amount of empirical data within two significant case 
studies which influence people’s everyday lives: the textbooks of RCMK lessons as the 
site of the construction of the dominant discourse, and the legislation as the site of 
controlling and restricting alternative discourses. The RCMK lessons provide three 
significant advantages to the goals of this study. First, RCMK lessons have the capacity 
to reflect the fundamental paradigm of the whole education system since they are taught 
in every school type. Second, those lessons are comprehensive to the whole population 
since they are compulsory for all students regardless of their families’ religiousness. 
Third, analysing those lessons enables us to comprehend the dominant discourses which 
are presented to children who do not yet have any ideological affiliation. Those lessons 
are therefore important for understanding the deep structural cultural hegemony since 
they reveal long-term culture-construction policies. By means of these two case studies, 
this study goes beyond simply detecting the existence of cultural hegemony and seeks to 
understand the mechanisms of cultural hegemony in detail. Since the two cases which 
will be studied influence the whole of Turkish society, they will reveal a more inclusive 
picture than the previous works about how the cultural hegemony was established. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
In the previous chapters, the political history of Turkey with regard to the 
historical roots of the cultural hegemonic struggle was presented, the theoretical 
framework of the thesis was introduced and the literature regarding hegemony-based 
studies was discussed. It is now necessary to discuss the data and the methodology of 
the study in the light of the research question before conducting the research. Flick 
(2014: 145) described a research question as “a door to the research field under study”. 
A research question is a question to which the researcher endeavours to find possible 
answers throughout the process of collecting and analysing relevant data. All 
subsequent phases of the research are directed by the research question (Hennink, 
Hutter & Bailey, 2011: 33). The research question for this current study is;  
How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015?  
This research question addresses two issues: it problematizes how the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc had established cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam in the post-28 
February process, and it directs us to understand how the JDP has responded to the 
Kemalist cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam. By this means, we also seek to 
investigate the continuities and discontinuities in the hegemonic project of the JDP.      
The terrain of Islam is a vital area for anyone endeavouring to understand the 
consensual, tensional and from time to time conflicting relationship between centre and 
periphery in the case of Turkey. The terrain of Islam deserves special attention both for 
being a source of counter-hegemony for the pious Muslims and for being a targeted area 
of persuasion for laicist dominant groups. We therefore locate Islam as the site where 
the hegemonic struggle takes place at the centre of the research. 
Seeking to understand the manufacturing of consent on the terrain of Islam 
necessitates a special focus on the concept and construction of discourse.  Fairclough 
(1995: 95) stated that “discourse is itself a sphere of cultural hegemony” and success in 
the establishment of cultural hegemony depends on the ability to form discourse and 




tactics of legitimation, manipulation, production of consent and different discursive 
means of shaping the minds of individuals in favour of the power holder (Van Dijk, 
1995: 18). We can therefore trace such legitimation, manipulation and mind-shaping 
tactics for the aim of manufacturing consent on the terrain of Islam as a response to our 
research question. The ‘critical’ character of our discourse analysis enables us to go 
beyond mere detection of discourses and comprehend its influence on the maintenance 
of the existing class structure and sustainability of power and domination in the long 
term. That is to say, beyond simply detecting the discourses of the Kemalists and the 
JDP, we shall seek to understand how those discourses served the normalisation and 
internalisation of dominance and class privileges of the Kemalists for years and how the 
JDP responded to those discourses to challenge such dominance and privileges after 
2002.  
Miles and Huberman (1984: 42) pointed out that “knowing what you want to 
find out leads inexorably to the question of how you will get that information”. Thus the 
discussion on data and methodology becomes a key step for a researcher in order to find 
the possible responses to the research question. This chapter is dedicated to clarifying 
why particular data and methodology have been preferred. Throughout the chapter, the 
selection criteria and representativeness of the documents and texts, and the way of 
analysing those data, will be discussed. After starting with a brief discussion about what 
discourse refers to in the research, CDA will be explained in detail to show its 
advantages in a study which aims to comprehend a cultural hegemonic struggle. The 
chapter will end by explaining how the research method will be used in the case studies.  
 
1. Qualitative Data of the Research 
The data acquired in the research will be analysed in Chapters 5 and 6. In 
Chapter 5, we shall analyse the textbooks of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge 
(RCMK) lessons to understand how the dominant discourses on the terrain of Islam 
were created, disseminated and imposed on society by the Kemalists and how the 
creation, dissemination and imposition of those dominant discourses were challenged in 
the period of the JDP by 2015. In Chapter 6, the emphasis will be on legislation to 




disseminated, how dominant discourses maintained their monopoly in society, how 
alternative discourses on the terrain of Islam were restricted, and how the situation 
changed in JDP’s first three terms of office from 2002 until 2015. 
 
1.1. Textbooks of Religious Culture and Moral Knowledge 
Lessons 
In Chapter 5, we shall endeavour to comprehend the education system as the site 
for the imposition of the dominant discourses on the terrain of Islam and for the 
construction of ‘common sense’ on the terrain of Islam. Analysing education provides 
us with an opportunity to comprehend the cultural hegemonic efforts which target 
students who do not yet have an ideological affiliation. By this means, our case study 
goes beyond short-term dominant discourse construction targeting ideological groups 
and reveals a deeper and long-term manufacturing of consent in favour of the dominant 
class. Moreover, the extent of the construction of the dominant discourse in the 
education system also reveals the extent of the construction in the whole public domain, 
since the education system is capable of representing all public life by reflecting the 
dominant discourse within the public domain. 
After selecting education as one of the case studies of the research, RCMK 
lessons were selected as the area of study. According to the curriculum determined by 
the Turkish Ministry of National Education, RCMK lessons occupy two hours a week 
for students from fourth grade to eight grade and one hour a week from ninth grade to 
twelfth grade (Official Gazette, 1982a). RCMK lessons are the only lessons in which 
the issues of religion and laicism are specifically taught although similar topics are 
handled in a variety of lessons such as ‘Introduction to Social Studies’, ‘Social Studies’, 
‘National Security Knowledge’ and ‘Revolution History and Kemalism’ lessons. RCMK 
lessons therefore provide an advantage for understanding the official discourse of the 
state on the terrain of Islam compared with other lessons in the curriculum. 
The data in Chapter 5 comprise the textbooks of the RCMK lessons used by 
primary, middle and high-school students. In accordance with the goals of the study, 




textbooks which were used in the post-28 February process until 2002 when the JDP 
came to power. This period is important for two reasons: first, Kemalism reached its 
peak following the intervention of the Turkish military in politics on 28 February 1997. 
Second, the period was the last term before the JDP came to power. The second period 
is the 2014-15 academic year, which corresponds to the end of the JDP’s third term. By 
investigating the changes between 1997 and 2015, we might understand the ongoing 
cultural hegemonic struggle between the two actors. 
Considering that it is unfeasible to transform the values, beliefs, worldviews and 
perceptions of each and every student in parallel with the official values, beliefs, 
worldviews and perceptions of the state led by the dominant class, the main goal of 
analysing the data composed of the texts from the RCMK textbooks is not to detect the 
transformation of the values, beliefs, worldviews and perceptions of each and every 
student. As Giroux (1981: 94) stressed, a cultural hegemony is achieved by determining 
the content and form of discourse in the society and thus by positing specific ideas as 
universal and natural. The RCMK textbooks are therefore a useful tool for the dominant 
group in terms of being able to impose on students what the ‘mainstream’ is in the area 
of religion and more specifically of Islam. Accepting an attitude towards Islam as 
mainstream eases the normalisation of such an attitude. Students can accept the official 
attitude of the dominant class towards Islam as normal, ordinary and acceptable even if 
they and/or their family members have a different attitude to the same issue. By such a 
normalisation, students’ tendency to develop a revolutionary challenge in their future 
life against the values, beliefs, and ideas which they accept as mainstream can be 
expected to decrease. Consequently, consent is manufactured for the values, beliefs, 
worldviews and perceptions of the dominant class. In the current study, therefore, we 
are focusing on the construction of the ‘mainstream’, rather than on students at the 
individual level. 
One of the most significant criteria for selecting the textbooks of RCMK lessons 
as the data for research was their inclusiveness. The word ‘inclusiveness’ refers to the 
maximum number of people in the society who have a link to the documents which are 
analysed in this study. Under Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, RCMK lessons are 
compulsory for all grades in primary, middle and high schools (Official Gazette, 




attend these lessons and use the basic textbooks as the main learning resource. 
Moreover, as a consequence of the inclusiveness criterion, RCMK lessons are more 
preferable than other optional religious lessons in schools or in private courses, such as 
Qur’an courses. Since those private courses are optional, students whose families prefer 
not to send their children are excluded from them. RCMK lessons, however, are 
compulsory for all Muslim students regardless of the sect and religiosity of their family. 
In terms of inclusiveness, RCMK lessons are more advantageous compared with 
other types of dissemination of religious discourse. For instance, Friday sermons (hutbe) 
preached during Friday prayers in all mosques are determined by the Turkish 
Directorate of Religious Affairs but only have an effect on those people who attend 
Friday prayers. RCMK lessons, however, have an impact on all students aged between 
eight and eighteen.  
Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution brings state control and supervision for 
instruction and education in ethics and religion (Official Gazette, 1982a). In other 
words, the state has a direct impact on the content of education and instruction in 
religion and, from a Gramscian perspective, this content can be seen as a reflection of 
the world-views, values and beliefs of the power holders in the state apparatus. The 
content of the religious education therefore provides an opportunity to comprehend how 
the ruling groups dominate the discourses in religious education. Moreover, direct 
control and supervision by the state over RCMK lessons offer an advantage over private 
religious education opportunities provided by a variety of religious groups (cemaat). 
Although those private religious education facilities are supervised and controlled by 
the state, the curriculum of religious lessons taught in schools are directly determined 
by the state. 
 
1.2. Legislation 
In Chapter 6, the data will be drawn from legislation, namely the Turkish 
Constitution, laws, regulations and bylaws. The legislation texts which we shall analyse 
are determined from their impact on Islam, Islamic organisations, Islamic symbols and 




28 February 1997 to 2015, which corresponds to the end of JDP’s third term. When 
selecting the legislation, its validity was taken into account rather than its date of 
enactment. We shall therefore analyse legislation which is valid between 28 February 
1997 and 2015. 
Legislation is known as the site of sanction and coercion. In addition to these 
roles, legislation also possesses a discursive and normative character. Each legislation 
reflects the official discourse of the state, and accordingly the discourse of the 
hegemons. They are significant tools for positioning the values of hegemons as 
‘common sense’ values. Legislation imposes a particular vocabulary on society and 
determine the boundaries of acceptable and unacceptable discussion. In Chapter 6, we 
shall consider particularly the long-term hegemonic dimension of legislation rather than 
their short-term coercive dimension. As the example of the headscarf ban at universities 
shows, the short-term coercive outcome of the related law is the banning of women with 
headscarves from continuing their education at university. The long-term hegemonic 
effect of such a ban is manufacturing the discourse that religious women are not eligible 
for university education and by this means normalising the secondary position of 
religious women in society.  
Understanding the state apparatus is key to understanding the domination and 
hegemony relations in a society. One of the most important features of the laws is that 
they are enacted by specific organs of the state and can therefore be interpreted as the 
reflection of the “will of the state” (Heywood, 2000: 24). Being the ‘will of the state’ 
refers to ‘reflecting the world-view of the state’, in other words reflecting the world-
view of the power holders. The documents which are analysed in this study are 
therefore very important in terms of reflecting the world-view of the state apparatus and 
the hegemons who control it.  
Moreover, legislation possesses a direct effect on the instruments of counter-
hegemony, such as private religious education facilities, the media and mosques, and 
accordingly limit the expression of alternative discourses on the terrain of Islam in 
society. Foucault (1981: 52) pointed out that “in every society the production of 
discourse is at once controlled, selected, organised and redistributed by a certain number 
of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its 




procedures for controlling the production of discourse. So analysing the legislation is 
significant for understanding how the dominant group has monopolised discourse, 
limited the emergence of alternative discourses and maintained its privileged position in 
terms of procuring the acceptance of its values as normal and common sense.  
Another important feature of the laws is that they are binding upon all the 
citizens to whom they apply (Heywood, 2000: 25). Accordingly, legislation has an 
impact on the whole society rather than a specific group. If there is a law, regulation or 
a bylaw which regulates the religious practices and discourses in a society, each citizen 
who has a link to that religious practice or discourse is influenced by the law, regulation 
or bylaw.  
Furthermore, laws are compulsory and enforced by means of punishment and 
coercion; people have to obey all laws without an option of ignoring some of them 
(Heywood, 2000: 24-25). Consequently, legal documents have an absolute impact on 
citizens and are therefore the most effective tool of the ruling class on the lives of 
subordinate classes. They determine or restrict how citizens can practise their religion 
and how they can act in public with their religious identity.  
 
2. Research Method: Critical Discourse Analysis 
So far in this chapter, the data, namely the textbooks of RCMK lessons, and 
related legislation have been introduced and discussed. The second part of the chapter 
starts by clarifying what the notion of ‘discourse’ refers to in CDA. CDA will then be 
discussed as the chosen research method for this study. We shall seek to bridge the gap 
between CDA and the current study by discussing the relationship between the concept 
of cultural hegemony and CDA. We shall complete the chapter by revealing how we 





2.1. Discourse  
In a variety of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities, the concept of 
discourse has a very important place. The reason for its importance is its relevance to 
the role of language in people’s relationships with each other and with the world and 
thus to the creation and design of the cultural, political and social structure of societies 
(Hyland & Paltridge, 2011: 1).  
The term ‘discourse’ has a broader definition according to critical discourse 
analysts. Discourses are accepted as forms of social practice in CDA (Fairclough, 
Mulderrig & Wodak, 2011: 357). Discourses can create social reality and in order to 
comprehend social relationships, people need to refer to the discourses which create 
them (Phillips & Hardy, 2002: 3).  
A discursive event has a dialectical relationship with various elements of the 
circumstances, social structures and organisations by which it is framed. This dialectical 
relationship, however, is reciprocal, which means that, on the one hand, the 
circumstances, social structures and organisations shape the discursive event, and on the 
other they are also shaped by it (Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak, 2011: 357). In other 
words, discourse is both ‘socially shaped’ and ‘socially constitutive’: it forms elements 
of knowledge, circumstances and the relationships between and social identities of 
individuals and groups of individuals. Its constitutive character can be seen in terms of 
sustaining and reproducing the current situation in society or in terms of contributing to 
the transformation of it (Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak, 2011: 358).  
Gee’s (2000: 197) definition is significant in terms of pointing out how 
particular discourses are accepted as natural and normal, whereas others are otherised 
and marginalised:  
Discourses are characteristic (socially and culturally formed, but 
historically changing) ways of talking and writing about, as well as 
acting with and toward, people and things. These ways are circulated and 
sustained within various texts, artefacts, images, social practices, and 
institutions, as well as in moment-to-moment social interactions. In turn, 
they cause certain perspectives and states of affairs to come to seem or be 
taken as ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ and others to seem or be taken as ‘deviant’ 




or student, or a ‘normal’ prison, hospital, or school, at a given time and 
place). 
The socially constitutive character of discourse brings us to the standpoint that 
discourses are a set of different options, that is to say “the construction of any 
representation of reality is necessarily selective, entailing decisions as to which aspects 
of that reality to include and how to arrange them” (Barker & Galasinski, 2001: 65). 
Because it is selective, construction of discourse on any issue is not a neutral process. 
Moreover, what CDA focuses on is the ‘power resource’ aspect of language 
which is associated with socio-cultural change and ideology (Bryman, 2012: 536). 
Beyond being solely a statement of social practice, according to Jäger & Maier (2009: 
35), discourses result in the “exercise of power”. Link (1983: 60, in Jäger & Maier: 
2009: 35) highlighted the relationship between discourse and power by defining the 
notion as “an institutionalised way of talking that regulates and reinforces action and 
thereby exerts power”. Discursive acts can have a significant role in the restoration, 
justification and perpetuation of the status quo or they can be used to transform the 
status quo (Barker & Galasinski, 2001: 65). This makes CDA vital for cultural 
hegemony research.  
Foucault (1981: 52) stated that the control, selection, organisation and 
redistribution of discourses are achieved by means of several procedures in order to 
assert dominance over them and to defuse their power and negative risks. He suggested 
that it is possible to witness procedures of these kinds in every society. Foucault (1981: 
52-53) explained why power holders endeavour to control discourses to assert 
dominance over them by stating that;  
Discourse is not simply that which manifests (or hides) desire - it is also 
the object of desire; and since, as historians constantly teaches us, 
discourse is not simply that which translates struggles or systems of 
domination, but is the thing for which and by which there is struggle, 
discourse is the power which is to be seized.  
 If we bridge the gap between Foucault’s point of view and the current study, it is 
possible to assert that the Kemalist hegemonic bloc sought to control the discourses in 
the terrain of Islam in order to assert dominance over those religious discourses and to 
defuse the power and negative risks of those discourses on the religious population. 




its own agenda after 2002. For this reason, discourse has not only been a notion which 
explains the existing struggle for domination in Turkey, it is also a target which both 
Kemalists and the JDP seek to seize. 
 
2.2. Critical Discourse Analysis 
In the previous part, what the notion of ‘discourse’ refers to in the current study 
was discussed. Comprehending how the particular discourses, world-views, beliefs and 
values of a group dominate the discourses, world-views, beliefs and values of other 
groups in society necessitates the analysis and interpretation of such discourses, world-
views, beliefs and values. In the current study, critical discourse analysis (CDA) will be 
the means of analysing and interpreting the data which has been discussed so far.  
CDA as a way of scrutinising the notion of ‘discourse’ originated in the ‘critical 
linguistics’ which emerged in the UK and Australia at the end of the 1970s as a 
challenge to the formal paradigms which dominated the literature in the 1960s and 
1970s (Alba-Juez, 2009: 236; Machin & Mayr, 2012: 2). It is possible to associate the 
notion of ‘critical’ with Marxist theory and afterwards with the Frankfurt School of 
Philosophy (Fairclough, Mulderrig & Wodak, 2011: 361). The adjective ‘critical’ 
corresponds to the standpoint which rejects the existence of impartial and value-free 
analysis (Renkema, 2004: 282). Being ‘critical’ is the distinctive feature of the CDA. 
By being ‘critical’, a CDA analyst seeks to denaturalise the language in order to show 
the presuppositions taken for granted and particular views embedded within texts 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012: 5). 
CDA supplies methods and theories which are essential for researching the 
relationships between discourse and cultural and social relations in various social 
contexts empirically (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002: 60). Van Dijk (2001: 352), a scholar 
who studied CDA, defined the method as “a type of discourse analytical research that 
primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, 
reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context”. He 
regarded CDA as a type of research which is in opposition to the supporters of the idea 




aware of their mission in society and that there is a burden on the shoulders of analysts 
to take an explicit stance and thus to comprehend, to disclose and eventually to 
withstand social inequality stemming from the discourse. Here, the role of critical 
discourse analysts overlaps with the role of this current study in terms of pointing out 
the inequality in the society which stems from the cultural hegemony of the dominant 
group. Coffin (2001: 99) underlined such a critical view towards language by defining 
the method as “an approach to language analysis which concerns itself with issues of 
language, power and ideology”. Fairclough (1995: 132-33), another prominent scholar 
in the field of CDA, explained the method as follows:  
By CDA I mean discourse analysis which aims to systematically 
explore often opaque relationships of causality and determination 
between (a) discursive practices, events and texts, and (b) wider 
social and cultural structures, relations, and processes; to 
investigate how such practices, events and texts arise out of and 
are ideologically shaped by relations of power and struggles over 
power; and to explore how the opacity of these relationships 
between discourse and society is itself a factor securing power and 
hegemony. 
An important feature of CDA is its emphasis on the structures and ways of 
domination and resistance among different gender, religion, language and age groups, 
classes and races which are discursively legitimated. In other words, the legitimacy of 
such domination and resistance relationships is taken for granted or accepted as natural. 
Here, CDA endeavours to divulge and unveil the latent one in the discursively 
legitimised domination and resistance relationships (Van Dijk, 1995: 18).  
CDA also seeks to underline the ideologies embedded in the social relationships 
by which domination in society is reproduced or resisted (Van Dijk, 1995: 18). 
Therefore, CDA is an important tool for the current research in order to understand the 
ideology which reproduces the dominance of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and to 
comprehend the emergence of resistance (or counter-hegemony) by the JDP against it.  
Moreover, CDA aims to tie macro and micro levels to each other. Domination, 
power and inequality among different social segments in society belong to the macro 
level, whilst verbal dialogue, discourse and usage of language belong to the micro level. 
A racist expression in a specific parliamentary discussion is a discourse which belongs 




article of a law or reproducing the racism at the macro level (Van Dijk, 2001: 354). The 
current research also aims to bridge the gap between cultural hegemony in the terrain of 
Islam at the macro level of social interaction and the dissemination of particular 
religious discourses at schools or in daily life at the micro level. 
 
2.3. Bridging the Gap between CDA and the Current Study 
To bridge the gap between the theory and the methodology, the discursively 
legitimised rule of a dominant class/group leads us to the relationship between CDA and 
the concept of cultural hegemony. An important element of power is ‘control’. Such 
control can be realised through action by directly restricting the actions of subordinate 
groups or through cognition based on persuading people and manipulating or shaping 
their thoughts in the direction of the powerful group’s interests. Shaping others’ 
thoughts is fundamentally a matter of talk and text (Van Dijk: 1993, 254). Coffin (2001: 
99) described the fundamental goal of CDA as “to highlight how language serves to 
construct particular ideological positions which entail unequal relations of power”. Our 
viewpoints on a variety of issues such as immigrants, nationalism and being British are 
shaped by means of language. Thus, institutions and people act according to this 
language since the language is perceived as common sense and neutral (Machin & 
Mayr, 2012: 25).  
What is important in CDA is the persuasive impact of power, a special 
understanding of power in association with the concept of cultural hegemony in the 
theory of Gramsci, which explains the means by which dominant classes successfully 
persuade subaltern classes to ensure the latter’s acceptance of the former’s political, 
cultural and moral institutions and values. In this sense, hegemonic beliefs, manners and 
views are constructed by discourse, so they are seen as common sense and usual 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012: 24).  
Fairclough (1995: 94) highlighted two dimensions of the discourse-hegemony 
relationship. First, the struggle for hegemony and hegemonic implementations 
considerably manifest themselves as discourse practices in various forms of speaking 




doctor/patient consultation, or mass media reportage) tacitly reflect particular 
ideological stances, world-views, notions and standpoints for different social actors 
(such as surgeons, patients, respondents in interviews, audiences) and particular 
viewpoints about the relations between different actors (such as the relationship 
between a surgeon and a patient). Naturalisation of the discourse conventions is the 
most influential way of sustaining and reproducing the ideological and cultural aspects 
of hegemony. Therefore, an important objective of struggling for hegemony is to 
denaturalise the actual conventions and replace them with new ones (Fairclough, 1995: 
94). Fairclough (1995: 95) specified discourse as a site of cultural hegemony and argued 
that “the hegemony of a class or group over the whole society or over particular sections 
of it … is in part a matter of its capacity to shape discursive practices and orders of 
discourse”.     
CDA is a significant means of analysing how legitimation and manipulation 
occur, how consent is manufactured and how the minds and behaviour of people are 
directed to the interests of the particular groups which hold the power (Van Dijk, 1995: 
18). As Van Dijk (1993: 258) pointed out, shaping people’s discourses, activities and 
perception of the world can be managed by controlling their knowledge. Education is 
therefore a site where the discourses, activities and world perception of young 
generations are shaped and their knowledge on nearly every topic is controlled. Thus, it 
becomes important to critically analyse the speeches and texts in the means of education 
in which the construction of knowledge takes place.  
Education is one of the case studies in this current study and we can benefit from 
CDA to critically analyse the textbooks of RCMK lessons. Educational research has 
widely benefited from CDA because it is a trans-disciplinary and issue-based set of 
methods and theories (Rogers, 2011: 1). Rogers (2011: 1) stated that “educational 
practices are considered communicative events; it therefore stands to reason that 
discourse analysis would be useful to analyze the ways in which the texts, talk, and 
other semiotic interactions that learning comprises are constructed across time and 
contexts”.  
Based on our research question, which is How has Islam been used as a site of 
hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the post-28 February process until 2015?, we benefit 




construction of meaning in the textbooks of RCMK lessons. We can critically analyse 
how students’ discourses, perceptions and values on the terrain of Islam have been 
shaped by both the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. The word ‘critically’ 
provides us with the opportunity to go beyond detecting the dominant discourses within 
the textbooks and to reveal the role of such discourses in wider power and class 
relationships in Turkey. 
Legislation constitutes the second case study of this study and is also analysed 
by means of CDA. In addition to the coercive dimension of legislation, its discursive 
dimension and its relationship with power, dominance and class structure are also 
crucial for our investigation of the role of legislation in the cultural hegemonic struggle. 
Gramsci (1971) stated that the power possessed by the ruling group could be embedded 
in laws, statutes, social norms and customs, and take the shape of hegemony. Law is the 
site where power is expressed (Gellers, 2015: 484).  
Legal language is the intersection point of language and social power (Mertz, 
1994: 441). Howarth (1995: 124) stated that “hegemony is achieved if and when one 
political project or force determines the rules and meanings in a particular social 
formation”. Such a meaning is constructed by discourse (Barker, 2004: 55). One of the 
sources of language is law and law is enforced almost completely by means of a 
particular language (Gellers, 2015: 484). In other words, law is the site of discourse. 
Moreover, discourses in a society are also regulated by laws (Määttä, 2007: 166). This 
means that beyond being the site of discourse on its own, the legal boundaries of 
acceptable and unacceptable discourses in society are also drawn by the current 
legislation. Law produces the basis for hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse – 
its possibilities and limits, conditions of operation, what is acceptable and unacceptable, 
legitimate and illegitimate. 
Foucault (1978: 88) also underlined the need for persuasion by stating that 
“power must be exercised in accordance with a fundamental lawfulness”. In other 
words, the actors who use power need to persuade others of the lawfulness of that 
power usage. Mertz (1994: 441) stated that “through legal language, the state imposes 
its interpretations and its appropriations (of physical and symbolic power), and social 
actors struggle to shift existing power relations”. Legal discourse is distinctive with its 




social institutions and arrangements are rational and just, or indispensable and 
accordingly legitimate (Klare, 1982: 1358).  
CDA emphasises the production and reproduction of domination and power in a 
society by means of discourse (Alba-Juez, 2009: 238). By means of CDA, therefore, we 
can analyse discourses in the legislation to understand legislation’s persuasive and 
consent-manufacturer character. We could thus find an opportunity to reveal how the 
existing power and domination relations in society are perceived as normal and natural 
and how the ideological backgrounds of such relations are constructed. 
 
2.4. Using CDA in the Research 
Textbooks of RCMK lessons constitute one of the two case studies in the current 
research study. We shall analyse those textbooks by means of CDA to comprehend how 
the discourse on the terrain of Islam had been constructed, disseminated and imposed on 
Turkish society by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and how the construction, 
dissemination and imposition of the discourse have been challenged by the JDP. In 
order to comprehend the construction of cultural hegemony within the textbooks, the 
following topics were selected which reveal the efforts for cultural hegemony in the 
textbooks: 
 The State; 
 The Military; 
 Economic differences; 
 The Image of Ataturk;  
 Laicism; 
 Tarikats and Cemaats; 
 Family; 
 Alevism.  
These topics are either the site of positive discourse construction in favour of the 
values, beliefs, perceptions, world-views and institutions of the dominant class or the 




views and institutions of the subordinate classes which might pose a threat to the 
cultural hegemony of the dominant class. In other words, those topics are either the site 
of creating the common sense or challenging the common sense in Gramscian terms. In 
accordance with the goals of the CDA, discourses related to each topic will be analysed 
critically by going beyond the text itself, emphasising their impact in the wider social 
context and revealing their role in the power relations and class struggle. 
To achieve this, an effort was made to detect the discourses which were 
manufactured to reconcile the Kemalist values with Islam. In other words, we shall 
emphasise the persuasion of the devout Muslims to minimise the threat perception 
caused by the laicist principle of Kemalism. For instance, the discourse within the topic 
of laicism is constructed so that the pious Muslims could be persuaded that the laicism 
does not pose a threat for Islam. 
Dressler (2011: 193) stated that “binaries play an important part in the discursive 
constitution of the religious in dialogue with its dialectical other, the secular”. In other 
words, the religious and the secular are defined as opposite concepts. In this definition, 
the secular one is accepted as hither, whilst the religious one is positioned as other. 
Dressler (2011: 193) described these binary concepts as “a means of world ordering”. 
This refers to creating a hierarchy between different conceptions of the world and 
favouring the one which serves your cultural superiority while otherising the ones 
which pose a threat to it. We shall seek to detect binaries in the textbooks in order to 
understand the favoured and unfavoured values, perceptions and viewpoints about the 
terrain of Islam, laicism and Islam-related issues. In some cases, those pairs of binaries 
are visible in the text, whereas in other cases one of a pair of binaries is hidden, implied 
rather than directly stated. Detecting the binaries such as progressive/reactionary, 
modern/outdated within the texts is significant for understanding how some approaches 
to Islam are dignified and others are disparaged. For instance, religious and worldly are 
presented as opposite binaries in the textbooks (Uludag, Hokelekli & Uysal, 2000: 88). 
The us-them divide is a general strategy employed throughout the textbooks of RCMK 
lessons. Pronouns such as ‘we’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ gather people for or against particular 
viewpoints. The textbook writer presents his views as ‘our shared views’ and constructs 
a collective ‘other’ opposing ‘our shared views’ (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 84). As Van 




presentation (boasting) and negative other-presentation (derogation)”. For instance, the 
statement of ‘our religion’, which is used in many of the RCMK textbooks, aims to 
gather the readers, namely the students, under the umbrella of ‘we’ and persuade them 
in favour of ‘our interpretation of religion’.  
Furthermore, the ‘we’ position in the ‘we-them’ divide is concentrated in the 
personality of Ataturk in the texts. We shall therefore also analyse how the image of 
Ataturk is used as the guiding reference point for almost every issue. By this means, we 
might understand how the cultural leadership of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc was 
guaranteed. We shall also analyse how the JDP has instrumentalised the image of 
Ataturk to challenge the ‘them’ position which has been located by Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc. 
Machin and Mayr (2012: 30) pointed out that the textbook authors might choose 
some specific words to explain something while avoiding using other words. Therefore, 
lexical choices in the texts become very important when we seek to comprehend the 
discourse within the texts. We shall therefore focus on word choices in the explanations 
about religion itself, religiosity or religious practices in the textbooks. The word 
‘motherland’ (Arslan & Eryilmaz, 2000: 83-84), which is used to refer to Turkey, is one 
example of the lexical choices in the textbooks. 
Legitimating with reference to Islamic sources, such as verses and speeches of 
the Prophet or sayings of other Islamic figures, is another discursive tactic which we 
shall look for when analysing the texts. Islamic sources can be used to legitimate the 
values of the dominant class, to support the institutions of cultural hegemony or to 
ensure the internalisation of the domination. For instance, under the topic of ‘Military’ 
in the fifth-grade textbook, sayings of the Prophet Muhammad are instrumentalised to 
gain consent for compulsory military service (Akgul et al., 2015: 131-132). 
Another important point is the presuppositions within the texts about “what 
kinds of meanings are assumed as given in a text”; some meanings in a sentence might 
be taken for granted by the authors (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 153). For instance, the 
identity of ‘Turkishness’, instead of ‘Muslimness’ is taken for granted in many texts as 




The choices about the representation of people is another point which will be 
analysed in Chapter 5. Within the texts, some dimensions of a person’s identity can be 
underlined or neglected, which influences perceptions, values and views about them 
(Machin & Mayr, 2012: 77). Role models are presented in the textbooks and acceptable 
or favourable religiousness is defined by reference to those role models. For instance, 
Ataturk is a strong figure presented as a role model for students with his views, values, 
beliefs and discourse about Islam. His sayings about Islam are carefully selected in both 
the textbooks used before 2002 and those used in 2015. 
CDA not only helps in analysing the verbal dimension of discourse, it also 
assists in analysing different semiotic dimensions such as pictures, music, sound and 
movies (Van Dijk, 1995: 18). We shall therefore also analyse the discourse in the 
illustrations and pictures in the textbooks of the RCMK lessons as they are important 
tools for constructing common sense on the terrain of Islam. Under the subtitle of the 
‘Image of Ataturk’, we shall seek to understand how the image of Ataturk is constructed 
for cultural leadership of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and for the consensual 
relationship with devout Muslims.  Under the subtitle of ‘family’, we shall seek to 
understand how the favourable Muslim family image was constructed. 
To understand the construction of cultural hegemony by means of legislation, 
the Articles regulating the following issues were selected: 
 Religious everyday life; 
 The State; 
 The Presidency of Religious Affaris 
 Political parties; 
 Associations and foundations; 
 The Headscarf; 
 Primary and Secondary Education; 
 Imam-Hatip Schools; and 
 Higher Education. 
The most significant feature of legislation for the current study is its direct role 
in constructing discourse about a variety of issues from the daily actions of individuals 




laicism, the role of religion in political, social and economic life, religious institutions, 
religious and non-religious lifestyle. The aim is to detect the construction of discourse 
in those areas within the legal texts which will be analysed.  
To analyse the legislation, discourses were selected which reflect the values of 
the dominant Kemalist hegemonic bloc. Such discourses are significant for equating the 
Kemalist values with the official paradigm of the state and positioning those values as 
common sense. For instance, the Constitution states the principle of laicism as one of 
the fundamental features of the Republic. By this means, a laicist interpretation of Islam 
becomes common sense by means of legal discourse. 
Detecting binaries within the legislation is another point which will be 
emphasised. By exploring binaries, we shall emphasise what distinguishes a legal 
religious practice from an illegal religious practice, such as wearing a headscarf in 
schools and public institutions. Illegalising particular actions on the terrain of Islam 
directly shapes people’s perception of religion and influences the place of religion in 
their daily life. Understanding the criteria for being ‘unacceptable’ according to the 
existing legislation, which is the means of controlling, restricting and banning particular 
discourses on the terrain of Islam, is vital in order to understand which acts or 
discourses are regarded as normal, natural and acceptable and which are regarded as 
unusual, criminal and antagonistic to the existing order. 
 When analysing the legislation by means of CDA, similar to the analysis of the 
textbooks, we shall also emphasise the lexical choices of the law-makers. Lexical 
choices in legislation are significant in shaping the vocabulary of people. For instance, 
the word ‘enlighten’ is used to describe the duties of the Presidency of Religious Affairs 
(Official Gazette, 1965: 1), which can be interpreted as a reference to the ‘Age of 
Enlightenment’. Presuppositions can also be detected in the legislation, such as the 
necessity and favourableness of ‘harmony’, ‘unity’ and ‘integrity’ among people when 
determining the rules of acceptable wearing standards in public institutions. 
The use of honorifics (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 82) and metaphors (Machin & 
Mayr, 2012: 163-165) are other discursive tactics of text producers. It is also possible to 
detect such tactics in the legislation. In the preamble of the Turkish Constitution, 




honorifics, and as an “immortal leader and the unrivalled hero”, which is an example of 
the usage of metaphor as a tactic to manufacture consent in favour of Ataturk and 
Kemalism. 
We shall also analyse the discursive actions and situations which emerge as a 
result of the enforcement of the legislation. For instance, the structural constraints on 
graduates of Imam-Hatip schools stemmed from legislation regarding the Student 
Selection and Placement Examination (SSPE) and resulted in the domination of secular 
values within the social space of the university. The situation which emerged from such 
constraints possesses a discursive dimension in itself.  
In both case studies, finally, we shall approach the issue of discourses in the 
wider context with its relation to power relations, structural hegemonies and hegemonic 
projects. We shall seek to comprehend how the discourse was used both to sustain and 
to challenge the existing class structure in Turkey. The current study is therefore more 
of a political examination of texts rather than a technical one which focuses on linguistic 
techniques. In accordance with the main goals of the study, we shall emphasise the role 
of discourse manufacture on the persuasion of the Muslims in the process of the cultural 
hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP, rather than 




CHAPTER 5: EDUCATION AS THE MECHANISM OF 
IMPOSITION OF THE DOMINANT DISCOURSES ON THE 
TERRAIN OF ISLAM 
 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, the data and the research method used in this study were 
described and discussed. In this chapter, we shall begin to operationalise those data by 
means of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with the aim of understanding how 
education had been instrumentalised in order to construct and disseminate the ruling 
laicist discourses, values, beliefs and perceptions regarding religion and particularly 
Islam over the pious Muslims. Because the focus is on Islam as the site of a cultural 
hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP, special 
emphasis will be given to religious education in this chapter. The textbooks of RCMK 
lessons are the main source of the data in this investigation of religious education.  
Gowarek (1977: 55) stated that “by examining the structure, processes and 
contents of an educational system we may learn more about the fundamental aspects of 
a society than by any other [means]”. So by directing our attention to the Turkish 
education system, we aim to understand the existing dominant discourse in society 
which reflects the official standpoint of the state and the dominant class in Turkey. For 
this aim, Chapter 5 starts with a discussion of the theoretical framework which reveals 
the role of education in the manufacturing of consent and the establishment of cultural 
hegemony. We shall then move on to the operational section of the chapter by selecting 
the texts in the RCMK textbooks which serve to establish a cultural hegemony and we 
shall analyse the discourses in the texts by emphasising their role on the normalisation, 





2. Education and Cultural Hegemony  
Beyond being merely an informative practice, the ideological, cultural and 
hegemonic aspects of education have been highlighted by many scholars (Lipset, 1959; 
Key, 1961; Inkeles, 1969; Gramsci, 1971; Shapiro, 1974; Gowarek, 1977; Gouttman, 
1977; Giroux, 1981; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Culture and education were very 
significant for Gramsci’s thinking (Forgacs, 2000: 53). Our starting point in considering 
the relationship between cultural hegemony and education is Gramsci’s (1971: 350) 
statement that “Every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educational 
relationship”. In Gramscian terms, education has three main roles. First, to construct 
discourse and shape the values, perceptions and thoughts of people and by this means to 
gain their consent. Second, to influence the hierarchy in society as a consequence of 
inequality of opportunity in the education system. And third, as Gramsci highlighted, to 
gain intellectual autonomy (Forgacs, 2000: 53). 
Gramsci (1985: 42) focused on the instrumentality of schools in the process of 
shaping the world perspectives of the new generations by commenting that “tomorrow, 
like today, the school will undoubtedly be a crucible where new spirits will be forged”. 
The metaphor ‘crucible’ symbolises the place where steel is forged and the action of 
forging symbolises the giving of a shape to the steel. He therefore perceived the school, 
and the education system by extension, as the site of shaping individuals in line with the 
goal of creating a new ‘conception of the world’. According to Gramsci (1985: 39-40), 
schools possess a significant role both for the present generation to realise a communist 
society and for the future generations to be raised with the mentality of the new order. 
Gramsci (1985: 40) explained this role as follows: 
The present generation will be educated into the practice of the social 
discipline necessary for the realization of a communist society, with 
assemblies and direct participation in deliberation and the administration 
of the socialist state. The school will have the task of rearing the new 
generations, those who will enjoy the fruits of our sacrifices and efforts, 
those who will reap, after the transitional period of national proletarian 
dictatorships, the fullness of life and development of international 
communist democracy. 
In every society, regardless of its simplicity or complexity, education is 
instrumentalised for the socialisation and integration of citizens. The main goal is to 




maintenance of the social order (Gowarek, 1977: 55). Bowles and Gintis (2011: 11) 
similarly stated that schools perpetuate the legitimate forms of inequality by designing 
the prototype of the social relations of an economic system in the school environment 
and by accustoming students to their eventual positions in the social hierarchy, labour 
market and work-place environment which they will later face. In developing countries, 
education is regarded as the most significant factor which can compel individuals to 
break with tradition and to tend towards modernity (Inkeles, 1969: 212). Attending a 
school influences an individual’s attitude to God, to destiny, to the opposite gender, to 
the earth and to politics (Inkeles, 1969: 212-13). The school is the space where people 
internalise values (Inkeles, 1969: 213). 
Giroux (1981: 94) suggested that there are four different but interrelated stages 
of hegemony operating in a school curriculum. First, a culture which is supposed to be 
popularly legitimate is determined. Second, cultural elements in society are categorised 
as being subordinate or superior. Third, the relationships in the classroom and school 
are determined and legitimised. And finally, the diffusion of and accession to various 
forms of culture and information by different cultural groups are organised. Giroux 
argued that all of these stages in the curriculum indicate how particular purviews and 
values are imposed to guarantee the hegemony of the dominant culture.  
Gramsci (1971: 242) clearly associated the state’s role in the field of formation 
and education with the issue of gaining the consent of the masses. What he meant by the 
state’s formative and educative roles is the construction of a newer and more developed 
civilisation and the shaping of that civilisation and the moral level of the people in it in 
accordance with the needs of economic means of production in order to ensure their 
uninterrupted development. Gramsci consequently referred to raising a new type of 
human being, even in physical terms.  
Gramsci (2000: 63) emphasised that the child of a family from the proletarian 
class was not able to attend school even though he/she had enough qualifications and 
intelligence. In other words, education was accessible only by the privileged part of the 
society. Hence, the education system was a tool for the maintenance of the existing 
social structure. Rutz and Balkan (2009: 38) similarly pointed out the influence of 




A hierarchical system of attained levels of education is conducive not only 
to the reproduction of a social hierarchy but also attuned to economic 
hierarchies related to expertise and manpower needs for a developing 
division of labour in an emerging industrial economy. Together these 
features function to satisfy the role that the education system plays in 
socializing individuals to become loyal citizens and disciplined workers in 
modern nation-states. 
Gramsci criticised the education system in Italy for being merely the affair of the 
bourgeoisie. He argued that the secondary schools and high schools administered by the 
state were funded by state income derived from direct taxation of the proletarian class 
but that only children of families from the bourgeois class, who possessed the economic 
freedom necessary for continuous study, were able to receive an education in these 
schools (Gramsci, 2000: 62-63). He argued that education and culture became a service 
for the privileged. There was no option for the children of the proletariat except 
misspending their qualifications on other activities or becoming autodidacts or vagrants 
(Gramsci, 2000: 63). To overcome such a problem, for him, the education system 
should be accessible for everyone in the society (Gramsci, 2000: 63-64). The school 
should be a place of freedom and children of the proletarian class should have the 
opportunity to access options in terms of education for the development of their 
character so that their productivity can be at maximum level both for themselves and for 
society (Gramsci, 2000: 64). 
In the early stages of his thinking on education, he emphasised the question of 
how people from the working class can gain autonomy intellectually. For Gramsci, 
achieving intellectual autonomy could enable workers to make their own decisions 
without delegating decision-making to career intellectuals of the bourgeois class. By 
this means, they could act as a ruling class (Forgacs, 2000: 53). So the notions of 
intellectuality and education are vital interrelating aspects of Gramscian understanding 
of cultural hegemony (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 39). Gramsci (1971: 10) regarded school 
as the means of training intellectuals from a variety of levels. Intellectuals who have 
been educated and shaped at school then play a role in the education of ordinary men 
and develop their intellectual capacity. Consequently, those ordinary men possess the 
capacity for self-education and convert into independent actors of the newly arising 




Finally, a significant question which needs to be addressed when researching the 
hegemonic role of education is whether education is within the boundaries of civil 
society or political society in Gramscian understanding. Civil society and the state 
should not be regarded as physically distinct and completely separate terrains. Both 
terrains primarily consist of social relations (Simon, 2015: 72). Therefore, an 
organisation can be within the boundaries of both civil and political society. In the case 
of education, Gramsci particularly regarded the school as an element of civil society 
since the pedagogic relationship between educator and student does not have a coercive 
character (Simon, 2015: 73) 
In the case of Turkey,
30
 modern education was seen as an instrument for the 
realisation and legitimation of the Republic and the creation of a modern economy and a 
national culture (Rutz & Balkan, 2009: 37). The ‘modern’ character of Turkish 
education stemmed from the radical departure from religion and was actualised by 
introducing the laicist education reforms which the laic nation-state required (Rutz & 
Balkan, 2009: 39). According to Ataturk and his cadre, cutting the ties with the 
Ottoman-Islamic past could be realised by means of education based on nationalism 
(Simsek, Kucuk & Topkaya, 2012: 2816). Ataturk told teachers that “The Republic 
requires guards who are powerful in terms of ideology, scholarship, science and 
corporeality and possess high moral quality. Raising the new generation in accordance 
with these qualities and abilities is in your hands” and added that “your achievement 
will be the achievement of the Republic” (Ataturk, 1989, cited in Simsek, Kucuk & 
Topkaya, 2012: 2816). These statements can be seen in parallel with education’s role in 
the creation of ‘a new conception of the world’ in the Gramscian sense. 
Considering that the main goals of a ‘war of position’ are the penetration to the 
terrain of civil society by disseminating a new world conception to society and the 
preparation of the civil society in cultural and intellectual terms for conquest by an 
already established hegemony, the political strategy of the Islamists to win a victory in 
the political battle against the dominant forces should be based on an active, conscious 
and long-term tactic which prioritise the education and re-education of people in the 
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light of Islamic principles (Butko, 2004: 57). In Turkey’s case, education became the 
site where the JDP’s ‘war of position’ took place. In this sense, Recep Tayyip Erdogan 
complained about the inability of the JDP government to win the cultural area, stating 
that “Politically ruling is one thing. Socially and culturally ruling is another thing 
entirely. We have been in power for 14 years but we still have problems with ruling in 
the social and cultural field” (HDN, 2017). He pointed out the vital need for education 
to win the cultural struggle by stating that “Teaching the Qur’an and the life of the 
Prophet Muhammad in all schools is nice. But we still have many deficiencies in raising 
the generations that we have dreamt of” (HDN, 2017). 
Religious education in Turkey has been designed by state officials based on 
indoctrination and propaganda and the education system has never provided any 
technical education in religion. The curriculum was not designed for pedagogic goals 
but for ideological goals. Diversity in terms of interpretations of religion was 
completely ignored and a single curriculum was taught throughout the whole country. 
The curriculum hinged on the claim of defending the absolute truth about religion in 
defiance of pluralism (Basdemir, 2011: 60). Therefore, the religious discourse within 
the RCMK lessons becomes a key issue which reveals the cultural hegemonic struggle 
in a country where clashes take places within the area of religion.  
 
3. The Texts and an Analysis of the Texts in the Textbooks 
of RCMK Lessons 
In this chapter, the textbooks of RCMK lessons used in the post-28 February 
process until 2002 and the textbooks used in 2015 will be analysed treating each title 
separately using CDA. The post-28 February process refers to the period starting with 
the 28 February 1997 coup d’état until 2002, when the JDP achieved its first general 
election victory
31
 just one year after its foundation in 2001. The year 2015 refers to the 
end of the JDP’s third term in government. By comparing the situation in the 
atmosphere of the post-28 February process with the situation in 2015, the intention is 
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to detect the continuities, evolutions and dramatic changes between those two 
hegemonic projects under the effect of deeper structural hegemonies, namely the global 
capitalist order, the religion of Islam and the official paradigm of the State coded in 
legislation of the country. The study therefore addresses the question:  
How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015? 
Considering that cultural hegemony refers to the ideational control by the 
dominant class by producing and distributing the dominant values, social practices and 
views, and that one of the institutions used for such mental control is the school 
(Giroux, 1981: 94), we shall focus on the school in order to comprehend the discursive 
aspect of the cultural hegemonic projects on the terrain of Islam carried out by both the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. We shall seek to understand how particular 
discourses in the education system, more specifically in RCMK lessons, were 
constructed and disseminated and what changes they underwent between the post-28 
February process and 2015. The titles
32
 explored in this chapter are;  
 The State; 
 The Military; 
 Economic Differences; 
 The image of Ataturk;  
 Laicism; 
 Tarikats and Cemaats; 
 Family; and 
 Alevism. 
The first three topics are directly related to the three pillars of the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc (the Kemalist bureaucracy, the Kemalist military and the Kemalist 
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bourgeoisie) and signify the organisational dimension of the hegemonic struggle. The 
discourse regarding those topics directly targets the consent of the pious Muslims 
regarding these three pillars. The maintenance and/or gradual change regarding the 
discourse about these topics also gives clues about the tactics and limits of the JDP’s 
hegemonic project. The topics ‘The image of Ataturk’ and ‘Laicism’ disclose the 
ideological aspects of the cultural hegemonic struggle. These topics are the sites where 
the Kemalist hegemonic bloc aimed at constructing a persuasive discourse which would 
ensure the normalisation and internalisation of Kemalist values in the eyes of the pious 
Muslims and minimise the threat perception stemming from the tension between laicism 
and Islam. The topic ‘Tarikats and Cemaats’ directs attention to a significant collective 
organisational force of pious Muslim opposition within the sphere of civil society. This 
topic reveals the clash of completely different discourses by the Kemalists and the JDP. 
The topic ‘Family’ is important because the family as a social institution is one of the 
determiners of discourse within civil society. Both the Kemalists and the JDP sought to 
shape the mainstream family image in order to minimise the effect of antagonist 
families as a determiner of discourse. The topic ‘Alevism’ is a new topic which was not 
present in the post-28 February textbooks. It constitutes the national-popular dimension 
of the JDP’s hegemonic project. 
The textbooks of RCMK lessons constitute the main source of data for 
understanding the hegemonic projects of both the Kemalists and the JDP. There are 
several reasons for selecting RCMK lessons as the source of data. First, the dominant 
discourses within the texts are in parallel with the dominant discourse in the public 
sphere and reflect how the state, and accordingly the ruling class, approaches the issues 
of Islam and Muslimness. For this reason, understanding the discourse in those texts 
corresponds to understanding the discourse in circulation in the public sphere and public 
institutions in general. The discourse in the texts can be regarded as a summary of the 
state’s and the ruling group’s standpoint on a variety of topics regarding Islam, 
Muslimness, religious lifestyle, state/religion relationship and other religions. Second, 
RCMK lessons also reveal the discourse on Islam which is in circulation within civil 
society. Because students spend most of their time at school away from their parents’ 
influence, the discourse flowing in the educational space has a significant effect on 
them. Third, a significant feature of RCMK lessons is their capacity to represent the 




interpretation of religion, RCMK lessons also give clues about the dominant discourse 
and ideological stance which shape the content of other lessons and the cultural 
tendency of the education system in general.  
Table 1 RCMK Lessons’ Hours per Week (Official Gazette, 1982a) 
 
Finally, under Article 24 of the Turkish Constitution, RCMK lessons are 
compulsory for all types of school, including private schools, beginning from fourth 
grade until the end of twelfth grade. All students, with the exception of students from 
non-Muslim minorities, have to attend RCMK lessons until they leave high school 
(Official Gazette, 1982a). These lessons are therefore very inclusive in terms of 
reaching all students, including students from Alevi families, and disseminating the 
discourse of the ruling class to them.  
 
3.1. The State 
The normalisation and internalisation of obedience to authority is vital for the 
emergence of a consensual relationship between the state and its citizens. The concept 
of ‘state’ has a very important place in analyses of the Marxist tradition. It is accepted 
as the most prominent institution among all other institutions which operate to secure 
and perpetuate exploitation and class domination (Miliband, 1991: 520). Within the 
Communist Manifesto, it is defined as “the executive of the modern state is but a 
committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie” (Marx & 




the coercive institution which controls the masses in compliance with a particular mode 
of production and economic order. So manufacturing consent for the state also means 
manufacturing consent for its coercion mechanisms. 
Gramsci (1971: 244) wrote that “the State is the entire complex of practical and 
theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”. 
Gramsci (1971: 263) described the state as the sum of political society plus civil society 
and argued that the state possesses elements of civil society. When the state is regarded 
as government in the narrow sense, it is protected by means of the hegemony which 
takes place in the sphere of civil society by private organisations such as schools, 
syndicates and the Church (Gramsci, 1973: 204). On the other hand, hegemony is 
guaranteed “by the armour of the coercion” which is realised by the state (Gramsci, 
1971: 263). Consequently, the state apparatus lies at the heart of the dominant class’s 
efforts to achieve cultural hegemony. Construction of positive discourse about the state 
is directly related to the prestige of the dominant class and to manufacturing consent in 
favour of the dominant class.  
The state was the terrain where the second element of the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc,
33
 the Kemalist bureaucracy, was located. So manufacturing consent for the state 
also meant manufacturing consent for the Kemalist bureaucrats. Since a powerful 
bourgeois class was absent, state bureaucrats used political power to reach the economic 
level of European countries (Atasoy, 2009: 72). The state therefore became the terrain 
of a development project carried out by bureaucrats to design a social structure and class 
relations by supporting the development of large-scale private capital, by creating an 
industrial national bourgeoisie and by repressing small-scale producers and labour 
(Atasoy, 2009: 74). Ataturk’s rule was based on the coexistence of capitalists and statist 
bureaucrats alongside newly emerging entrepreneurs within the structure of his party. 
He had a mediating role between these two pillars of economic development (Ahmad, 
2007: 159). Thus, the state became the site of action for the Kemalist bureaucracy and 
the instrument for the creation of the Kemalist national bourgeoisie.  
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Consequently, constructing a positive discourse about the state became a key 
step for manufacturing consent in favour of the site where the Kemalist bureaucrats 
acted and the Kemalist bourgeoisie benefited from concessions. This was achieved by 
underlining its indispensability in people’s lives by constructing a Muslim-friendly state 
image and by supporting such a discourse with Islamic references. If we look at how the 
JDP responded to such a discourse construction, we detect that the JDP did not prefer a 
frontal attack, a war of manoeuvre, against the state establishment, but rather preferred 
war of position by gradually increasing its control over the state apparatus. Tugal (2009) 
named this process a passive revolution, the absorption of Islam. The outcome of this 
passive revolution was “the integration of antisystem cadres and strategies into the 
system” (Tugal, 2009: 148) and increasing the loyalty of the Islamist activists to the 
state (Tugal, 2009: 239). This tendency can be seen in the maintenance of the discourse 
regarding the state in the 2015 textbooks.  
3.1.1. Post-28 February Textbooks 
Text 134 
 Since the State carries out its duties in the best way towards individuals, 
people become deeply loyal to it. For this reason, dying for the sake of 
Allah is considered equal to dying for the sake of the state. Belief has a 
significant role in the birth and internalisation of such a loyalty. 
 Each Muslim standing in the presence of Allah accepts loving his/her 
state as sacred as loving his/her religion. Whenever possible, it is prayed 
‘May Allah not harm our State and Nation’. In this way, integration of 
state and nation is also a fundamental principle according to our 
religion. (Bolay, 1997: 62) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses: 
 The state is a beneficial entity for the people. 
 Being loyal to the state is the same as being loyal to Allah. 
 In the first paragraph, the state is presented as an entirely beneficial entity which 
carries out its duties for people in the best possible way. By this means, people’s loyalty 
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to the state is rationalised by the discourse of ‘state as the server of people’s interests’. 
The word ‘deeply’ is the antonym of ‘superficial’ and signifies persistency of loyalty. In 
the second sentence, sacrificing self for the state is equated to sacrificing self for Allah. 
Considering the position of Allah in Islam, the state gains a very sacred importance in 
the eyes of believers by this discourse. 
 In the second paragraph, ‘loving the state’ is presented as expected behaviour 
and the only common attitude for all Muslims. The discourse is strengthened by the 
discourse that Allah confirms the sacredness of loving the state and equates it to the 
sacredness of loving religion. Since loving Islam is an undeniable condition for being a 
Muslim, loving the state also becomes an undeniable condition for being a Muslim. 
Praying against any harm befalling the state and the nation is emphasised. Praying for 
the state and nation makes any challenging action against the existing state structure and 
social structure impossible. Finally, integration of state and nation is depicted as a 
fundamental principle of Islam. By this discourse, every individual as a part of the 
nation is compelled to be integrated with the state. 
Text 235 
The state, with all its institutions and organisations, is responsible for 
serving the people. The main mission of the state and its rulers is to 
guarantee the implementation of laws. … to guarantee peace and mutual 
trust in society, citizens are supposed to obey the laws. 
Laws are written rules designed to conserve trouble-free and harmonious 
collective habitation and to ensure justice in society. ... Laws are passed 
to provide society with an environment in which to live at peace. 
Penalties are determined for those who ruin this peaceful environment.  
When making laws, the needs and capacity of society, and the sentimental 
values of individuals such as morality, manners and customs, are taken 
into account. Laws made in this way are easily embraced by society.  
… In Islam, after obedience to Allah (the God) and Resul (the Prophet), 
obedience and respect to the rulers of the state come second.  
Our religion values rights and liberties. It attaches importance to 
guarding the rights of others. Accordingly, it can only be possible by 
obeying and showing respect to the laws. (Arslan & Eryilmaz, 2000: 80-
81) 
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 The state is a beneficial entity which always serves the people. 
 Laws are necessary for a peaceful society. 
 The morality, manners, customs, needs and capacity of society are taken 
into account when making laws. 
 Respecting the state, its rulers and its laws is an obligation in Islam. 
The discourse in this text regarding the need for the state and its laws is 
supported by reference to Islam. A strong emphasis on the positive sides of the state 
apparatus can be seen at first glance. The state is presented as an entity with the sole 
duty of serving the people. The implementation of laws is regarded as a requisite for 
mutual trust and peace in society. The references to ‘mutual trust’ and ‘peace’ link to 
the relations and issues between people. So an authoritative relationship between state 
and people is not part of the text. Also, the possible conflicts and problems stemming 
from the existing laws are not mentioned in the text either. The necessity for and 
benefits of the current laws are taken for granted. Unquestioning and automatic 
obedience to the laws is expected from citizens. This expectation makes any opposition 
to the laws an abnormal and intolerable act.  
Two significant benefits of the laws are specified as “to conserve trouble-free 
and harmonious collective habitation” and “to ensure justice in society”. The law’s 
mission of ‘conserving trouble-free environment’ makes those who oppose those laws 
trouble-seekers. The word ‘harmonious’ refers to acting in the same manner and 
‘collective’ refers to togetherness in action. So acting together in the same manner is 
presented as an expected attitude from the people. Thus, any acts against the 
collectiveness are illegalised and criminalised by this discourse. The discourse about the 
law’s mission of ‘ensuring justice’ is based on the binary of ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’ and 
aims at increasing reliance on the laws. With this discourse, the laws cannot be against 
justice. The discourse locates anyone who opposes the laws as an agent of ‘injustice’. 
Since the laws are associated with ‘peace’, infringing them is associated with ruining 
the “peaceful environment”. Penalties are imposed on those who ruin the peaceful 




situation for people. So by showing the risk of an undesired situation, the discourse 
legitimises the punishments for those who oppose or break the law. 
In the third paragraph, the main discourse is that moral values and traditions are 
taken into consideration in the process of legislation. According to this discourse, the 
laws cannot be against the values of a Muslim society. This aims at persuading the 
pious Muslims about the compatibility of the laws with Islamic values. It is also 
expressed that those laws compatible with the values of society are embraced by the 
people. The text therefore imposes on society the stance that they should take without 
questioning. Thus, embracing the laws becomes the only acceptable option for people.  
Obeying and respecting the rulers of the state is equated with obedience to God 
and the Prophet. Obedience to God and the Prophet are indispensable and 
unquestionable prerequisites for being Muslim. Rulers are therefore regarded as being in 
the same category as God and the Prophet. As obedience to God and respect for the 
Prophet is an obligation for a pious Muslim, the same is expected in regard to the rulers. 
This discourse aims at manufacturing the consent of pious Muslims for the rulers of the 
state who represent the dominance of the dominant class. 
In the final paragraph, rights and liberties are presented as values of Islam. But 
the following sentence reveals that such rights and liberties also belong to other people 
in society. The concepts of ‘rights’ and ‘liberties’ are used to show the boundaries of 
people’s actions in order not to violate other’s rights and liberties. Therefore, rather than 
increasing people’s boundaries of action, the discourse about rights and liberties 
restricts those boundaries. Obeying the laws is regarded as compatible with the values 
of Islam. By this discourse, obedience to the laws is ensured with Islamic references. 
Text 336 
… 
Citizens should be conscious of the sacredness of paying tax, they have to 
pay tax based on their income to the state because every penny paid to the 
state is spent for the benefit of the people.  
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According to our belief, serving the people is equal to serving Allah. The 
state is an entity which is established in order to serve the people. … 
(Arslan & Eryilmaz, 2000: 81-83) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 Paying tax is sacred. 
 The state serves the people in order to serve God. 
Paying tax to the state is defined as a sacred act for Muslims. These payments 
are said to return to the people as services. The religious word ‘sacred’ grants an Islamic 
value to the action. Being sacred makes an activity acceptable to God. In other words, 
such an activity is ethically evaluated with reference to religious norms. In this 
statement, a value is determined for the services of state. The term ‘tax’ symbolises this 
value. This discourse gives the message that the services of the state have a value and 
that people must be grateful for those services. Paying tax is a consequence of showing 
gratitude.  
Moreover, serving the people is associated with serving God. According to this 
discourse, the state is in line with the commandments of God.  From this point of view, 
the state cannot have a negative effect on people in order not to contradict the will of 
God. So gaining the consent of people for such a beneficial entity becomes easier for the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc which controls the state apparatus. 
Text 437 
 “O you who have believed, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those 
in authority among you.” (Arslan & Eryilmaz, 2000: 89) 
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 People must obey the commands of the public authorities as they obey 
the commands of God and the Prophet. 
This verse states that believers must obey the commands of Allah, the prophet as 
the messenger, and the authorities. Here, the public authorities are ranked alongside 
religious authorities – God and the Prophet. Thus, people’s obedience to the public 
authorities is equated with obedience to God and the Prophet. It can be interpreted that 
Islam is being used as an instrument to legitimise and normalise obedience to the public 
authorities. 
Although it is not specified in the verse, the word ‘authority’ connotes the 
authorities of an Islamic administration. In the text, however, it is used in order to 
ensure people’s obedience to the capitalist state apparatus and the public authorities 
controlled by the Kemalists. Interiorising obedience to authorities diminishes the 
revolutionary tendencies of the religious groups against the power of the authorities of 
the capitalist state apparatus. 
Text 539 
The motherland is the geographic piece of soil on which people live. At 
first glance, it is just a piece of land. When this piece of land is in danger, 
people fight and are prepared to be killed for it. Many mothers lose their 
sons, many brides lose their valiant husbands. Thus the stones, ground, 
mountains and rivers of this land gain new meanings. Each of them 
becomes an obstacle and a bulwark against the enemy. That piece of land 
is treated with great respect. That piece of land becomes the homeland 
which is irrigated with the blood of martyrs. … 
One of the emotions is the emotion of religion by which people sacrifice 
themselves in order to defend the motherland. No other religions have a 
position like martyrdom in Islam. No other religions have such a strong 
motive as the honour of being a martyr in Islam. … 
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… When unity, solidarity, common ideals and common goals are put into 
action, human groups transform into a nation. The mass becomes no 
longer a crowd. The coming generations will inhabit a nation and a 
homeland in which they are proud of living. 
… 
As is known, the unity of language, religion, history, culture and ideals 
and common sensitivity and goals in morality, manner and custom 
constitute the nation. Nation and motherland are like soul and body. For 
this reason, the Constitution states that “The State of Turkey, with its 
territory and nation, is an indivisible entity”. (Bolay, 1997: 58-59) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Homeland gains a spiritual meaning when people devote themselves to it. 
 Martyrdom has a significant place in Islam. 
 Unity, solidarity, common ideals and common goals are the main factors 
for transforming people from a crowd into a nation. 
The text begins with a common definition of the term ‘homeland’ (vatan) with 
reference to its material features. However, the text continues by explaining the process 
during which those material features gain spiritual meaning. The attention of the reader 
is directed to the possibility of danger to the homeland. Fighting and even being killed 
are presented as possible options for people who wish to protect the homeland. The 
main discourse is the need to sacrifice the self for the country. This is strengthened by 
scenarios in which a mother loses her son and a bride loses her husband. These 
scenarios are accepted as the most intense sorrows in society. After such sacrifices and 
sorrows, the homeland’s physical elements such as stones, ground, mountains and rivers 
possess a spiritual meaning and value. The word ‘enemy’ is used to define the negative 
other. All people in the country are described as against such enemies. As a 
consequence of heroic deeds, the land is transformed into a motherland. The term 
“blood of martyrs” shows how people have sacrificed their lives for the perpetuity of the 
motherland. The word ‘blood’ symbolises the extent of both sacrifice and kinship with 
those who sacrifice themselves for the country.  
 In the second paragraph, loyalty to the homeland is strengthened by the 




of Islam. Defending the homeland in every condition necessitates always being 
positioned on the state’s side and makes positioning on the side of any group 
challenging the state impossible. This reduces any revolutionary tendencies of the pious 
Muslims against the laic regime, since such a tendency would be regarded as 
unacceptable for Islam because of the value given to loyalty to the homeland and 
accordingly to the state. Islam is compared with other religions in terms of its approach 
to martyrdom. By specifying the distinctive value attributed to martyrdom in Islam, 
special responsibility towards the state is imposed on pious Muslims. 
In the third paragraph, “unity, solidarity, common ideals and common goals” are 
presented as the main conditions of the transformation from crowd to nation. Gramsci 
(1971: 152) underlined the need for the organisation, centralisation and discipline of the 
masses for their emergence as a force. A significant function of political society is to 
ensure political unity. The idea of ‘nation’ represents the realisation of such a political 
unity in the contemporary world. Tugal (2009: 28) stated that “nationalism becomes not 
only the expression of the desire for unity but also a way of channelling internal class 
and status grievances to the international arena and delaying internal struggle”. The 
word ‘unity’ in the text directs people to act in unison. Nationwide solidarity imbues 
people with the prioritisation of the interests of the nation instead of individual or group 
interests. Since the state has the monopoly to determine the ‘common ideals’ as well as 
‘common goals’, the agenda of the subordinate classes and religious groups becomes of 
secondary importance. According to the text, a nation which possesses these qualities 
becomes a source of pride for the young generations. The term ‘coming generations’ 
can be interpreted as an effort to direct students towards an attitude of pride in the 
nation. 
There is a strong emphasis on the ‘unity’ of particular elements for the 
constitution of the ‘nation’. Gramsci (1971: 325) stated that “every language contains 
the elements of a conception of the world and of a culture”. Therefore, language is able 
to construct meaning and give shape to values and beliefs. Achieving unity in language 
would mean achieving unity in culture and world conception. The discourse of ‘unity in 
religion’ can be seen as an effort to find common ground for pious Muslims and secular 
segments under the umbrella of a laicised Islam. The discourse on ‘unity in ideals and 




laic state by restricting the effect of Islam on people’s motivations. The terms ‘nation’ 
and ‘motherland’ are symbolised by the metaphors of ‘soul’ and ‘body’, which reflect 
religion’s understanding of existence. They symbolise the supreme type of unity, the 
unity necessary for human survival. Such a discourse puts strong emphasis on the 
harmony between state and nation. The paragraph ends with a reference to the 
Constitution in which the legal base of the idea of the unity is presented.  
Text 640 
… The motherland is the legacy of our ancestors; we cannot betray it, 
loving and defending the homeland are duties commanded by our 
religion. Allah commands as follows: “Fight in the way of Allah those 
who fight you…”.
41
 As can be seen, waging war when it is necessary in 
order to live in liberty and peace is the command of Allah. This is named 
‘Jihad’ in our religion. 
As can be seen, protecting the integrity of the homeland is a divine duty 
for all Muslim men and women. It is, at the same time, a supreme national 
duty. (Bolay, 1997: 60) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
• The homeland is inherited from our ancestors. 
• Protecting the motherland is a religious duty. 
The motherland is described as the legacy of people’s ancestors. Being a legacy 
grants the homeland a sentimental value. The word ‘ancestor’ signifies kinship relations 
with former generations. Being a ‘legacy of ancestors’ imposes a responsibility on the 
current generations stemming from their gratitude towards ancestors. This discourse 
prevents people from being contrary to the authorities within the homeland, since those 
authorities represent the administration of that legacy. Betraying the motherland is 
regarded as an undesirable attitude against it. The word ‘betray’ is open to be misuse. 
Since there are no criteria for deciding what actions are within the boundaries of 
betrayal, it can be used as a pretext for suppressing oppositional and revolutionary 
movements. Based on the quoted verse, the text equates holy wars of Islam with wars of 
                                                          
40
 This text, entitled ‘The Indivisibility of the Motherland’, is from the tenth-grade RCMK textbook. 
41





the Turkish nation-state. Waging a war involves two sides, the state’s side and the 
enemy’s side. When Turkish people participate in a war, they automatically position 
themselves on the state’s side. Therefore, the discourse locates people on the side of the 
state and constructs a required loyalty against the enemy ‘other’. The word ‘jihad’ 
symbolises the ultimate dedication for Muslims in terms of sacrificing the self for the 
sake of a holy purpose. Another discursive tactic here is to de-Islamise the concept of 
jihad by alienating it from its function as a source for Islamic action and by presenting it 
as a “secular” national duty. By this means, the Kemalists minimised the concept’s 
capacity to inspire counter-hegemonic Islamist movements. 
“Protecting the integrity of homeland” is described as a religious duty for 
Muslims. The word ‘protecting’ necessitates an ‘other’ who is dangerous to the integrity 
of the homeland. This discourse therefore locates people on the side of the state and 
demands protection of that integrity by them. Thus, people are conditioned to abstain 
from engaging in destructive activities against the state. This tendency is a braking 
mechanism to prevent the devout subordinate classes from acting against the state and 
the ruling class. In other words, the consent of those classes is possessed by the state.  
3.1.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Text 142 
 … 
 We possess particular duties towards the state. Some of these duties are 
paying tax, joining the army, participating in elections and obeying the 
laws.  
 … 
 The state is responsible for preparing conditions which are necessary for 
the material and moral development of its citizens. The state’s realisation 
of these duties (the construction of schools, roads, bridges, hospitals, 
communication facilities etc.) can only be possible with the income from 
taxes. Refusing to pay taxes or evading taxes is a crime in law, a sin in 
religion and disrespect to the people in morality.  
 …  
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 … In order to ensure that fundamental rights and liberties are not 
violated, we have to adhere to the laws and give consent for our share 
and others’ share. 
 Everyone has to be conscious of and carry out their rights and 
responsibilities. Within this framework, the state controls whether its 
citizens obey the laws or not. According to Islam, people feel that they are 
under Allah’s control. This feeling and belief prevents people from 
victimising others by violating their rightful share in the areas which are 
not regulated by law. (Eksi et al., 2015: 107-109) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
• We have unilateral duties towards the State. 
• Refusing to pay taxes or evading taxes a sin in Islam. 
• Giving consent for the State and its laws is a religious duty for us. 
The text specifies particular duties which citizens are expected to fulfil. The 
word ‘duty’ indicates unilateral tasks. Such unilateral tasks construct a hierarchical 
relationship of authority with the state and expects obedience from citizens.  
 In the second paragraph, the state is described as having a positive influence on 
human life. ‘Conditions for material development’ indicates the control of the state over 
means of production. ‘Conditions for moral development’ underlines the role of the 
state as a source of morality. ‘Preparing conditions’ signifies control over both means of 
production and the source of morality. The state, with duties such as constructing 
schools, roads and hospitals, is presented as an organisation which always serves the 
public interest. ‘Refusing to pay tax’ means ‘refusing to obey the rules of the state’. 
‘Evading taxes’ means ‘infringing the law’. Therefore, in addition to being a crime in 
law, infringing and refusing to obey the law are presented as “a sin in religion and 
disrespect to the people in morality”. Therefore, obedience to the law is secured with 
religious and moral references. 
 People’s fundamental rights and liberties are based on their adherence to laws 
and their consent for their share and others’ share. Giving consent for one’s own and 
others’ shares signifies giving consent for the existing distribution relations in society. 




 In the final paragraph, everyone is expected to “be conscious of and carry out 
their rights and responsibilities”. The conscious/unconscious duality reveals that people 
are not active determiners of those rights and responsibilities but passively learn and 
become conscious of them. The state’s control over such an internalisation is presented 
as normal and associated with Allah’s control over believers. People are therefore 
expected to regard the control of Allah and the state as the same thing and to take into 
account that control when acting. In the final sentence, an analogy is made between the 
law and Islam in terms of being the source of rules. The main discourse in this analogy 
is that the laws have the same mission as Islam in terms of determining people’s 
behaviour and actions and that people should obey the legal rules just as they obey the 
rules determined by Islam.  
Text 243 
‘Homeland’ refers to the piece of land where a nation survives and which 
has determined borders. Homeland, at the same time, is the place where 
we practise our national and moral values. Nation, on the other hand, is 
the human community who live on a piece of land together and who have 
a unity of language, history, ideal, emotion, customs and traditions.  
The people live together in solidarity with each other. Their will and 
desire to live together has resulted in the creation of the understanding of 
nation (millet) by coming together under the flag of specific values. Those 
values are language, history, homeland and religious belief. Those values 
are fed by customs and traditions throughout the years and they become 
the shared values of the society. Those values which sustain nations and 
underpin the independence of states contribute to the unity and solidarity. 
Possessing a homeland is crucial in the history of civilisations. One’s 
patriotism manifests itself by serving and protecting the state. 
…  
This homeland is a heritage protected by and bequeathed to us by our 
ancestors. Our duty is to protect it and love it. … 
… 
Loving and protecting our homeland refers to doing what we can for its 
development. The statement of His Holiness Ali [Hz. Ali] that “countries 
develop by means of patriotism” reveals this reality. For the development 
of a country, the people need to act in unity. (Akgul et al., 2015b: 120-22) 
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 The homeland is the piece of land where moral and national values are 
practised and where people are united by the same language, emotions, 
ideals, customs, traditions, homeland and religious belief.  
 A nation is the result of people’s need to live in solidarity with each 
other. 
 The homeland provides a safe and comfortable environment. 
 The Islamic Caliph Ali pointed out the need for patriotism. 
The text begins with a definition of homeland by underlining its features as a 
piece of land, as the site of the nation’s survival, and as possessing borders. The word 
‘homeland’ refers to the political organisation within those borders, namely the state. 
Basing the nation’s survival on the state grants the state a raison d’être as a nation. As 
the homeland is presented as the place where moral and national values are practised, 
the presence of commonality for those values is taken for granted. Since the homeland 
is presented as the only way of practising those moral and national values, the homeland 
necessarily reflects the shared values of society. It therefore becomes impossible for the 
state apparatus to act against those values of its people. The text continues with a 
definition of nation with a special emphasis on the unity of language, history, ideals, 
emotions, customs and traditions. In the second paragraph, homeland and religious 
belief are also added as the common value of the nation. The main discursive tactic here 
is putting emphasis on the commonalities which form the rational common ground for 
the integrity of society and concealing dissimilarities between people.  
In the second paragraph, the people in the homeland are expected to “live in 
solidarity with each other”. The statement “their will and desire to live together” 
indicates that people voluntarily come together and form the nation. The statement 
“coming together under the flag of specific values” underlines that people have common 
values. The flag is the symbol of authority and the word refers to the main authority, 
namely the state apparatus, in the country. Those values are presented as “language, 
history, homeland and religious belief”. History as an element of nation signifies that 




Those collective experiences can be ‘fighting against the enemies’ or ‘being the subjects 
of an empire’. The word ‘homeland’ refers to the country in which people live. It also 
signifies the authority, namely the state, which rules that country. Another element of 
nation according to the text is “religious beliefs”. Because it is a constituent of the 
nation, religion, namely Islam, is suggested as a shared value. From this point of view, a 
state apparatus which prioritises the Islamic lifestyle cannot be against the shared values 
of the nation. Moreover, according to the text, those values “contribute to unity and 
solidarity” by sustaining the nation and underpinning the independence of the state. So 
rather than being a threat, religious values conversely contribute to the nation and the 
state. When religious values contribute to the solidarity and unity of the nation, any 
individual who does not share the Islamic values can be interpreted as being against the 
unity and solidarity of the nation.  
In the third paragraph, “possessing a homeland” is presented as a vital issue for a 
civilisation. The sense of ownership of a land creates a spiritual bond with the country 
and its citizens. The main requirement for patriotism is presented as “serving and 
protecting the state”. Serving the state necessitates acceptance of the authority of the 
state. This discourse conceals the notion of the state as a servant of the people and 
changes it to the idea that the people are the servants of the state. Moreover, the need to 
protect the state can hinder people from criticising the actions of the state apparatus. 
Being a legacy of ancestors makes the homeland a sentimental heritage which 
people possess. Just like a heritage passed down a family, the homeland gains a 
meaning which needs to be protected. This need interiorises the tendency to serve the 
homeland and its rulers instead of criticising it. The injunction “to protect and love it” is 
used to give people the responsibility to favour the state in any circumstance. 
Making the maximum effort for the development of the country is presented as 
the main indicator of loving and protecting the homeland. According to this discourse, 
any acts which oppose or challenge the current regime could be categorised as treason, 
or at least aversion. The quotation from Ali
44
 is used to encourage people to possess the 
manner of patriotism. The main discursive tactic is strengthening the discourse by 
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giving reference to a highly influential religious figure and instrumentalising his 
influence on Muslims. Thus, loyalty to the political entity which governs the homeland 
is secured. 
Although it is not possible to define the JDP as a nationalist
45
 political party in 
the Kemalist sense, we might argue that the JDP pragmatically included nationalist 
discourse in its hegemonic project as can be seen from this text. Tugal (2009: 96) 
underlined the absorption of Islamic internationalism into Turkish nationalism in the 
process of Islamism’s passive revolution. Oztan (2014: 84-89) defined the JDP’s 
hegemony as a “neo-liberal nationalist hegemony”. When identifying the nationalist 
discourse in Erdogan’s speeches, he summarised the JDP’s nationalism as “compassion 
for, commitment to, and ‘love of service’ towards the nation” (Oztan, 2014: 86). 
Therefore, the nationalist discourse, which also possesses a religious nuance, is 
pragmatically included in the text. 
Text 346 
When creating humankind, Allah gave them the obligation that all human 
beings need to and are obliged to live together. Division of labour has 
contributed to the natural and historical links between the human beings 
who already exist. New links are those which make up the shortages of 
humanity and secure the tomorrows in addition to the todays. (Akgul et 
al., 2015b: 122) 
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 Prominent discourse; 
 People’s need to live together with others stems from Allah (the God). 
In the text, the necessity to live together with other human beings is presented as a 
consequence of God’s will. When a necessity stems from God’s will, such a necessity 
becomes unquestionable and undeniable. The reference to the creation grants such a 
necessity the feature of naturalness. Use of the term ‘human beings’ instead of ‘people’ 
or ‘citizens’ strengthens the discourse by underlining the independence from artifical 
social structures.  
Moreover, “division of labour” is accepted here as a positive development for 
society. This acceptance legitimises the organic social structure in society. People 
interiorise their roles within the division of labour and take the organic structure of 
society as granted. ‘Division of labour’ is associated with the natural and historical links 
already in existence in society. This makes it more significant, since such a discourse 
accepts its harmony with historical and natural elements. 
In the final sentence, “the new links” refers to the division of labour relations 
between people. According to the text, division of labour compensates for shortages in 
society and secures the future. Therefore, those who refuse to play their part in the 
division of labour also refuse to play their part in making up the shortages in society and 
securing its future. As a response to our research question, religion is used here as an 
instrument to legitimise and internalise the division of labour, and by this means the 




We need to show respect to everyone in our country. We should regard 
our homeland as our home and we should regard each person living in 
this country as a member of our home. His Holiness Ali [Hz. Ali] told us 
that “The homeland is our home. What else will you defend if you do not 
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defend your home?” From this point of view, we need to keep in mind that 
each person in this country is a part of this common culture. … 
We need to act in unity in order to live in a happy and peaceful 
environment. We need to abstain from those acts which might endanger 
our unity. We can overcome all difficulties in this manner. (Akgul et al., 
2015b: 123-24) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 The homeland is like our home. 
 All people in the homeland are like members of our family. 
 We need to act in unity. 
 The text begins with a call to respect everyone in the country. The word 
‘homeland’ is used to refer to the country. The word is a compound of the words ‘home’ 
and ‘land’. ’Land’ refers to the region where people live and ‘home’ refers to the place 
where a person lives. It also points out the sense of ownership of a place. It therefore 
constitutes a vital bond between the land and the people living on it. ‘Motherland’ also 
covers all elements of the country from the state apparatus and officials to its people as 
a whole.  
 Moreover, everyone living in the country is presented as “a member of our 
home”.  This discourse is based on an imagined society which is like a family composed 
of people connected to each other by kinship bonds. With this image, understanding 
society as a family conceals the class divisions and struggles between classes within it. 
For this reason, this discourse is beneficial for the dominant class which seeks to 
distract the attention of the subordinate classes from their domination. Moreover, 
accepting society as a family has significant outcomes in terms of identity in the case of 
Turkey. Finding a common identity is directly related to efforts to create an historic bloc 
with the subordinate classes which are composed of different identity groups. By 
propagating a sense of kinship, the ruling class becomes able to prevent the sense of 
exclusion among different ethnic and sectarian identities. By this means, the ruling class 
can take precautions against any threat or challenge to the existing social and political 




 In the text, the discourse about the homeland is supported with an Islamic 
reference. The text repeats the same discourse with reference to a significant Islamic 
figure, Hz. Ali. He also defined the homeland as “our home” and associated defending 
the homeland with defending the home. This discourse aims to unite the people within 
the country against the ‘other’. In the statement “each person in this country is a part of 
this common culture”, the discourse of creating a common culture can be interpreted as 
an effort to nullify cultural differences and show the country as a single homogeneous 
body. 
 Moreover, acting in unity is presented as a prerequisite for living “in a happy 
and peaceful environment”. As a consequence of such a discourse, any differences and 
any opposition stemming from those differences can be interpreted as a threat to a 
peaceful and happy environment. The word ‘peaceful’ is used to direct people to a 
passive attitude. This passive attitude is strengthened in the following sentence: “We 
need to abstain from those acts which might endanger our unity”. This is therefore a 
useful discourse since any opposition from antagonistic groups can be regarded as a 
danger to unity. 
 In summary, cultural differences and class struggle are concealed within the text 
by emphasising unity and presenting the country as a home and the people living in it as 
members of a family. Considering our research question, religious references are used in 
the text in order to encourage people to always act in favour of the country with all its 
elements from the state apparatus to its people. 
 
3.2. The Military  
 ‘Military’ is another significant topic in the RCMK textbooks. It was historically 
one of the pillars of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc together with the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie and the Kemalist bureaucracy. Its importance stems from its role as a 
determiner of civilian politics. In Turkey’s history, civilian politics have been directly 
intervened in by the TAF (Turkish Armed Forces) four times (1960, 1971, 1980 and 
1997). Following the 1960 coup, the TAF dominated civilian rule and adopted a 
watchdog role over civilian politicians (Sarigil, 2012: 8). As Narli (2000: 108) pointed 




laicism and Ataturk’s main principles. Especially following the 1980 coup d’état, the 
leading actor of the hegemonic strategy in Turkish politics was the TAF which 
established an authoritarian rule and gained the consent of the daunted masses 
exasperated by the economic and political crisis (Yalman, 2002b: 41). 
 Considering these roles of the military in the political arena, a carefully 
constructed positive discourse about the military would mean constructing a positive 
discourse about the values and the ideology which the military represents and protects. 
Such a positive discourse would also legitimise the TAF’s interventions in civilian 
politics and its restrictions on groups which challenge Kemalism. In the textbooks, we 
can therefore detect a completely positive discourse about the military which underlines 
the sacredness of military service. The JDP determined the same hegemonic strategy for 
its discourse about the military as it determined about the state. Considering the power 
of the military, the JDP did not attempt to construct a completely negative discourse in 
the school textbooks. In other words, the party preferred a war of position with gradual 
reforms of the military, rather than a war of manoeuvre targeting the military. 
3.2.1. Post-28 February Textbooks 
Text 148 
… 
The homeland on which we live is not a mere piece of land. Homeland is 
a sacred value which was irrigated by the blood of heroes and martyrs 
who sacrificed their lives without any hesitation. We also carry out the 
duty for our homeland and its independence. We have to join the army 
when we reach the age that is determined by law. 
Military service is a necessary duty to protect the state and homeland. 
Every young Turk should be willing to accept this duty which is one of the 
most fundamental duties that we need to carry out for our state. … 
Our nation regards the people who join the army as valuable people who 
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Our Supreme Lord commands in the Qur’an as follows: 
 ‘Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. 
Indeed. Allah does not like transgressors (Bakarah, 2/190)’. This means 
that serving in the army and contributing to the defence of the homeland 
is a command of Allah. On this issue, our beloved Prophet has many 
hadiths in addition to the verses. Some of these are:  
 The feet which get dusty on the way of Allah do not go to hell. 
 Hellfire does not burn the eyes which stand guard during military 
service. 
  Our beloved Prophet hailed those commanders and leaders who 
educate soldiers about ascending to heaven by stating that “Allah 
welcomes three people to heaven: the craftsman who makes an arrow out 
of love, the one that shoots the arrow and the one who helps the person 
who shoots the arrow.” (Arslan & Eryilmaz, 2000: 83-84) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Joining and serving in the army is a command of Islam. 
In the first paragraph, the homeland is described by the adjective ‘sacred’, which 
gives a meaning of Islamic importance and value to the country. The statement 
“irrigated by the blood of heroes and martyrs” creates a sense of gratitude. The word 
‘blood’ also represents kinship. By using the words ‘heroes’ and ‘martyrs’ in the same 
sentence, the text equates martyrdom with heroism and presents sacrificing the self for 
the state as a form of heroism. The statement ‘without any hesitation’ indicates that 
questioning military service is unnecessary and unacceptable. This discourse therefore 
underlines obedience to the commands of the military as the only correct behaviour. The 
emphasis on the age determined by law shows the need to obey the law.  
In the second paragraph, by presenting military service as a ‘necessary duty’, the 
text leaves no room for any avoidance of military service. As protecting the state is 
presented as expected behaviour in the texts, any challenge or opposition to the state 
becomes impossible and unacceptable. The word ‘willing’ refers to consent. This 
discourse conceals the coercive character of compulsory military service and seeks to 




Basing the value and sacredness of joining the army on appreciation of the 
nation can be interpreted as an effort to create loyalty for the military and defining 
military service as a ‘sacred duty’ gives it a moral significance confirmed by Islam. 
Students are incentivised and motivated to join the army by a religious reference 
describing military service as a ‘religious command’. The statement “beyond being a 
civic duty” constructs a moral base for military service in addition to the legal base. 
The discourse is strengthened with references to verses and hadiths. In the verse, 
engaging in war for the nation-state is associated with a holy war on behalf of Allah. 
Therefore, any war under the command of the laic nation state is regarded as a holy war. 
Since “serving in the army and contributing to the defence of the homeland” is 
presented as a command of Allah, obedience to the military and the state also becomes a 
command of Allah. 
The discourse is also supported by the Prophet Muhammad’s hadiths. The first 
hadith emphasises that those who make efforts for Allah are rewarded by escaping the 
risk of going to hell. Getting dusty refers to something wearing off, so being affected 
negatively while making efforts for Allah is accepted as normal. Making efforts for 
Allah refers here to fighting in the military. In the second hadith, standing guard during 
military service is presented as a way of achieving salvation since it keeps people from 
being punished by hellfire. ‘Hellfire’ represents the punishment caused by sinful actions 
following interrogation in the afterlife. So military service guarantees a positive result 
from that interrogation. In the final paragraph, there is a reference to a saying of the 
Prophet Muhammad about commanders and leaders who educate soldiers. 
Consequently, as a response to our research question, Islam has been instrumentalised 
in the text in order to ensure obedience and loyalty to the military and therefore to the 
state.   
3.2.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Text 149 
Military service is the art of defending the homeland against enemies. … 
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Defending the homeland is an indispensable duty for a nation. To fulfil 
this duty, we need to do our military service at the right time. We need to 
keep in mind that this service is a duty stemming from being a citizen. 
Our dear Prophet defined military service as a divine duty, stating that 
“There are two types of eyes that will not be burned: the eyes which cry 
from the fear of God, and the eyes that keep guard at the borders of the 
homeland in the way of the God”. (Akgul et al., 2015b: 131-132) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Doing military service is a divine duty in order to defend the homeland. 
Military service is presented as “the art of defending the homeland against 
enemies”. The word ‘art’ represents the creation of an artist whom people admire. 
Artists achieve prominence through their special abilities which help them to display the 
best performance in a particular field. So associating military service with the ‘art of 
defending the homeland’ puts a special emphasis on the ability of military personnel.     
Military service is described as “an indispensable duty for the nation”. When 
something is indispensable, no-one can question it and its necessity is taken for granted. 
The necessity of military service, according to this discourse, is taken for granted and 
cannot be questioned. The phrase “for the nation” emphasises that serving the nation is 
a significant duty for each individual and everyone has to sacrifice their time and labour 
for the sake of the nation. In the statement that “this service is a duty stemming from 
being a citizen”, the prominent discourse is that being a citizen is not a free gift but 
requires sacrifices for the state, such as labour, time and even liberty, as in military 
service. The reference to citizenship can also be interpreted as a reference to legal 
obligation. 
The text continues by basing the need for sacrifices for the sake of the military 
and the state on religious discourse. With reference to the expression of the Prophet, 
“the eyes that keep guard at the borders of the homeland in the way of the God” are 
accepted as possessing equal value to “the eyes which cry for the fear of God”. First, 
since the quotation is from the Prophet of Islam, this discourse is expected to be more 




equivalent to the attitude towards God makes the service unquestionable and 
inescapable. 
The discourse on military service is a symbol representing the idea of serving the 
state. When it is considered that the state apparatus is the main instrument of the 
dominant class, such a discourse is used for the internalisation of the service as the 
instrument of the dominant class. Moreover, internalising military service refers to 
internalising the division of labour and its role in the existing social structure. At the 
end, the discourse in this text points out the importance of serving the state and 
accepting this role in the social structure by basing the injunction on religious 
references. 
 
3.3. Economic Differences 
 ‘Economic differences’ is another topic which can be found in the RCMK 
textbooks of the post-28 February process. The text below constructs a causal 
relationship between religiousity and economic conditions of individuals. The 
mainstream discourse about socio-economic differences is significant since the 
acceptance of socio-economic differences as natural reduces people’s revolutionary 
attitudes and compels them to internalise and be integrated into the existing economic 
system. Moreover, accepting the economic differences between different segments of 
society is equal to internalising the historical centre-periphery cleavage between the 
Kemalist centre and the pious Muslim periphery and thus to normalising the current 
class structure in Turkey. Consequently, the discourse distracts attention from the 
structural hegemony of the deep economic system and and Kemalists’ privileged 
position in this economic system and directs it to the personal religiousity of pious 
Muslims.  
It should also be noted that the topic ‘Economic Differences’ has been removed 
from the content of the 2015 textbooks. This can be interpreted as both a challenge to 
the discourse which normalises the subordinate socio-economic position of the pious 





3.3.1. Post-28 February Textbooks 
Text 150 
An individual’s economic conditions influence his/her thoughts and 
behaviours. The understanding of religion is also affected by the 
economic structure of society. Economic developments also influence the 
emergence of different ways of living and thinking. Advancements in the 
fields of economy and technology cause the break-up of systems of 
thought. This results in the emergence of a variety of religious 
understandings. For instance, the understanding of religion in a modern 
individual who has good economic conditions is different from that of a 
poor individual who lived 500 years ago. The understanding of religion in 
an underdeveloped society is different from that in a developed society. In 
developed industrial societies, religion is mostly an individual lifestyle 
whereas it is practised as a social norm in underdeveloped societies. 
Sudden material changes cause imbalance in the distribution of wealth in 
a society. This results in widespread social disharmony. The discomfort in 
society compels people to look for new remedies. In order to cope with 
the discomfort, different groups develop different understandings of 
religion. (Aydin et al., 2002: 91) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 Economic conditions in a society influence people’s understanding of 
religion. 
 In developed industrial societies, religion is within the personal, private 
sphere. 
 In underdeveloped societies, religion is more powerful as a social norm. 
According to the main discourse in the text, the thoughts and behaviours of 
people are affected by their economic conditions and their class position. People’s 
perception of religion and religious practices are also influenced by the “economic 
structure of society”. Here, ‘economic structure’ refers to the existing class structure in 
society. According to the text, people’s understanding of religion changes with 
economic and technological advancements. The term ‘economic developments’ refers to 
capitalist development and ‘advancement’ refers to proceeding to a progressive phase 
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from a reactionary phase. In other words, as people move to a more progressive phase, 
they give up their former understanding of religion.  
The text continues with binary words which are used for dividing the socio-
economic differences into two categories: On the one side, ’modern individual’ is 
associated with ‘good economic conditions’ and on the other, the word ‘poor’ is used to 
describe an individual who lived 500 years ago. It is underlined in the main discourse of 
the text that a person needs to change his/her understanding of religion if he/she aims to 
be a contemporary individual living in good economic conditions. In other words, 
people from the lower classes cannot maintain the existing place of religion in their 
lives when they climb to a higher position in the country’s class structure. 
The binary statements ’underdeveloped society’ and ‘developed society’ are 
similarly used to point out the differences in people’s understanding of religion. How 
the understanding of religion differs between underdeveloped and developed societies is 
clarified in the subsequent sentences by asserting that religion is a ‘lifestyle’ at the 
individual level in developed industrial societies but a strong social norm in 
underdeveloped societies. Since the word ‘lifestyle’ refers to individual choice, 
religiousity is limited to the individual level and loses its character as a source of world 
conception in Muslims’s life. When religion and religiousity are individualised, 
religion’s interpersonal and social power is diminished. Being a ‘social norm’ for a 
religion refers to going beyond the individual level and having a prescriptive rule-
making role in society. Such a role is associated with underdevelopment in the text. 
Moreover, this role also contradicts Ataturk’s principle of laicism which aimed at 
limiting Islam’s social power as a source of collective action by the pious Muslims. 
The word ‘disharmony’ is used to explain the outcomes of an unbalanced 
distribution of wealth. In the final part of the text, diversification in the understanding of 
religion is presented as the outcome of efforts to find remedies for the discomfort in 
society. The word ‘remedy’ is linked with the feeling of discomfort, rather than with the 
poverty which results from the unbalanced distribution of wealth. In other words, it is 
not a real remedy, but a consolation for the discomfort. This discourse regards religion 
as a reaction to the negativities in society. Therefore, such a discourse ignores religion’s 
position as the basis of all other values in human life and reduces it to a reaction against 




The discourse in the text normalises the gap between Kemalists and the pious 
Muslims in terms of religiosity, since it presents such a gap as the natural outcome of 
economic conditions. Moreover, such a discourse also normalises the economic 
superiority of the secular people, since it relates religiosity with underdevelopment and 
presents the hierarchy between the seculars and religious people as a natural 
stratification stemming from economic conditions. The discourse embedded in the text 
also directs readers’ attention from the differences in people’s economic conditions to 
the differences in people’s understanding of religion. In other words, the text takes the 
economic differences in society as a given and seeks to explain them in the 
understanding of religion with reference to dichotomies such as being developed and 
underdeveloped. 
 
3.4. The Image of Ataturk 
The education system is one of the areas in which the image of Ataturk, as the 
founder of the Republic of Turkey, has dominated every aspect of the discourse. 
Students face Ataturk’s image not only in the content of the textbooks, but also in 
physical spaces such as classrooms and the schoolyard, in oral elements such as the 
‘Student Oath’ and in activities such as celebrations of national holidays or the 
commemoration of Ataturk.  
How his image is presented in the RCMK lessons is especially important for this 
study since these lessons directly reveal the construction of discourse about Ataturk’s 
ideas in relation to Islam and Muslimness. Acceptance of Kemalist values, perceptions 
and beliefs as superior values, perceptions and beliefs by the subordinate pious Muslims 
is vital for the moral and intellectual leadership of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. 
Ataturk’s moral superiority is therefore frequently emphasised in RCMK lessons to give 
the message that Ataturk is morally superior even when the main issue is Islam.  
The textbooks begin with a portrait of Ataturk and ‘Ataturk’s Address to Youth’. 
A unique and perfect image of Ataturk dominates different units of the textbooks. This 
image made a significant contribution to the historical prestige of the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc. The qualities of ‘moral and cultural leadership’, to use Gramsci’s 




lead society as a result of being true followers of Ataturk. Under topics such as 
‘Ataturk’s views on Laicism’, ‘Ataturk’s view on religion’ and ‘Islam for Ataturk’, 
Ataturk is presented as a leader who was a reference point for virtually every issue. The 
perception that ‘Ataturk is always right’ has been applied to the Kemalists as the 
perception that ‘the Kemalists are always right’. Efforts to reconcile the principles of 
Ataturk with Islamic values and to construct an image of ‘devout Ataturk’ aimed at 
preventing the religious people from perceiving any threats from the laicist Kemalists. 
By this means, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc has benefited from the unique image of 
Ataturk to gain the consent of the religious subordinate classes.  
On the other hand, Ataturk’s image was also a significant issue for the JDP. 
First, a positive discourse towards Ataturk, instead of a radical negative discourse 
against him, was important to minimise the threat perception of the Kemalists stemming 
from the ideology of the JDP and from the move of the Islamic middle class from the 
periphery to the centre. Gramsci (1971: 160) pointed out the need to make some 
sacrifices to convince the antagonist groups in society. From this point of view, the 
positive discourse about Ataturk can be interpreted as a sacrifice by the JDP to gain the 
consent of secular and Alevi groups. Second, the JDP benefited from the construction of 
a ‘religious Ataturk image’ by instrumentalising such a construction to legitimise its 
policies regarding the Sunni interpretation of Islam, compulsory religious education and 
religious scholars.  
Moreover, the ‘depoliticisation of the other’ has always been a hegemonic 
strategy used by both the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. In terms of Ataturk’s 
image, the JDP sought to depoliticise Ataturk’s image to prevent it from being a source 
of oppositional discourse against the JDP. Erdogan commented that Ataturk’s image 
was “used by certain mentalities” as a “tool for ideological purposes”. He condemned 
the RPP, the political party founded by Ataturk, for “abusing Ataturk’s name” and 
pointed out the importance of protecting Ataturk from the “ideological bigotry which 
instrumentalizes his name.” (HDN, 2017). He also stated that “We consider it a duty to 
give Ataturk due credit as the commander-in-chief of our Independence War and the 
founder of our Republic, at the front of our nation” and added that “There is nothing 
more natural than respect for a name who was the leader of such a struggle to have a 




as an attempt to depoliticise Ataturk by emphasising his commandership during the War 
of Independence and by ignoring his revolutions and principles and thus by isolating 
him from any political debates against the position of the JDP. By this means, the 
Kemalists were deprived of benefiting from the historical prestige of Ataturk’s political 
ideas, principles and values against the JDP. 
3.4.1. Post-28 February Textbooks 
The Portrait of Ataturk 
The RCMK textbooks at every grade start with a portrait of Mustafa Kemal 
Ataturk. The picture differs between books but the following portrait is an example: 
 






 Ataturk is a unique leader with his world-views, beliefs, values and 
perceptions. 
 Ataturk’s views and principles are compatible with Islam. 
The picture of Ataturk at the beginning of the textbook represents his privileged 
position and uniqueness in Turkish society, since no-one else could form the starting 
image of those textbooks. Moreover, under a law enacted in 1934, Mustafa Kemal 
gained the surname ‘Ataturk’, which means “the Father of Turks” (Akyol, 2011: 186). 
The word ‘Ata’, which means ‘ancestor’, was combined with the word ‘Turk’ and 
became the compound word ‘Ataturk’. Just as a family chronology often starts with 
pictures of family elders, the picture at the beginning of the textbook implicitly 
reproduces Ataturk’s image as an ancestor (ata) which was granted him by his surname. 
Furthermore, beginning a textbook with a specific historical figure’s picture grants 
him/her a leadership role in the topic of that textbook. The picture at the beginning of 
the RCMK textbook implicitly reproduces the discourse of ‘great leader’
51
 (Ulu Onder), 
which is a very common metonymy used to refer to Ataturk in Turkey. His ‘greatness’ 
derives from his position as the first and the only historical figure who has a picture at 
the beginning of the textbook. By means of such discourses, he is presented as a role 
model for students with his values,
 
world-views, beliefs, discourses and perceptions. 
Beginning the books with a portrait of Ataturk means that he is the only one who is the 
main reference for students for every topic, including religious issues and Islam. He is 
the only person whose path should be followed by the students. This discourse grants 
him a privileged position in terms of being the point of reference and rightfulness for all 
times and for all cases. His followers, namely the Kemalist hegemonic bloc, also 
benefited from this privileged position and rightfulness in issues of religion. 
Moreover, a significant aim of locating the portrait at the beginning of the books 
is to minimise the threat perception of the pious Muslims stemming from Kemalist 
revolutions and principles. As the books start with a portrait of Ataturk, his principles 
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and world-view do not pose a threat against Islam or Muslimness but signifies the 
compatibility of Ataturk’s views and principles with Islam and with the interests of 
Muslims.  
These discourses about Ataturk’s image have significant outcomes in terms of 
the cultural hegemonic struggle and class domination in Turkey. Gramsci (1971: 57-58) 
stated that a dominant class cannot rely solely on its governmental power. For Gramsci, 
moral and cultural leadership was also essential for a dominant class to maintain its 
class position. Ataturk’s image can be interpreted as the concentration of the cultural 
and moral leadership qualities in single body. By means of the positive, outstanding and 
unique features attributed to him, his ideas and principles, and thence the Kemalists as 
his followers, possess licence to lead society. The Kemalists have a comparative moral, 
ideological and intellectual advantage by means of this image against other ideological 
groups and classes in society.  
Loyalty to his principles and ideas, rather than questioning them, becomes the 
main norm that each citizen is expected to follow. By this means, gaining the consent of 
people for the superiority of Ataturk’s followers becomes easier. As the main reference 
with his ideas and preferences on nearly every issue, Ataturk also gains consent for his 
standpoint regarding economic policies and for the class structure stemming from his 
preferences in the field of economy. The discourse of ‘main reference for every issue’ 
makes it impossible to question Ataturk’s ideas and principles. Criticising those ideas 
and principles can easily be perceived as an abnormal and even transgressive act. This 
discourse could easily be instrumentalised by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc as a 
protective shield in their struggle against the Islamist counter-hegemonic movements. 
For instance, TUSIAD, the representative of the Kemalist bourgeoisie, called for an 
early election against the JDP government in a press statement released on 29 April 
2007 stating that an early election was inevitable for the protection of laicism and the 





Ataturk abolished the Caliphate after establishing the Republic. Ataturk’s 
attitude was not welcomed by those who did not think in parallel with 
him. Some even said “we become suspicious of our religion, our belief 
without a Caliph. In this situation, can we be Muslim?” However, Turks 
had not been suspicious of Islam before Yavuz Sultan Selim passed the 
Caliphate to the Turks.  
Ataturk stated: “Omar called himself an emir, not a caliph. Therefore, 
caliphate is equal to government. Thereby, there are three conditions of 
government: consultancy (consulting the people’s representatives), justice 
(ensuring equality and freedom) and obedience to the order (ensuring 
obedience to the duties of the state). Our government possesses all of 
these qualities. The goals of forming a government are to protect the 
nation and country, and to ensure the comfort and happiness of the 
nation. A government which is able to realise these goals is good, but a 
government which does not is bad. Therefore, today, the nation protects 
its state and liberties in pursuance of Allah’s commandment.” (Bilgin, 
1991: 82-83) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 There is no need for the Caliphate in contemporary Turkey. 
 Consultancy, justice and obedience are three elements of the Caliphate. 
 The governments in the Turkish state have all the qualities that Omar 
possessed. 
The text begins by highlighting the abolition of the Caliphate by Ataturk and 
negative reactions to the abolition are stated. The adverb ‘even’ is used to underline the 
‘presumption of critics’ stemming from criticising Ataturk’s decision. As a response to 
critics who claim the need for the Caliphate for maintaining Muslimness, the text gives 
reference to the period before Yavuz Sultan Selim when the Caliphate was not within 
the borders of the Ottoman Empire. This discourse aims at trivialising the institution by 
showing the situation of Muslims without it. The discourse about the Caliphate is 
significant since it has the potential to provide the political leadership which Gramsci 
(1971: 88) specified as a vital element for the development of cultural hegemony.  
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In the reference to Omar, Ataturk associated the institution of the Caliphate with 
laic government in the modern sense. He completely neglected the Islamic character of 
the institution by merely emphasising its administrative role in a technical sense. Three 
features of the Caliphate are specified as consultancy, justice and obedience to the 
order. The explanation of consultancy, namely “consulting the people’s 
representatives”, is used for gaining consent for the Grand National Assembly of the 
Republic. The word ‘consultancy’ is associated with the parliamentary system. The 
concept of ‘justice’ reflects a secular understanding which refers to “ensuring equality 
and freedom”. The Islamic tone in the definition of the concept is totally ignored. The 
statement “obedience to the order” aims at manufacturing consent for the current 
regime, namely the laic Republic of Turkey. By this means, an Islamic term ‘Caliphate’ 
is used to ensure obedience and loyalty to the laic regime. 
In the statement “our government possesses all of these qualities”, the 
government of the Republic is is presented as a successor institution to the Islamic 
Caliphate fulfilling its political and administrative role. “Our government” refers to the 
governments of the Republic which serve the principles and ideals of Ataturk. Being a 
successor of the Caliphate grants the governments of the Republic the opportunity to 
represent the fundamental values and historical authority of the Caliphate. Such a 
discourse can be interpreted as an effort to gain consent for the government of the 
Republic which serves the same goals as the Caliphate of Islam. The features of a 
government are restricted to “to protect the nation and country” and “to ensure the 
comfort and happiness of the nation”. Therefore, Islamic features of the Caliphate are 
totally ignored in the text. Features of the Caliphate which do not contradict the 
principle of laicism are selectively emphasised and the features which can provide 
sources for Islamist political action are totally ignored. 
People are encouraged to display loyalty to the state with the statement that the 
“nation is protecting their state and the state’s independence in parallel with Allah’s 
commandment”. This loyalty is defined as a commandment of Allah. This can be 
interpreted as an effort to gain the consent of pious Muslims for the current regime 





Ataturk showed interest in Islam and expressed positive opinions about 
our supreme religion in his speeches. Here are some of his statements 
about our religion: 
“I believe in our religion as I believe in reality. It does not have any 
elements that are against reason and advancement. 
A commandment of Allah is to work hard. ... Working hard does not mean 
getting tired in vain and sweating. Benefiting from science, technology 
and inventions to the utmost is a requisite.  
 Our religion does not advise being bad, lazy and vile. On the contrary, 
both Allah and the Prophet commended to nations and people to maintain 
their greatness and honour.” 
Ataturk expressed these complimentary statements about our Prophet: 
“He is the first and supreme human of Allah. Millions of people follow 
him today. My name, your name can be forgotten, but his name lives for 
ever. (Uludag, Hokelekli & Uysal, 2000: 93)    
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Ataturk is a true Muslim who should be regarded as a role model for 
Muslims. 
The text starts by underlining Ataturk’s interest in Islam. All of his thoughts 
about Islam are summarised in one word: ‘positive’. The statement “expressed positive 
opinions” implies that ‘his views are in favour of Islam’. His views therefore cannot 
contradict Islam or disadvantage Muslims. The adjective ‘supreme’ indicates the 
superiority of Islam compared with other religions and can be interpreted as an effort to 
show that the existing regime represents Islam. 
In the quotation from Ataturk, there is strong emphasis on his belief in Islam. In 
the statement “our supreme religion” in Ataturk’s own sentences, the word ‘our’ refers 
to a ‘sense of possession’. By using the word ‘our’, Ataturk is presented as a Muslim 
who explicitly embraces Islam. The quotation aims at revealing that the interests, goals 
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and viewpoints of ‘Muslim Ataturk’ coincide with the interests, goals and viewpoints of 
the pious Muslims. This discourse is intended to minimise the threat perception felt by 
devout Muslims from the values of Ataturk and his followers. There is also an effort to 
harmonise religion with science. By this means, any negative influence of Islam on the 
positivist development strategies of Kemalism would be restrained. “Working hard” is 
highlighted as a command of God. According to Ataturk, working hard refers to 
“benefiting from science, technology and inventions”. This can be interpreted as an 
effort to divert attention from the social, political and economic roles of Islam to the 
non-social, non-political and non-economic issues which reduce the boundaries of Islam 
to the individual level, such as working hard and being interested in science. By this 
means, the potential of Islam to challenge the Kemalist cultural hegemony could be 
impeded. 
Moreover, Islam’s opposition to being lazy, bad and vile is expressed and 
maintaining greatness and honour is advised. The emphasis on the concept of ‘nations’ 
can be interpreted within the scope of the identity-building of Kemalism. When we 
consider how Kemalism defined the concept of ‘nation’, here ‘greatness’ and ‘honour’ 
are used to describe ‘Turkishness’. 
The final quotation from Ataturk in which he praised Allah and the Prophet can 
also be seen as an attempt to construct a ‘Muslim Ataturk’ image which can serve to 
minimise the threat perception stemming from the principles and values of Kemalism. 
Text 354 
Although Ataturk is in favour of true religion purified from superstition, 
he is, nevertheless, against bigotry and the exploitation of religion for any 
reasons and the misuse of religion for personal benefit. He expressed his 
opposition to people who exploit religion for their personal interests as 
follows: 
“People who gain material benefits are immoral. We are against this. We 
do not allow this. Such religion traders deceive our pure and innocent 
people. They are the people with whom we and you struggle.” 
Ignorance and bigotry are the most convenient environments for the 
exploitation of religion. Ignorant societies fall into the trap of bigotry, 
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and they suppose superstitions to be true religion. Ataturk regards this 
issue as follows: 
“However, the existence of people who use religion as an instrument for 
various kinds of political and personal goals by benefiting from 
ignorance and bigotry at home and abroad does not prevent us from 
speaking out on this platform. 
The only way of combating the exploitation of religion and bigotry is 
learning religion in a correct way and raising religious scholars who can 
teach religion correctly.” (Uludag, Hokelekli & Uysal, 2000: 91-92) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 Ataturk’s understanding of religion represents the true religion. 
 Some people exploit religion for their personal benefit. 
 Ignorance and bigotry are the main reasons for the exploitation of 
religion. 
The text claims to reveal Ataturk’s understanding of religion and starts with an 
emphasis on his opposition to the exploitation and misuse of religion. The discourse is 
based on the implicit binaries of ‘true religion’ and ‘distorted religion’. In order to 
specify favourable Islam, the statement “purified from superstition” is used. The 
existence of ‘true Islam’ also requires the existence of a ‘distorted Islam’. The word 
‘bigotry’ refers to extremism in religiosity. As the antonym of bigotry, the text 
implicitly positions Ataturk’s understanding of Islam as ‘moderate’. The word 
‘exploitation’ as a feature of ‘distorted religion’ is used three times in the text and is 
very often instrumentalised in the political arena in the discourses targeting Islamist and 
conservative parties. For instance, the Republican People’s Party deputy Mahmut Tanal 
made a legal approach to the Supreme Committee of Elections about the propaganda 
song Haydi Bismillah (‘In the name of Allah, let's [start]’) of the JDP before the 2015 
elections by claiming that the JDP had exploited people’s religious and moral feelings. 
As a result of this litigation, the propaganda song was banned (Daily Sabah, 2015).  
In the quotation from Ataturk, the statements “the people who gain material 
benefits” and “religion traders” are used to point out the economic dimension of the 




relations which hinge entirely on seeking economic interests and deriving profit. The 
words ‘pure’ and ‘innocent’ are used to show the good intentions of pious individuals 
stemming from their unawareness and ignorance.  
In the third paragraph, the words ‘ignorance’ and ‘bigotry’ are used to point out 
the main causes of exploitation of religious people. ‘Ignorance’ refers to the 
unawareness of pious Muslims who cannot recognise what is good and what is bad. An 
ignorant pious Muslim needs to be educated so that his\her religious feelings cannot be 
exploited. Bigotry is a more severe form of ignorance and comprises more a persistent 
attitude than ignorance. By these words, pious Muslims are regarded as passive objects 
deprived of reason and open to the influence of exploiters. This discourse creates an 
intellectual hierarchy between aware laicist Kemalists and unaware pious Muslims who 
need to acquire awareness through the guidance of aware Kemalists. This intellectual 
hierarchy contributes to the moral and intellectual leadership (Gramsci, 1971: 57) of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc, which is a significant prerequisite for a successful hegemonic 
project. So religion possesses a negative image in which it is a tool used for deceiving 
pure and innocent devout people. 
In the quotation from Ataturk, there is an emphasis on the instrumentalisation of 
religion for personal and political goals. The word ‘instrumentalisation’ signifies the 
possibility of gaining economic and political interests by means of religious discourse. 
This discourse aims at preventing Islam from being a source of economic and political 
action and from providing discursive support for counter-hegemonic Islamist 
movements. According to the text, the emergence of ‘ignorance’ and ‘bigotry’ among 
Muslims requires an action plan to get rid of the ‘distorted Islam’. Ataturk presented 
this action plan as “learning religion in a correct way” and “raising religious scholars 
who can teach religion correctly”. The first action can be interpreted as the declaration 
of efforts to shape the discourse on Islam among ignorant and bigoted Muslims in order 
to restrict the influence of the representers of so-called ‘distorted Islam’ on the Muslims 
and increase the influence of the representers of ‘true Islam’, namely the Kemalists, on 
them. The action of “raising religious scholars” offers alternative religious intellectuals 
who would teach ‘true Islam’, the Islam which would not damage the laicist hegemony 




3.4.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Picture 1 
 




 Ataturk is the reference point in the field of Islam for the Muslims.  




The image of Ataturk in the textbooks is one area which the JDP did not prefer 
to challenge. Like the post-28 February textbooks, the 2015 textbooks begin with the 
same portrait of Ataturk (see Pictures 1 and 2). Beginning a book with someone’s 
portrait is equal to accepting him/her as the main reference point for the issues handled 
in the book. His ideas consequently hierarchically became more important than anyone 
else’s. Such a privileged position for his ideas also applied to the issues regarding Islam. 
The Kemalist hegemonic bloc, as the followers of Ataturk, also benefited from being a 
reference point in terms of values and lifestyle. It can therefore be argued that the 
privileged position of Kemalist segments in terms of ideology remained unchallenged in 
2015.  
On the other hand, the JDP did not construct a completely negative discourse 
against Ataturk but preferred to construct a positive discourse to find a reconciliation 
point with the laicist segments in society. The effort to seek a reconciliation point with 
the laicist segments can be seen in parallel with the JDP’s desire to build more dialogue-
oriented relations with non-Islamist segments of society (Cizre-Sakallioglu & Cinar, 
2003: 326). So in its first term in office, the JDP enjoyed the fruits of this dialogue-
oriented discourse as in the instance of Guler Sabanci, the chairwoman of Sabanci 
Holding’s executive board, who accepted that the JDP had managed to relocate itself to 
the centre of the political spectrum to represent all segments of society (Hurriyet, 2007). 
However, this does not mean that the JDP had completely overcome any tensions 
stemming from the laicist/Islamist divide and articulated the Istanbul bourgeoisie to its 
hegemonic project. As shown by a press statement of the Kemalist Istanbul bourgeoisie 
association in 2007 (TUSIAD, 2007), this tension remained a central issue between the 
JDP and the Istanbul bourgeoisie. 
Picture 2 
Construction of a ‘religious Ataturk’ image can frequently be noticed in different 
units of RCMK lessons. The sixth unit of the ninth-grade textbook, entitled ‘Laicism 





Figure 3 Mustafa Kemal Ataturk shown praying with Religious Scholars (Turkan et al., 2015: 98) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses: 
 Ataturk is a pious Muslim. 
 There is no tension between Ataturk’s principles and Islam’s ideals. 
 Ataturk cannot be instrumentalised by laicists for their political goals. 
The unit ‘Laicism and Religion’ begins with a picture of Ataturk praying with 
Muslim religious scholars. The religious scholars seem to be representing Sunni Islam. 
Ataturk is seen praying in the forefront of religious scholars and other people. Since the 
praying style depicted symbolises Sunni Islam, it can be interpreted that the 
construction of a ‘pious Ataturk’ image is the aim of the picture.  
Gramsci (1971: 160) remarked that a dominant class should make sacrifices to 
some degree and that by means of those sacrifices, a compromise can be ensured in 
order to persuade the dominated groups. When both the post-28 February textbooks and 
the 2015 textbooks are considered together, a common tendency shared by both the 




can be detected. This effort to achieve a compromise can be interpreted as a way of 
creating a unified bloc with various segments of society. We can argue that gaining the 
consent of the antagonist group(s) is the aim of both situations: on the one hand, the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc aimed at minimising the threat perception of the pious 
Muslims by creating an Islam-friendly Ataturk image, and on the other, the JDP aimed 
at minimising the threat perception of the Kemalist segments of the society by creating 
an Ataturk-friendly interpretation of Islam. This discourse can be used to minimise the 
oppositional attitudes of those classes whose lifestyle is characterised by secular values 
in society and to hinder any counter-hegemonic attempts.  
The image of ‘religious Ataturk’ could also be used by the JDP for ensuring the 
legitimation of its power by claiming the approval of ‘religious Ataturk’ for its policies 
and discourses on the site of Islam. By this means, the JDP constructed a counter-
discourse to any attempt to declare the policies of the JDP on the terrain of Islam as 
illegitimate on the pretext of contradicting Ataturk’s principles. 
A significant discursive tactic of the JDP was the depoliticisation of Ataturk’s 
image in order to nullify the advantage of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc stemming from 
Ataturk’s privileged position. By pruning his function as a source of political action, the 
JDP sought to construct a neutral Ataturk image which could not be instrumentalised by 




Ataturk believed that people should have a modest understanding of 
religion. For this reason, he objected to the superstitions which had 
entered religion subsequently… Ataturk stated his views on this issue as 
follows: “The Turkish nation needs to be more religious, in other words, I 
mean that the Turkish people need to be religious with full modesty. As I 
believe in reality, I believe in my religion. It does not comprise any 
elements which are against awareness and progress…” (Akgul et al., 
2012: 83) 
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 Prominent discourses within the text are as follows:  
 Religion is a necessity in the life of human beings and in society. 
 Ataturk advised people to have modest religiousness and to avoid superstitions. 
 Under the unit ‘Laicism’, this text aims at showing how necessary religion is 
with reference to the ideas of Ataturk. The main discourse here is that laicism complies 
with Islam and that there is no tension between them. Ataturk’s statements regarding the 
necessity of religion are underlined in order to support religiosity instead of an 
irreligious lifestyle. “Modest understanding of religion” refers to being religious with a 
true heart, instead of pretending to be religious. Superstitions are presented as the sole 
problem with religion. Therefore, terms such as ‘exploitation of religion’, ‘reactionism’ 
and ‘bigotry’ are not used here. Ataturk’s statement that the “Turkish nation needs to be 
more religious” directly gives authority and legitimacy to the existing JDP government 
for cultural projects on the terrain of Islam which consolidate its rule. In his statement 
“As I believe in reality, I believe in my religion”, Ataturk is presented as a religious 
figure. The religion in this statement refers to Sunni Islam. As previously discussed, 
Ataturk’s image is instrumentalised by the JDP to prevent any irreligious tendencies 
which can challenge the religious and cultural supremacy of the JDP. Moreover, 
Ataturk’s statement that Islam does not possess “any elements which are against 
awareness and progress” is used as a response to claims from the laicist segments of 
society which associate religiousness with irrationalism and reactionism. 
Text 256 
… 
Ataturk believed in the necessity that the people who teach religion must 
be trained well in accordance with the contemporary age. In one speech, 
he stated that “As it is necessary to train well-educated professional 
experts in every area, we also need to have higher education institutions 
to train the prominent religious scholars who research the real 
philosophy of our religion and have the ability to inspire others 
technically and academically.” He desired religious scholars to be well-
educated and expected them to guide the Turkish nation in accordance 
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with the national and religious values of society. Ataturk established the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs. He pioneered studies for the Qur’an to be 
understood better and he encouraged the translation and explanation of 
the Qur’an. (Turkan et al., 2015: 104-105) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Ataturk believed that well-educated religious scholars can guide the nation in 
parallel with the national and religious values of society. 
 The Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) was founded by Ataturk. 
 The quotation from one of Ataturk’s speeches emphasises the need for the 
education of religious scholars and teachers. In the term ‘religious scholars’, the JDP 
was able to find discursive support for the permanence of the Imam-Hatip Schools 
which had been opened to provide education for imams and preachers within the 
Turkish education system, although there was significant opposition from the laicist 
segments of society against them. Also, according to the text, well-educated religious 
scholars are expected to guide the people in accordance with religious and national 
values. With this statement, “the national and religious values of society” are taken as 
positive, necessary and significant. The discourse that those values are accepted and 
shared by the whole society aims at constructing the idea of a homogenous society. 
Moreover, presenting the condition of guiding society grants religious scholars the 
qualification of being opinion leaders for society. This discourse can be interpreted as 
an effort to create organic intellectuals, in Gramscian terms, from pious Muslims. This 
discourse therefore deems religious scholars worthy of moral and intellectual leadership 
when they have been educated well. The discourse also legitimises the religious 
education policies of the JDP since education targeting well-educated religious scholars 
is provided by the JDP government.  
 Moreover, the emphasis on Ataturk as the founder of the PRA grants legitimacy 
to the institution. So criticising the PRA equates to criticising an institution founded by 
Ataturk. The text ends with a positive discourse about Ataturk’s pioneering role in the 
study of the Qur’an. Consequently, by presenting Ataturk’s efforts on the terrain of 
Islam, the JDP aims at increasing its legitimacy and gaining the consent of the laicist 





 Religion is a social reality. A significant element of the reality of religion 
is the religious scholars who provide religious services to society. 
Because religion is necessary for society, religious scholars who serve 
society are also necessary. 
 … 
 Ataturk has always praised religious scholars and appreciated their 
work. During his visits across the country, he met with religious scholars 
and complimented those who had become prominent through their 
knowledge and intelligence.   
Religious scholars played a significant role in the establishment of 
organisations such as Kuvayi Milliye (Turkish Revolutionaries) and 
participated in the forefront of the Turkish War of Independence. They 
encouraged the Anatolian people to resist the occupation. … 
 … 
Religious scholars who comprehend the principles of religion very well 
and have sufficient intellectual capacity can motivate people for a 
common purpose by keeping their hopes alive in the hard times as they 
did during the Turkish War of Independence. During the time of peace, 
they can have a role in spreading universal moral values and social 
norms. (Akgul et al., 2012: 87-88) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses: 
 Ataturk appreciated religious scholars for their positive role. 
 Religious scholars played a significant role in the War of Independence. 
 A positive discourse about religious scholars was one of the new issues 
introduced in RCMK lessons by 2015. Extracts from Ataturk’s speeches were 
instrumentalised to legitimise religious scholars. The statement “religion is a social 
reality” underlines the unavoidable place of religion in social life. Including this 
quotation can be interpreted as an effort to strengthen the place of Islam in society by 
glorifying Ataturk’s image in the eyes of secular segments of society. Moreover, 
religious scholars (dini alimler) are presented as “a significant element of the reality of 
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religion”. The term ‘religious scholars’ refers to Islamic scholars. In Gramscian terms, 
Ataturk’s statements are instrumentalised to support the intellectual capacity of Islamic 
scholars to contribute ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ of Islamic segments in society. 
Accepting religious scholars as ‘necessary’ means moving away from a neutral position 
towards them and supporting their existence in society. 
 Ataturk’s praise for and appreciation of Islamic scholars can be seen as an effort 
to construct a positive discourse about them using Ataturk’s image as the founder of the 
state and his privileged position as the ‘reference point’ on nearly every issue. The 
emphasis on the ‘knowledge and intelligence’ of religious scholars increases the 
reliance on their intellectual capacity to lead society morally and intellectually. 
 The discourse about Islamic scholars’ participation in the Turkish War of 
Independence can be regarded as a response to Ataturk’s negative discourse about 
religious scholars, such as “The Turkish Republic cannot be the homeland of  sheikhs, 
dervishes, disciples and lunatics”, which has often been given as a reference by 
Kemalists. Moreover, including Ataturk’s statements about the positive role of religious 
scholars in the War of Independence is significant to overcome the negative discourse 
about so-called ‘reactionary Islamists who disrupted the struggle for the independence 
of the Republic’, since such a discourse is expressed by the founder of the Republic.  
 Religious scholars are described as people “who comprehend the principles of 
religion very well and have sufficient intellectual capacity”. By this discourse, religious 
scholars gain the approval of Ataturk for their intellectual capacity and competence to 
be followed by people in Turkey. Moreover, religious scholars are associated with 
“universal moral values and social norms”. This discourse nullifies the discourse which 
regards Islamic scholars as unmodern and outdated. By this shift in the discourse 
regarding religious scholars, they become people who should be followed and taken as 
role models. This discourse is completely opposite to the discourse which depicted them 






Laicism (laiklik) is a key topic which directly affects the cultural hegemonic 
struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP on the terrain of Islam. Its 
significance stemmed from the tension between laicism and Islam and from efforts to 
reconcile them. As a significant element of cultural hegemonic strategy, Gramsci (1971: 
328) pointed out the importance of maintaining an “ideological unity” for all social 
blocs and attributed the mission of cementing and unifying a social bloc to the ideology. 
Laicism was an exceptionally significant principle of Kemalist ideology in the 
modernisation of Turkey. For the Kemalists, it was the fundamental requisite for 
reaching the level of contemporary civilisations (Keyman, 2007: 221). Kemalists 
therefore needed to conscientiously construct a discourse on laicism which could have a 
unifying role for the social structure of the Republic. 
Considering that a significant element of exercising power is persuasion in 
Gramscian understanding (Simon, 2015: 17), the laicist founders of the Republic needed 
to persuade the pious Muslims to accept their values, beliefs, lifestyle and ideology to 
gain the consent of the pious Muslims in favour of the laic Republican regime 
established and maintained by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and for the cultural 
leadership of Kemalism. Common ground between laicism and Islam, in other words a 
laicist interpretation of Islam, became a necessary reconciliation with the religious 
Muslims for the Kemalists. As the boundaries of hegemonic projects are drawn by 
deeper social structures (Joseph, 2002: 132), Islam, in this case, created the need to find 
common ground with the religious people and determine the limits of Kemalist 
hegemonic projects. 
So a laicist interpretation of Islam was significant for the Kemalist cultural 
hegemony for three reasons. First, endearing Ataturk’s principle of laicism to the pious 
Muslims was significant for the Kemalist hegemonic bloc to decrease pious people’s 
threat perception stemming from the tension between laicism and Islam. By this means, 
reconciliation with laicism would mean reconciliation with the Kemalists. Second, as 
the global capitalist economic order forms another deeper structural hegemony which 
limits hegemonic projects in Turkey (Kucukali, 2015: 9), transforming the pious 
Muslim groups into individual customers becomes a key issue for the sustainability of 




Muslims served the privileged class position of the Kemalist bourgeoisie by weakening 
the ties between pious customers and Islamic enterprises and thus eliminated the 
comparative advantage of Muslim enterprises stemming from sharing the same values, 
beliefs and lifestyle with the Muslims. Third, the preference between the laicist and 
non-laicist interpretations of Islam affects the power of Islam in people’s lives. As 
people’s sympathy for laicist values increases, Islam becomes restricted to the 
individual level and loses its social, political and economic roles as the main determiner 
of human action and behaviour. Consequently, Islam cannot maintain its role of uniting 
the religious masses and organising the collective will of the people, and loses its 
capacity as a source of counter-hegemony against the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. 
On the other hand, the JDP’s attitude to laicism is also significant in order to 
comprehend its counter-hegemonic project against the cultural hegemony of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc. The discourse in the 2015 textbooks regarding laicism was 
nearly the same as the discourse in the post-28 February textbooks. The JDP determined 
a similar strategy to its strategy regarding the image of Ataturk. Rather than 
constructing a completely negative discourse about laicism, the JDP preferred to 
redefine the concept by minimising its challenging power and by rendering it harmless 
against its Islamic values. Tugal (2009: 235), who defined the JDP’s move to the centre 
as ‘passive revolution’, pointed out that a hegemonic strategy was developed by Turkish 
Islamism which was absorbed by Turkish laicist hegemony. In its official Political 
Vision document, the JDP defined laicism as “the impartial stance of the state toward all 
religions and beliefs” and underlined that the Party took laicism neither irreligion nor to 
be enmity to religion; but rather, the Party interpreted laicism as “the guarantee of all 
religions and belief systems” (JDP, 2012: 23). It can be seen in the redefinition of the 
JDP that laicism is not defined as a means of modernising social engineering project. 
Rather than creating a new type of human, it aims to draw boundaries to state action in 
the sphere of religion. It is also stated in the same document that the JDP regards 
“inciting and discriminating against religious people for their choice and lifestyle, or the 
exploitation of religion to put pressure on people having different lifestyle” as 
unacceptable situations (JDP, 2012: 24). This can be interpreted as a criticism of the 
Kemalist understanding of laicism and an attempt to nullify the Kemalist project which 




Moreover, Gramscian hegemony necessitates sacrifices and compromises with 
other groups in society (Sassoon, 1991: 230). So another reason for not constructing a 
completely negative discourse about laicism can be minimising the threat perception felt 
by secular people and maximising its bloc by gaining the support of different segments 
of society which have a secular lifestyle. The JDP, which was founded by the reformist 
faction of the Islamist WP, revised its stance by deriving lessons from the 28 February 
experience of the WP. The party prevented its political agenda from being dominated by 
Islamic issues. By taking into account the heterogeneous character of society, the JDP 
sought a dialogue-oriented and consensus-oriented tone in its party discourse towards 
the non-Islamist segments in society (Cizre-Sakallioglu & Cinar, 2003: 326). So 
maintaining the principle of laicism with a new definition can be interpreted in this 
dialogue-oriented and consensus-oriented tone.  




 [laik] stems from the word ‘laicus’ in Latin. It was 
introduced into Turkish with a French pronunciation. In the dictionary, it 
refers to a person who is not spiritual (ruhani in Turkish) (neither 
ecclesiastic nor clerical). As an adjective, ‘laic’ [laik] is also used for 
views, institutions and principles which have no relationship with 
religion.  
In the light of this definition, laicism [laiklik] comprises views, 
institutions and principles which are not religious, are not based on 
religion, and are independent from religion. Although laicism varies in 
terms of implementation, its core meanings can be indicated as follows:  
a) Non-intervention of the state in religious affairs, and non-intervention 
of religion in state and political affairs, 
b) Separation of religious and worldly authorities from each other, 
c) Existence of the state without an official religion, and existence of a 
state which is impartial and tolerant of all religions,   
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d) Ensuring freedom of religion and conscience, non-intervention in 
religious practices and the freedom to pray.  By this principle, religious 
affairs are left to the conscience of individuals. (Uludag, Hokelekli & 
Uysal, 2000: 86) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 The state and religion do not interfere with one another according to the 
principle of laicism. 
 Laicism separates the worldly from the religious. 
 A laic state is impartial and tolerant. 
 Laicism does not intervene in religious practices and guarantees freedom 
of prayer. 
The text begins with the root of the concept ‘laicism’. After stating the Latin 
roots of the word ‘laicist’, its introduction into Turkish in a French form is stated. This 
emphasis on French reflects the influence of the French model on the world-view of the 
Kemalist bourgeoisie. A laicist is defined as someone who is not spiritual. In this 
definition, ecclesiastical and clerical are regarded as spiritual. This definition is a 
reflection of the view that spirituality is not a common feature of all human beings.   
The concept also includes institutions, principles and ideas. Categorising 
something with reference to the spiritual/non-spiritual dichotomy is based on the 
discourse which regards religion as solely unworldly and restricts it to the spiritual life 
of individuals. Therefore, unworldly religion cannot have any influence on political, 
social and economic life.  
Four features of laicism are presented in the text. First, the word ‘non-
intervention’ is used to explain the reciprocal independence of state and religion. Here, 
reciprocal non-intervention can be understood as a bargaining between state and 
religion. The statement “non-intervention of religion in state and political affairs” is 
significant in terms of the class struggle in Turkey. Religion is a significant factor which 
gathers the pious Muslims together and enables them to be organised under religious 
associations, foundations and Islamist-conservative political parties. Religion therefore 




organisations and to organise political action which can challenge the Kemalist 
hegemony. Such a discourse restricts the organisational capacity and boundaries of 
political action for the religious masses by depoliticising Islam. 
The second feature of laicism is propounded as the “separation of religious and 
worldly authorities from each other”. A dichotomy of worldly/unworldly is seen in this 
statement and religious authorities are not regarded as within the boundaries of the 
worldly. So the sphere of the worldly is assigned to secular authorities, and religious 
authorities are placed in the sphere of religious. Gramsci (1971: 9) stated that every 
individual performs intellectual practice to some extent, maintains or changes ‘a 
conception of world’ and creates a new way of thinking. The discourse in the text, 
however, limits the area of intellectual practice for religious authorities, impedes their 
impact on the masses and prevents them from having a say in various worldly issues 
from politics to the economy.  
The third feature of laicism is manifested as the “existence of the state without an 
official religion” and “the existence of a state which is impartial to and tolerant of all 
religions”. The emphasis here is on the impartiality of the state.  The words ‘impartial’ 
and ‘tolerant’ are given together as complementary features of the state. ‘Impartial’ 
means that the state does not favour any religious beliefs; the message given to the 
religious masses is that the laic state does not favour other religions as well as Islam. 
The word ‘tolerant’ is used to express a guarantee for religious people of freedom of 
religion and conscience. By this discourse, the religious majority would not regard 
laicism, the fundamental element of Kemalist ideology and values, as a threat to their 
belief. This discourse therefore prevents the religious masses from strong reactions 
against the Kemalist hegemonic bloc which might stem from the threat perception 
caused by the practice of laicism. 
The fourth feature of laicism is securing freedom of religion and conscience. 
Similar to the third feature, the discourse regarding ‘freedom of religion’ uncovers the 
effort to show the religious masses that the Kemalist principle of laicism does not pose a 
threat to their religion and religiosity. A significant reason for this effort is to hinder the 
organisational power of Islam which might create a severe challenge to the Kemalist 




intervention in religious practices and the freedom to pray”. The message in this 
statement is that the lifestyle of religious people is guaranteed by virtue of laicism. 
Text 260 
Through Ataturk’s views about laicism, the meaning which we attribute to 
laicism can be understood better. How Ataturk interprets laicism is 
significant because it is one of the fundamental principles of the Republic 
of Turkey... 
For Ataturk, laicism is not only the separation of religious affairs from 
worldly affairs, but is also a guarantee of freedom of conscience, prayer 
and religion for all citizens. Careful attention shows that this definition 
reveals two things: 
a) Religious and worldly are separate. 
b) Freedom of religion and of prayer are guaranteed for all people. 
In the light of this, everyone can practise his/her religion in accordance 
with his/her conscience. No-one can intervene in the religious views and 
life of others, and no-one can despise others. 
Ataturk explained freedom of religion and conscience in speeches made 
at different places as follows:  
“Each individual is free to think whatever he/she wants, to believe, to 
possess a political view, to practise the religion that he/she chooses to 
believe, to abstain from practising religion. It is impossible to control 
one’s thoughts and conscience. Freedom of conscience is unconditional 
and cannot be contravened. It is defined as one of the most important 
rights of individuals.” 
“All people in the Republic of Turkey can pray to God at will. Nothing 
can be done to anyone because of his/her religious views. The Republic of 
Turkey has no official religious belief. There is no-one in Turkey who can 
impose his/her thoughts on other people by force, and it is not allowed.” 
(Uludag, Hokelekli & Uysal, 2000: 88) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses;  
 Ataturk’s views on the fields of Islam and laicism should be the main 
reference point for Muslims. 
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 Worldly and spiritual, as well as religious affairs and state affairs should 
be separated.  
 Laicism ensures freedom of religion, conscience and prayer. 
The most significant point in the discourse here is its Ataturk-centred 
explanations about laicism. When explaining the meaning of laicism, Ataturk’s views 
are taken as the main and the only reference. As a consequence, Ataturk’s standpoint 
hierarchically becomes superior to other standpoints in society. This superiority also 
provides an advantage to the Kemalist bourgeoisie in terms of cultural domination over 
the religious masses. Since Ataturk is an unrivalled figure, the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc, claiming to be followers of Ataturk, become safe from objections in terms of 
religious beliefs, culture and lifestyle. Thereby, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc gains a 
comparative advantage in terms of moral and intellectual leadership, which is a 
significant element of cultural hegemony according to Gramsci (1971: 57-58). 
The principle of laicism is presented as the fundamental principle of the 
Republic of Turkey. As a consequence of being ‘fundamental’, it becomes an 
irrevocable principle which defines and characterises the Republic so withdrawal of the 
principle is not negotiable.  
The binary words ‘worldly’ and ‘religious’ are used to explain the meaning of 
laicism. This worldly/religious dichotomy makes religion an unworldly matter. Being 
unworldly restricts religion’s radius of action in social, political and economic life. As a 
consequence of this discourse, Islam, as a religion which regulates every aspects of 
world life, is a limited, individual spiritual sphere. The word ‘separation’ refers to the 
divided and separate areas of the religious and the non-religious. The idea of the 
separation of such areas makes religion’s power a source of legitimacy and an organiser 
of religious people’s collective will impossible. 
Moreover, one of the features of laicism is presented as the guarantee of freedom 
of prayer and religion. In the broadest sense, praying can be regarded as a religious 
practice which possesses important communal roles in the social and the political 
dimensions. Throughout the RCMK textbooks and the current text, however, the 
religious and the worldly are completely separated without leaving any intersection 




continues by stating that “freedom of religion and of prayer are guaranteed for all 
people”. Presenting these two statements consecutively means that the guarantee does 
not cover the worldly dimensions of religion and that praying is understood as primarily 
an individual act which does not have social, political or economic dimensions. So the 
individualistic aspects of religion are brought to the forefront, whereas the social, 
political and economic dimensions of Islam are totally ignored. 
In the subsequent paragraph, the practical dimension of religion is focused on. 
By saying “no-one can intervene in the religious views and life of others and no-one can 
despise others”, limited independence is given to people from one another in their 
thinking and their practice of their religion. ‘Religious life’ should be understood as the 
spiritual and practical dimensions of religion at the individual level. By considering the 
speeches of Ataturk regarding freedom of religion and conscience, religion is intangibly 
understood at the thought and feeling level. Freedom of religion and conscience refers 
to non-interference in the thoughts and feelings of people. 
Text 361 
Ataturk desired the Republic of Turkey to be laic, since the nation was 
fragmentised as a consequence of various views based on religion at the 
time when the Ottoman Empire was weak and education and training had 
regressed. The people who made advancements incompatible with their 
personal interests achieved making those advancements look as if they 
were against religious beliefs. As a consequence, scientific studies in our 
country stopped and the adoption of and benefit from the inventions and 
technical advancements in other countries were delayed. The state was 
not able to prevent this situation. Ataturk propounded the principle of 
laicism by expressing that ‘the state does not possess a religious belief’ in 
order to protect the nation and country from such dangers. The state is 
not an individual; accordingly it cannot possess a religion. The state 
establishes institutions according to the needs of the nation. These 
institutions serve in accordance with their main mission. The state also 
establishes religious institutions and these institutions carry out religious 
affairs. (Bilgin, 1991: 80) 
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 Islam should not be included in state affairs. The state should not have an 
official religion. 
The text begins with Ataturk’s preference for the laic structure of the state. The 
word ‘fragmentised’ is used with negative connotations to explain the structure in the 
Ottoman Empire period. The variety of views on religion at that time is presented as the 
cause of such a fragmented situation. Such differences in society are regarded as 
negative and undesired. 
Training and education in the Ottoman Empire are defined with the word 
‘regressed’. From this point on, being ‘regressed’ requires progressive action. Two 
opposing groups are highlighted. On the one hand, there are “the people who made 
advancements incompatible with their personal interests”, and on the other, there are the 
people who put those advancements into action. At the centre of this antagonism, there 
is the issue of religion, namely Islam. According to the text, the advancements are 
associated with an ‘irreligious’ image. That is to say, those advancements do not pose a 
threat to religion, but it is a delusive claim by the people who made advancements 
incompatible with their personal interests. The ceasing of ‘scientific studies’ and the 
delay of “the adoption of and benefit from the inventions and technical advancements in 
other countries” are presented as the result of the dominance by people who had 
reactionary views and regarded those advancements as irreligious. The term ‘personal 
interests’ refers to the power of the reactionary people in society. By explaining that 
“the state was not able to prevent this situation”, the inadequacy of the state is 
acknowledged and the need for a change in the structure of the state is emphasised. 
Ataturk’s preference for laicism is presented as the remedy for getting rid of ‘such 
dangers’.    
In the statement “the state is not an individual; accordingly it cannot possess a 
religion”, the scope of religion is limited to the individual level. Together with Ataturk’s 
statement that “the state does not possess a religious belief”, the discourse means that 




technology and causes the state to regress. According to the text, Ataturk found a 
solution by offering the principle of laicism for the new Republic. In the statement “the 
state establishes institutions according to the needs of the nation”, the ultimate decision-
maker about the establishment of new institutions is the state, which responds to the 
demands of society. The statement “in accordance with their main mission” refers to the 
mission determined by the state. From this point of view, the religious institutions 
established by the state also serve the mission determined by the state. So the final say 
about religion and Islam belongs to the power holders of the state. This discourse gives 
the state apparatus, and by extension the Kemalist bourgeoisie which controls the state, 
the power to rule Islam in accordance with class interests. 
3.5.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Text 162 
The most significant feature of Ataturk’s understanding of laicism was his 
criticism of the exploitation of religion which had been the consequence 
of withdrawing the original version of religion. Ataturk knew that 
religion, the sense of religion, the area of belief and prayer are not going 
to be damaged by embracing laicism; on the contrary, their value is going 
to increase by the principle of laicism. For this reason, he stated that “We 
insist on the principle of laicism because freedom of religion, which is the 
most sacred value of national will and humanity, can be protected by 
being loyal to the principle of laicism.” 
Ataturk’s understanding of laicism is certainly not against religion itself. 
According to him, religion is an issue of conscience. Everyone is free to 
follow or not to follow his/her conscience. Ataturk regards laicism as a 
principle which forms the basis of the practice and development of 
religion, and which even guarantees its protection. Ataturk does not deny 
the reality of religion, he acknowledges the need for religion and states 
“Religion is a necessary entity.” … (Turkan et al., 2015: 104-105) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 Ataturk’s principle of laicism is not against Islam. 
 Laicism guarantees freedom of religion and conscience. 
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 The text begins by revealing Ataturk’s objection to the “exploitation of 
religion”. It therefore positions laicism at the centre of the analysis and defines religion 
from laicism’s point of view. The statement “withdrawing the original version of 
religion” is based on the binaries of ‘original religion’ and ‘distorted religion’ and 
classifies Ataturk’s understanding of religion as the original religion while categorising 
all opposing understandings as distorted religion. A prominent discourse is that 
embracing laicism does not damage religion, belief or prayer, but increases their value. 
This discourse aims at annihilating the threat perception felt by the pious Muslims 
stemming from Kemalist laicism. In the quotation, Ataturk specifies laicism as the only 
means of protecting freedom of religion. His use of the word ‘sacred’ can be seen as an 
effort to highlight his adherence to and his desire to protect freedom of religion. By the 
image of an ‘advocate of freedom of religion’, Ataturk’s defence of laicism is 
strengthened. 
 The discourse throughout the text is constructed to highlight harmony between 
laicism and Islam. Seeking ground for the compromise between Ataturk’s image and 
Islam was also the hegemonic strategy used by the JDP. By this means, the existing rule 
of the JDP would be accepted as legitimate and acceptable even if it was not favoured 
by the laicist segments of society. So the discursive goal of the text is to prevent the 
perception of a radical change regarding the discourse on laicism. One of the points 
which the JDP could not challenge by 2015 was the confining of Islam to the area of 
personal conscience. Freedom of religion is still defined as the freedom to believe or not 
to believe. As will be discussed in the next chapter, however, deeper structural 
hegemonies such as the legal system and global capitalism prevent Islam from carrying 
out the function of challenging the legal and economic status quo. Ataturk’s statement 
that “Religion is a necessary entity” can also be seen as an attempt to instrumentalise 
the figure of Ataturk, to construct a ‘religious Ataturk’ image and to consolidate the 
deeper structural position of Islam in society by giving reference to Ataturk’s positive 
views regarding Islam. 
 Tugal (2009: 235) pointed out that Turkish laicist hegemony absorbed Turkish 
Islamism. The passive revolution of the JDP and the absorption of Turkish Islamism are 
the most visible elements under the subtitle ‘Laicism’ within the RCMK textbooks. 




Therefore, the hegemonic strategy of the JDP to find a reconciliation ground with 
laicism had made it impossible to mobilise the pious Muslims against the Kemalist bloc. 
 
3.6. Tarikat (Religious Order) and Cemaat (Religious 
Community) 
 Tarikat (religious order) and cemaat (religious community) are significant 
elements of religious life in Turkey which deserve to be discussed under a special sub-
topic. Although tarikats were declared as illegal in 1925, they carried on their activities 
as secret underground brotherhood organisations. Establishing foundations was the 
means of legalising those underground organisations to be able to operate and to raise 
funds for their activities (Narli, 1999: 45 [fn. 5]). So illegalising the tarikats was not a 
totally successful solution for the Kemalists and a discourse which could distract the 
pious Muslims from the influence of tarikats was required. The texts analysed in this 
part are not only important for the creation and distribution of such a discourse, they are 
also important for reflecting the general attitude of the state apparatus and the dominant 
class about the tarikats. 
 Tarikats and cemaats have had a significant role in social and political life in 
Turkey. Heads of tarikats and cemaats have been very influential and able to shape the 
viewpoints of their communities (Ozgur, 2012: 118). The Nurcu Movement, a 
prominent religious order in Turkey, allied with the Democratic Party (DP), the centre 
right political party, in the 1950s (Narli, 1999: 45 [fn. 7]). Likewise, Naksibendi 
Tarikati was one of the significant religious orders which affected political life in 
Turkey. The power of this religious order was used by the first two Islamist political 
parties, the National Order Party and the National Salvation Party, in the 1970s (Sabah, 
2006). Iskenderpasa Cemaati, one of the branches of Naksibendi Tarikati, was founded 
by Mehmet Zahid Kotku, who motivated his followers to undertake political activities 
such as taking responsibility in active political life, forming political parties and 
spreading their views in the bureaucratic structure of the state (Ozgur, 2012: 118-119). 
For instance, Turgut Ozal, former prime minister and former president of Turkey, was 
one of the prominent disciples of Mehmet Zaid Kotku (Sabah, 2001). As can be seen, 




and their leaders can give inspiration to political movements. They could therefore pose 
a threat to the political domination of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc.  
The religious segment of the Kurdish population is mostly from the Shaafi 
school of Sunni Islam. A significant proportion of the Kurds has always been 
conventionally pious and tarikats have been particularly influential among the pious 
segment of the Kurds, who are influenced by sheiks and tarikat leaders under the impact 
of the feudal structure in the Eastern part of Turkey (Narli, 1999: 46 [fn. 18]). 
Therefore, the capacity of tarikats and cemaats to organise the religious Kurds can be 
interpreted as an obstacle to integrating the Kurdish population into the individualistic 
laic nation state. 
Moreover, tarikats and cemaats have significant economic power. Tarikats 
possess a variety of enterprises generally united under holding companies. Server 
Holding, the enterprise of the Iskender Pasha Cemaati, is an example of the economic 
capabilities of tarikats (Ozturk, 2015: 120). Similarly, Ihlas Holding is owned by Enver 
Oren, the head of the Isikcilar Cemaati (Karpat, 2001: 108). As these examples show, 
tarikats and cemaats control a significant amount of capital and possess economic 
power. This has always represented a potential threat to the domination of the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie for two reasons. First, such economic power can be used for sponsoring 
alternative cultural hegemony instruments such as schools, the media and publications. 
As a consequence, the economic power based in the organisation of Islamic identity 
becomes a challenge in the struggle for cultural hegemony. Second, the capital of the 
tarikats and cemaats rivals the Istanbul capital. It should be remembered that many 
senior members of TUSIAD, the business association of the Kemalist bourgeoisie, 
welcomed the 28 February 1997 coup d’état which resulted in the resignation of the 
government led by the Islamist Welfare Party (Atasoy, 2009: 115). It is possible to 
interpret this support as the threat perception of the Kemalist bourgeoisie against the 
rising Anatolian middle class which is characterised by its Muslim identity (Erdogan, 
2007: 25). 
The tarikats and cemaats are related to resistance to cultural hegemony through 
their possession of cultural hegemony instruments such as education and the media. In 
terms of education, tarikats and cemaats provide informal religious courses in their 




and mosques and in the Qur’an courses provided by the state (Akpinar, 2007: 162). For 
instance, the Suleymani Cemaat is known for its Qur’an courses and dormitories located 
in nearly every Turkish city (Konuralp, 2006). Similarly, Ihlas Holding has thirteen 
private schools (IHW, 2017a). In terms of the media, Ihlas Holding owns two TV 
channels, TGRT Haber and TGRT Belgesel, one newspaper, the Turkiye Gazetesi, one 
radio station, TGRT FM, and one news agency, the Ihlas News Agency (IHW, 2017b). 
As can be seen, tarikats and cemaats possess different types of cultural hegemony 
instrument which can be used to mobilise the devout mases and challenge the laicist 
cultural hegemony by circulating the discourse of the religious perspective. Those 
instruments were influential in creating an alternative discourse which could unite the 
religious masses and challenge the discourses, values, perceptions and world-views of 
the Kemalists.   
According to Mardin (1991: 28), the tarikats have been one of the pillars of the 
prolongation of religion. They are significant instruments for maintaining particular 
Islamic discourses in society which can create a common discursive base for the 
constitution of an Islamic tradition for the unity of the devout people. As a consequence, 
Islam becomes a significant factor which shapes the discursive roots of the religious 
opposition groups against the Kemalist hegemony.  
The most vital discursive change in the textbooks is that about tarikats and 
cemaats. The post-28 February textbooks were dominated by a completely negative 
discourse regarding tarikats and cemaats. In those texts, tarikats and cemaats were 
presented as dangerous entities which exploit the beliefs of devout people. They were 
regarded as a threat to individual development and their closure was presented as the 
only option for a free society. In the 2015 textbooks, however, the negative discourse 
about tarikats and cemaats had dramatically evolved into a completely positive one. 
The text highlights the benefits of tarikats and cemaats for people in terms of both 
spiritual and social life. Thus the influence of tarikats and cemaats as a collective 
challenging force increased as the official discourse about them evolved. They provided 





3.6.1. Post-28 February Textbooks 
Text 163 
 “In the Islamic tradition, tarikats are entities which are based on Islamic 
Sufism. This has resulted in different interpretations of Islam for different 
tarikats. Tarikats emerged a long time after the period of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Individuals in tarikats act according to the guidance of the 
group. For this reason, tarikats are harmful entities which hinder 
individual development and restrict liberties, and exploit religion and 
religious sensitiveness for group interests. People must abstain from these 
entities. 
 In the Ottoman period, many tarikats were founded. The places where 
members of the tarikats gathered were called tekke and small tekke were 
called zaviye. Those tarikats had sheikhs (seyh), dervishes (dervis) and 
disciples (murit). They deceived many ignorant people by means such as 
preparing amulets or praying for illnesses. They derived benefits by 
forcing people to donate and sacrifice animals to tekkes, and turbes 
(tombs). They convinced people to sacrifice animals in order to guarantee 
that their prayers would be accepted by God. By these means, they 
exploited people’s pure religious beliefs. Since sheiks and dervishes had 
an influence on people, they were also interested in politics. Mustafa 
Kemal aimed at closing the tarikats which make the thinking dull and 
sponge on the people, and at making the members of religious orders 
more beneficial to society. By this means, he aimed at preventing the 
exploitation of people’s beliefs. He thought that there is no room for the 
tarikats in the Republic of Turkey which is based on laicism and hinges on 
the outcomes of reason and science; he said: “The Republic of Turkey 
cannot be the homeland of sheiks, dervishes, disciples and lunatics 
(meczup); the truest and the most proper path is the path of civilisation. 
Following the orders and desires of civilisation is enough in order to be a 
human”. In the light of Ataturk’s enlightening thoughts, the tarikats which 
had become the site of laziness, reactionism and exploitation were closed 
by the revolution law no. 677 enacted on 30 November 1925. By this 
means, a new understanding of religion which is suitable for modern 
Turkey has emerged.” (Aydin et al., 2002: 93) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 The emergence of tarikats occurred a long time after the period of the 
Prophet Muhammad. 
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 Tarikats are harmful for the development and liberties of human beings. 
 Tarikats exploited people’s pure religious feelings and religion itself. 
 Tarikats gained monetary benefits by exploiting ignorant people. 
 The tarikats cannot exist in a laic country based on science and reason. 
 Throughout the text, tarikats are presented as dangerous and harmful entities. 
They are regarded as a significant cause of divisions among Muslims. Such divisions 
are presented as a negative circumstance for Muslims. This discourse is compatible with 
the ‘homogeneous society’ ideal of Kemalism. There is an emphasis on the 
‘individuality’ of Muslims in the text. Two words, ‘group’ and ‘individual’, are 
presented as antonyms. In other words, the existence of one is a threat to the existence 
of the other. The sentence “individuals in tarikats act according to the guidance of the 
group” asserts that people’s actions depend on the values, beliefs and world-views of 
tarikats. Therefore, this was a significant obstacle for the Kemalists to make their own 
values the leading values. The influence of tarikats on collective behaviour is clear in 
the expression “… exploit religion and religious sensitiveness for group interests”. 
‘Group interests’ refers to the political and economic interests of tarikats. The main 
message of this statement is that Muslims should be aware of the need not to be 
instrumentalised for the collective interests of tarikats. Tarikats were regarded as a 
threat to the individuality of Muslims. The emphasis on individuality aimed at 
restricting the Muslim identity to the individual level and preventing social and political 
projects which are based on collective action stemming from Muslim identity. 
The members of tarikats are referred to as ‘ignorant’ in the text. The word ‘pure’ 
is used to describe the religious beliefs of those people. The words ‘ignorant’ and ‘pure’ 
together underline the good intentions of members of tarikats, but these good intentions 
resulted in exploitation since those ignorant people were not able to distinguish between 
what is wrong and what is right. From this point of view, preferring to be a member of a 
tarikat does not stem from a person’s free will, so a normal person cannot be a member 
of these entities. In this way, membership of the tarikats is marginalised.  
The words ‘exploit’ and ‘exploitation’ are repeated four times in this text. The 
members of tarikats are believed to be exploited by the religious leaders of the groups. 
The threat perception arises from the power of tarikats to influence their members in 




religious groups which produce alternative discourses in society, this diminishes the 
power of the laicist dominant class to influence and shape the beliefs and religious 
discourses of ‘ignorant’ people and to dominate them culturally, and ultimately it 
restricts the capability of dominant class to gain the consent of the pious Muslims. 
Therefore, the emphasis on the individuality of Muslims is important to restrict any 
effects on them by the tarikat leaders.  
There is also an emphasis on the economic power of tarikats. In the text, it is 
stated that the exploitation of ignorant people results in monetary benefit for tarikats. 
As indicated at the beginning of the topic, tarikats have significant economic power 
with their holdings and small firms. The main discourse in the text aims at preventing 
the religious Muslims from contributing to the economic power of tarikats and from 
creating an alternative economic bloc. So all kinds of contribution to tarikats are 
considered as a kind of exploitation of people’s pure religious beliefs. As a 
consequence, a discourse which makes contributing to tarikats undesirable is 
constructed. 
Another discourse in the text is that tarikats cannot survive in a country based on 
the principle of laicism. The concept of laicism is described by reference to science and 
reason. This discourse can be interpreted as an effort to articulate the pious Muslims to 
the industrialisation and individualistic capital accumulation processes of the country. 
According to the founding cadre of the Republic, science was the means of 
acknowledging the objective universal truth regarding the world. For them, the main 
prerequisites for comprehending and controlling developments in the world were the 
“technological applications of science, and science-driven technology”. By this means, 
the country would achieve complete industrialisation and become a thriving 
contemporary society (Irzik, 1998: 165). Such a positivist discourse of Kemalism aimed 
at minimising the influence of Islam on people’s lives and integrating them into the 
industrialisation process of Turkey.  
In Ataturk’s statement that “The Republic of Turkey cannot be the homeland of 
sheiks, dervishes, disciples and lunatics”, the main goal is to prevent the leaders of 
tarikats from being opinion leaders for the pious Muslims. The terms sheiks, dervishes, 
disciples and lunatics are used pejoratively. As an alternative to sheiks, dervishes, 




enlightened thinking and his call for civilisation. According to this discourse, 
intellectuals whose world-view was opposed to Ataturk’s were not able to fulfil the role 
of intellectual leadership. Moreover, the word ‘civilisation’ represents Western 
civilisation. Therefore, following the orders and desires of civilisation is equal to 
accepting the superiority of the West and becoming westernised, which were 
propounded as the only requisites for being human.  
By applying the guidance of Ataturk through his own words, a significant 
discursive tactic is detected in the use of implicit binaries. Describing Ataturk’s thinking 
as ‘enlightened’ automatically positions other thoughts as unenlightened. The statement 
‘in the light of’ positions all other challenging thoughts to a position of darkness. By 
associating the tarikats with ‘reactionism’, ‘laziness’ and ‘exploitation’, the legal 
arrangement which had closed the tarikats takes on the position of progressivism, 
diligence and goodwill. A new understanding of religion without tarikats is presented as 
‘suitable for modern Turkey’. Being ‘new’ makes the previous form ‘outdated’. The 
‘new’ is legitimised by underlining its appropriateness to modern Turkey. The word 
‘modern’ refers to the modernisation project of Kemalism. So being suitable to the 
modernisation project is presented as a desired goal in the text. 
Text 264 
 Religious communities are unions composed of people who are gathered 
around a religious viewpoint and belief. However, religious communities 
cannot be widespread and cannot be extensive, like religious orders. They 
comprise people from a narrower environment. They unite their members 
under the umbrella of a religious understanding which is appropriate 
only to their conditions. Thereby, they differ from other kinds of group. 
Like religious orders, religious communities are dangerous entities which 
group people. They hinder individual liberties and personal development. 
Therefore, we have to keep away from religious orders and communities; 
we need to learn our religion from its source, the Qur’an. We should 
know that we do not need intermediaries to learn our religion. (Aydin et 
al., 2002: 93). 
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 Cemaats are dangerous and harmful entities to personal development and 
individual liberties. 
 Religion should be learned from the Qur’an, not from the cemaats, the self-
appointed intermediaries between people and God. 
The discourse regarding cemaats is similar to the discourse about tarikats. Like 
tarikats, cemaats are also regarded as a significant cause of divisions among Muslims 
and presented as dangerous and harmful entities. The element which makes them 
dangerous is their grouping of people. Since the act of ‘grouping people’ is regarded as 
a threat to the homogeneous ideal society of Kemalism, a negative discourse is 
constructed for the action. Unlike tarikats, however, being less extensive and less 
widespread are presented as the features of cemaats. 
 Like tarikats, cemaats are also regarded as a threat to personal development and 
individual liberties. Since the cemaats possess significant functions in the hegemonic 
struggle with the organisational power which they provide to the pious Muslims in their 
efforts for counter-hegemony, the negative discourse regarding the cemaats targeted 
their organisational power. In the context of the deeper structural hegemony of  global 
capitalism, the words ‘personal’ and ‘individual’ reflect an individualistic discourse 
which aims at transforming the pious Muslims acting collectively into individual clients 
in the market. Tarikats and cemaats played a significant role in the prevention of people 
from alienation and traditional groups from atomisation in the context of the 
urbanisation process and a rapidly-growing market economy (Ayata, 1996: 49). 
According to the main discourse of the text, the members of cemaats do not have strong 
will and all of their practices, viewpoints, beliefs, perceptions and values are determined 
by the cemaats. For a laicist dominant class, such a situation decreases the effect of an 
official discourse about Islam on the pious Muslims, and prevents them from embracing 
the Kemalist values and thus from accepting the cultural and intellectual leadership of 




 The statement “we need to learn our religion from its source, the Qur’an” 
constructs the discourse that Islam must not be learnt from ‘other’ sources. Here, the 
cemaats represent ‘other’ sources and pose an obstacle to learning religion in a correct 
way. This statement makes a distinction between the Islam in the Qur’an and Islam 
learnt from the cemaats and regards the cemaats’ understanding of Islam as conflicting 
with the Islam in the Qur’an. The discourse about the unnecessariness of 
‘intermediaries’ when learning about religion aims at minimising the influence of 
religious entities such as tarikats, cemaats and religious figures on pious Muslims and 
increasing the influence of the Kemalist discourse on them.  
3.6.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Texts 165 
 The differences in the sensations, thoughts and characters of people 
influence how they interpret things. Since religious scholars have grown 
up in different places, possess different cultures and use various methods, 
religion is interpreted differently. … 
 One of the reasons behind the diversity of interpretations is the human 
factor. Each human being has some features peculiar to him/her. … The 
differences which people have in their daily lives are also influential on 
their understanding and interpretation of religion. In this manner, 
religious scholars interpreted the verses (ayet) and hadiths (hadis) 
according to their knowledge and they reached different conclusions on 
different topics. (CMNE, 2015: 80-81) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Since religious scholars have different backgrounds in terms of sense, character, 
thinking and geography and use different methods, their interpretations of 
religion vary. 
 The human factor causes different interpretations of religion. 
 In contrast to the post-28 February textbooks, the main goal of this text is to 
construct a positive discourse regarding tarikats and cemaats by basing their emergence 
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on the diversity between humans in terms of interpreting religion. The text begins by 
underlining the differences between people in different fields, such as sensations, 
cultures and thinking. The reasons for these differences are associated with the 
interpreter subjects, rather than the object interpreted. Such differences are therefore 
regarded as natural and normal. It is underlined that “religious scholars have grown up 
in different places and possess different cultures”. Rather than favouring a specific 
geography and culture, all different cultures and geographies in the Muslim world are 
regarded as equal. This discourse can be interpreted as a response to the Kemalist 
discourse which claims to hold the monopoly on truth. According to the text, different 
methods used by scholars are also seen as a factor which causes the diversity of 
interpretations. So using different methods is also regarded as acceptable and normal. 
 The ‘human factor’ is presented as one of the main causes of diversity in 
different interpretations of Islam. The message is that as human beings are distinctive, 
their interpretations are also distinctive. The word ‘human’ in the term ‘human factor’ 
refers to biological species, rather than a legal definition such as ‘citizen’. Basing the 
diversity on the human factor signifies the naturalness of the differences. Therefore, the 
tarikats and cemaats are presented as the result of unconscious uncontrolled natural 
factors, rather than conscious malicious intentions of their founders. ‘Daily life’, which 
is also a non-political factor, is also introduced as a possible determiner for the diversity 
in interpretations. Unlike the goals attributed to tarikats and cemaats in the post-28 
February textbooks, there is no attribution to any political or power-related goals 
regarding tarikats and cemaats in the passage. According to the text, the variety in the 
interpretations of verses and hadiths made by religious scholars are equally acceptable. 
All of those who bring a different interpretation to Islam are referred to as ‘scholars’ 
instead of any pejorative word. Being a scholar signifies to these interpreters an 
intellectual capacity in Gramscian terms. 
Text 266 
 One of the forms within Islamic thought is that which emphasises 
morality. The interpretations which emerged in order to morally educate 
people and to beautify morality by leaning the fundamental principles of 
the religion are called Islamic Sufism (tasavvuf)… Sufi interpretations 
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focus on the moral bases of religion. The aim of this is to educate and 
develop people by encouraging them to be loyal to Allah. 
 Sufi interpretations helped the religion of Islam to spread to different 
places. For instance, Islam mostly spread to Anatolia, the Balkans and 
Central Asia by means of Sufi interpretations. Names such as Hoca 
Ahmet Yesevi, Abdulkadir Geylani, Bahaeddin Naksibend, Mevlana, Haci 
Bektas Veli, Yunus Emre, Ahi Evran and Haci Bayram Veli have played a 
significant role in the dissemination of moral values to different regions, 
Anatolia being the first place. Sufi interpretations are significant for the 
diffusion of values such as tolerance, respect and love within society. 
Through these values, people whose origins are from different social and 
cultural environments can live together peacefully and happily. (CMNE, 
2015: 85) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Sufi interpretations aim to educate people morally and direct them 
to the fundamental principles of the religion 
 Sufi interpretations helped Islam to spread to other places. 
 What is meant by ‘Sufi interpretations’ in this unit is the tarikats. The 
text begins with the information that Islamic Sufism emphasises the issue of 
morality. Two goals, “to educate people morally” and “to beautify morality”, are 
attributed to tarikats. Regarding the issue of morality as the focus of tarikats 
means rejecting any political or economic agendas which were attributed to them 
in the textbooks used before 2002. Moreover, in order to educate people morally 
one needs to possess moral qualifications. Therefore, the moral qualifications of 
the tarikats are taken for granted in the text. The word ‘beautify’ has a positive 
connotation. It is taken for granted that the tarikats have enough moral capacity 
to beautify morality. It is also pointed out that Islamic Sufism teaches the basic 
principles of religion. Unlike the discourse before 2002 which regarded the 
tarikats as an obstacle between God and believers, they are now not seen as a 
threat to the relationship but as one of the ways of being loyal to Allah. From this 
viewpoint, their situation shifts from being dangerous entities which exploit 
people’s religious sensitivity to entities which equip people morally and help 




 In the text, there is an emphasis on the contribution of Sufi 
interpretations, namely tarikats, to the spread of Islam in different geographic 
locations such as Anatolia, Central Asia and the Balkans. It can be understood 
that the understanding of Islam in those places was shaped or at least influenced 
by Sufi interpretations. As a consequence of these interpretations, tarikats cannot 
be exploiters of religion in those places since the interpretation of Islam there is 
already affected by the tarikats’ interpretation of Islam. Moreover, it is also 
stated that the leaders of the Sufi interpretations had a “significant role in the 
dissemination of moral values to different regions”. This requires those tarikats 
to reach a particular level of moral quality. Sufi interpretations are associated 
with the words ‘respect’, ‘love’ and ‘tolerance’, which all have completely 
positive connotations and are important components of a peaceful society. In the 
text, tarikats are regarded as a significant reason for living together happily and 
peacefully in Turkey. Therefore, the benefit of tarikats for society is taken for 
granted with no negative criticisms against them. 
 In the light of the analysis above, a radical shift in terms of the discourse 
about tarikats and cemaats can be detected in the texts. This radical shift has 
significant consequences in terms of class struggle and vertical mobility in 
society. As has been already discussed, tarikats and cemaats possess social, 
political and economic power. A positive shift in the state’s attitude towards 
them increases their radius of action, since both the legal and the discursive 
restrictions on them are lifted.  
Textbox67 
Hodja Ahmet Yesevi, Abdulkadir Geylani Bahaeddin Naksibend, Mevlana 
and Haci Bektas Veli; What do you know about these Islamic notables? 
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 Dominant discourse: 
 These five names are notable people and opinion leaders within the 
Islamic tradition. 
 Within the textbox, five names from different religious orders are presented and 
students are asked what they know about them. The word ‘notable’ is used to describe 
them. ‘Notable’ has a positive connotation and is used in the text to mean opinion 
leader. These names are accepted as those who lead a school within the Islamic 
tradition. Such a radical change in the attitude towards these tarikat leaders can be 
interpreted as an acquittal of the tarikats which had previously been defined as 
dangerous entities. This change in the discourse on tarikats has given the devout 
followers of those names the possibility of possessing vertical mobility opportunities 
within the class structure of society. 
Text 368 
Kadirilik is a Sufi interpretation based on the thoughts of Abdulkadir 
Geylani.  
 Similar to other Sufi interpretations, according to Kadirilik, obeying the 
Qur’an and Sunnah is the main principle. For this reason, the emphasis is 
on the obedience of human beings to the commands and restrictions of 
religion. So humans should repent for their sins and gravitate with 
honesty towards prayer. The most significant mission in Kadirilik is 
serving and fulfilling the needs of the poor… (CMNE, 2015: 88) 
Analysis 
  Prominent discourses; 
 The fundamental principle in Kadirilik is obeying the Qur’an and Sunnah. 
 Serving and fulfilling the needs of the poor is the most important mission 
for Kadirilik. 
 The text begins with a statement regarding Kadirilik within the tradition 
of Sufi interpretations. In the text, “obeying the Qur’an and Sunnah” is presented 
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as the fundamental principle of Kadirilik. This means that Kadirilik interprets 
Islam in a correct way and there is no doubt about the loyalty of Kadirilik to the 
main principles of Islam. This symbolises a radical shift from the discourse in 
the post-28 February textbooks which regarded tarikats as exploiters of religion. 
Moreover, helping the poor is highlighted here as the principle of Kadirilik. The 
image of tarikats has radically shifted from being dangerous to being beneficial. 
Thus, the attitude of the text towards Kadirilik is not neutral and Kadirilik is 
associated with solely positive qualities.  
Text 469 
 Naksibendilik is a Sufi interpretation based on the thoughts of Bahaeddin 
Naksibend… 
 In Naksibendilik, referring to Allah every time is given importance for 
getting rid of evil… 
 In Naksibendilik, loyalty to the Qur’an and Sunnah and praying are 
valued. One of the most significant features of this Sufi interpretation is 
being together with good and well-behaved people in social gatherings of 
science and knowledge. (CMNE, 2015: 89) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Loyalty to Allah, the Qur’an and Sunnah is the valued action in Naksibendilik. 
 Meeting well-behaved and good people in knowledge and science gatherings is 
valued in Naksibendilik. 
 The text begins with a statement which accepts Naksibendilik as a type of Sufi 
interpretation. According to the text, “referring to Allah” is accepted as the most 
important principle in the Naksibendilik. This means that Naksibendilik truly follows the 
path of Allah. 
 In the second paragraph, it is stressed that the Qur’an and Sunnah, the two main 
sources of Islam, are prioritised as the main reference in Naksibendilik. “Being together 
with good and well-behaved people” is presented as the most important characteristic of 
                                                          
69
 The Naksibendilik is one of the most active, powerful and well-known tarikats in Turkey. This text, 




Naksibendilik. The adjective ‘well-behaved’ refers to those who have reached a required 
standard of moral level. This means that the environment of Naksibendilik is composed 
of people who possess moral qualifications. The term ‘social gatherings of science and 
knowledge’ can be understood as an emphasis on the importance given to knowledge 
and science by Naksibendilik. This discourse can be interpreted as a response to the 
discourse of “tarikats are harmful entities which hinder the individual development and 
restrict liberties” in the textbooks used before 2002. The shift is from an entity which is 
harmful to individual development to a beneficial entity which contributes to the 
development of individuals through its value of science and knowledge.  
 This radical change in the discourse regarding Naksibendilik has significant 
consequences since it is one of the most powerful and influential religious orders in 
Turkey. As it is an entity which provides its devout members with the ability to be 
organised and to act collectively, those people possess the capacity to challenge the 
hegemonic power of the Kemalist bourgeoisie. Second, the Naksibendi religious order 
has an economic power stemming from its wide-ranging commercial enterprises. A 
radical change in the discourse regarding tarikats removed the constraints on such 
economic entities and in the new process, those entities started to develop and to rival 
the hegemonic Kemalist bourgeoisie. Moreover, the Ismail Aga Cemaati, a branch of 
Naksibendilik, possesses the means of hegemony such as television and radio channels 
(Lalegul TV and Lalegul FM), a publishing company (Lalegul Yayinevi), a monthly 
magazine (Lalegul Dergisi) and its own mosque (Ismail Aga Camii) and education 
facilities (Ismail Aga Ihtisas Medreseleri). It can therefore challenge the discursive 
hegemony of the Kemalist bourgeoisie by creating an alternative discourse by means of 








3.7. The Family 
The family is a significant element of civil society in which a child is born and 
raised from the very beginning of his/her life. Family is an important agency of human 
socialisation. Primary socialisation
70
 is realised by the family during which infants and 
children experience the most intensive phase of cultural learning in their early years. In 
this phase, they learn fundamental behaviour and language.  Secondary socialisation 
begins in childhood and develops through to maturity during which time the family 
shares the responsibility of socialisation with other actors such as education institutions, 
the media and social circles. This is the phase in which individuals internalise the 
norms, beliefs and values which shape their cultural patterns (Giddens & Sutton, 2013: 
339). So the family is a vital terrain which fulfils the duty of ideological control needed 
by a cultural hegemony (Giroux, 1981: 94). 
Family is the primary foundation where culture is transmitted to young 
generations (Semmes, 1979: 185). According to Gramscian understanding, it is one of 
the civil society institutions where the cultural hegemony is exercised (Giroux, 1981: 
94). Therefore, restricting the influence of parents on children and shaping the discourse 
manufactured within the family is a significant step in shaping the values, beliefs and 
discourses within the sphere of civil society. In the texts analysed in this section, the 
family image changed dramatically between the post-28 February period and 2015. In 
both periods, the state presented a particular family image which reflected the official 
ruling values. By presenting a particular family lifestyle as common, natural, universal 
and mainstream, the textbooks compelled students to question their families which did 
not share the same values and lifestyle as the image depicted in the textbooks. 
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self-aware, knowldgeable person, skilled in the ways of the culture into which he or she was born” 




3.7.1 Post-28 February Textbooks 
Pictures 4, 5 and 671 
 
Figure 4 (Gokbulut & Ocal, 2002: 82) 
 
Figure 5 (Gokbulut & Ocal, 2002: 83) 
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Figure 6 (Gokbulut & Ocal, 2002: 85) 
 
In Picture 4, a family which has a secular lifestyle is posing with all its members. 
In Picture 5, the same family is spending free time walking outside together. In Picture 
6, the parents waken their daughter. In all three pictures, the family images reflect a 
secular Western lifestyle. The characters are selected from non-Turkish, European 
models who do not reflect a devout Muslim image. The parents represent white-collar, 
middle-class people. The father character has neither a beard nor a moustache. The 
mother character does not wear a headscarf. No Islamic practice or Islamic symbol can 





Pictures 7, 8 and 9 72 
 
Figure 7 (CMNE, 2002: 102) 
 
 
Figure 8 (CMNE, 2002: 99) 
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Figure 9 (CMNE, 2002: 103) 
Although drawings instead of real pictures are used in the second set of 
illustrations, the mother and father characters reflect a similar secular Western family 
image. The father character possess neither beard nor moustache. The mother character 
does not wear a headscarf and she wears a skirt. There is no Islamic symbol or Islamic 
practice shown in the figures 7, 8 and 9.  
Analysis 
The prominent discourses in these figures are; 
 The Western and secular family type is the main family model in Turkey.  
 The members of an ordinary family do not have an Islamic appearance.  
 Religious practices do not play any part in ordinary family life in Turkey. 
 The houses of mainstream families do not possess any Islamic symbols.  
 Children imitate the values, lifestyle and appearance of their secular 
families. 
The main discursive tactic in these pictures and drawings is selectively 
constructing the discourse about family with images which reflect completely Western 
and secular values, appearance and lifestyle. By this means, a Western and secular 
family becomes ordinary, normal and mainstream whereas a pious Muslim family is 




Western secular family image in the RCMK textbooks highlights a distinctive 
discourse: the capacity of the RCMK lessons to determine the boundaries and standards 
of religiosity and to represent religious values is higher than in any other lessons. 
Therefore, those textbooks are more effective in shaping the mainstream family image 
in the minds of the students. 
A significant outcome of such a discourse is the discrepancy between the 
Western secular family image and the pious family image in the minds of children who 
were born in a pious family and raised by pious Muslim parents. The child from a pious 
family might think that his/her family does not come to mind as a prototype family 
model and does not represent the mainstream values and lifestyle in the country. In the 
minds of the pious families’ children, such a discourse corresponds to possessing an 
unusual family type. Since those children might perceive the secular family type as the 
universally ideal family model, they do not regard their own families as cultural, 
ideological and intellectual role models. The discourse diminishes the intellectual 
impact of parents on their children and lowers their power to shape the values, 
discourses and perceptions of their children. Consequently, the family institution cannot 
fulfill its roles as the challenger of the existing cultural hegemony and as the contributor 
of a counter-hegemony within civil society. 
For the sake of the Kemalist cultural hegemony, the domination of public space 
by people who have a secular lifestyle needs to be internalised and should be regarded 
as natural by the pious Muslims. The family images discussed above ease the 
internalisation of secular values and lifestyle by increasing the visibility of secularity in 
public space. As will be shown in the next chapter, there were structural obstacles to 
Muslim women, such as the headscarf ban which prevented them from working in both 
public and private sectors. Such obstacles resulted in the occupation of the public space 
by those women who had a secular lifestyle. Ultimately, this contributed to the class 




3.7.2. 2015 Textbooks 
Pictures 10, 11, 12 and 13 
The four pictures shown below were taken from the fourth-grade RCMK 
textbooks. 
 
Figure 10 (Akgul et al., 2015a: 107) 
 A devout Muslim family image is seen in Picture 10. The female characters wear 
headscarves and the daughter character imitates her mother’s dress style. Thus the 
parents are presented as role models and as main determiners of their children’s values, 
lifestyle and appearance. All members of the family are depicted as happy characters 





Figure 11 (Akgul et al., 2015a: 108) 
 
A pious Muslim family and an acquaintance with her daughter are seen in Figure 
11. The adult women characters wear headscarves. The acquaintance has the same 
lifestyle as the family. The main discourse is that the pious Muslim lifestyle is not only 
possessed by children’s own family, it is also embraced by the wider environment. The 
main goal of the image is to show how widespread the devout Muslim values and 
lifestyle are. Moreover, the father character is reading a religious book (ilmihal). The 
two women and the children are listening to him attentively. Hence, the father possesses 
a ‘narrator’ role and he is accepted as the main authority in terms of determining the 
world-views and values of the family. Such a discourse increases the pious Muslim 





Figure 12 (Akgul et al., 2015a: 109) 
 
Picture 12 shows two children receiving religious education. The female child 
character is reading the Qur’an and the male child is listening to her. Learning and 
practising Islam, and by this means acquiring the Islamic values and lifestyle, are 
accepted as common, expected and necessary acts for children. Moreover, both children 
have an Islamic appearance. Therefore, religious values are presented as the only option 
alternative for the children. The main goal of picturing the children reading the Qur’an 





Figure 13 (Akgul et al., 2015a: 117) 
A young pious Muslim couple reading the Qur’an are shown in Picture 13. The 
woman wears a headscarf, which is the symbol of Muslimness. The couple spend their 
time reading the Qur’an. This shows that religious activities have a significant role in 
people’s daily life in Turkey. In this way, the necessity of having a religious lifestyle is 
taken for granted in the text. This discourse symbolises a radical shift from the family 
image in the post-28 February textbooks which depicted walking outdoors as the 
ordinary activity of families to the family image in the 2015 textbooks which depict 
reading the Qur’an as the common activity.  
Analysis 
The main discourses within the four pictures are; 
 A pious Muslim family type is the ordinary, mainstream family type in 
Turkey. 
 The members of an ordinary family have an Islamic appearance.  
 Religious practices play a significant part in ordinary family life in 
Turkey. 





In all four pictures, the main discursive tactic is selectivity; that is, selecting 
images which reflect elements from a particular value set, lifestyle and appearance, 
while completely ignoring all other value sets, lifestyles and appearances. As can be 
seen in these pictures, there is a sharp change in terms of family image in the 2015 
textbooks. This change has significant meanings regarding the cultural hegemonic 
struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP because they depict 
particular values, beliefs and world-views as common, normal and mainstream.  
As already discussed, the family is the basic institution where children are 
culturally shaped and receive their first education. There is a significant alternative here 
in terms of the family having an educative role which can bypass the school in the 
process of constructing and disseminating particular discourses within the sphere of 
civil society. As the effectiveness of the family shapes children’s minds in opposition to 
the values of the ruling class increases, the effectiveness of the state to shape the minds 
of children diminishes and consequently the ruling class loses its monopoly on the 
education of the young generations.  
How the family image is represented in the textbooks becomes a vital issue for 
determining the influence of families on their children. The family images which reflect 
pious Muslim values and lifestyle give students who were born and raised in secular 
families the message that the pious Muslim values and lifestyle form the normal, 
common, mainstream values and lifestyle. Since the lifestyle of students’ own families 
is not reflected in the images, they might realise the differences between their secular 
families and the common, mainstream family type and tend to regard their own families 
as unordinary, abnormal and out of mainstream. Thus, the influence of their family on 
them decreases as they would start to question the place of their family in society. In 
this regard, from the family image before the JDP period, the children of the devout 
families internalised the secondary position of their families in society. Following the 
changes in the family image in the textbooks in the period of the JDP, the children of 
devout families would have a greater tendency to regard their families as role models 
for themselves, since their families had started to represent the mainstream, ordinary 
family type. 
The change in the representation of the mainstream family in the textbooks also 




of the Islamic middle class from the periphery to the centre and the increase in the 
visibility of Islamic values, symbols and lifestyle in civil society. Civil society, which 
was formerly dominated by secular values, has become dominated by Islamic values in 
recent years. Thus, the textbooks reflect the increasing visibility of Islamic values and 
lifestyle in society. This change also influenced the consent relations in Turkey. In the 
past, the Muslim lower and middle classes were invisible at the level of the public 
sphere due to the structural restrictions used to internalise and normalise their 
invisibleness, since they had acknowledged the discursive dominance of the Kemalist 
values in both public and private spaces. However, as the pious Muslim lower and 
middle classes began to challenge that discursive dominance by means of different 
hegemonic instruments such as school textbooks, pious Muslims were encouraged to 
question their secondary position within the existing class structure. On the other hand, 
it also diminished the Kemalists’ sense of moral and intellectual leadership and 
increased the normalisation and internalisation of Islamic values in both the public and 
civil spheres.  
 
3.8. Alevism  
Alevism was one of the new topics which was introduced into the RCMK 
curriculum in the period of the JDP. Analysis of the texts about Alevism is very 
significant since those texts reveal a failed attempt by the JDP at the construction of a 
political bloc with the Alevi groups who were the sufferers from the nation-building 
process of Kemalism. 
Alevis can be described as the “carriers of religious traditions that partially 
overlap with the Islamic tradition, but also with other local and regional religious 
traditions that were carried by the peoples of Anatolia and their neighbouring 
geographies (in particular the Balkans, Mesopotamia, and Iran)” (Dressler, 2015: 446). 
Alevis often underline their distinction from the Sunni tradition of Islam (Dressler, 
2008: 281). The Alevi population, composed of Turkish, Kurdish and Arabic Alevis, 
was approximately 20% of the population of Turkey (Gunes-Ayata & Ayata, 2002: 
145). The ‘Alevi question’ arose from the nation-building process led by the founders of 




based on the principles of nationalism and laicism (Dressler, 2015: 446). During the 
secularisation of the Republic, the Alevi religious and social organisations, and the 
institution of dedelik, shared the same fate as the Sufi tarikats which were closed and 
their activities were banned (Dressler, 2008: 284-285).  
Within the frame of the national-popular dimension of cultural hegemony in 
Gramscian understanding, a class which seeks national leadership should respond to 
“the popular and democratic demands and struggles of the people, which do not have a 
purely class character, that is, which do not arise directly out of the relations of 
production” (Simon, 2015: 20). So as a response to the democratic demands of the 
Alevis, the JDP initiated a process (Alevi Acilimi) for the Alevis which included Alevi 
workshops, the organisation of Alevi iftars, and changes in the curriculum of RCMK 
lessons (Ozkul, 2015: 83-84). Hence, the topic of ‘Alevism’ was included in RCMK 
lessons from the 2011-12 academic year (Ozkul, 2015: 87). On the other hand, 
significant numbers of Alevi groups who were opposed to compulsory RCMK lessons 
argued that those initiatives of the JDP reproduced the dominance of Sunni Islam and 
triggered disputes stemming from cultural and religious distinctions between the Alevis 
and the Sunnis. In particular, steps to include Alevism in a chapter dedicated to Sufi 
understanding of Sunni Islam were interpreted by Alevis as the Sunni Islamisation of 
Alevism (Kaya, 2013a: 153). It can therefore be argued that the topic of ‘Alevism’ 
represents a failed attempt of the JDP’s cultural hegemony project, since it merely 
reproduced the Sunni discourse regarding Alevism. 
3.8.1. 2015 Textbooks 
Text 1 73 
 An Alevi is a person who loves, respects and acts on behalf of Ali. Alevis 
are people who believe in the oneness of Allah, who accept Muhammad 
as the last prophet, whose holy book is the Qur’an, and who love the 
Prophet Muhammad and his family.  
… 
 Alevi-Bektasi thinking seeks to disseminate the moral principles of Islam 
among people as other Sufi thoughts do. In this context, it imitates the 
Prophet Muhammad and his family. (CMNE, 2015: 91-100) 
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 Prominent discourses; 
 Alevis believe in Allah, accept Muhammad as the prophet and the Qur’an as the 
holy book. 
 Alevis want to spread Islamic principles among people. 
 The text begins with a definition of Alevi belief. The emphasis is on the loyalty 
of Alevis to Ali. However, the distinctive position of Alevis regarding Ali and political 
incidents in the period of Ali is totally ignored. The text continues with Alevis’ 
acceptance of Allah as the one God. Allah is the name of the God in Islam. Therefore, 
the main discourse here is that Alevis believe in the same God as Sunnis and other 
Muslims throughout the world. Similarly, it is underlined that they accept Muhammad 
as their prophet and the Qur’an as the holy book and they love Muhammad and his 
family just as the Sunnis and other Muslims do. The most significant point in this 
discourse is totally ignoring any distinctions of Alevism from Sunnism and presenting 
Alevism as a branch of Sunnism by underlining commonalities between Alevism and 
Sunnism. 
 Moreover, the mission of the dissemination of Islam is attributed to Alevism. 
Disseminating a belief is a further step than being a passive adherent to a belief. So the 
discourse aims at articulating the Alevis to Sunni Islam by transforming them to the 
vanguard position of the religion. An analogy between Alevis and Sunni Sufi tarikats is 
made in order to depict Alevi groups as a type of Sunni religious order. By showing 
Alevi-Bektasi thinking as imitating the Prophet Muhammad and his family, the text 
locates Alevi thinking within Sunni Islamic thinking.  
 Two discursive tactics can be detected throughout this text. The first is the 
official recognition of Alevis as a response to their democratic demands within the 
frame of the national-popular dimension of cultural hegemony in the Gramscian sense. 
The second is the effort to articulate the Alevis to the Sunni Islamic tradition. By this 
means, the JDP aimed to correlate the interests of Alevis with the interests of the Sunni 





Text 2 74 
Cem means a coming together and becoming united. Cems were practised 
in Dervish convents and squares. Following urbanisation, cem started to 
be practised in places called Cemevi. Cem is administered by Dede.  
 During cem, people are directed to Allah. They fill their hearts with the 
love of Allah. Tevhid (La ilahe illallah [God is supreme]) is read during 
the cem practice. By putting the hands on the chest, salawat is read for 
the Prophet Muhammad and his family, and people repent of their sins… 
 Cemevi is the place where cem is practised. In addition, it becomes the 
place where Sufi conversations are held, it is used as a food bank for the 
poor, it becomes a house of unity, peace and fraternity. It is also used as 
a house of wisdom, education and culture. (CMNE, 2015: 93-95) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourses; 
 Alevis come together and are united under the name of cem in order to be 
directed to Allah and to respect the Prophet Muhammad and his family. 
 Cemevi is solely the place of cem, unity, peace and fraternity, a food bank for the 
poor, a house of wisdom, education and culture. 
 The text begins with a definition of cem (tot). According the text, cem refers to 
“coming together and becoming united”. In this definition, cem is defined as a type of 
social activity. It is stated that “cem started to be practised in places called Cemevi”. 
Cemevi are regarded as a consequence of urbanisation. This means that a cemevi is a 
newly introduced place which has no historical roots.  
 In the second paragraph, the practise of cem is associated with love for Allah and 
the practice of showing respect for the Prophet Muhammad and his family is 
emphasised. Therefore, Alevism is depicted within the tradition of Sunni Islam by 
merely highlighting the common points with Sunni Islam, which are the images of Allah 
and the Prophet Muhammad. 
 Cemevi is described as a place “where Sufi conversations are held”, a “food 
bank for the poor”, it becomes “a house of unity, peace and fraternity” and “a house of 
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wisdom, education and culture”. The activities which are emphasised in the last 
paragraph are related to the social and cultural spheres. Therefore, a cemevi is depicted 
as a place where some very basic religious rituals are practised just like Sunni Muslims 
do, and where worldly activities, which are no different for Sunni Muslims, are carried 
out. With such a discourse, the distinctive features of Alevism in terms of belief and 
worship and more importantly the historical background of Alevism are completely 
ignored in the text. The only difference between a cemevi and a Sunni mosque is 
presented in the worldly sphere by emphasising the cultural activities and social 
responsibility projects which are held in cemevi. 
The main discursive tactic in this text is depicting Alevism within the narrative 
of Sunni Islam by underlining very fundamental commonalities between Alevism and 
Sunni Islam and detaching the distinctions of Alevism from the area of belief and 
locating them to solely social and cultural areas. According to this discourse, Alevism 
becomes a branch of Sunni Islam with a special focus on social projects and cultural 
practices.  
Text 3 75 
Semah is the whirling of people who ebulliently and ecstatically 
participate in Alevi-Bektasi cems with a divine love. Alevi-Bektasi people 
express their divine love for Allah by taking into consideration the fact 
that everything in the universe is perpetually whirling. (CMNE, 2015: 97) 
 Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Semah is the expression of divine love for Allah. 
 Semah is a ritual performed by Alevis. In this passage, how semah is physically 
practised is described and the divine love displayed by practising it is emphasised. The 
significant point about semah is that its aim is defined as the expression of divine love 
for Allah. The adverbs ‘ebulliently’ and ‘ecstatically’ reflect the enthusiasm and desire 
of people who practise semah. Their enthusiasm and desire are associated with divine 
love for Allah. The text therefore stresses the most fundamental common point, love for 
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Allah, between Alevism and Sunni Islam. In a similar vein to the first two texts, the 
distinctions between Alevism and Sunni Islam are overlooked and the sole common 
point, love for Allah, is emphasised. By this means, any tensions and conflicting topics 
between Alevism and Sunni Islam can be concealed. 
 
4. Conclusion 
4.1. Overview of Chapter 5 
So far in Chapter 5, we have sought to find the answer to the research question 
‘How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the post-28 
February process until 2015?’ by emphasising the construction of discourses on the 
terrain of Islam within the RCMK textbooks used in the post-28 February process and 
in 2015.  
Based on the findings of Chapter 5, the discourse under the heading ‘State’ 
aimed at ensuring people’s loyalty to the state, which was a significant instrument of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and which was the site where the Kemalist bureaucracy was 
located. The state, with its various institutions and laws, was presented as a completely 
beneficial, positive and necessary entity. This discourse was strengthened by frequent 
references to Islamic texts such as verses and hadiths. The discourse under the heading 
‘Military’ was nearly the same as the discourse about the state. In the 2015 textbooks, 
the discourses on the state and the military were almost completely maintained 
unchanged because the JDP abstained from a direct clash with the Kemalist 
establishment. Moreover, another reason for the maintenance of those discourses can be 
the JDP’s increasing influence on the state apparatus and the military over its three 
terms in office. 
The discourse on ‘Economic Differences’ was constructed in such a way as to 
find a causal relation between economic differences and the understanding of religion 
and to associate underdevelopment with religiousness. This discourse aimed at 
legitimising the current class structure in which the Kemalists formed the dominant 




had been completely removed from the 2015 textbooks. This can also be interpreted as 
the outcome of the Islamic middle class’s rise vis-à-vis the Kemalist bourgeoisie. 
The discourse under the heading ‘Laicism’ aimed at minimising the threat 
perception of pious Muslims stemming from the practices of laicism. For this aim, the 
discourse was mostly based on the presentation of laicism as the guarantor of freedom 
of religion, conscience and prayer. Another prominent discursive tactic of the Kemalists 
was the depoliticisation of Islam. The strong emphasis on the distinction between the 
worldly and the religious was an effort to construct an individualist understanding of 
Islam and to remove Islam from the social, economic and political spheres and restrict it 
to the personal sphere. The JDP’s response to this discourse was to redefine laicism in 
such a way as to prevent the concept from constructing an alternative secular world 
conception to the world conception of Islam. However, such a redefinition of laicism 
was not actualised in official processes such as the contents of school lessons. The JDP 
merely achieved such a redefinition of laicism in the party documents and in the 
unofficial speeches of its prominent members. 
Similar to the discourse on laicism, the discourse under the heading ‘Image of 
Ataturk’ also aimed at minimising the threat perception of pious Muslims stemming 
from the reforms, principles and the ideology of Ataturk. Ataturk was presented as the 
main reference point for nearly every issue including Islam and as a ‘true Muslim’ 
whom Muslims should take as a model. The ‘religious Ataturk’ discourse had been 
maintained in the 2015 textbooks. The discursive strategy of the JDP was to depoliticise 
Ataturk’s image by preventing it from providing an ideological advantage for the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc. This discursive strategy revealed the JDP’s careful war of 
position without initiating a frontal attack on the Ataturk image which still held a 
privileged position in Turkish society.  
The discourse under the heading ‘Tarikats and cemaats’ in the post-28 February 
textbooks had been changed from completely negative to completely positive in the 
2015 textbooks. Tarikats and cemaats, which provided a significant organisational 
power and an umbrella organisation under which to act collectively for some religious 
groups, were originally depicted as completely harmful entities which exploited 




them as the beneficial outcome of natural distinctions among Muslim people which 
enriched society. 
The ‘Family’ was another topic in which the discourse had been completely 
changed between the two terms. Whereas the mainstream family image in the post-28 
February textbooks had been composed of family members who had a completely 
secular Western appearance, apparel and lifestyle, the image of the family in the 2015 
textbooks turned into a religious Islamic style. The construction of discourse about the 
family in both periods was a reflection of the efforts to shape the mainstream values, 
beliefs and lifestyle in accordance with the visibility in both political and civil societies. 
The heading ‘Alevism’ was a newly included topic in the 2015 textbooks. As a 
part of the national-popular dimension of cultural hegemony, the JDP attempted to 
respond to the democratic demands of the Alevis. Since the discourse on Alevism was 
wholly based on Sunni-Islamic perspective, it became a failed attempt by the JDP to 
articulate the Alevis to its hegemonic project and to construct a political bloc with the 
Alevis. 
 
4.2. The Cultural Hegemonic Struggle in the Light of the Key 
Findings in Chapter 5  
In the light of Joseph’s (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) distinction between deeper 
structural hegemonies and surface hegemonic projects, the textbooks of the RCMK 
lessons revealed the deeper structures, namely Islam and global capitalism, which have 
influenced and restricted hegemonic projects in Turkey. First, Islam, as a significant 
deeper structure in Turkey just as in other Muslim-majority societies, compelled the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc to find common ground with pious Muslims in order to 
minimise their threat perception stemming from the principle of laicism and the 
Kemalist values and lifestyle. Therefore, the discourse about Islam and the Islamic 
lifestyle in the RCMK textbooks can be interpreted as the efforts of the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc to construct such a common ground to which pious Muslims could 
consent. Second, the RCMK textbooks also showed the structural hegemonic dimension 




laicism. The discourses under the titles ‘Laicism’ and ‘Tarikats and Cemaats’ aimed at 
transforming the pious Muslims who act collectively under various Islamic 
organisations into individualist Muslim customers who were fit for the market economy 
of global capitalism.  
In organisational terms of the hegemonic struggle, the RCMK textbooks 
revealed the construction of discourses about the sites where all three pillars of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc were located. The discourse on the terrain of Islam was 
constructed to ensure loyalty to the main instruments of Kemalist hegemony, namely 
the state, its legal system, and the military, which had always been the source of 
organisational power of the Kemalist hegemony. The JDP maintained a positive 
discourse on the state, its legal system and the military as it gradually achieved more 
control over these institutions compared with the control which it had in 2002 when the 
party had just come to power. Moreover, the economic system, which had created 
economic differences between the Kemalist and the pious segments of society, was also 
normalised by means of the texts in the RCMK textbooks to ease the internalisation of 
the superior position of the Kemalist bourgeoisie in the class hierarchy vis-à-vis the 
Islamic subordinate classes. The discourses regarding the economic differences were 
removed from the content of the RCMK lessons and the normalisation of the Kemalist 
bourgeoisie’s privileged position in the class hierarchy could be hindered by 2015. The 
JDP achieved limited success in changing the discourse about the family which is the 
most basic institution in civil society by characterising the mainstream family image 
with a completely Islamic discourse. The party also changed the completely negative 
discourse to positive regarding tarikats and cemaats, which provide a collective 
organisational power to a significant proportion of pious Muslims, and constructed a 
completely positive discourse. 
The RCMK textbooks also revealed the unrivalled advantageous position of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc in terms of ideology in the establishment of cultural 
hegemony. The image of Ataturk in the post-28 February textbooks was constructed to 
present him as the role model in terms of the attitude towards Islam and to position him 
as the only reference point for every issue regarding religion and religious life. This 
construction also provided a privileged position to the Kemalist hegemonic bloc vis-à-




Ataturk. In a similar vein, Ataturk’s principle of laicism was presented as the main 
determinant of attitudes towards Islam and Muslimness. By this means, a laicist attitude 
towards Islam and Muslimness became the acceptable, normal and mainstream attitude. 
The JDP sought to soften the absolute advantage of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc in 
terms of ideology by depoliticising the image of Ataturk and redefining laicism. 
However, the JDP could not shape the mainstream ideology in accordance with its own 
value set and consequently failed to gain a comparative advantage vis-à-vis Kemalism. 
Constructing political blocs was a significant strategy for both the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc and the JDP. The majority of the texts in the RCMK textbooks 
disclosed the Kemalist hegemonic bloc’s efforts to find common ground with pious 
Sunni Muslims who form the majority of the population in Turkey and to construct a 
political bloc in order to create a homogeneous society with them. On the other hand, 
the JDP also attempted to find common ground with the Alevi population, who suffered 
from the social engineering of Kemalism. The aim of such a common ground was to 
create a political bloc with Alevis against the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. Since the 
discourse on Alevism in the RCMK textbooks completely reflected the Sunni 
perspective, the attempt of the JDP was interpreted as the Sunnification of Alevism by 
Alevis and it failed.  
In the light of the discussions above, the RCMK textbooks were significant for 
understanding the hegemonic strategy of the JDP vis-à-vis the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc. As the 2015 textbooks revealed, the JDP did not prefer a radical change in the 
discourses regarding the main institutions and symbols of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
such as the state, the military, the principle of laicism, and the image of Ataturk. 
Instead, it preferred to introduce a very gradual change by focusing on the discourses 
regarding the organisations of civil society such as the family and the tarikats and 
cemaats. It can therefore be claimed that the JDP began its war of position from the 
most distant organisations to the state apparatus. In this war of position, the JDP failed 
to win a new position since it could not persuade the Alevis to support its reform project 
regarding Alevism. Consequently, it is not possible to argue that the JDP fully 
established a cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam. By 2015, the Kemalist 









 The aim of this study is to comprehend the struggle for cultural hegemony taking 
place in Turkey on the site of religion, and specifically on the terrain of Islam. In order 
to achieve this aim, it is necessary to explore the time during which people carry out 
their everyday life activities and are exposed to the cultural hegemonic projects, and the 
space in which people’s everyday activities are carried out and in which the cultural 
hegemony takes place. In the previous chapter, the textbooks of the RCMK lessons 
which are taught at all types of school were analysed. Schools were significant both in 
terms of time, since students spend considerable periods of their time there (at least six 
hours a day, five days a week, over twelve years), and in terms of a space where 
students socialise outside the home. In this chapter, consideration will be given to all the 
public spaces where people spend the rest of their time outside the home, studying, 
working, interacting with other people, getting involved in the economic system, and 
acting in accordance with the opportunities of the class to which they belong.  
 This chapter starts with a theoretical discussion about the role of legislation on 
the establishment of cultural hegemony. It will continue with an analysis of the 
legislation which regulated the issues regarding religion in Turkey from the 28 February 
1997 coup d’état until 2015 by means of the critical discourse analysis (CDA) method. 
Particular attention will be given to legislation ranging from the Turkish Constitution 
and laws to the bylaws and regulations which regulate the terrain of religion.
76
 The 
long-term effects of legislation on the manufacture and dissemination of consent, and on 
the determination of class positions within society, rather than emphasising the ‘direct 
sanction’ dimension of legislation, will also be examined. 
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2. Legislation and Cultural Hegemony 
Hegemonic struggles are usually understood as a simple inter-group issue in the 
agency-oriented sense by neglecting the relations between those social groups and the 
underlying structures. Hegemonic struggles should be understood as conjunctural or 
coincidental occurrences, but they “have their basis in deeper social relations and 
processes – such things as relations of production, modes of political power, ideological 
apparatuses and structures of communication” (Joseph, 2001: 269). At this point, 
Turkish legal order ranging from the Constitutional system to laws, regulations and 
bylaws constitutes a deeper structure which directly determines the boundaries of 
hegemonic projects and the rules of the hegemonic struggle.  
Understanding the role of law in Gramsci’s theory is significant in order to 
highlight the instrumentality of law in the establishment of cultural hegemony, and by 
this means in maintaining the existing class structure in the hands of the state. Gramsci 
(1971: 34) pointed out that people need “a legal order which organically regulates men's 
life in common” for the realisation of productive human work. According to him, 
people’s respect for such a legal order must be based on spontaneous consent, rather 
than merely being based on coercion. That is to say, people must perceive a legal order 
as a necessary condition for their freedom rather than solely perceiving it as an external 
imposition.  
Gramsci emphasised the educative role of the state for the construction of a new 
type of civilisation. As he pointed out, when a new structure is created, the means of 
economic production are developed and reorganised, but this does not mean that the 
factors of superstructure should be ignored or be compelled to spontaneous 
development (Gramsci, 1971: 247). On this point, Gramsci commented on the 
instrumentality of the state in the domain of superstructure as well as in the domain of 
structure and stated that; 
 It operates according to a plan, urges, incites, solicits, and ‘punishes’; 
for, once the conditions are created in which a certain way of life is 
‘possible’, then ‘criminal action or omission’ must have a punitive 
sanction, with moral implications, and not merely be judged generically 
as ‘dangerous’. The Law is the repressive and negative aspect of the 
entire positive, civilising activity undertaken by the State. The ‘prize-




incorporated in the conception of the Law; praiseworthy and meritorious 
activity is rewarded, just as criminal actions are punished. 
In this comment, Gramsci pointed out the normative and value-attributing 
character of the law. The state reveals its reaction to the possible actions of its citizens 
by urging, persuading, soliciting or punishing them. By declaring a ‘particular way of 
life’ to be possible, and other ways to be criminal, the state attributes value to the 
actions of its citizens. Gramsci (1971: 258) therefore attributed a negative educative role 
to the legal system. In contrast to the positive educative role of the school which 
constructs discourse by directing people to a practice or a value system, the legal system 
constructs discourse by declaring particular practices or values as illegal. From this 
point of view, Gramsci (1971: 246) wrote that;  
If every State tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilisation 
and of citizen (and hence of collective life and individual relations), and 
to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and disseminate others, then 
the Law will be its instrument for this (together with the school system, 
and other institutions and activities). 
In this quotation, the role of law in constructing “a certain type of civilisation” 
with its all superstructural elements such as culture and world perception and in creating 
humans with every aspect of their lives and social relations can be interpreted as an 
emphasis on its function of creating meaning, manufacturing discourse and constructing 
a world conception. By this means, law possesses a non-coercive role of leadership by 
putting forward a particular way of life as acceptable and legal for the state (Litowitz, 
2000: 530). 
The instrumentality of laws in the establishment of hegemony stems from their 
social construction function. Social ontology is constructed by laws through declaring 
particular undesirable behaviours as a crime and particular acceptable actions as 
legitimate (Litowitz, 2000: 546). In this sense, laws are not only coercive, they are also 
discursive and normative. Laws possess an official discourse which is based on the 
values, beliefs and perceptions of the state about what is acceptable and what is not. It is 
possible to claim that they are not value-free. From this point of view, the dominant 
discourse regarding religion and religiosity within the legislative texts reflects the 
discourse of the dominant class in Turkey at a particular point in time. Taking into 
consideration the significant point in the definition of hegemony which underlines that 




natural and universal (Giroux, 1981: 94), legislation serves such an acceptance as a 
consequence of regulating social life according to the values embedded within it. This 
also results in the emergence of a hidden suppression on particular kinds of discourse 
about religion and the religious lifestyle. By hidden suppression, we mean the self-
control tendency of people which restricts them from expressing particular discourses 
about religion and religiosity in order to be accepted as a good citizen according to the 
law. 
The significant dimensions of hegemony are everyday life and space (Tugal, 
2009: 29-30). Everyday life provides the terrain for a perpetual struggle between 
various hegemonic projects. Consent for inequalities is produced by politicians, 
intellectuals, pedagogues and activists through shared everyday practices by naturalising 
social hierarchy, class structure and the distribution of power (Tugal, 2009: 29). 
Legislation, which is the most extensive determinant in people’s everyday lives, draws 
the boundaries of acceptable everyday practices. It constructs and disseminates 
particular discourses, influences social relations, and encourages or limits particular 
types of hegemonic instruments such as schools, religious facilities, cinemas and the 
media. The extensiveness of legislation therefore increases the coverage capacity of this 
study in terms of space and time. 
Moreover, as everyday practices are important elements of hegemony, the 
location occupied within the space is also another element of manufacturing consent. 
Hegemonic projects become embodied in a location where social space is shaped in 
order to ensure the internalisation of the dominance and inequalities in society. Each 
power relation manifests itself in a space (Tugal, 2009: 30). As the analysis in this 
chapter shows, social space has been directly shaped by legislation which granted 
particular privileges for the secular lifestyle while determining legal structural obstacles 
for a pious Islamic lifestyle in the same social spaces. Such legal structural obstacles 
were accompanied by the discourse which attaches social space to the people who have 
a secular lifestyle.  
Legislation regulating religious life has directly affected the class position of 
people in Turkey by providing different opportunities and obstacles to different 
lifestyles. The headscarf ban in public institutions and universities is a typical example 




in society. Using the example of the headscarf ban, we emphasise the long-term effect 
of legislation on the composition of classes within society, rather than its immediate 
coercive aspect.   
Litowitz (2000: 545) pointed to the exclusivity of laws as a cause of their 
hegemonic character. Since there is no alternative to the current legal system, the law on 
which the state has a monopoly holds an absolute position in society regardless of 
people’s opposition to it or criticisms of it. He compared the law with fashion. Fashion 
also determines rules about what to wear and how to wear it, and people who ignore 
these rules might face a social sanction from popular culture. However, there is always 
the possibility of creating alternative modes of dress which would challenge the existing 
preferences of the dominant fashion without the fear of being punished. On the other 
hand, one must accept the laws and bear the results for violating them. It can therefore 
be argued that there is no escape from the binding nature of the current legal system and 
the world conception which it draws. The dominant group which rules the state has a 
significant advantage in determining the boundaries of ‘legal’ and ‘acceptable’ 
behaviours and practices of daily life. 
 
3. Analysis of the Legislation  
 After discussing the role of legislation on the establishment of cultural 
hegemony, an analysis of the legislation
77
 will now be made using CDA. The aims of 
CDA here are to understand the official discourse on specific areas and to reveal the 
effect of legislation on the class struggle and on vertical social mobility. The analyses in 
this chapter are categorised according to the area which the legislation regulates. Since 
the influences of the competing hegemonic blocs, namely the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
and the JDP, over the judiciary have gradually evolved over time without an exact 
revolutionary moment, it is impossible to draw a line to separate the instrumentalisation 
of legislation made by the Kemalists from those made by the JDP. Consequently, the 
current study endeavours to respond to the question;  
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How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015? 
Answers to this question will be sought by focusing on the following topics; 
 Religious Everyday Life;  
 The State; 
 The Presidency of Religious Affairs; 
 Political Parties; 
 Associations and Foundations; 
 The Headscarf; 
 Primary and Secondary Education; 
 Imam-Hatip Schools; and 
 Higher Education. 
 The topic ‘religious everyday life’ signifies how the sphere of civil society is 
regulated in accordance with the Kemalist hegemonic project by means of legislation. 
Legislation under the topic of ‘the state’ grants a privileged position to specific ideas 
and principles which shape the state apparatus. Thus, the legislation manifests the 
fundamental paradigm of the state which constitutes the ideological aspect of Kemalist 
cultural hegemony. The ‘Presidency of Religious Affairs’ (PRA), which is a significant 
institution of the state apparatus, is the main instrument of the ruling class for 
constructing and disseminating religious discourse and is therefore at the centre of the 
hegemonic struggle on the terrain of Islam. The legislation regarding ‘political parties’ 
shows the boundaries of the acceptable political action for the Islamic segments of 
society and Islamist counter-hegemonic movements. The legislation about ‘associations 
and foundations’ constitutes the organisational aspect of the hegemonic struggle which 
directly influences the collective action and organisational power of the Muslims. 
Headscarf bans had a direct negative impact on the raising of pious intellectuals and the 
class position of pious Muslim women. The topics ‘primary, secondary and higher 
education’ and ‘Imam-Hatip Schools’ are significant both for being sites for the 
production and dissemination of the hegemonic group’s values and ideas on the terrain 
of Islam and for determining the class position of both the secular and the pious 




à-vis Islam and fundamental paradigm of the Turkish State as the deeper structures 
within society. 
3.1. Religious Everyday Life 
 Religious everyday life is a key area where the Kemalist hegemonic bloc sought 
to establish its cultural hegemony by determining acceptable and unacceptable religious 
practices, beliefs and lifestyle. Everyday life is a significant ground where hegemonic 
projects clash with each other. Since religion diffuses to every part of everyday life in 
most modern and traditional societies, it is necessary to analyse religious everyday life 
in order to fully understand the sphere of civil society (Tugal, 2009: 29). Therefore, the 
terrain which religion occupies in the sphere of civil society and the state’s attempts to 
limit those areas become vital for understanding the hegemonic struggle taking place in 
civil society. 
 The topic was regulated by Article 24 of the Constitution with additional 
provisions in Article 14. Rather than drawing the boundaries of state action, Article 24 
draws the boundaries of religion and determines the relationship between the state and 
religion. The title of Article 24 is ‘Freedom of religion and conscience’, which aims at 
creating a sense of freedom for pious Muslims in order to defuse their threat perception 
stemming from the principle of laicism towards which the state leans. It should be noted 
that the Article was not amended in the period of the JDP. 
3.1.1. The Constitution 
Article 14 
None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be 
exercised in the form of activities aiming … to endanger the existence of 
the democratic and secular order of the Republic based on human rights. 
(Official Gazette, 1982a) 
Article 24 
Everyone has freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction. 
Acts of worship, religious rites and ceremonies shall be conducted freely 




No-one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious rites 
and ceremonies, or to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be 
blamed or accused because of his religious beliefs and convictions. 
…  
No-one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, 
or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the 
purpose of personal or political interest or influence, or for even partially 
basing the fundamental, social, economic, political and legal order of the 
State on religious tenets. (Official Gazette, 1982a) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Religious practices are acceptable as long as they do not violate laicism. 
 Religion cannot go beyond the personal level of belief and prayer and 
cannot target political, legal, social and economic spheres. 
 Religion and religious feelings are open to exploitation and abuse. 
Article 24 begins with an emphasis on the freedom of conscience, religious 
belief and conviction. However, the terms ‘religious belief’, ‘conscience’ and 
‘conviction’ indicate a person’s emotional state which is difficult to detect when it is not 
in practice. It is technically impossible to prevent anyone from believing something or 
from having a sense of conscience. The discourse therefore directs attention to the 
personal emotional aspect of religion by overlooking the functions of religion in social, 
economic and political life. 
The second paragraph presents the violation of the provisions of Article 14, 
entitled ‘Prohibition of abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms’, as sufficient 
condition for restricting religion and religious practices such as worship, religious 
ceremonies and rites. The main discourse is that people must be on the side of laicism 
when there is a conflict between religion and laicism. Such a discourse creates a 
hierarchy between laicism and religion and places laicism in the superior position.   
In the final paragraph, the exploitation and abuse of religious feelings and 
religion for personal interest or political goals are presented as illegitimate. The 
discourse of being open to exploitation and abuse depicts religious people as passive 




illegalising religion’s functions which go beyond the personal sphere is intended to 
nullify the effect of Islam in the hegemonic struggle by excluding religion from legal, 
political, social and economic areas and constraining it to only the terrain of belief and 
prayer. Consequently, Islam loses its function of being the source of counter-hegemonic 
political action. 
 
3.2. The State 
 As was discussed in detail in Chapter 5, the state is a significant instrument for 
preserving and justifying the domination and exploitation by the dominant class over 
the subordinate classes (Miliband, 1991: 520). The state also involves itself in every 
action by which the ruling group gains the consent of the ruled (Gramsci, 1971: 244). 
For this reason, determining the fundamental features of the state and ensuring the 
internalisation of those features are vital for the establishment of hegemony.  
 Considering that Gramsci (1971: 263) formulated the state as the composite of 
political society and civil society, all discourses and perceptions within the Constitution 
about the fundamental principles which the state holds and any values by which the 
state is shaped also have a significant impact on civil society. Therefore, the 1982 
Turkish Constitution became a value-constructing tool for the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
within the sphere of civil society. Harmony with that value system can provide the 
dominant class with an advantageous position in the struggle for cultural hegemony. 
 The main reference point for understanding the principal paradigm of the state 
was the Turkish Constitution, which has been the supreme legal document among all 
the types of legislation. The fundamental features and principles of the Turkish state are 
defined in the Constitution according to a very specific value system. The Constitution 
strengthened the Kemalist hegemony by characterising the fundamental features of the 
Republic in parallel with Kemalism. As Fairclough (1995: 42) pointed out, 
“Naturalization gives to particular ideological representations the status of common 
sense, and thereby makes them opaque, i.e. no longer visible as ideologies”. In this 
sense, the Constitution naturalised the Kemalist ideology by transforming it into 
common sense. The Kemalist principles constituted the pillars of the paradigm of the 




hegemonic struggle. By this means, Kemalism went beyond the ideology of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and became the ideology on which the state hinges. It should 
be noted that the privileged position of Kemalism still continues since the Articles 
regarding the principles on which the state relies were never amended.  
3.2.1. The Turkish Constitution 
The Preamble 
Affirming the eternal existence of the Turkish Motherland and Nation  
and  the  indivisible  unity  of  the  Sublime  Turkish  State,  this  
Constitution,  in  line  with  the  concept  of  nationalism  introduced  by  
the founder of the Republic of Turkey, Ataturk, the immortal leader and 
the unrivalled hero, and his reforms and principle; 
… 
That no protection shall be accorded to an activity contrary to Turkish 
national interests, Turkish existence and the principle of its indivisibility 
with its State and territory, the historical and moral values of 
Turkishness; the nationalism, principles, reforms and civilizationism of 
Ataturk, and that sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not be 
involved in state affairs and politics as required by the principle of 
laicism; 
…  
With these IDEAS, BELIEFS, and RESOLUTIONS to be interpreted and 
implemented accordingly, thus commanding respect for, and absolute 
loyalty to, its letter and spirit;     
Has been entrusted by the TURKISH NATION to the democracy-loving 
Turkish sons’ and daughters’ love for the motherland and nation. 
(Official Gazette, 1982a; Official Gazette, 1995; Official Gazette, 2001a) 
Article 2 
 The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular [laic] and social state 
governed by rule of law, within the notions of public peace, national 
solidarity and justice, respecting human rights, loyal to the nationalism of 
Ataturk, and based on the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble. 






 Prominent discourses; 
 The fundamental features of the state are characterised by Kemalism. 
 Any opposition to Ataturk’s nationalism, his principles or reforms and 
his understanding of civilisationism is not acceptable.  
 The Republic of Turkey is a laic state loyal to the nationalism of Ataturk. 
The preamble of the Constitution expresses the value set on which the Republic 
is based. The expression of those values starts with an emphasis on Ataturk’s 
understanding of ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’. There is a strong emphasis on 
‘Turkishness’ and ‘Turkish’ identity throughout the Preamble of the Constitution. In the 
first paragraph, the motherland and the state are characterised by the word ‘Turkish’. In 
the second paragraph, the statement ‘Turkish national interests’ constructs the discourse 
that those national interests belong to the Turkish identity. By this means, the 
Turkishness becomes the basis for all standards regarding the state and the society. On 
this point, Gramsci regarded nationalism as the most serious threat to Catholicism and 
to other religions in general. This was because nationalism possessed the capacity to 
construct a particular nationalistic culture by giving it the social base of an alternative to 
religion, and to unite people under a particular ideology and leadership (Fulton, 1987: 
213). So nationalism emerged as an alternative to Islam with its capability to unite 
people under the ideology and leadership of Kemalism and to provide an alternative 
culture to Islamic culture. Moreover, the term ‘Turkish existence’ grants the Turkish 
identity an existential character which is an alternative to Muslimness as the existential 
characteristic of the people. Considering that the main definer of identity was religion in 
the Ottoman period (Togel, 2016: 203), this emphasis on ‘Turkishness’ can be regarded 
as a disengagement from the religiously constructed identity of the Ottoman period and 
the reconstruction of a unifying identity with Turkishness by the founders of the new 
Republic.  
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 Within the preamble of the Turkish Constitution, the fundamental features of the state are expressed. 
The discourse which is related to the current study is analysed rather than all the points within the text. 
The elements which are significant for this study are those which present Ataturk as the “immortal 




 Using functional honorifics is a significant discursive tactic which creates a 
sense of respect for the person represented (Machin & Mayr, 2012: 82). So Ataturk is 
presented as the founder of the Republic and being the ‘founder’ grants Ataturk and his 
followers the privilege of determining the founding values and principles of the 
Republic. Such a privilege also applies to issues regarding Islam and religiosity. As 
another prominent discursive tactic, moreover, superhuman metaphorical qualities are 
attributed to Ataturk with the terms ‘immortal leader’ and ‘unrivalled hero’. The word 
‘immortal’ refers to the eternity of living organisms and is used here to underline the 
permanence of his ideas and principles. Those ideas and principles are also contained in 
the area of Islam and the religious lifestyle. ‘Leading’ is the natural consequence of 
being a ‘leader’, therefore the attribute of ‘immortal leader’ refers to the eternal and 
unlimited capacity of Ataturk to lead morally and intellectually. Moreover, being 
‘unrivalled’ refers to being uniquely privileged in terms of the validity and impact of his 
ideas and principles. It therefore becomes impossible to challenge Ataturk’s ideas and 
principles. The epithet ‘hero’ attributes a moral value to the image of Ataturk which 
demands appreciation and loyalty towards him. This discourse aims at minimising the 
threat perception from devout Muslims to Kemalism, since the acts of a hero cannot be 
against the values and interests of his nation. Consequently, the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc gained a constitutional privilege in terms of the values and ideas which stem from 
Ataturk. The same privilege also applied over the terrain of Islam and religiosity. 
 By the statement “sacred religious feelings shall absolutely not be involved in 
state affairs and politics”, the influence of Islam as a reference for state affairs and 
political struggle is restricted. Here, the term ‘state affairs’ includes all dimensions of 
the public sphere. In both the Preamble and Article 2 of the Constitution, there is a 
strong emphasis on the principle of laicism. Following the establishment of the new 
Republic, Kemalist laicism aimed at creating a new identity and a new order in the 
country. Islam, however, emerged as an obstacle to the creation of such an identity and 
order (Celik, 2009: 86-87). Akyol (2011: 185) stated that “while trying to sweep away 
the influence of traditional religion in the society, to replace it with ‘science and 
reason’, the Kemalists in fact filled the void with a newly created ersatz religion: the 
cult of Turkishness”. So when we consider the strong emphasis on Turkishness, it can 
be seen that Ataturk’s principles of nationalism and laicism, in both the Preamble and 




3.3. The Presidency of Religious Affairs 
The Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi; abbr. PRA) is 
one of the most significant tools of the state for constructing and disseminating 
discourse on the terrain of Islam. The institution was established on 3 March 1924 to 
succeed the Shaikh al-Islam (Seyhulislam) institution of the Ottoman Empire with the 
mission of administrating religious affairs in the areas of Islamic worship and faith, and 
controlling mosques (cami) and small mosques (mescit) (PRA, 2013).  
The PRA was one of the two institutions (the other was the Ministry of National 
Education) used by the Kemalists for the cultural and political instrumentalisation of 
Islam to unify the nation in parallel with the ideals of Turkish laicism (Kaya, 2013a: 
134). The PRA has been a cultural hegemonic institution operating on behalf of the state 
and the ruling class in so far as it carries out the “educative and formative role of the 
state” on the terrain of Islam, which Gramsci (1971: 242) described as “creating new 
and higher types of civilisation”. In this sense, the PRA was expected to contribute to 
the creation of such a civilisation by shaping the understanding of religion in parallel 
with the ideals of Kemalism.  
Turkish laicism aimed at separating state and religion and administrating religion 
by means of the state. Thus, the repression of Islamic activism was justified and the 
supremacy of the state apparatus over Islamic institutions was guaranteed. This 
supremacy was realised through the PRA (Dressler, 2011: 190). In this regard, 
performing the daily prayers (namaz) and adhan (ezan) in Arabic was banned and 
performing them in the Turkish language became compulsory in 1932 during the single-
party period, which was achieved by means of the PRA (Okumus, 2008: 354). This was 
an example of how the PRA was instrumentalised for controlling the terrain of Islam in 
line with the attitude of the regime towards Islam. The ban on performing adhan and 
daily prayers in Arabic was lifted by the Democratic Party (DP) in 1950 (Okumus, 
2008: 354). 
Since the majority of the population of Turkey is composed of Sunni-Muslims, 
the PRA has always represented mainstream Sunni Islam. It was also more functional 
for the state elites to control Sunni Islam compared with Alevism, since Alevism was 




As can be seen from the legislation analysed under this topic, this cultural hegemonic 
role has also been maintained in the period of the JDP between 2002 and 2015. In 2010, 
significant amendments were made by the JDP government regarding the law on the 
duties of the PRA (Official Gazette, 2010). However, those amendments were far from 
transforming the PRA to a more pluralistic institution. On the contrary, they 
strengthened the monopolistic control by the institution over the terrain of religion 
(Massicard, 2016: 84).  
The identity and the bureaucratic structure of the PRA began to change after 
2002. Academics from Theology Faculties were employed in senior management 
positions within the structure of the institution. The rank of the PRA’s president in the 
state protocol was raised to the tenth level in 2011 (Korkut, 2016: 461-462). In addition 
to its domestic functions, the PRA was also transformed into an instrument of soft 
power in the international arena with its wide range of activities in Europe and Asia and 
in recent years in Latin American and African countries too (Korkut, 2016: 464-465). 
 
3.3.1. The Turkish Constitution79 
Article 136 
The Presidency of Religious Affairs, which is within the general 
administration, shall exercise its duties prescribed in its particular law, in 
accordance with the principles of laicism, removed from all political 




 The PRA acts in compliance with laicism. 
 Acting in compliance with laicism refers to being removed from all 
political views. 
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Article 136 signifies the fundamental principles on which the PRA is based. The 
principle of laicism is presented as the fundamental principle of the PRA. Basing an 
institution which administers religion on laicism constructs a discourse which creates a 
hierarchy between laicism and religion. It locates laicism to the superior position and 
religion to a secondary position which has to be adapted to laicism in any case of 
incompatibility with laicism. Considering that the principle of laicism given in the 
Article is one of the pillars of Kemalism, the statement “removed from all political 
views and ideas” corresponds to locating Kemalism to a supra-ideological and supra-
political position which is independent from all political views and ideologies and has to 
be shared by the entire population of Turkey. 
The goal of the PRA is determined as “national solidarity and integrity”. Such a 
discourse refers to gathering all different and even conflicting understandings of 
religion under one umbrella, the umbrella of the interpretation of the PRA and 
accordingly of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. ‘National solidarity’ is the alternative to 
conflict and disagreement. Therefore, the umbrella of the PRA is presented as the means 
of preventing such conflicts and disagreements. 
3.3.2. The Law on the Establishment and Duties of the 
Presidency of Religious Affairs80 
Article 1 
The Presidency of Religious Affairs, being affiliated with the Prime 
Ministry, has been established to execute affairs regarding faith, worship 
and the principles of morality in Islam; to enlighten society in the area of 
religion; to administrate prayer facilities. (Official Gazette, 1965) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 The PRA possesses the intellectual and moral qualifications to enlighten 
society on the terrain of Islam. 
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Article 1 determines the areas of responsibility of the PRA as the worship, faith 
belief and principles of morality in Islam. These areas devolve the formative and 
educative functions of the state apparatus to the PRA. The institution therefore becomes 
a key instrument for cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam, as it is used to construct 
and disseminate the discourse about Islam. 
The word ‘enlighten’ is used to specify the role of the PRA in society. The 
lexical choice here, as a discursive tactic, refers to the ‘Age of Enlightenment’ of 
Western Europe. The Enlightenment was an era which was characterised by tension 
with established religion and distinguished by a belief in human progress symbolised in 
and associated with the development of the natural sciences (Bristow, 2017). Therefore, 
the use of the verb ‘to enlighten’ can be understood within the frame of the Kemalist 
modernisation project which was aimed at decreasing the effect of religion in society. 
The Enlightenment is also generally identified with political ideals and revolutions, and 
especially with the revolution in France in 1789 which sought to establish a new order 
based on reason instead of the ancien regime (Bristow, 2017). Considering that Turkish 
laicism had been adapted from the French model (Ulutas, 2010: 391; Dressler, 2011: 
188), the emphasis in the Article can be interpreted as an effort to associate the Kemalist 
Revolution with the French Revolution. 
Article 581 
… 
The duties of Religious Affairs High Council are as follows:  
a) To conduct examinations and research on religious topics, and to 
present the findings to the PRA; 
… 
c) To make compilations and translations of religious works, to prepare 
preaching and sermon examples; 
d) To decide about the production of the printed, audio and video works 
which the Presidency wants to produce; 
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the duties and responsibilities of the Religious Affairs High Council, which is the supreme decision-
making organ of the PRA. During the 1990s and 2000s until the amendment in 2010, the 1990 amended 




e) To express opinion about printed, audio and video works which the 
Presidency wants to be reviewed. 
f) To answer religious questions; 
g) To follow and evaluate developments in religion, religious affairs, 
scientific activities, publications and studies which can be accepted as 
religious propaganda at home and abroad, and to report about them to 
the Presidency. 
... 
(Official Gazette, 1965) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 The PRA possesses the moral and intellectual capacity to carry out an 
educational role on the terrain of Islam. 
Article 5 provided the PRA with the legal basis of the authority to regulate the 
areas of faith, religious intellectual life, religious events and organisations. By this 
means, the PRA gained the opportunity to construct the entire discourse about Islam.  
Paragraphs (a) and (g) granted the PRA the authority to determine the 
problematic areas on the terrain of Islam, to carry out research and to reach findings 
about religious topics. Since deciding on the topic to be researched would bring that 
topic onto the agenda, the PRA had control over agenda setting on the terrain of Islam.  
Under paragraph (c), the PRA had authority for making translations and 
compilations about Islam. By this means, the PRA became responsible for controlling 
the intellectual capital on the terrain of Islam. Just as financial capital accumulates, the 
accumulation of intellectual capital contributed to the cultural hegemony of the 
dominant class by intellectually monopolising cultural capital in parallel with the 
values, belief, discourse and world-view of the dominant class, namely the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc. Moreover, preaching (hutbe) and sermons (vaaz) are two significant 
sources of Islamic discourse in mosques. They cover a range of topics from faith and 
morality to social relations with non-Muslims and religiously acceptable Muslim 
behaviour patterns towards the state and its rulers. Therefore, by preparing examples of 




Muslims to the state authority and decreasing the threat perception stemming from the 
principle of laicism. 
Paragraphs (d) and (e) provided the legal basis for leading, investigating and 
controlling all kind of religious intellectual works. The PRA became an authority which 
determined the boundaries of acceptable or unacceptable religious discourse. In the long 
term, such an authority directly guarantees the development of particular interpretations 
of Islam, while restraining the dissemination of other interpretations.  
Paragraph (f) authorised the PRA to answer all kinds of questions, in other 
words to issue fatwa
82
 about Islam. Since a fatwa is expected to manifest “Allah’s will 
in this world” and fatwa issuers (muftis) are accepted as “the interpreters of God’s will” 
(Ocal, 2008: 325), such an authority granted the PRA a privileged position in terms of 
representing God’s will and being the point of reference for Muslims. The discourse of 
‘representing God’s will’ created a hierarchy between the institution and the pious 
Muslim people and required the unquestioning loyalty of those people to the PRA and 
thus to the state on all religious issues.    
Article 5 (2010) 
…. 
The duties of the Religious Affairs High Council are as follows:  
a) To decide on religious issues, to express opinions and respond to 
questions about religion taking into account the fundamental source 
methodology of Islam, Islam’s historical experience and contemporary 
demands and needs. 
b) To make compilations, translations, studies and researches on 
religious topics; to create study and research groups on the topics which 
are required to be studied; to benefit from specialists and organisations 
at home and abroad; to buy services if required and report the results to 
the Presidency. 
c) To research and evaluate groups of different Islamic understandings, 
religious-social organisations and traditional religious-cultural entities 
at home and abroad; to organise scientific and advisory meetings and 
conferences and to study those issues; 
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ch) To follow and evaluate developments about Islam, religious and 
scientific activities, publications and studies which can be accepted as 
religious propaganda at home and abroad; and to report about them to 
the Presidency. 
d) To decide about the production of printed, audio and video works 




 The PRA possesses the moral and intellectual capacity to carry out an 
educational role on the terrain of Islam. 
In paragraph (a), the PRA is established as the main decision-making body for 
responding to questions on religious issues ranging from faith and worship to topics 
regarding social and economic life. By this means, the PRA can determine the 
definitions of good and bad, right and wrong, and acceptable and unacceptable 
according to Islam. Being such a decision-making mechanism makes the Presidency a 
tool of the state for constructing a discourse compatible with the ruling class. Moreover, 
based on the PRA’s role as a fatwa authority, a discourse which locates the institution to 
an educative position is constructed. Considering that the authority which issues fatwa 
has enough qualifications to interpret issues on behalf of God (Ocal, 2008: 325), this 
educative position constructed a hierarchical relationship in terms of intellectual and 
moral competence between the institution and the Muslims and positioned the 
institution to a privileged position capable of determining acceptability and 
unacceptability in Islam.  
Paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) in the 1990 version have been completely maintained 
in paragraphs (b) and (d) of the 2010 version of the Law. Therefore, the PRA is still the 
significant instrument for leading and controlling all kinds of religious activities and 
intellectual works in the area of religion. By this means, the PRA possesses the power to 
determine the boundaries of acceptability and unacceptability in terms of religious 





Paragraph (c) authorised the PRA to approach and assess traditional religious-
cultural entities, religious-social organisations and groups of various understandings of 
Islam. By this means, the PRA became able to favour particular groups while distancing 
itself from others. As was discussed under the sub-heading of tarikats and cemaats in 
Chapter 5, religious groups have a significant influence through their social, economic 
and political capacity on the Muslims. Any cooperation with religious groups through 
the instrumentality of the PRA contributed to the hegemonic project of the JDP. 
Therefore, the PRA determined the boundaries of acceptability for religious groups 
which enabled it to control the sphere of civil society. 
Paragraph (ch) granted the PRA the authority to directly set the current agenda 
on the terrain of Islam. By this means, the PRA became able to construct the Islamic 
discourse and to determine the standpoint on behalf of the pious Muslims based on 
developments in Islam and Islam-related issues. Thereby, a discourse which depicted 
the PRA as a competent authority determining attitudes on behalf of Muslims was 
constructed.  
Following the amendments in 2010, Article 5 maintained the roles of the PRA in 
cultural hegemony and it was used as an instrument in the hegemonic project of the 
JDP. The PRA is still used as the instrument of the state to carry out an educational role 
on the terrain of religion, to construct and disseminate religious discourse, to control 
and lead intellectual works and to sponsor activities which emphasise religion. The 
institution has therefore always been the main instrument for the state to determine the 
mainstream and official interpretation of religion. 
 
3.4. Political Parties 
The topic ‘political parties’ is very significant for being the legal means of 
political struggle and organisation. The significance of the political party in Gramscian 
thought stems from its function in the development of a counter-hegemonic process as 
the institution which provides political education and constitutes the organisational 
force which coordinates national movement (Adamson, 1980: 207). Political parties 
function in the same way within the sphere of civil society as the state functions within 




One should stress the importance and significance which, in the modern 
world, political parties have in the elaboration and diffusion of 
conceptions of the world, because essentially what they do is to work out 
the ethics and the politics corresponding to these conceptions and act as 
it were as their historical ‘laboratory’. 
 So for Gramsci, political parties carry out a quasi-religious function in the moral 
and intellectual spheres of the modern world. Just as religious communities and 
churches undertook the mission of producing and propagating particular conceptions of 
the world and of representing social norms, political parties have functioned in the same 
way in the modern world (Grelle, 2017: 38). 
In the case of Turkey, it can be seen that Islamist political parties played a 
significant role in winning the war of position on behalf of the Islamist movement. 
From the end of the 1970s, the Islamic movement endeavoured to win people’s minds 
and hearts by means of cultural leadership, ideological persuasion and moral supremacy 
(Hosgor, 2015: 211). Gramsci’s concept of hegemony was blended with the Islamic 
concept of teblig (Islamic propaganda) and was determined to be an effective strategy 
for increasing its influence on society. The grassroots of Islamic political parties 
provided the human resources for the war of position, since a war of position requires 
the active support and participation of the people. A prominent aim of the 1990s 
Islamist Welfare Party was to overcome the social and economic shortcomings in 
society, especially in the areas of health and education, which stemmed from the 
inadequacy and ineffectiveness of the state’s social spending by providing social aid, 
education facilities, medical clinics and cooperatives by means of Islamic networks 
(Hosgor, 2015b: 212). Similarly, the JDP integrated previously excluded Islamic 
cultural, political and economic elites into the public sphere (Akca, 2014: 32). 
Therefore, political parties have always been the motor of Islamist movements in their 




3.4.1. The Turkish Constitution83 
Article 68 
 … 
The statutes and programmes, as well as the activities of political parties, 
shall not be contrary to the independence of the State, its indivisible 
integrity with its territory and nation, human rights, the principles of 
equality and the rule of law, the sovereignty of the nation, the principles 
of the democratic and secular [laic] republic; … (Official Gazette, 1982a; 
Official Gazette, 1995) 
Article 69 
 … 
The permanent dissolution of a political party shall be decided when it is 
established that the statutes and programme of the political party violate 
the provisions of the fourth paragraph of Article 68.  
 … 
The members, including the founders of a political party whose acts or 
statements have caused the party to be dissolved permanently shall not be 
founders, members, directors or supervisors in any other party for a 
period of five years from the date of publication of the Constitutional 
Court’s final decision with its justification for permanently dissolving the 
party in the Official Gazette. (Official Gazette, 1982a; Official Gazette, 
1995) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Positioning against laicism is sufficient reason for the closure of political 
parties. 
 Article 68 imposes restrictions on the programmes and statutes, as well as the 
activities, of political parties. Of these restrictions, the current study focuses on the 
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restriction which prevents parties from carrying out activities contrary to the principle of 
laicism. This restriction produces a discourse in which challenging and even criticising 
any elements regarding the practical or ideological elements of laicism is perceived as 
illegitimate and thus unusual and abnormal.  
 Article 69 also bans the members and founders, supervisors and directors of 
closed political parties for five years. As Gramsci (1971: 15) stressed, political parties 
are a significant means of raising organic intellectuals in philosophical and political 
areas for particular social groups in a society. Such a ban was therefore aimed at 
hindering the functioning of organic intellectuals under the umbrella of political parties 
and diminishing the intellectual leadership opportunity for Islamist movements. Since 
the Islamist parties are significant instruments for constructing an Islamic conception of 
world, the founders and members of those parties became prevented from using a 
significant instrument to construct an Islamic conception of the world which would 
challenge the laicist world conception of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. Second, those 
politicians lose the opportunity to be organised as a counter-hegemonic bloc by means 
of the organisational power of political parties and to directly participate in and 
influence the decision-making processes within the parliament. 
 In the history of Turkey, Islamist political parties have faced closure decisions 
many times on the pretext of being a threat against the principle of laicism.
84
 In 2008, a 
closure case was prosecuted against the JDP and “a serious warning” was issued by the 
Constitutional Court on the grounds of it “being a focal point of anti-secular [anti-
laicist] activities” (Hurriyet, 2008). In the hegemonic struggle, Kemalism gained a 
comparative privilege for representing the legal side of the political struggle whilst its 
antagonist counter-hegemonic rivals suffered from being accepted as being on the 
illegal side. Moreover, the possibility of being closed because of the risk of violating 
laicism compelled the Islamist political parties to soften their Islamic discourse and to 
let their values be absorbed
85
 by the Kemalists, as can be seen in the case of the JDP. 
                                                          
84
 The Welfare Party (WP), the Islamist Party of 1990s, was closed by the Constitutional Court in 1998 
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3.4.2. Political Parties Law86 
Article 4 
 … Political parties shall carry out their activities in loyalty to the 
principles and reforms of Ataturk. (Official Gazette, 1983c) 
Analysis 
 Prominent Discourse; 
 Political parties have to be loyal to Ataturk. 
 Article 4 states that loyalty by political parties to the revolutions and principles 
of Ataturk is a legal obligation. By this discourse, the Ataturk figure becomes a shared 
value and loyalty to him becomes a social norm for the entire society. Such loyalty also 
necessitates loyalty to the secular lifestyle, laicist worldview and the Kemalist 
understanding of Islam. Consequently, the views and values of Kemalism become 
common sense views and values for the whole society. 
 When it is taken into account that the political parties are expected to be the 
main instruments for expressing the objections of pious Muslims regarding the Kemalist 
policies which target the Islamic lifestyle and Islamic discourse, Article 4 diminished 
the capacity of political parties to express such objections. This situation created the 
discourse that any organised objections under the umbrella of political parties are 
regarded as illegal, unusual and unacceptable. 
Article 85 
 Political parties shall not aim at denigrating or humiliating the 
personality, activities or memory of Ataturk, the liberator of the Turkish 
nation and founder of the Turkish Republic; and cannot carry on 
activities or develop behaviour which might cause this situation. (Official 
Gazette, 1983c) 
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 Prominent discourse; 
 It is illegal for political parties to denigrate or humiliate Ataturk’s 
personality, activities or memory.   
 In Article 85, denigrating and humiliating Ataturk’s personality, memory and 
activities are rendered illegal. The words ‘denigrating’ and ‘humiliating’ possess 
ambiguous meanings about the boundaries of acceptable opposition to Ataturk and 
might refer to any negative statements against Ataturk which might weaken his 
privileged position. This ambiguity compels political parties to abstain from expressing 
any negative statements or voicing any criticisms against Ataturk. This produces a 
discourse about the unacceptability of positioning against Ataturk  
 Functional honorifics are again used as a discursive tactic in the text in order to 
grant a privileged position to Ataturk and his followers. Ataturk is presented as “the 
liberator of the Turkish nation” and “founder of the Turkish Republic”. This 
characterisation grants a privileged position to Ataturk and thus to all values associated 
with him. Being the ‘founder of the state’ entails being ‘the determiner of the 
fundamental principles, values and paradigm of the state’.  
 The Article contributes the perception that negative criticisms of Ataturk are 
unordinary, unacceptable and abnormal. This perception creates a shield of 
untouchability which would promote a deeper structural hegemony of the Ataturk image 
in society. The political parties which favour Kemalism gain a comparative advantage 
over Islamic political parties by such a privileged position. Moreover, such a structural 
hegemony was a significant determiner of the limits of the JDP’s hegemonic project 
which was obliged to take into account the image of Ataturk and seek a reconciliation 
ground with the Kemalists.  
Article 86 
Political parties shall not seek to change the Turkish Republic’s feature of 
laicism or to re-establish the Caliphate; and shall not carry out activities 





 Prominent discourses; 
 It is illegal and unacceptable for political movements to be against 
laicism. 
 It is illegal and unacceptable to aim at re-establishing the Caliphate. 
 Article 86 illegalised any attempts by political parties to change the laic structure 
of the state or to re-establish the Caliphate which had been abolished in 1924. Beyond 
directly changing the Republic’s fundamental feature of laicism, this Article plays a 
more comprehensive restrictive role on the Islamist political parties. Even steps to 
widen the realm of religious freedom and to lift the bans on Islamic practices such as the 
headscarf ban were regarded as a violation of laicism. In the long term, these restrictions 
compelled political parties to avoid culturally and ideologically challenging the 
Kemalist values. This can be interpreted as compulsory silent consent for those 
Kemalist values by the Islamist parties in order to remain within the legal boundaries.  
 The abolition of the Caliphate represented a disengagement from the Ottoman 
past, so any discourse which yearns to restore that social and political order and the 
institutions of the past is illegalised and accepted as abnormal by means of this Article. 
The Caliph represents leadership in the Muslim world so demanding the re-
establishment of the Caliphate might correspond to expressing the lack of and the need 
for a Muslim leadership in Turkey. So banning any political goals regarding the re-
establishment of the Caliphate can be understood as an effort to construct a discourse 
underlining that ‘the leadership in the laic order is sufficient, and does not require the 
leadership of a Caliph’. A Caliph would have the power to challenge the laicist 
hegemony in both discursive organisational terms and by directly organising the 
Muslim population and directing their organised power at the Kemalist domination. A 







 Political parties shall not make propaganda, exploit or abuse religion, 
religious feelings or things which are accepted as sacred by religion in 
any circumstance by instrumentalising them in order to base the state’s 
social, economic, political or judicial order, even if partially, on religious 
elements or beliefs; or for political targets; or for obtaining or 
establishing political gain. (Official Gazette, 1983c) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Islamic discourse cannot be used in any propaganda activities. 
 Islam cannot be the basis of the state’s economic, social, political or 
judicial order. 
 Article 87 prevents political parties from using propaganda, exploiting or 
abusing religion or religious feelings. The term “make propaganda of religion” is very 
ambiguous since any religious discourse aimed at representing and expressing the 
demands of religious people can be understood as a propaganda effort.  
 Moreover, Article 87 prevents Islamic political parties from shaping or at least 
influencing the social, economic, political or judicial order of the state with Islam. This 
Article completely restrains Islam’s role as a source of counter-hegemony against the 
laic regime. The main discourse in this legislative text is that Islam’s role is composed 
solely of a personal spiritual area. Any attempt to widen its scope to include issues of 
the worldly area is perceived as unacceptable, unordinary and abnormal. The imposition 
of illegality strengthens such a discourse by labelling it as unacceptable in the eyes of 
political society. 
Article 88 
Political parties shall not perform religious ceremonies or religious 
rituals and cannot participate in such ceremonies and rituals as a 
political party. Political parties shall not use religious festivals, religious 
rituals and funeral rites for the exhibitions and propaganda of the party. 





 Prominent discourse; 
 Islam cannot be the source of political action and discourse. 
 Article 88 bans participation in and the performance of religious rituals or 
ceremonies by political parties. The ban is a significant obstacle to political parties 
sharing the same space as pious segments of society. Moreover, religious festivals, 
funeral rites and religious rituals cannot be used for propaganda or exhibitions of any 
parties. The word ‘exhibition’ originates from the verb ‘exhibit’ referring to ‘showing 
something to people’. The word ‘propaganda’ refers to any discursive activities which 
target the electors. The intentions of this ban are to sever the link between political 
parties and Islam, to keep political parties out of any religious discourse and to compel 
them to carry out their activities within the laic terrain. 
 
3.5. Association (Dernek) and Foundation (Vakif) 
Analysing the legislation regulating associations and foundations is significant 
for understanding how the Kemalist hegemonic bloc dominated the sphere of civil 
society for many years, since controlling civil society organisations also meant 
controlling the whole collective action within civil society. Gramsci (1985: 389) 
regarded associations as part of the ideological structure which shapes or is able to 
shape public opinion. According to him, voluntary associations are a significant element 
of civil society where a dominant group manufactures consent and establishes 
hegemony and where the dominated groups are organised and endeavour to construct 
counter-hegemony (Forgacs, 2000: 420). More importantly, Gramsci (1971: 243) 
regarded associations in civil society as the trenches of a war of position. In other 
words, they have a significant function in the preparation of the battlefield for a war of 
movement. 
The newly-established Republic illegalised tarikats in 1925. The only option for 
them then was to go underground and to gather as secret brotherhood organisations. 




overcome the illegality problem and to gain a legal personality and to raise funds for 
their activities (Narli, 1999: 45 [fn. 5]). In the 28 February process, however, this 
strategy failed and 21 Islamic foundations were closed down for carrying out 
reactionary Islamist activities (Vatan Gazetesi, 2013). Among those 21 foundations, a 
prominent example was the National Youth Foundation (Milli Genclik Vakfi), the youth 
branch of National Vision Movement (Milli Gorus Hareketi) which was the leading 
Islamist movement at that time. The Foundation was shut down in the post-28 February 
process with its 900 bureaux, 125 student dormitories, 15,000 students living in those 
dormitories, two nurseries and approximately 350,000 members (Vatan Gazetesi, 2004). 
Similarly, MUSIAD, an association of Islamic-oriented businessmen, was compelled to 
dissociate itself from the figures of political Islam, to withdraw from political issues and 
to focus solely on the economic area (Yankaya, 2015: 60). Thus, MUSIAD was 
deprived of the capacity to construct political discourse and to influence the political 
decision-making processes which became a privilege for its laicist counterpart 
TUSIAD. 
As can be seen from these examples, associations and foundations, which were 
the only means for collective action under a legally-recognised organisation for pious 
Muslims, faced severe legal restrictions and even closure in the 1990s. From the late 
1980s, on the other hand, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc incorporated Kemalist civil 
society associations such as the Ataturkist Thought Association and the Association for 
Supporting Contemporary Life to its hegemonic project, a process which was carried 
out by means of the state apparatus (Erdogan, 2009: 585). The atmosphere of the 1990s 
therefore provided the Kemalist hegemonic bloc with a comparative advantage in the 
sphere of civil society in its struggle for hegemony. 
3.5.1. Associations Law No. 290887 
Article 5 
Associations which are against the fundamental principles stated in the 
Preamble of the Turkish Constitution cannot be established.  
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It is illegal to establish an association in order to;  
… 
2. Endanger or end the existence of the Republic of Turkey, whose 
fundamental features are defined in the Constitution, by means of 
differentiations based on language, race, religion and sect. 
… 
5. Carry out any activities in the name of or hinging on region, race, 
social class, religion and sect. 
6. Express the claim that there are minority groups based on differences 
in race, religion, sect and culture: or to create minority groups by 
protecting, developing or disseminating any language or culture apart 
from the Turkish language and culture; or seeking to ensure the 
dominance of or provide privileges for those who are from a specific 
region or race or class or religion or sect over others. 
…  
8. Denigrate or humiliate the characteristic features, principles, works 
and memory of Ataturk 
… 
(Official Gazette, 1983b) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 It is unacceptable for Islam to be the source of collective organised action 
against Kemalism, Kemalist laicism or nationalism.  
Article 5 started with a reference to the Preamble of the Turkish Constitution 
which defined the fundamental features of the Republic. Among those features, those 
about the revolutions and principles of Ataturk with a special emphasis on laicism and 
nationalism are within the interest of the current study. The establishment of an 
association which was against the principles of Ataturk, and more specifically against 
the principles of laicism and nationalism, was declared illegal by this Article. This could 
be interpreted as a restriction on any criticisms regarding Kemalist policies based on 
Kemalist nationalism and laicism. With such a legal restriction, starting a public debate 




practices of the principles of laicism and nationalism became impossible. In the long 
term, religious groups became deprived of the organisational capacity of associations 
and compelled to retreat from civil society on any organisational level. Consequently, 
Kemalist laicism and nationalism became exempt from any organisational challenge 
from the pious Muslim segments of society. 
In paragraph 2, “differentiation based on language, race, religion and sect” was 
signified as a dangerous act against the existence of the Republic of Turkey and was 
declared illegal for associations. Similarly, in paragraph 6, any associations which 
expressed a claim of existence of minority groups based on religion, sect, race or culture 
were illegalised. ‘Religion’ and ‘sect’ in paragraphs 2 and 6 refer to those religious and 
denominational stances which are different from the Kemalist understanding of laicised 
Sunni-Islam. Such a legal provision, which aimed at unifying different identities under a 
single common identity and determining the boundaries of the identity with reference to 
Kemalist principles and values, could be interpreted as the outcome of the homogeneous 
society project of Kemalism. Since paragraph 6 illegalised the expression of any 
differences on the terrain of religion, any organisational challenge to the Kemalist 
perspective regarding religion was also hindered in discursive terms. Consequently, 
challenging the Kemalist understanding of Islam at an organisational level became 
illegal, and was thus perceived as unacceptable and abnormal by the discourse of the 
Article.   
In paragraph 5, carrying out activities in the name of or hinging on religion and 
sect were declared illegal. This statement directly prevented Islam from being the 
source of collective action under the umbrella of associations. This legal restriction had 
two major effects on the cultural hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc and Islamic movements. First, associations were providing a legal personality and 
an organisational capacity for Islamic movements and this organisational capacity 
provided Islamic segments of society with an opportunity to use counter-hegemonic 
instruments such as education facilities, mosques and culture centres. By these legal 
restrictions, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc became a monopoly with its unrivalled 
organisational capacity at the civil society level. Second, civil society was providing the 




disseminated among people. By these legal restrictions, those physical spaces were 
completely dominated by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. 
Paragraph 8 made it illegal to humiliate or denigrate the characteristic features, 
works, principles or memory of Ataturk. Considering the emphasis of Gramsci (1971: 
57-58) on “intellectual and moral leadership” as a requisite for cultural hegemony, 
paragraph 8 provided an unrivalled moral and intellectual leadership opportunity for the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc. With strict restrictions on any criticisms targeting Ataturk, it 
became impossible for pious Muslim groups to establish associations which might 
challenge the values, discourses and ideology of the bloc. The most significant of those 
unrivalled ideological elements and values were the ones on the terrain of Islam. 
Therefore, any association could carry out activities to claim the superiority of values, 
beliefs and discourses alternative to Kemalism. 
When we assess the provisions of Article 5 as a whole, we detect that the main 
discourse emerged as the unacceptability, caused by illegality, of Islam’s organisational 
power as the source of Islamic counter-hegemonic movements. With such a discourse, 
Islam’s functions at civil society level were regarded as unusual and abnormal and 
Islam was restricted to a solely personal faith and worship level. Consequently, 
Kemalist dominance at civil society level was normalised and internalised by means of 
the law’s normative power. 
3.5.2. Associations Law No. 5253 
The new Associations Law No. 5253, which replaced the former Associations 
Law No. 2908, was accepted in 2004 as the main legislative text for regulating matters 
regarding associations in Turkey (Official Gazette, 2004). The most prominent 
difference in the new law was the annulment of the provisions which were analysed 
above under the former Associations Law No. 2908. 
The most significant outcome of the new law was the increase in the 
organisational power of Islamic movements within the sphere of civil society. By this 
means, Kemalism’s apparent monopoly in organisational terms in civil society was 
diminished and the plurality in civil society was increased. From 2004, there was no 




The most important discursive effects of the new law were the nullification of the 
discourse which restricted Islam to the personal worship and faith level and the 
recognition of its functions as a counter-hegemonic force within civil society. 
3.5.3. Turkish Civil Law88 
Article 74 
 Applications for the registration of foundations which are against 
legislation, ethics, morals or national interests, or which are founded for 
the purpose of supporting a particular political view or a specific race or 
religious community [cemaat]
89
 members, are not acceptable. (Official 
Gazette, 1926) 
Article 101 
It is not allowed to establish foundations which are against the features 
of the Republic determined by the Constitution and against the 
fundamental principles of the Constitution, the law, morality, national 
unity and national interests; or foundations which are founded for the 
purpose of supporting a specific race or religious community [cemaat] 
members. (Official Gazette, 2001b) 
3.5.4. Bylaw Regarding the Foundations Established According 
to Turkish Civil Law90 
Article 6 
Applications for the registration of foundations which are against the law, 
ethics or morals, or which are founded for the purpose of supporting a 
particular political view or a specific race or members of a religious 
community are not acceptable. (Official Gazette, 1970) 
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 Similar to associations, foundations (vakiflar) were also strictly regulated by legal system. Article 74 of 
previous Turkish Civil Law drew the limits of activity of foundations until 2001. Article 101 of the new 
Turkish Civil Law has been regulating the issues regarding foundations since 2001. 
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 It should be noted that the term ‘cemaat’ in Article 74 of the former Turkish Civil Law, Article 101 of 
the new Turkish Civil Law and Article 6 of the Bylaw Regarding the Foundations Established According to 
the Turkish Civil Law refers to the religious communities of non-Muslim minority groups. The reason for 
not including the Islamic cemaats in these Articles was that they were not recognised by the state.  
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 The 1970-dated Bylaw Regarding the Foundations Established According to the Provisions of the 
Turkish Civil Law (Turk Medeni Kanunu Hukumlerine Gore Kurulan Vakiflar Hakkinda Tuzuk) was one of 
the legislative texts which regulated the registration issues of foundations. This Bylaw was annulled by 
the ‘Bylaw Regarding Registration and Proclamation of Foundations Founded According to the 
Provisions of Turkish Civil Law (Turk Medeni Kanunu Hukumlerine Gore Kurulan Vakiflarin Tescil ve Ilani 






 Prominent discourses; 
 Foundations cannot seek to support a specific political view. 
 Foundations cannot be against fundamental features of the Republic, 
including laicism and nationalism. 
Foundations in Turkey were regulated by Article 74 of a 1926-dated Turkish 
Civil Law until 2001. In 2001, Article 101 of the new Turkish Civil Law, which is still 
in effect, annulled the previous article. Article 6 of the above-referenced Bylaw 
regulated foundations from 1970 to 2013. 
The most prominent provision of the former Article 74 and Bylaw was the 
restriction on foundations’ support for any particular political view. Since foundations 
were compelled to operate in accordance with the fundamental principles of the 
Republic including laicism and Ataturk’s nationalism, the discourse of ‘supporting a 
particular political view’ targeted all political views except Kemalism. This provision 
therefore constructed a discourse which elevated the Kemalist ideology to a supra-
political and supra-ideological position. In 2013, the restriction regarding supporting a 
specific political view was lifted (Official Gazette, 2013a). 
Article 101 also illegalised establishing foundations against the fundamental 
features of the Republic. Thus tarikats and Islamist movements lost the opportunity to 
use the instruments of hegemony under the umbrella of legal foundations. In addition, 
dormitories, student lodgings and courses which belonged to tarikat foundations were 
closed to prevent them from indoctrinating students with views hostile to Ataturk, 
laicism and the Republic in the post-28 February process (Hurriyet, 1998). Considering 
that dormitories, student lodgings and courses are instruments for cultural hegemony, 
this decision of the judiciary directly diminished the power of tarikats in terms of their 
organisational capacity for counter hegemony. Those Islamic foundations were enabled 
to reopen under the Additional Article 12 in the Foundations Law in 2013 (Official 
Gazette, 2008; Official Gazette, 2013c). Article 101 was still valid without any 




3.6. The Headscarf 
The headscarf ban in middle and high schools, universities and public 
institutions has always been a controversial issue in the history of Turkey. Debates on 
the issue reached a peak in the 1990s when the Muslim middle class had started to 
become the rising class in Turkey. The 28 February process in 1997 made the 
restrictions on headscarves stricter. As the discussion of this issue will show, the 
headscarf ban was eventually lifted in the 2010s. 
The headscarf ban directly influenced the class structure and vertical social 
mobility opportunities between different segments of society in Turkey. Until the 
headscarf ban was lifted in the 2010s, it had prevented female students at educational 
institutions from continuing their education in middle and high schools and more 
importantly at university. Because they were deprived of formal education in this way, 
they were not able to get high-status jobs in either the public or the private sector. This 
situation created a gap between the laicist and religious segments of the society in terms 
of access to opportunities for vertical mobility within the class structure. On the one 
hand, women with a secular appearance could gain a university degree and become 
equipped with the necessary qualifications for high-status and prestigious jobs in the 
public and private sectors. This led to dominance in the decision-making processes in 
the state bureaucracy by women who had an overt secular and Western lifestyle. For 
pious Muslim women, on the other hand, the only option was to be a housewife or to 
work in a lower-status job which did not require at least a bachelor’s degree. Gramsci 
(1971: 9) emphasised that every person performs intellectual activity to some extent by 
contributing to the construction, maintenance and transformation of a particular world 
conception. Therefore, the headscarf ban deprived pious Muslim women of the 





Table 2 The dates when the headscarf ban was lifted 
 
Another long-term effect of the headscarf ban on the cultural hegemony was the 
dominance of the secular lifestyle and discourse in education facilities such as middle 
schools, high schools and especially universities and in workplaces. As the way in 
which social space is shaped is a significant determinant of the manufacture of consent 
and the success of cultural hegemonic projects (Tugal, 2009: 30), the impact of 
dominating those spaces both physically and discursively can be understood better. 
Since women wearing a headscarf could not appear in those spaces with their own 
values, discourses and lifestyle, they became deprived of taking part in the construction 
and dissemination of discourse in those spaces.  
3.6.1. The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of 
Students and Personnel at Schools Affiliated to National 
Ministry of Education and Other Ministries91 
Article 1 
The aims of this Regulation, in every type of school, are;  
 a. To ensure that administrators, teachers, other personnel and students 
have an appearance and style of clothing which are in accordance with 
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 The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of Students and Personnel at Schools Affiliated to the 
National Ministry of Education and Other Ministries (Milli Egitim Bakanligi ile Diger Bakanliklara Bagli 
Okullardaki Gorevlilerle Ogrencilerin Kilik Kiyafetlerine Iliskin Yonetmelik) was the main legislative text 
which regulated the appearance and apparel of students studying in formal schools and public 




the reforms and principles of Ataturk, and which are civilised, modest and 
far from extremism. 
 b. To ensure unity, integrity, harmony and order in appearance and 
apparel. 
 c. To get students to adopt an attitude, manner and habit of being in 
harmony with the features of our society in terms of appearance and 
apparel. (Official Gazette, 1981a) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourses; 
 Appearance and style of clothing in schools have to be in accordance 
with Kemalism. 
 Unity, integrity, harmony and order are the fundamental principles in 
schools in terms of appearance and style of clothing. 
The first goal of the Regulation is expressed as ensuring that the style of clothing 
worn and people’s physical appearance are “in accordance with the reforms and 
principles of Ataturk”. This discourse locates the secular lifestyle which the Kemalist 
segments of the society represent at the top of the hierarchy of social values, and scales 
down all other values to a secondary position. Being in harmony with Kemalist values 
becomes a social norm. Moreover, the terms ‘civilised’, ‘modest’ and ‘far from 
extremism’ are used in order to define the legally approved forms of appearance and 
apparel. ‘Civilised” is based on the ‘civilised/uncivilised’ dichotomy and in this context 
means Western civilisation. Therefore, ‘being civilised’ refers to having a Western 
lifestyle. This duality positioned Kemalist secular values on the side of civilisation and 
other values, namely religious values, on the uncivilised side. The statement “far from 
extremism” is based on the ‘extremist/central’ dichotomy which positions secular 
values at the centre and expels all opposing values from the centre. The adjective 
‘modest’ signifies the absence of any need to have an appearance and a style of clothing 
which go beyond the style described above.     
In paragraph (b), harmony, unity, integrity and order in terms of appearance and 
apparel are presented as an aim of the Regulation. The first three words prioritise 
homogeneity in terms of apparel and appearance. The words ‘unity’ and ‘integrity’ 
ensure a single type of clothing and appearance style for all students and employees. 




variety and heterogeneity are presented as negative and undesirable. The use of the 
word ‘order’ is based on the ‘order/disorder’ dichotomy and aims at creating a threat 
perception stemming from violation of the rules regarding apparel and appearance. 
Homogeneity in education institutions is associated with order whereas heterogeneity 
and diversity are associated with disorder. 
In paragraph (c), “being in harmony with the features of our society” is 
presented as a goal for students. The words ‘attitude’, ‘manner’ and ‘habit’ signify 
continuity in terms of maintaining one’s position in different situations. As well as 
establishing a long-term attitude for students in terms of what they wear and what they 
look like, those words also determine a long-term attitude in terms of the values which 
they are compelled to embrace. 
Article 1192 
In middle schools, female students shall be bareheaded and their hair 
must be clean and combed plain while they are at school. (Official 
Gazette, 1981a) 
Article 1293 
 In high schools and their equivalent, female students shall be bareheaded 
and their hair must be clean and combed plain, and can be long-plaited 
or tied at the back. (Official Gazette, 1981a) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Women who have a pious and overt Muslim lifestyle are not eligible to 
attend middle and high schools. 
 In both Articles, being ‘bareheaded’ is presented as the expected manner in 
terms of appearance and apparel at middle and high schools. ‘Being bareheaded’ is the 
opposite of ‘being headscarved’. The implicit binary definitions of ‘bareheaded’ and 
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 Article 11 of ‘the Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of Students and Personnel at Schools 
Affiliated to the National Ministry of Education and Other Ministries’ constituted the legal basis of the 
headscarf ban in middle schools. 
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 Article 12 of ‘the Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of Students and Personnel at Schools 
Affiliated to the National Ministry of Education and Other Ministries’ constituted the legal basis of the 




‘headscarved’ represent the axis of the secular/pious divide. Being bareheaded 
represents having a secular lifestyle whereas being headscarved represents having a 
pious Muslim lifestyle. The main discourse in this legislative text is the ineligibility of 
pious Muslim people for any further education after primary education. By this 
discourse, education is perceived as a right accessible only by women who have a 
secular lifestyle and world-view. Consequently, vertical social mobility is associated 
with a secular lifestyle and the secondary position of pious Muslim women is 
normalised and internalised in society. The two Articles offered pious female students 
two options: accepting the secular style of clothing and being secularised, or rejecting 
the secular style and dropping out of high school. Therefore, the ban on the wearing of 
headscarves in high schools prevented some female students from continuing their 
education at high-school level since high-school education was not compulsory. A 
significant outcome of the ban was the dominance of the space of middle and high 
schools by secular symbols and lifestyle. On the other hand, the visibility of a pious 
Muslim lifestyle became completely impossible in the same space. The dominance of 
secular symbols and lifestyle in middle and high schools led students to perceive the 
secular values as ordinary, mainstream and universal, while directing them to perceive 
pious Muslim female style as extraordinary, marginal and unusual. 
 In 2014, finally, Article 4 of the Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of 
Students at Schools run by the National Ministry of Education
94
 lifted the ban on 
wearing the headscarf in middle and high schools. 
Female students shall attend schools with their faces uncovered; they 
must not wear a kerchief, knitted-cap, cap, bag or any similar items; … 
(Official Gazette, 2012a; Official Gazette, 2014) 
After the ban was lifted at middle and high schools, the absolute dominance of 
the secular style of clothing started to diminish in schools and the visibility of the 
religious Muslim style in the social space of schools started to increase. The discourse 
which associated the right to education and to vertical social mobility with secular 
values has been nullified. Moreover, with this new freedom, pious students now had the 
opportunity to act as intellectuals in their education and their future lives. 
                                                          
94
 The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of Students at Schools run by the National Ministry of 
Education (Milli Egitim Bakanligina Bagli Okul Ogrencilerinin Kilik ve Kiyafetlerine Dair Yonetmelik) lifted 






At Higher Education establishments: 
Female students shall obey the rules specified in Article 7/a of this 
Regulation which are determined for the officials, administrators, 
teachers and officials who assist education and for civil servants in terms 
of appearance and apparel. (Official Gazette, 1981a) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Women who have a pious Muslim lifestyle are not eligible for higher 
education at university. 
Beyond its coercive effect in the short-term, this Article constructed a discourse 
of the superiority of secular values by depicting university education as a privileged 
right accessible only by secular women. A ‘university’, as a higher education 
establishment, has a symbolic meaning stemming from the word ‘universe’ which gives 
the sense of representing the ‘universal’. Associating university education with secular 
values and a secular lifestyle helped the universalisation and internalisation of secular 
values as opposed to pious Muslim values. Since the visibility of women wearing 
headscarves on university campuses had become impossible, the social spaces of 
universities were completely shaped by secular values. 
Moreover, a significant discursive outcome of the ban in the long-term was the 
internalisation of sacrifices for short-term interests, as in the instance of sacrificing a 
pious Muslim lifestyle in order to have the right to attend a university. That is to say, the 
rule compelled pious women to choose between two options: to conform to the secular 
lifestyle and accept being articulated to the Kemalist cultural project, or to reject 
attending a university and lose the opportunity for vertical mobility in society. For those 
who preferred the former option, it was the beginning of accepting the superiority of 
secular values and being secularised. For the others, the headscarf ban at universities 
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  A reference is given to Article 7/a of the same Regulation which applied the same restrictions on the 
clothing of university students as of public personnel. Article 5 of ‘The Regulation on the Appearance 
and Apparel of the Personnel Working in Public Institutions and Organisations’ stated that being 
‘bareheaded’ was a legal obligation for public personnel in the workplace (Official Gazette, 1982b). Thus, 




became a direct determinant of their class position by dispossessing them from having a 
formal university education and from being equipped for high-status jobs in both the 
public and the private sectors. 
In 2010, the Council of Higher Education issued a public statement emphasising 
that people should not be deprived of the right to higher education under the pretext of 
wearing a headscarf. Following this announcement, although many universities began to 
accept the wearing of headscarves within the university campus, some still insisted on 
enforcing the ban (Kaya, 2013a: 165). Finally, in 2013, freedom to wear a headscarf 
was given a legal guarantee with the amendment of the Regulation on the Appearance 
and Apparel of the Personnel Working in Public Institutions and Organisations (Official 
Gazette, 2013b). After the ban had been lifted, the discourse which associated higher 
education and higher social status with a secular lifestyle was challenged. The visibility 
of religious Muslim lifestyle in the social spaces of universities began to increase and 
the absolute cultural dominance of secular segments of society within universities began 
to diminish. Once women wearing the headscarf gained their right to higher education, 
they had the opportunity to become qualified for vertical social mobility and to find 
high-status positions in both the public and the private sectors.  
3.6.2. The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of the 
Personnel Working in Public Institutions and Organisations96 
Article 1 
The ban on headscarves in all public institutions and the associated regulations 
took their source from Article 1 of the Regulation as follows: 
This regulation aims at guaranteeing the apparel and appearance of 
public personnel to be civilised, far from extremism, simple and in 
accordance with the revolutions and principles of Ataturk, and ensuring 
unity and integrity among employees in terms of appearance and apparel. 
(Official Gazette, 1982b). 
                                                          
96
 ‘The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of the Personnel Working in Public Institutions and 
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 Women who have a pious Muslim lifestyle are not eligible to work in 
public institutions and organisations. 
Article 1 explained the main objectives of a set of regulations about the 
appearance and style of clothing of public sector employees. The expected appearance 
of employees was described as ‘civilised’, ‘far from extremism’ and ‘simple’. This 
legislative text is based on the implicit binaries of civilised/uncivilised, 
extremist/central. The word ‘civilised’ refers here to ‘westernised’ since civilisation in 
Kemalist ideology refers to Western civilisation. Therefore, a civilised style refers to a 
modern, secular, Western style. Because the traditional religious Muslim style did not 
comply with this requirement, it was excluded from public institutions and 
organisations. The statement ‘far from extremism’ refers to being central, usual, normal 
and mainstream. The secular Western style represents the centre whereas alternative 
styles represent the extreme. The word ‘extremism’ refers to Islamic styles of dressing 
such as the headscarf (basortusu), imamah (sarik) and cassock (cubbe). Consequently, 
the Islamic style of dress was regarded as being outside the normal and mainstream. The 
word ‘simple’ refers to being ordinary and unobtrusive. In other words, the appearance 
of employees should not attract attention since attracting attention is interpreted as an 
abnormality. The Islamic style in dressing is regarded as an anomalous and 
extraordinary style which is likely to attract attention. The statement “in accordance 
with the revolutions and principles of Ataturk” directly signifies the principle of laicism 
and Ataturk’s revolutions in the area of religion. Apparel and appearance in accordance 
with secular Kemalist style is presented as the expected mainstream style for the 
Muslims. By means of the law, pious Muslim people were compelled to accept the 
supremacy of the secular Kemalist style in what they wore and in their appearance and 
to interiorise their secondary position in the public sphere. This also applied to 




In the statement “ensuring unity and integrity among the personnel in terms of 
appearance and apparel”, an effort to unite people under a single homogeneous style can 
be recognised.  The need for ‘unity’ and ‘integrity’ is taken for granted in the Article. 
Therefore, the texts leave no room for plurality in terms of apparel and appearance. As 
the secular Western style became an umbrella under which such unity and integrity 
would be ensured, such a style was accepted as the necessary and thus superior style for 
pious Muslims. 
The headscarf ban had had a direct effect on pious Muslim women’s opportunity 
for vertical social mobility. As a result of the headscarf ban in public institutions and 
organisations, those spaces were completely dominated by the secular segments of the 
society, which provided those with a secular lifestyle and appearance with the 
advantage of vertical social mobility within the class hierarchy. A secular woman who 
possessed at least a bachelor’s degree became able to find a prestigious job in various 
public institutions and organisations. On the other hand, a woman wearing a headscarf 
was unable to gain a bachelor’s degree because of the headscarf ban in universities: she 
was not able to find a high-status job in either the public or the private sector because 
she did not have a university degree. As the way in which social space is shaped has a 
direct impact on hegemonic projects (Tugal, 2009: 30), this situation resulted in the 
domination of the workplace by secular Western values and lifestyle which contributed 
to the success of the Kemalist cultural hegemonic project. 
In 2013, the statement “shall be present in the workplace bareheaded” in Article 
5 of the same Regulation was annulled (Official Gazette, 2013b) as a part of the JDP 
government’s democratisation package. By this change, pious Muslim women gained 
the opportunity to work in the workplace with their headscarves in both public and 
private institutions and to climb the socio-economic hierarchy. As religious values and 
lifestyle within the social space of workplaces increased, the dominance of secular 
values and lifestyle within those spaces decreased and the superior/subordinate 
relationship between secular and religious Muslim lifestyles in the workplace 






3.7. Primary and Secondary Education 
In the previous chapter, the textbooks of RCMK lessons were analysed in order 
to emphasise how a specific discourse was constructed and disseminated in those 
lessons. Under this current sub-heading, attention will now be directed to the legislation 
which regulates the education system in Turkey. The fundamental principles of 
education determined by the legislation are significant indicators of the cultural 
hegemonic elements within the content of lessons as well as the social spaces of 
education facilities. 
Gramsci (1973: 204) categorised the school within the organisations of civil 
society by which cultural hegemony is achieved. For him, the school was the vital 
instrument for shaping new generations in line with a specific world conception 
(Gramsci, 1985: 42). The legislative texts which will be analysed under this topic will 
reveal that the school has also been used as a significant instrument for shaping the new 
generations of Turkey in line with the fundamental paradigm of the state. Since the 
school, as Gramsci (1971: 10) pointed out, is the site where intellectuals are raised, how 
they are intellectually and morally equipped plays a vital role in the success of 
hegemonic projects. A need therefore emerges to analyse and understand the 
fundamental principles of education policy within the main codes, from the Turkish 
Constitution to National Education Basic Law. 
We shall therefore seek to understand the main goals and paradigm of the state 
and the ruling class, and to detect the acceptable and unacceptable discourses within the 
education system. It should be noted that the legislation analysed under this topic had 
remained the same without any amendments by 2015. Article 25, which introduced 
lessons on the Qur’an and on the Life of His Holiness Muhammed into the curriculum, 
is the only Article which was included in the National Education Basic Law in 2012. 
This shows that the main paradigm on which the education system is based did not face 




3.7.1. Turkish Constitution97 
Article 4298 
 …Education shall be conducted along the lines of the principles and 
reforms of Ataturk, based on contemporary scientific and educational 
principles, under the supervision and control of the State. Educational 
institutions contravening these principles shall not be established.  
 …  
 (Official Gazette, 1982a) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Kemalism constitutes the fundamental value set of the education system. 
Article 42 determined the fundamental principles of Turkey’s education system 
in general. Under the Article, Ataturk’s reforms and principles are taken as the 
fundamental source of values in the education system. The Article therefore required 
that the discourse on education had to be in harmony with the Kemalist discourse. This 
also applied to the discourse about religion in general, and more specifically about 
Islam. This means that education, which is one of the main instruments of cultural 
hegemony, must serve the construction and dissemination of Kemalist discourses about 
religion and Islam in schools. This general principle, which formed the fundamental 
ideological face of education, helped the Kemalist lifestyle and Kemalist values to be 
internalised as natural, universal, mainstream and ‘common sense’ within the space of 
schools. Moreover, Article 42 of the Constitution guaranteed the control and 
supervision by the state over the whole education system. This ensured the monopoly of 
the state and the Kemalist hegemonic bloc over the production and dissemination of 
discourse. The discourse regarding religious life and Islam also came under the 
monopoly of the state and therefore of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. All of the content 
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 The Turkish Constitution, as the highest legislation binding on all other laws and regulations, 
determines the fundamental principles of both the education system in general and religious education 
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of lessons, especially RCMK lessons, was determined by the state. By the sentence 
“Educational institutions contravening these principles shall not be established”, it was 
guaranteed that any independent educational institutions which might challenge the 
Kemalist cultural hegemony would be prevented from being established.  
Article 2499 
…Religious and moral education and instruction shall be conducted 
under state supervision and control. Instruction in religious culture and 
morals shall be one of the compulsory lessons in the curriculums of 
primary and secondary schools. Other religious education and instruction 
shall be subject to the individual’s own desire, and in the case of minors, 
to the request of their legal representatives. 
... 




 The state is the only educator on issues of religion and morality. 
Paragraph 4 authorises the state to be responsible for religious and moral 
education. This authorisation creates a hierarchy between the state and society in terms 
of the construction of the discourse about religion and morality. Such a discourse also 
means the normalisation and internalisation of the educative function of the ‘ethical 
state’ to which Gramsci (1971: 258) referred. Religious education is a significant 
instrument for cultural hegemony since it is the main tool of the state for constructing 
and disseminating a specific discourse on Islam, other religions and on religious and 
secular lifestyles to the Muslims. This instrument therefore enables the state to influence 
and even to shape the values, beliefs and standpoints of religious Muslims in parallel 
with the official discourse of the state determined by the Kemalists. It also provides an 
opportunity for the state to demonise and marginalise alternative discourses on the 
terrain of religion. 
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In the Article, state supervision and control is presented as an obligation for 
religious and moral education. This means that education cannot construct an alternative 
discourse to that of the official state discourse on Islam and religious lifestyle. The state 
therefore has the authority to intervene in and shape the discourse on Islam and 
religious lifestyle in Turkey. Moreover, religious education was made compulsory 
under Article 24 of the Constitution. By this means, it became impossible for any family 
to keep its children out of the religious education of the state apparatus. This increased 
the extent of the Kemalist discourse on Islam and a religious lifestyle. The compulsory 
religious curriculums in primary and secondary schools were also a significant step in 
constructing the discourse about religion in the children’s very early years. No matter 
how different the discourse of their families, those children encountered the official 
discourse of the state, and therefore of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc, at an early age. 
Because of the hierarchical authority relationship between students and teachers, 
students internalised the discourse about Islam and religious life as the discourse of the 
authority to which they felt they had an obligation.  
In the statement “other religious education and instruction”, Islam was officially 
regarded as the primary religion and religions other than Islam were regarded as ‘other’. 
This statement can be interpreted as an effort to design a homogeneous religious 
identity. By this means, a laicist interpretation of Sunni-Islam, which reflected the 
fundamental position of the Kemalists, would be the shared national religious identity in 
Turkey. This effort not only constructs the discourse of ‘state as favouring Sunni-
Islam’, but also articulates pious Muslims to its laicised Islam.   
3.7.2. National Education Basic Law100 
Article 2101 
 The main goal of Turkish National Education is to raise all individuals of 
the Turkish nation as people who are loyal to the reforms and principles 
of Ataturk and to Ataturk’s understanding of nationalism which are 
defined in the Constitution; who protect and develop the national, ethical, 
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regulating the principles of education in Turkey. It is the most inclusive law of the Ministry of Education 
and determines all other regulations, bylaws and directives about the issue of education. 
101





humanistic, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation; … 
(Official Gazette, 1973; Official Gazette, 1983a) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Being loyal to Ataturk’s principles, reforms and nationalism is the 
expected attitude from students. 
The fundamental goal of this law is defined as ensuring the loyalty of students to 
the principles and reforms of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk with a special emphasis on his 
understanding of nationalism. Using implicit binary notions of Turkishness and 
Muslimness is one of the discursive strategies in the legislative text. In order to nullify 
Islam’s function as the fundamental determinant in society, the Kemalist founders of the 
Republic sought to construct Turkishness as the new artificial ‘religion’ of Turkey 
(Akyol, 2011: 185). In this sense, the emphasis on ‘Turkishness’ can be interpreted as 
an effort to construct an alternative identity to Muslimness. The word ‘loyal’ refers to 
being tied to something by respect and commitment and requires a one-way 
unconditional devotion to it. Devotion to Ataturk, and accordingly to the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc as his followers, becomes an expected unconditional attitude and a 
social norm for students. Since being loyal to Ataturk is secured by the law, being 
contrary to Ataturk and his principles is perceived as unlawful. The discourse of 
‘unlawfulness’ positions all opposing attitudes to Kemalism as unacceptable, 
unordinary and abnormal. The law therefore plays a normative role in the construction 
of a hierarchy between opposing world conceptions in Turkish society. The Kemalist 
world conception also includes the Kemalist understanding of Islam. Thus, loyalty to 
Kemalism also necessitates being loyal to the Kemalist understanding of Islam. 
Moreover, students are encouraged to protect the “national, ethical, humanistic, spiritual 
and cultural values of the Turkish nation”. In this requirement, Turkishness is presented 
as the basis of the existence of those values. By this means, the ‘Turkish nation’ gains 
an existential character and becomes the definer of all other notions. The word ‘protect’ 
is the antonym of the word ‘challenge’. Whereas protecting those values is regarded as 
acceptable, normal and common behaviour, challenging them is regarded as abnormal, 





The reforms and principles of Ataturk and Ataturk’s interpretation of 
nationalism are the basis of all education activities and the preparation 
and application of the curriculum at each stage and every type of the 
education. … (Official Gazette, 1973; Official Gazette, 1983a) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Ataturk’s principles, reforms and nationalism constitute the normative 
basis of education. 
 In this Article, Ataturk’s principles and reforms and his understanding of 
nationalism are presented as the normative and ideological basis of education system. 
This means that all values and discourses in the education system are based on the 
Kemalist value set. Thus, Kemalism gained a supra-ideological character and was 
perceived as a ‘common sense’ value by this discourse. Among the principles of 
Ataturk, there is a special emphasis on nationalism. Defining nationalism with reference 
to Ataturk can be interpreted as an emphasis on the shift in the meaning of ‘nation’ from 
the Ottoman period to the Republican era. The word millet (‘nation’) was used to define 
religious communities, and during the Ottoman era in accordance with its meaning in 
Arabic and its use in the Qur’an (Togel, 2016: 204), all Muslims constituted a single 
millet (Togel, 2016: 209). When Kemalist nationalism gained a positivist and laicist 
character (Oztan, 2014: 76), however, the emphasis on Kemalist nationalism can be 
interpreted as an effort to construct a secular identity based on nationality of 
Turkishness as an alternative to the identity based on religion. Consequently, the main 
discourse in Article 10 created a comparatively significant advantage for the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc to gain ideological and moral leadership over the pious Muslims, which 
was necessary for long-term cultural hegemony.  
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It shall be sought to raise and develop students’ understanding of 
democracy, which citizens need for the actualisation and maintenance of 
a powerful, stable, free and democratic social order; their knowledge, 
intellect, behaviours and sense of responsibility regarding the 
administration of the country and their respect for moral values; 
however, making political and ideological statements against Ataturk’s 
understanding of nationalism and participating in events and discussions 
regarding this issue are not allowed. (Official Gazette, 1973; Official 
Gazette, 1983a) 
Analysis 
 Prominent discourse; 
 Making ideological and political criticisms against Ataturk’s nationalism 
is illegal, abnormal, and unacceptable. 
 Article 11 seeks to draw the boundaries for democracy education in schools. The 
Article has a symbolic meaning for regulating education regarding the awareness and 
understanding of democracy. Considering that education about democracy requires the 
expression of different views, Article 11 determines the acceptability and 
unacceptability of those views and directly restricts any statements criticising Ataturk’s 
nationalism. As was discussed under the previous sub-heading, the Turkish identity 
constitutes an alternative to a religious identity. So declaring the expression of 
criticisms of Ataturk’s nationalism to be unlawful means positioning the expression of 
Islamic discourses as unlawful. Moreover, although the principle of nationalism is 
specified in the Article, the provisions of Article 11 also cover other aspects of the 
Kemalist ideology, including the principle of laicism. In order to create an image of 
‘uncriticisable Ataturk’, such a restriction is designed to prevent students from 
encountering any criticisms targeting Ataturk, his reforms or his principles. Students 
accept the requirement to abstain from criticising Kemalism as a legal obligation and a 
social norm. A significant outcome of this Article is that students come to regard 
criticising any ideological elements of Kemalism as unusual, extraordinary and 
unacceptable. In the long term, this attitude of students towards criticisms of Kemalism 
makes them less likely to challenge the cultural hegemony of the Kemalist hegemonic 
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bloc. Moreover, families with an Islamic origin and a critical attitude towards Kemalism 
might face the possibility of losing their influence on their children, since their children 
might perceive their families’ cultural and political position as unacceptable, marginal 
and abnormal. A possible reason for this might be that students accept their teacher as 
the authority figure in the classroom and as the representative of the mainstream values 
and attitudes.  
Article 12104 
 Laicism forms the basis of Turkey’s education system. Education in 
religious knowledge and moral knowledge is among the lessons which are 
taught in the various grades of primary and secondary education schools 
or equivalent schools. (Official Gazette, 1973; Official Gazette, 1983a) 
Analysis  
 Prominent discourse; 
 The education system is based on the principle of laicism. 
 In this Article, the principle of laicism is envisaged as the basis of the Turkish 
education system. The educational space is also designed to favour the principle of 
laicism from the symbols in the school buildings to the style of dress of teachers and 
students. Thus the laicist discourse dominates the social space of schools from the 
curriculum to the physical built areas. When it is taken into account that students are 
likely to accept the discourse at school as universal and mainstream, they are also likely 
to accept the laicist values as mainstream and universal. This prevents students from 
devout families from perceiving any threats from the principles of laicism. In the second 
sentence, there is an emphasis on the legal obligation of the RCMK education. This 
emphasis reveals the efforts of the state to monopolise the discourses, values, beliefs 
and lifestyle in the area of religion. Since the National Education Basic Law covers all 
grades in the education system and all types of school from public to private, this 
Article has a comprehensive normative effect in the field of religious discourse as a 
whole. 
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... Lessons on the Qur’an and The Life of His Holiness Muhammed are 
taught as optional lessons in Middle and High Schools. … (Official 
Gazette, 1973; Official Gazette, 1983a; Official Gazette, 2012b) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Sunni-Islam is the mainstream faith of the state. 
This paragraph was added to Article 25 of the National Education Basic Law as 
an amendment on 30 March 2012. By this amendment, lessons on the Qur’an (Kuran-i 
Kerim) and on The Life of His Holiness Muhammed (Hz. Muhammed’in Hayati) were 
added to the curriculums of middle and high schools. In addition to compulsory RCMK 
lessons, those two optional lessons can be regarded as an attempt to give students a 
deeper understanding of the Qur’an, the holy book of Islam, and of Muhammad, the 
prophet of Islam, in order to further their intellectual knowledge on the terrain of Islam. 
This educative attempt can also be seen as an effort to associate the state with Sunni-
Islam and by this means to create ‘a sense of belongingness towards the state’ for the 
pious Muslims. Since the non-specific word ‘religion’ was preferred in the name of the 
‘Religious Culture Moral Knowledge’ lessons, those lessons do not seem to represent a 
specific religion or sect at first glance. However, the lessons on the Qur’an and The Life 
of His Holiness Prophet Muhammed give a direct reference to Islam. The adjective 
Hazreti (‘His Holiness’) before the name of the Prophet Muhammed possesses a 
meaning of respect and sacredness. Since these lessons directly reflect the Sunni-Islamic 
standpoint, their inclusion in the curriculum might mean the acceptance of Sunni-
Islamic values as the mainstream values. This also symbolises a shift in what is 
accepted as mainstream and what is accepted as marginal. It also represents the move of 





3.8. Imam-Hatip Schools 
After analysing the legislation regarding primary and secondary education, we 
shall now address the issue of Imam-Hatip Schools under a separate sub-heading 
because of their impact on the determination of class position for their graduates, on the 
education of Islamic organic intellectuals and on the construction Islamic discourse. 
This school type has always been a debated issue between Islamic and laicist segments 
of society because of their students, graduates, course contents and organisational 
structure (Aslamaci & Kaymakcan, 2017: 280). 
Imam-Hatip Schools were founded in 1951 as special schools to educate imams 
and preachers for mosques (Aslamaci & Kaymakcan, 2017: 282). The curriculum of 
these schools was determined and strictly controlled by the Ministry of National 
Education and the Presidency of Religious Affairs in order to create a ‘state Islam’ 
which would not jeopardise the principle of laicism (Pak, 2004: 326). When the 
numbers of graduates exceeded the employee numbers needed by the state in religious 
areas, they began to attend university departments and to take jobs which were not 
related to religious sectors (Pak, 2004: 327). So the main reason for preferring Imam-
Hatip Schools was not the vocational education which they provided for becoming an 
imam or a preacher, but it was the successful coexistence of religious education and 
modern education in the curriculum of these schools (Gur, 2016). 
The numbers of students in these schools fluctuated according to the varying 
attitudes of different ruling groups towards them.
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 One of the most significant turning 
points for the Imam-Hatip Schools was the closure of middle grades in those schools in 
1997 (Official Gazette, 1997) as a consequence of 28 February coup. From 1999, Imam-
Hatip students faced a coefficient problem when their scores were calculated in the 
Student Selection and Placement Examination (SSPE) (Dogan & Yuret, 2015: 201). The 
year 2012 saw the revival of Imam-Hatip Schools as the middle grades in these schools 
were reinstated (Official Gazette, 2012b) and coefficient of the Imam-Hatip graduates 
was equalised with students from other school types (Official Gazette, 2012c). Finally, 
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in 2014, the headscarf ban on female students at these schools was lifted (Official 
Gazette, 2014). 
Imam-Hatip schools were at the centre of the cultural hegemonic struggle 
because of their special role in civil society. They promoted a sense of community and 
initiated social networks which support the achievements of Islamist NGOs and political 
parties (Ozgur, 2012: 11-12). Graduates of these schools began to advance in their 
careers in bureaucracy and formed a pious Muslim middle class which could compete 
with the laicist middle class in political, economic and cultural areas (Tugal, 2009: 48). 
Naturally, the initial objection to the increasing number of Imam-Hatip graduates in 
different disciplines outside the theology departments of universities was raised by 
TUSIAD, the main representative of the Kemalist bourgeoisie (Cakir, Bozan & Talu, 
2004: 22). Therefore, in discussions about the cultural hegemonic struggle, special 
attention needs to be paid to the role of Imam-Hatip Schools in raising the intellectuals, 
in the Gramscian sense, required for Islamic political movements and civil society 
organisations. 
Under this topic, the headscarf ban on female students at Imam-Hatip schools 
will be discussed and then the coefficient problem for the graduates of Imam-Hatip 
High Schools in the calculation of their scores in the SSPE will be considered. 
3.8.1. The Regulation on the Appearance and Apparel of 
Students and Personnel at Schools Affiliated to the National 
Ministry of Education and Other Ministries106 
Article 12 
Female students at Imam-Hatip High Schools shall wear the 
headscarf only during the Holy Qur’an lessons. (Official Gazette, 1981a) 
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 The wearing of religious apparel should be limited to solely the times 
when dealing with religious practices. 
Article 12 constituted the legal basis of the headscarf ban at Imam-Hatip High 
Schools until 2014. The only exception for wearing headscarves in school was the 
Qur’an lessons. This exception constructed a discourse which constricted the scope of 
religion only to individual worship. This discourse compelled religion to be withdrawn 
from all other areas not directly related to worship and to lose its function of being a 
determinant in social, political and economic areas. Although the overwhelming 
majority of students at Imam-Hatip Schools were from pious Muslim families, the 
clothing style in the school space was dominated by secular values. In terms of the long-
term cultural hegemony of Kemalism, this dominance strengthened the idea that secular 
values are common, mainstream and the only acceptable values at even Imam-Hatip 
Schools which are the only option for having an intensive Islamic education. 
Since high-school education was not compulsory at the period when the ban was 
valid, the headscarf ban became a reason for some female students to drop out of high 
school. Therefore, even Imam-Hatip schools, as the only option for having an education 
in a religious environment, could not provide an opportunity for female students to 
attend classes without sacrificing their Islamic lifestyle. This was the end of the vertical 
mobility opportunity along with the social class hierarchy for those who did not agree to 
sacrificing their style of clothing for high-school education. 
The ban was finally lifted by Article 4 of the Regulation on the Appearance and 
Apparel of Students at Schools run by the National Ministry of Education in 2014 
(Official Gazette, 2014). The outcome of the headscarf liberty was similar to other high-
school types. Unlike other high-school options, Imam-Hatip schools now became a 
significant alternative for those students who wanted an intensive religious education 





3.8.2. Higher Education Law 
Article 45107 (1981) 
The issue of coefficient problem at the Student Selection and Placement 
Examination
108
 (SSPE) is one of the most important sub-topics under the category of 
education since it played a significant role in the determination of people’s class 
position in Turkey. Until the amendment in 2012, Article 45 of the 1981 Higher 
Education Law was as follows: 
When selecting students for higher education institutions, the success of 
students during their secondary education period is calculated as an 
additional score by means of the method determined by the Student 
Selection and Placement Centre and added to the scores gained from 
higher education selection examinations. (Official Gazette, 1981b) 
 Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 People who have had an Islam-intensive education are not eligible for 
higher education.  
Different coefficients for different high-school types were accepted under the 
decision of the Higher Education Council dated 30 July 1998. The decision became 
valid in 1999 and was implemented until the amendment in 2012 (Dogan & Yuret, 
2015: 201). Under this law, students’ SSPE scores were multiplied by 0.8 if they 
preferred a department in their own area, and by 0.3 if they wanted to study a 
programme different from their own area. It therefore became impossible for graduates 
of vocational high schools, and accordingly graduates of Imam-Hatip High Schools, to 
prefer a non-area bachelor programme such as Law, Political Science, Engineering, 
Management or Journalism with their SSPE score. The Faculty of Theology became the 
only option for graduates of Imam-Hatip High Schools. 
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Since people who had had an intensive religious education were not able to 
continue on to higher education, the prominent discursive effect of the Law was the 
association of higher education and high-status jobs with a secular lifestyle, and the 
association of low-status jobs with the religious Muslim lifestyle. Intensive religious 
education became an obstacle to vertical mobility in society, and the discourse about the 
need to sacrifice the right of having an intensive religious education in order to rise in 
the social hierarchy was produced by this Law.  
Gramsci (1971: 9) categorised all people as intellectuals, but he emphasised that 
not all people fulfil an intellectual function in society. He explained that each person 
performs intellectual activity to a degree, has a particular world conception and acts in a 
particular moral manner, and thus contributes to sustainment or modification of the 
world conception. The structural barrier that the Imam-Hatip graduates faced prevented 
them from performing any intellectual activity in specific social spaces. Considering 
that how social space is designed directly effects hegemonic projects (Tugal, 2009: 30), 
such a barrier for Imam-Hatip graduates directly affected the value composition within 
the social space at universities and the social working space in both the private and the 
public sectors. This legal barrier changed the student composition of universities from 
1999. A significant proportion of students from religious families and with an intensive 
religious education background were prevented from becoming university students. As 
a result, they did not have any opportunity to represent their values, world-views, 
beliefs, lifestyle and discourses in the university space. This contributed to secular 
values, world-views, beliefs, lifestyle and discourses dominating university spaces.  
This legal barrier also dispossessed Imam-Hatip students from climbing the 
socio-economic hierarchy since they were deprived of the opportunity for vertical social 
mobility. Such a structural barrier can be associated with Gramsci’s discussion about 
vocational schools. He pointed out that each group in a society had its own category of 
school. Diversification of vocational schools paved the way to the perpetuation of 
traditional social differences (Gramsci, 1971: 40).
109
 The social-class position of Imam-
Hatip graduates remained the same compared with those students who faced no legal 
barriers to gaining a bachelor’s degree. This situation eased the aggregation of secular 
people in the middle and upper classes. Without a bachelor’s degree, low-status jobs 
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were the only options for Imam-Hatip graduates. Just like the effect on the social space 
of the universities, the legal barrier influenced the employee composition in both the 
public and the private sectors. Secular values, world-views, beliefs, lifestyle and 
discourses became more dominant in both sectors. Corporate culture in most private 
companies was primarily shaped by people who did not have an intensive religious 
education background. Graduates of Imam-Hatip Schools could not exercise an 
intellectual function in society since they had no opportunity to work in most sectors. 
Article 45110 (2012) 
Selection and placement to higher education is carried out as follows: 
a) Selection and placement to higher education institutions is done 
according to the methods and principles determined by the Higher 
Education Council under the condition that all precautions are taken to 
guarantee equality of opportunity and possibility. 
 b) Placement to higher education institutions shall be qualified by a 
central examination the principles of which are determined by the Higher 
Education Council. Candidates’ success at high school is taken into 
account when calculating the placement scores. High-school grades are 
transformed into high-school grade point average scores providing that 
the score is between two hundred and five hundred. When the placement 
score is being calculated, 12% of the high-school grade point average 
score is added to the score gained from the central examination. (Official 
Gazette, 2012b) 
 Analysis  
 Prominent discourse; 
 Students with an Islam-intensive education have equal status with 
students from other school types. 
From 2012, the coefficient multiplied by the weighted high-school grade point 
average became the same for all high-school types for the calculation of a university 
selection and placement score and all students, including those from Imam-Hatip 
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Schools, had the same opportunity to choose whichever department they wanted at 
universities. 
Following this amendment, the laicists lost their discursive advantage stemming 
from the association of university education and high-status positions with secular 
values. A dramatic change in the composition of students in the social spaces of 
universities and work spaces in the public and private sectors occurred. Each year, more 
students from Imam-Hatip Schools possessed the opportunity to continue their 
education in higher education and gain high-status jobs. By this means, pious Muslims 
now had the opportunity to perform intellectual activities in a variety of social spaces, 
which constituted an Islamic challenge to the Kemalist cultural hegemony. 
 
3.9. Higher Education 
In addition to the primary and secondary education sub-section, a special sub-
section dealing with higher education has been added to this chapter because of the 
significant role of universities on opportunities for vertical social mobility and on the 
construction and dissemination of a discourse which serves the consolidation of the 
hegemony of the ruling class. Gramsci (1985: 383) described universities and 
academies “as organisations of culture and means for its diffusion”. From this point of 
view, these institutions constitute a terrain of organised culture which can shape or at 
least influence the culture of a society. They are also the site of cultural diffusion with 
state-controlled lecture contents with a dominant discourse in the social spaces of 
universities and academies.  
Similar to the National Education Basic Law, Higher Education Law also 
constructs a Kemalist paradigm within the higher education system. Turkish universities 
therefore possessed a significant discursive role in the production and dissemination of 
Kemalist discourses, views and values. Second, depriving some students of the 
opportunity for higher education has a direct impact on social mobility, class position 
and intellectuals. By means of Article 45 of the Higher Education Law, the SSPE 
became a legal barrier for students of Imam-Hatip schools to continue their education at 




3.9.1. Higher Education Law111 
Article 4 
The goals of higher education are; 
a) To educate students; 
 1- towards Ataturk’s reforms and principles, and as loyal students to 
Ataturk’s principle of nationalism; 
 2- so that they can carry the national, ethical, humanistic, moral and 
cultural values of the Turkish nation, feel honoured and feel happy for 
being Turkish; 
… 
(Official Gazette, 1981b) 
Analysis 
Prominent discourse; 
 Ataturk’s reforms, principles and understanding of nationalism constitute 
the basis of the values of the education system. 
In the first paragraph, the principles and reforms of Ataturk, with special 
emphasis on his principle of nationalism, are presented as the normative basis of higher 
education in Turkey. Thus, Kemalist values are accepted as the leading, universal, 
common and mainstream values in the social space of universities. This situation also 
applies to the terrain of religion. How the Kemalists perceive Islam, Muslimness and 
religious lifestyle becomes ‘common sense’, in Gramscian terms, in universities. As has 
already been discussed, Ataturk’s principle of nationalism was an alternative to the 
understanding of ummah (‘the unity of Muslims’) in Islam. From the early days of the 
Republic, what society understood by the term ‘nation’ was different from what the 
state understood by it. As the meaning of ‘nation’ transformed from Muslimness to 
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Turkishness, the state apparatus sought to designate ‘nation-alism’ as the new religion 
of the new Turkish nation (Karpat, 2009a: 241). Therefore, constructing a nationalist 
discourse symbolises a shift from the Islamic discourse to the laicist discourse.  
According to the discourse in the second paragraph, the Turkish nation forms the 
source of all national, cultural, ethical and moral values. This discourse can be 
interpreted as an effort to position nationality as the source of human existence and of 
values related to that existence. Such a discourse prevents the religion, and more 
specifically Islam, from being the determinant of human existence and fundamental 
values. Moreover, according to the Article, being Turkish becomes a sufficient reason to 
feel happy and honoured. Such a discourse is contrary to accepting being Muslim as 
sufficient reason to feel honoured and happy. So what defines identity has shifted from 
Islam to Turkishness, as had been planned by Ataturk during the establishment of the 
new Republic. This shift had significant outcomes on the cultural hegemonic struggle. 
First, determining Turkishness as the main defining element of identity gathers all Turks 
together regardless of their religiosity. A pious Muslim Turk and an atheist Turk can 
perceive each other on the same common ground. Secondly, since Muslimness loses its 
position as the main determinant of the identity, the policies of a Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc on the terrain of Islam are not regarded as a threat against the basic identity. Hence, 
the conflict between Kemalist ruling class and religious segments of the society loses 
the character of being an ‘identity-based conflict’. 
Article 5 
Higher education shall be planned, programmed and carried out in 
accordance with the main principles below: 
a) It shall be ensured to raise the consciousness of the students about 
serving with an understanding of Ataturk’s principle of nationalism and 
in line with the principles and revolutions of Ataturk.   
…. 
i) Lectures on ‘The Principles of Ataturk and the History of the 
Revolution’ … shall be compulsory in higher education. (Official Gazette, 







 Serving Ataturk’s revolutions, principles and nationalism is a legal 
obligation and a social norm. 
Article 5 regulates the normative basis on which the planning, programming and 
execution of higher education hinge. In paragraph (a), students are expected to serve the 
nation from the perspective of Ataturk with his nationalism, revolutions and principles. 
Serving necessitates one-sided loyalty to the served side. Students are therefore 
expected to serve the Turkish nation which had been defined by Kemalism as an 
alternative to the understanding of ‘Muslim nation’ in the Ottoman period. The legal 
obligation of being in line with Ataturk’s revolutions, principles and nationalism 
positions any opposition to or criticism of them as an unlawful and therefore 
unacceptable act.  
Paragraph (i) makes lectures on ‘The Principles of Ataturk and the History of the 
Revolution’ compulsory for all students enrolled in the higher-education system. Those 
lectures can be interpreted as an effort by the Kemalist hegemonic bloc to produce and 
disseminate Kemalist discourse in order to position laicist Kemalist values as the 
leading values in universities. This legal obligation grants Kemalism, and hence 
Kemalism’s understanding of Islam, a supra-ideological and supra-political position 
which is accepted as common, mainstream and universal. By this discourse, any 
perceived threat to Kemalist principles and values becomes unusual and abnormal. 
Therefore, in the struggle between laicist and pious Muslim lifestyles, the laicist 
lifestyle represents the mainstream.   
Both Article 4 and Article 5 are still valid without any amendments. This might 
suggest that the JDP governments since 2002 had not been able to construct and 
disseminate a distinctive discourse in universities or to shape the higher-education 
system to its own values by 2015. Kemalism therefore maintained its privileged position 





4.1. Overview of Chapter 6 
So far in Chapter 6, we have endeavoured to find the answer to the research 
question ‘How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015?’ by emphasising the construction and 
dissemination of discourses on the terrain of Islam through the legislation. 
The topic of ‘Religious Everyday Life’ drew the boundaries of acceptable 
religious everyday life. By means of legislation, a hierarchy was constructed between 
laicism and religion. In situations when there is a conflict between laicism and religion, 
the discourse directed people to be on the side of laicism. This discourse therefore 
sought to decrease the influence of religion in the everyday lives of Muslims. In 2015, 
laicism was still prioritised within the legislation over all alternative sources of value 
such as religion. 
The legislation under the heading ‘the State’ within the Constitution provided 
the Kemalist hegemonic bloc with a comparative ideological and organisational 
advantage in their struggle for cultural hegemony since the reforms and principles of 
Ataturk were presented as the fundamental paradigm of the state. Special emphasis on 
nationalism among those principles was the result of the effort to create an alternative 
secular source of identity to Islam as the source of Islamic identity. The legislation 
regarding the state could not be challenged by the JDP by 2015. Therefore, Kemalism’s 
privileged position as the fundamental paradigm of the state continued over the three 
terms of the JDP. 
The legislation regarding the PRA granted the institution an educative role. In 
particular, by means of the authority to respond to questions on Islam, the institution 
gained the opportunity to determine the standards and discourses regarding Islam and 
Muslimness. By this means, the PRA had the position of intellectual leadership on the 
area of Islam. As a result, an intellectual hierarchy was created between the institution 
and the pious Muslims, and this superior position in the hierarchy also applied to the 
state and to the dominant class controlling the state. The privileged position of the PRA 




significant reason for the maintenance of the PRA’s privileged position was the JDP’s 
rising influence on the state apparatus and its institutions within its three terms. 
The laws and regulations on political parties, associations and foundations, all of 
which were the instruments of Islamic collective organisational action, illegalised any 
influence of Islam on these entities. Having an Islamic agenda for these organisations 
was a sufficient reason for their closure. The discourse within the legislation aimed at 
destroying the organisational power of Islam and restraining it to only the personal area 
of faith and worship. Especially after the 28 February coup d’état, Islamic discourse at 
the organisational level was completely perceived as illegitimate, unacceptable and 
abnormal. Determining Islamic goals and challenging the principles of laicism and 
nationalism were still a reason for the closure of political parties by 2015. After the 
amendments to related laws and regulations, however, associations and foundations 
gained a wider area of rights as compared with political parties in terms of inclusion of 
Islam in their organisational goals and discourses. 
The laws on primary, secondary and higher education determined the 
fundamental paradigm and entire value set in these educational institutions. The 
principles of Kemalism, with a special emphasis on laicism and nationalism, became the 
leading mainstream ideas in the social space of schools and loyalty to those principles 
became a social norm in schools. Thus, the attitude towards Islam, Muslim identity and 
religious life was also determined by those mainstream ideas. The fundamental 
paradigm on which the education system was based could not be challenged by the JDP 
within its three terms in office. Therefore, the Kemalists still possessed an intellectual 
and ideological advantage in their struggle for cultural hegemony vis-à-vis the opposing 
Islamic groups. 
The legislation regarding the headscarf ban and Imam-Hatip schools directly 
determined the class position of pious Muslims in the social hierarchy by presenting 
structural legal obstacles to their vertical social mobility opportunities. The headscarf 
ban deprived pious Muslim women of secondary and higher education opportunities and 
of jobs in their later ages. The coefficient inequality for Imam-Hatip graduates in the 
SSPE prevented them from continuing their education at university. The main discourse 
which was the result of these legal restrictions was that possessing high status in society 




and values were associated with lower social status. Because the legal obstacles 
hindered many pious Muslims from having access to a variety of places such as middle 
and high schools, universities and work-places, they could not perform intellectual 
activities in any of those places. In the 2010s, the ban on headscarves was gradually 
lifted in different places from middle and high schools, and universities to work-places 
in the public sector, and the coefficients in the SSPE were equalised for all school types. 
By these means, the discourse which associated high social status with a secular 
lifestyle and values was nullified and the Islamic segments’ opportunities for vertical 
social mobility began to increase. 
 
4.2. The Cultural Hegemonic Struggle in the Light of the Key 
Findings in Chapter 6 
Considering Joseph’s (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) distinction between structural 
hegemony and surface hegemony, the legislation also revealed the deeper structures 
which influenced and restricted the hegemonic projects of both the Kemalists and the 
JDP. Islam as a deeper structure in Turkish society compelled the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc to take into account the counter-hegemonic power of Islam and to design a legal 
system which had the capacity to hinder the counter-hegemonic power of the Islamic 
opposition. More importantly, the official paradigm of the state, which has been coded 
within the legislation, constituted a deeper structure which provided a structural 
advantage for the Kemalist hegemonic project and drew the boundaries of the JDP’s 
hegemonic project. 
Legislation provided a significant comparative advantage for the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc vis-à-vis Islamic opposition in terms of organisational power in their 
struggle for cultural hegemony. Laws and regulations regarding political parties, 
associations and foundations diminished the collective counter-hegemonic power of 
Islamist-conservative movements and of the JDP. Following the 28 February coup 
d’état, the Kemalist hegemonic bloc became unrivalled in organisational terms within 
both civil society and political society. These laws and regulations restricted Islam’s 
capacity as the source of collective action for pious Muslims and limited Islam to the 




collective revolutionary challenge and from a direct war of manoeuvre initiated by an 
Islamist movement. 
Considering Gramsci’s (1971: 328) emphasis on the importance of a unifying 
and cementing ideology for the establishment of cultural hegemony, the legislation 
showed that Kemalism gained a privileged position vis-à-vis all other ideologies. The 
state as the main instrument of the dominant class was designed in parallel with the 
Kemalist principles, values and ideology. According to the Turkish Constitution, 
Kemalism represented the official impartial position and all other opposing ideologies, 
including Islamism, were depicted as representing a partial position which was expected 
to be compatible with the impartial official ideology of the Turkish state. Moreover, 
Kemalism also gained special protection since any challenges to Kemalist principles 
were declared as illegal by means of various laws and regulations. By this means, 
Kemalism gained a supra-ideological character and its privileged position could not be 
challenged by the JDP by 2015. 
The legislation analysed in this chapter also showed that Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc had a significant advantage in terms of intellectual power vis-à-vis the JDP. The 
education system was designed in accordance with the goal of equipping students with 
Kemalist values, principles and ideology. The social spaces of schools and universities 
were dominated by secular values and lifestyle. Because these educational institutions 
were the sites for raising intellectuals, they provided both an intellectual and an 
ideological advantage for the Kemalists in their efforts to achieve and maintain cultural 
hegemony by shaping the minds of the country’s future intellectuals in accordance with 
Kemalism. As a result of the legal obstacles blocking women wearing a headscarf and 
Imam-Hatip graduates from a full education, high-status jobs in both public and private 
sectors were dominated by people who had a secular lifestyle. As a result, both the ways 
through which intellectuals were nurtured and the social spaces where intellectuals were 
able to perform intellectual activities were dominated by people who had a secular 
lifestyle. The JDP was partly successful in nullifying the legal obstacles which deprived 
pious Muslims of opportunities for vertical social mobility, such as the headscarf ban 
for pious Muslim women and the coefficient problem for Imam-Hatip graduates. 




processes such as schools and universities through which the ideas and values of 
intellectuals were shaped. 
Consequently, the legislation revealed that the JDP was not entirely successful in 
developing its own cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam by 2015. The legislation 
was very important for comprehending the boundaries of the JDP’s counter-hegemony 
strategy vis-à-vis the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. The official paradigm of the state as the 
deep structure coded in the legislation had a significant restrictive effect on Islam’s 
social, political, economic and organisational roles and on the opportunities for social 
mobility for pious Muslims. Since challenging this deep structure in the short term 
required a frontal attack (or a war of manoeuvre in Gramscian terms) on the Kemalist 
establishment, namely the state bureaucracy and the military, the JDP preferred a more 
gradual strategy to challenge the Kemalist cultural hegemony by initiating a process of 
nullifying the legal obstacles which deprived pious Muslims of access to vertical social 
mobility. Unlike the WP, the JDP did not directly target the legislation constructing the 
fundamental paradigm of the state. It is therefore possible to claim that the strategy of 
the JDP was more successful compared with the government experience of the WP 
which had faced the 28 February coup in 1997. On the other hand, the JDP failed to 
transform the official paradigm of the state, to design a new paradigm in parallel with 
its own discourses, values and worldview within the spheres of both political and civil 
society, and to wholly annihilate the privileged organisational, ideological and 





The operational phases of this study have now been completed and this 
Conclusion will provide a general discussion of the findings. First, the preceding 
chapters will be reviewed and then the strengths, difficulties and limitations of the study 
will be considered. We shall seek to find answers to the main research question and sub-
questions by summarising and evaluating the key findings of the research. We shall 
discuss the cultural hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the 
JDP in the light of the key findings. This concluding chapter and the study as a whole 
will end with some recommendations for future research in this field. 
 
1. Overview of the Research 
The aim of this study was to explore how Islam was used as the terrain for a 
hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP from 28 
February 1997, the date of the post-modern coup d’état against the Islamist Welfare 
Party, to 2015, the end of JDP’s third term as a single-party government. The Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc was composed of military and bureaucratic officials and Kemalist 
bourgeoisie, whereas the JDP represented the Islamic lower and middle classes.  
Chapter 1 briefly presented the recent social and political history of Turkey 
beginning from the late Ottoman period until the end of the third term of the JDP’s 
single-party rule. Mardin’s (1973) detection of the maintenance of centre-periphery 
relations as the main determinant of Turkish social and political structure from the 
Ottoman period to Republican Turkey was important for understanding the distinction 
between the Kemalists at the centre who needed to create a hegemonic project to 
construct a consent-based relationship with the periphery and the people at the periphery 
who were exposed to the Kemalist hegemonic project. After discussing the Kemalist 
nation-building and modernisation projects as a culture-construction process, the coups 
d’état and the tutelage regime as means of sustaining the dominant position in the multi-
party era were considered. Finally, the roots, position and main characteristics of the 
JDP as the most significant challenger to the Kemalist hegemonic project in the history 




Chapter 2 started with a definition of the critical realist standpoint as the 
ontological and epistemological basis of the study and a discussion of its distinctive 
features as opposed to other positions. Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony and its 
components provided a theoretical explanation of the Kemalists’ efforts to manufacture 
consent on the terrain of Islam and the JDP’s counter-hegemonic attempt after 2002. 
The chapter ended with a discussion of Gramsci’s ideas about religion, especially 
Christianity, which provided a guide for investigating the terrain of Islam.  
Chapter 3 started by presenting the class-based understanding of the Turkish 
case; the peculiarities of the Turkish case in terms of class stratification throughout the 
cultural identities were discussed. This was important for revealing the difference 
between the class structures of Western countries and that in Turkey. The literature 
review section started with a review of the literature on hegemony-based studies 
regarding Turkey and continued with hegemony-based studies on Islam moving from 
the global context to the case of Turkey. Ultimately a need was identified for special 
attention to be given to the terrain of Islam in order to comprehend Turkey’s cultural 
hegemonic struggle.  
Chapter 4 was dedicated to a discussion of the data and the research method 
used in this study. The sources of data comprised the textbooks of Religious Culture and 
Moral Knowledge lessons and legislation regulating the terrain of religion. In order to 
comprehend how the religious discourse was constructed in the education system, 
textbooks used in the post-28 February period and in the 2014-15 academic year were 
selected. In order to identify legislation’s discursive dimension and their effect on the 
class structure, the legislation selected ranged from the Constitution to laws, regulations 
and bylaws which were in effect between 1997 and 2015. The Critical Discourse 
Analysis method was used to analyse those data in order to comprehend the functions of 
those religious discourses in the wider picture of class structure and hegemonic struggle. 
Chapter 5 focused on the textbooks of the RCMK lessons in order to understand 
how the discourse on the terrain of Islam was constructed and disseminated by means of 
education. Those textbooks were also important for reflecting the discourse in the entire 
education system and the mainstream discourse outside the school. The topics of ‘the 
State’, ‘the Military’, ‘Economic Differences’, ‘the Image of Ataturk’, ‘Laicism’, 




Constructing discourse on the terrain of Islam was important for the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc for bridging the gap between Kemalists’ and pious Muslims’ 
interpretations of Islam and finding common ground in accordance with Kemalism’s 
ideal of creating an homogeneous society. Second, Islamic references, such as Qur’an 
verses and the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, were instrumentalised to ensure 
obedience to hegemonic instruments such as the state and the military. Third, the 
discourse on the terrain of Islam was constructed in order to demonise the concepts and 
institutions such as tarikats and cemaats which belonged to devout Muslims. 
Reconstruction of the discourse was also vital for the JDP to reverse the goals of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc. Also, discourse on particular topics was changed so that the 
values and lifestyle of the rising Islamic middle class could be regarded as common and 
mainstream. On the other hand, some of the discourses on the terrain of Islam were only 
slightly changed or remained the same. The JDP’s reluctance can be seen as a 
concession in order not to increase the threat perception which the secular segments of 
society might feel, so that any hostile moves by the secular opposition against the rule 
of the JDP could be prevented. 
Chapter 6 emphasised legislation as a source of hegemony. The emphasis in the 
chapter was on the long-term hegemonic effects of legislation, rather than its short-term 
coercive effects. A significant long-term effect stemmed from its role in determining the 
class positions of both religious and non-religious people by providing them with 
different opportunities based on their religiosity and in people’s internalisation of their 
existing class positions in society. As another long-term effect, legislation directed 
people to accept the instruments of hegemony such as the state apparatus, school and 
university as natural and universal. Moreover, legislation also constructed and 
disseminated particular discourses on the terrain of Islam while restricting alternative 
discourses on the terrain of religion. In order to investigate those long-term hegemonic 
effects of legislation, an analysis was carried out using CDA on legislation under the 
topics of ‘Religious Everyday Life’, ‘the State’, ‘the Presidency of Religious Affairs’, 
‘Political Parties’, ‘Associations and Foundations’, ‘the Headscarf’, ‘Primary and 





2. Strengths, Difficulties and Limitations of the Research 
A prominent strength of the current study is its comprehensiveness in terms of 
social spaces where people are located, such as schools, universities, work-places, 
mosques, associations, public institutions and facilities of foundations. Tugal (2009: 30) 
underlined that everyday life and social space are significant elements of the hegemonic 
struggle. So in order to comprehend the hegemonic struggle on the terrain of Islam, the 
maximum areas of social spaces where people spend their time and carry out their 
everyday activities with their Islamic identity, and where people engage in social, 
political and economic activities which are related to the terrain of Islam, were 
examined. We also endeavoured to consider the maximum areas of civil society where 
citizens meet, from schools and universities to political parties, associations, 
foundations, tarikats and cemaats, and consideration was also given to the political 
society which people encounter in their everyday lives such as the workplace in public 
sector. 
The study is also comprehensive in terms of the time during which people are 
under the influence of hegemonic projects in their daily life. Legislation has an 
influence on every second of people’s everyday life. There is no time during which 
people are free from the obligations of legislation. Compulsory RCMK lessons last from 
the fourth grade to the twelfth grade in schools for students. In other words, students are 
under the influence of mainstream official discourse on the terrain of religion for a long 
period of time in their early ages when their minds are being shaped. Furthermore, 
RCMK lessons not only reflect the dominant official discourse of the entire education 
system, but they also reflect the dominant discourse of the entire public life. Therefore, 
those lessons represent a significant amount of time during which people are exposed to 
the dominant discourse. 
Another strength of the study is its comprehensiveness in terms of the population 
affected by the case studies of the research. RCMK lessons are compulsory for eight 
years in both public and private schools for all students with the only exception of 
children of non-Muslim minorities. A significant proportion of Turkish students 
therefore face discourses on Islam, Muslimness and Islamic lifestyle in these lessons. 
Moreover, legislation is also comprehensive for being binding on every Turkish citizen. 




It might also be beneficial to consider the difficulties and limitations of the 
study. One difficulty stems from the Western understanding of class-based analysis 
which often associates the terms ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’ with purely economic 
aspects. Class is understood as an economy-based stratification stemming from 
differences in economic conditions and possession of productions means (Giddens & 
Sutton, 2013: 485). In Marx’s understanding, people’s social class is determined by 
their common relationship to the instruments of production (Giddens & Sutton, 2013: 
487). As can be seen throughout the study, however, we went beyond an economy-
based understanding and defined social classes in terms such as ‘Kemalist bourgeoisie’, 
‘Islamic middle class’ and ‘Islamic bourgeoisie’. This is because the social classes in 
Turkey have been formed from people’s cultural/religious stance; and people’s 
cultural/religious stance has also determined their position in the class hierarchy.
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 On 
the other hand, the difficulty of applying class-based analysis to Turkey might also 
provide an advantage in testing Gramsci’s theory on cultural hegemony, since 
prominent features of his thinking are his objection to the reduction of political to 
economic (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 55) and his insistence on the importance of culture 
in political struggles (Hoare & Sperber, 2016: 29). As classes are divided into class 
fractions based on their cultural determination, the case of Turkey provides a significant 
opportunity for studying the influence of culture on political struggles. 
A significant limitation is the length of the period which had to be investigated 
in order to understand the progresses and retreats of the Kemalist hegemonic project 
from the early days of the Republic until the present. Moreover, the existing struggle for 
cultural hegemony is still an ongoing process since the JDP is still an incumbent party 
and is still waging a war of position. We endeavoured to address this limitation by 
taking a snapshot of a specific period from a continuing time spectrum, the period 
between the 28 February 1997 coup d’état and the 7 June 2015 general election when 
the JDP’s third term in office ended. This period was chosen as the most recent peak 
point of the Kemalist cultural hegemony just before the JDP came to power in 2002 and 
for enabling us to see the most serious challenge from the Islamist-conservative 
segments of society under the umbrella of the JDP against the Kemalist hegemony. 
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3. Research Question, Sub-questions and Key Findings 
After reviewing the research from the very beginning and discussing the 
strengths, difficulties and limitations of the study, we shall now summarise the findings 
presented in Chapters 5 and 6 and re-evaluate the research question and sub-questions in 
the light of those findings. To determine where this study is positioned on the bigger 
picture of social research, we based the study on the assumptions of critical realism 
which acknowledged the existence of a social reality independent from people’s 
awareness, and underlined socially constructed knowledge about the nature of that 
reality (Danermark et al., 2002: 5-6). In the study, therefore, religion, and specifically 
Islam, is accepted as possessing a reality independent from the hegemonic projects 
targeting it. However, people’s knowledge about religion is also influenced by the 
constructions of those hegemonic projects. This brings us to Gramsci’s understanding of 
cultural hegemony, since it emphasises the aspect of ideological control and seeks to 
explain the production and distribution of social practices, values, discourses and beliefs 
(Giroux, 1981: 94). The principal motivation for this study was therefore to explore the 
establishment of hegemony, the maintenance of domination and the sustainment of 
intellectual leadership through discourse construction. With this motivation and goal, 
answers to the following research question were sought: 
How has Islam been used as a site of hegemonic struggle in Turkey in the 
post-28 February process until 2015? 
The ‘how’ question enabled us to investigate the construction and dissemination 
of discourse on the terrain of Islam. ‘The terrain of Islam’ not only involves the 
discourse which is directly related with Islam but also the discourse about the social, 
political, economic and everyday life aspects of Islam and Muslimness. This emphasis 
is important, since it gives information about the nature, strengths and weaknesses of 
hegemonic projects and the competence of the sides which are engaged in the 
hegemonic struggle.  
What are the differences between the cultural hegemonic projects of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP on the terrain of Islam? 
The aim of the first sub-question was to understand both the differences in the 
discourses constructed by two hegemonic projects and the differences in the strategies 




discontinuities in discourses and the possible reasons for the maintenance of the same 
discourses.  
To what extent has the JDP government established an alternative 
cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam between 2002 and 2015? 
The aim of the second sub-question was to explore the successes, strengths and 
shortcomings of the JDP’s hegemonic project in its first three terms of office from 2002 
until 2015. A critical point related to this sub-question is whether or not the JDP could 
shape the fundamental mainstream paradigm in the spheres of both civil society and 
political society with its own values, beliefs and discourses. 
In the light of the main research question and the two sub-questions, the 
discourse on religious everyday life in the Turkish Constitution determined the 
acceptable boundaries of religion in people’s daily lives. The discourse also directed 
attention to the dimension of personal conscience and faith by neglecting the functions 
of religion on social, political and economic terrains. It also created a hierarchy between 
laicism and religion and expected people to position on the side of laicism when there is 
a conflict between the principles of laicism and religion. This official discourse had not 
been challenged by the JDP by 2015.  
Discourse regarding the state within the RCMK textbooks provided the state, as 
the coercive body on a territory, with an opportunity to gain the consent of its citizens. 
Giving consent for the actions of the state can be regarded as equivalent to accepting the 
state’s authority as the main implementer of coercion over society. This can be 
summarised as ‘consent for coercion’.  Discourses about the state apparatus and the 
symbols which represent the authority of the state were significant for constructing a 
consent-based relationship between the state apparatus and citizens of the state. The 
discourse on the state was constructed by means of Islamic texts and references to 
ensure the obedience of people to the state. Serving the state was presented as a duty 
stemming from Islamic belief for all Muslims. Serving the state is the direct opposite to 
challenging the state. So challenging the state and any of its institutions and 
administrators becomes unacceptable under this discourse. 
Legislation about the state, the Turkish Constitution being in the first place, has 




terrains of Islam, laicism and religious/non-religious lifestyle. Moreover, Mustafa 
Kemal Ataturk, as the founder of the state, gained constitutional protection and a 
privileged position which facilitated the moral and intellectual leadership of the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc, a vital requisite for cultural hegemony. As a result of the 
discourse in the Turkish Constitution, his views and principles, and thus Kemalism as a 
whole, were presented as an impartial standpoint to which every Turkish citizen was 
expected to be loyal. Those articles of the Turkish Constitution which characterised the 
state remained the same by 2015 without any amendments.  
Legislation regarding the PRA, as an institution of the state apparatus, aimed at 
authorising the institution as the supreme body to regulate all kinds of issues about 
religion. In this way, the institution was placed at the top of the decision-making 
process on religious matters, and thus the institution was authorised with an educative 
role, the role of finding answers to religious questions, in other words the role of issuing 
fatwas. This educative role created a moral and intellectual hierarchy between the 
institution as answerer and society as questioner. The ruling class also benefited from 
the same moral and intellectual superiority. The PRA’s role in the cultural hegemony 
was maintained in the period of the JDP. The institution was still used as a significant 
means of cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam. 
Similar to the discourse regarding the state, the discourse on the military was 
also constructed in a completely positive manner. That positive discourse was 
strengthened with religious texts of Qur’an verses and hadiths by depicting military 
service as a command of Allah and associating it with the holy war of jihad in Islam. 
The discourse on the military was also significant since the military was one of the three 
pillars of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc. On the other hand, the positive discourse was 
maintained by the JDP and this reflected the JDP’s reconciliatory attitude towards the 
military in general as a part of its strategy of war of position.  
The discourse on economic differences in the RCMK textbooks related 
economic underdevelopment with the understanding of religion and religiosity. This 
discourse served the normalisation and internalisation of religious people’s subordinate 
position within the class hierarchy. This topic was removed from the content of the 




JDP successfully nullified the negative discourse about religiousness.  No alternative 
discourse on this topic was found. 
The image of Ataturk was a prominent issue in the RCMK textbooks as well as 
in a variety of laws and regulations which disclosed the hegemonic strategies of both 
the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. Functional honorifics such as ‘founder of the 
Republic’ and metaphorical descriptions such as ‘unrivalled hero’ and ‘immortal leader’ 
were prominent discursive tactics in those texts. As was revealed from the texts and 
pictures in Chapter 5, Ataturk’s viewpoints were taken as the main and only reference in 
discussions on Islam, laicism and religiousness. Ataturk emerged as a figure whose 
ideas cannot be challenged. The Kemalist hegemonic bloc, which claimed to be 
Ataturk’s successor, also benefited from the completely positive discourse about and 
unquestionable prestige of Ataturk. Being on the side of Ataturk gave the Kemalists a 
source of legitimacy and by this means the approval of the pious Muslims. A discourse 
which depicted Ataturk as a ‘true Muslim’ was constructed in the textbooks. The JDP, 
on the other hand, responded to the Kemalist discursive project by using the discursive 
tactic of depoliticisation. In order to avoid a confrontation with his strong image in 
society, the discourse of ‘religious Ataturk’ was maintained in the 2015 textbooks. 
Ataturk was presented as a common value by concealing his function in the political 
struggle as an ideological source for the Kemalist hegemonic bloc, in other words by 
depoliticising him. The religious Ataturk image was also instrumentalised by the JDP 
for legitimating pro-Islamic policies, religious scholars and the PRA. 
The discourse on laicism in the RCMK textbooks also carried traces of the 
cultural hegemonic struggle between the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. A 
prominent discourse was that laicism provided a guarantee of freedom of conscience, 
religion and prayer. This discourse directly aimed at defusing the threat perception from 
pious Muslims stemming from the Kemalist lifestyle and values and at gaining their 
assent in favour of the laic regime and Kemalism. The separation of worldly affairs 
from spiritual and state affairs from religious was another prominent discourse which 
had a significant effect on the cultural hegemonic struggle. Differentiating worldly from 
spiritual was intended to prevent Islam from being a determinant in worldly issues. 
Thus, Islam’s roles in social, political and economic life were completely consciously 




restrict Islam to the solely personal level. The capability of Islam to organise Muslim 
people for a common objective diminished and the Kemalist hegemonic bloc got rid of 
a potential organised opposition which could challenge its superior class position. All 
these discourses were maintained in the 2015 textbooks. The cultural hegemonic 
struggle under the heading of laicism can be interpreted as the ‘depoliticisation of the 
other’ by both the Kemalists and the JDP. On the one hand, the Kemalist hegemonic 
bloc sought to depoliticise Islam and to cut its links with politics by limiting its scope to 
the area of personal faith and worship. On the other hand, the JDP also sought to 
depoliticise the principle of laicism by redefining the term in a way that would not 
intervene in the social, political and economic roles of Islam in society. 
The discourses within the legislation on the area of primary, secondary and 
higher education were mostly characterised by special protection of Ataturk’s principles 
and reforms and a strong emphasis on his two principles of laicism and nationalism. 
Throughout the legislative texts on the area of education, loyalty to Ataturk, his ideas 
and principles was presented as a social norm, and a ‘common sense’ attitude in schools 
and universities. The strong emphasis on nationalism was a reflection of the Kemalist 
effort to establish Turkishness as the main identity of the nation instead of religion. 
Both laicism and nationalism were therefore regarded as means of de-Islamising schools 
and were presented as universal values which had to be internalised by every citizen. 
Schools and universities were also significant for being the sites of raising intellectuals. 
The social spaces of these education facilities were dominated by laicist discourses and 
secular values, and the Kemalist hegemonic bloc had a comparative advantage in 
influencing future intellectuals. It should be noted that the dominance of Kemalism 
stemming from the current legislation in primary, secondary and higher education had 
not been challenged by the JDP by 2015. 
Imam-Hatip schools required special attention since they were at the heart of 
discussions regarding the vertical social mobility opportunities of pious Muslims. 
Because of the coefficient disadvantage when calculating the Student Selection and 
Placement Examination (SSPE) scores of Imam-Hatip graduates, a legal obstacle 
emerged from 1999 until 2012. In this period, students who had had an intensive 
religious education were regarded as ineligible for higher education and consequently 




completely separated the areas of religious and worldly. By this discourse, higher 
education and high-status jobs were also associated with secular ideas and lifestyle. 
Since such a legal restriction directly influenced the vertical mobility opportunities of 
Imam-Hatip graduates; they could not perform any intellectual activity in a variety of 
places from universities to high-status jobs. After the coefficient was equalised for all 
school types in 2012, the graduates of these schools had the opportunity to continue in 
higher education and to climb through the social class hierarchy. By this means, the 
discourse which had associated university education and the higher ranks of the social 
hierarchy with the secular lifestyle and values were nullified. 
The headscarf ban was one of the most influential legal restrictions which 
directly determined the class position of and the discourse about devout Muslim 
women. With the ban on headscarves in middle and high schools, universities and all 
public institutions and organisations, it became impossible for pious Muslim women to 
have a formal education, to gain at least an associate’s or bachelor’s degree, and to find 
a high-status job in the public or private sectors. Since the social spaces within these 
areas were dominated by the secular lifestyle, secular values became universal, 
mainstream and common. One of the most significant achievements of the JDP was 
gradually lifting the headscarf ban in the early 2010s. By this means, the discourse 
which had formerly associated high-status jobs with secular values was annulled. 
Kemalist domination of the social spaces of schools, universities and work-places began 
to diminish. This also provided an opportunity for pious Muslim women to be involved 
in intellectual activity in key positions in bureaucracy and working life and to 
participate in the decision-making processes within these high-status positions. 
Political parties were a significant means of organisational power for the Islamist 
counter-hegemony and were the sites where Islamist intellectuals could perform 
intellectual activity. The discourse on political parties in legislation aimed at pruning 
Islam from all political functions and restricting it to solely the personal area of faith 
and worship. Loyalty to Ataturk’s principles and reforms became the norm for political 
parties (Official Gazette, 1983c). Challenging any ideological elements of Kemalism by 
means of political parties was declared illegal and perceived as unacceptable and 
abnormal. Kemalism thus gained immunity from any organised challenge from political 




same in 2015. Therefore, the JDP had not been able to provide a permanent legal basis 
to prevent political parties from closure by 2015. 
Tarikats and cemaats, which were significant means of organised counter-
hegemonic activity for pious Muslims, were presented as absolutely dangerous entities 
for Muslims in the post-28 February RCMK textbooks. The texts regarding tarikats and 
cemaats involved a discourse about the exploitation of religion and the religious 
feelings of ignorant Muslims. By the binary of ignorant Muslim/conscious Muslim, 
people were advised to avoid membership of these organisations in order to maintain 
their personal liberties. Another discourse constructed in the texts was the requirement 
of individualistic Muslimness. Such a discourse which saw group action under a tarikat 
or cemaat as abnormal could be interpreted as an effort to create a Muslimness in 
accordance with the boundaries drawn by the global capitalist system as a source of 
structural hegemony. The discourse was changed completely by the JDP in the 2015 
textbooks. Tarikats and cemaats were now perceived as the products of different 
interpretations among people and depicted as completely positive in terms of their role 
in contributing to the moral education of people in society.   
Associations and foundations, as a significant source of organisational power in 
civil society, faced extensive legal restrictions on the terrain of religion. Religion’s 
involvement in the activities of associations and foundations was completely illegalised. 
By this discourse, Islam was completely limited to the personal area of faith and 
worship by illegalising its political, social and economic functions. By this means, 
legislation’s declaration of illegitimacy constructed a discourse which accepted Islam’s 
involvement in wider civil society as unacceptable and abnormal. Moreover, 
challenging Ataturk, his reforms, his principles and especially his understanding of 
nationalism and laicism by means of associations and foundations was also illegalised. 
Thus, Kemalism gained special legal and discursive protection which its opponent 
groups, especially the Islamist-conservative movements, did not have. With the new 
Associations Law in 2004 (Official Gazette, 2004), the legal restrictions on associations 
were lifted. This increased Islam’s power as a source for counter-hegemonic 
organisation in civil society and nullified the discourse which had restrained Islam to 




How the family image was depicted in the RCMK textbooks was also used an 
important discursive element in the cultural hegemonic struggle. The family pictures in 
the post-28 February textbooks were composed of families which had a completely 
secular and Western appearance and lifestyle. These images presented the Western 
secular lifestyle and appearance as universal, mainstream and common. By this means, 
young people internalised the dominance of Western secular values in society. This also 
caused a duality in the minds of children whose families were religious, since their own 
families contradicted the mainstream and universal family image. As one of the 
significant achievements of the JDP in the cultural hegemonic struggle, the family 
image had been radically changed in the 2015 textbooks. Illustrations of families were 
now dominated by a pious Muslim appearance and lifestyle. The mother characters 
depicted wore headscarves, reflecting the religiousness of the mother character and the 
whole family. Religious activities, such as praying and reading the Qur’an, were 
presented as a significant part of the everyday activities of the mainstream family type. 
The topic of Alevism was added to the curriculum by the JDP in order to create 
a common political bloc with the Alevi population who had previously suffered from 
the Republic’s homogenisation programme in the nation-building process. It was one of 
the attempts of the JDP to articulate the Alevis to its hegemonic project as a part of the 
national-popular aspect of cultural hegemony by responding to their democratic 
demands. However, the construction of the discourse in the texts analysed in Chapter 5 
reflected the attitude of the JDP towards Alevis in general and revealed the reason for 
the failure of efforts to construct a common political bloc with the Alevis. Alevis have 
not embraced such a step, since the topic of Alevism has been approached from a 
completely Sunni perspective in the RCMK textbooks. 
 
4. The Cultural Hegemonic Struggle in the Light of the Key 
Findings 
Based on Joseph’s (2000; 2001; 2002; 2008) distinction between hegemonic 
projects and deeper structural hegemonies which draw the boundaries of those 
hegemonic projects, it can be argued that the hegemonic projects of both the Kemalist 




Kemalist hegemonic bloc to seek a particular interpretation of Islam which would 
enable the creation of common ground with pious Muslims to gain their consent for the 
Kemalist rule might be regarded as a sign of the influence of Islam as a deep structure 
within society. In this regard, the discourse on Islam in the RCMK textbooks was the 
result of these efforts to find common ground with pious Muslims on the terrain of 
Islam. Similarly, legislation also revealed that the Kemalist hegemonic bloc 
acknowledged the power of Islam in the social, political and economic spheres and 
sought to control and restrict that power to sustain their own hegemony. On the other 
hand, Islam as a deep structure also aided the JDP’s electoral victories as the Party 
included Islamic-conservative discourse in its political discourse.  
The fundamental paradigm of the Republic, which was codified in the 
legislation, constituted another deep structure which helped the success of the Kemalist 
hegemonic project and determined the boundaries of the JDP’s hegemonic project. 
Kemalism possessed the character of structural hegemony since the fundamental 
paradigm of the Republic had been shaped in line with Kemalism’s conception of the 
world by means of legislation. This deep structure also hindered an Islamist revolution 
against the Kemalist domination in the history of Turkey. Because of the restrictive role 
of the structural hegemony, the JDP preferred a more reconciliatory discourse vis-à-vis 
the fundamental paradigm and main institutions of the Republic. 
Finally, another structural hegemony was global capitalism, which resulted in 
the efforts of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc to transform Muslims from pious people 
who act collectively under the influence of various Islamic civil society organisations 
such as associations, foundations, tarikats and cemaats into secular customers who act 
individually in accordance with the interests of the market economy. This 
transformation restricted Islam’s role to the areas of worship and belief in the everyday 
lives of pious Muslims. This situation had significant impacts on pious Muslims’ pattern 
of behaviour in the market economy from their consumption habits to their business 
activities. It is also possible to argue that such a deep structure also had an impact on the 
JDP’s capitalism-friendly neo-liberal policies in contrast with the anti-globalist stance 
of previous Islamist political parties. 
The Kemalist hegemonic project had a comparative advantage in terms of 




conservative movements. In addition to their historical prestige stemming from being 
the successors of the founders of the state, the Kemalists also had a privileged 
organisational power as they controlled the state apparatus, which was incomparably the 
most effective organisation over any other type of organisation in terms of contributing 
to or restraining the hegemonic projects. The discourse which aimed at ensuring the 
loyalty of people to the state apparatus with its entire legal system and the military was 
constructed in the RCMK textbooks as was demonstrated in Chapter 5. Moreover, the 
Kemalist hegemonic project also had a privileged position in terms of political parties, 
which provided significant organisational power for the hegemonic projects. Although 
the RPP, the prominent Kemalist party founded by Ataturk, could not achieve continual 
election victories in the multi-party period, it did successfully construct the discourse of 
‘Islamist threat’ (Tugal, 2009: 38). Moreover, as was shown in Chapter 6, the political 
party system in Turkey was shaped by Kemalist principles and values. This advantage 
in the area of political parties also applied to the area of associations and foundations, 
which resulted in the absolute Kemalist domination of civil society in the 1990s. 
Islamist-conservative counter-hegemonic movements were at a disadvantaged 
position as compared with the Kemalist hegemonic bloc in terms of organisational 
power and collective action. The discourse which limited the terrain of Islam to solely 
the individual level constrained Islam’s influence on collective action and its counter-
hegemonic power. The provisions of specific legislation brought structural obstacles for 
Islamist political parties, foundations and associations in terms of both carrying out 
activities and expressing particular discourses. With the closure of those parties, 
foundations and associations, Islamist movements lost the most significant 
organisational power for the construction of a counter-hegemony. Even the JDP faced 
closure case in 2008, even though it had been seeking to distance itself from its Islamist 
legacy. Tarikats and cemaats, which were a significant site of collective action for a 
significant part of the pious Muslim population, were illegitimated by the legal system 
from the early days of Republic and compelled to carry out their activities secretly as 
underground organisations (Narli, 1999: 45 [fn. 5]) and also discursively marginalised 
in the content of school textbooks until the 2010s. 
Considering the vital need for a unifying and cementing ideology in Gramscian 




Constitution granted Kemalism a privileged position compared with other ideologies in 
Turkey. The discourse within the Preamble and Article 2 of the Constitution located 
Kemalism to an impartial supra-ideological position while regarding all other ideologies 
as partial stances which had to be compatible with the impartial position of the state. 
This provided a hierarchical advantage for the Kemalist hegemonic bloc since its values 
represented the official position of the state. By this means, the discourse of impartiality 
eased the opponent groups’ internalisation of Kemalist values and made the threat 
perception stemming from the values of the Kemalist hegemonic bloc more difficult, 
since perceiving a threat from those values became equal to perceiving a threat from the 
state. 
On the other hand, Islamist or conservative ideologies which attached special 
importance to Islam’s social, political and economic roles were restricted both 
discursively as in the example of RCMK lessons and legally by different laws, 
regulations and bylaws regulating a variety of areas such as the state, political parties, 
associations and foundations. A discourse which regarded Islam’s roles on social, 
political and economic terrains as unacceptable, unusual and abnormal was constructed 
through legislation. Since Islam was constrained to the personal area of faith and 
worship, its power stemming from its being a source of political action and political 
discourse was curtailed. 
A significant advantage of the Kemalist hegemonic project stemmed from its 
intellectual power. Since significant instruments for raising intellectuals such as primary 
and secondary education facilities and universities were controlled by the state 
apparatus, the discourse within these instruments was shaped in accordance with the 
world conception of Kemalism. The privileged position of Ataturk, as the founder of the 
State, also applied to Kemalist intellectuals as his followers. Moreover, Kemalist 
intellectuals also had a comparative advantage in terms of organisational power, since 
there was no legal restriction on political parties and civil society organisations by 
which Kemalist intellectuals could perform intellectual activity. Particularly in the post-
28 February period, with the closure of Islamist political party associations and 





Islamist-conservative intellectuals, on the other hand, faced significant structural 
constraints until the 2010s. The most significant of these were the blocking of Imam-
Hatip graduates from higher education because of the coefficient problem and the 
headscarf ban on pious women in middle and high schools, universities and the public 
sector. The coefficient issue prevented Imam-Hatip graduates from performing 
intellectual activity in key positions in high-status jobs, and the headscarf ban deprived 
pious Muslim women of access to formal education and from being equipped in terms 
of the technical intellectual knowledge necessary for finding high-status jobs and 
carrying out an intellectual mission in those places. 
It is possible to detect efforts to create historic/political blocs by both the 
Kemalist hegemonic bloc and the JDP. As can be seen from the Kemalist’s efforts to 
construct a laicised version of Islamic discourse in the RCMK textbooks, the target 
group of the historic bloc was the devout Muslims who formed the majority in terms of 
religious identity. On the other hand, the focus of the JDP’s efforts was the victims of 
the nation-building process; Kurds, tarikats, cemaats and Alevis. In this regard, the 
newly introduced curriculum section on Alevism and significant changes in the 
discourse regarding the cemaats and tarikats in the RCMK textbooks can be seen as 
instances of the JDP’s efforts on the terrain of Islam. 
From the discussion so far, it can be seen that the principles and values of 
Kemalism formed the fundamental paradigm of both political and civil society by 2015. 
In entire terrains ranging from schools, universities and the PRA to associations, 
foundations and political parties, it was illegitimate and therefore perceived as 
unacceptable and abnormal to undertake activities and construct discourse against 
Ataturk’s principles and reforms. The Kemalists were therefore still able to benefit from 
Ataturk’s privileged position. 
It is also possible to claim that Kemalism’s long-term hegemonic project, 
beginning from the establishment of the Republic, tended to turn into a deeper structure 
by characterising the fundamental paradigm of the state with all its institutions and 
organisations in line with a laicist and nationalist value set. As loyalty to such a value 
set became the social norm as a consequence of a long-running social engineering 




universities, the normalisation and internalisation of the laicist discourse vis-à-vis the 
Islamic discourse became much easier.   
It should be noted that the Kemalist hegemonic project never hinged on the 
electoral victories of the RPP, the prominent Kemalist party founded by Ataturk, or on 
the terms of office of RPP governments. It might therefore be problematic to evaluate 
the success of the Kemalist hegemony with reference to the election results of the RPP. 
When Kemalism’s domination was under risk of Islamic threat, the regime preferred to 
close the Islamist parties down, as in the examples of the WP in 1998 (Morris, 1998) 
and the VP in 2001 (Frantz, 2001). Although the JDP itself also faced closure case for 
posing a threat to the principle of laicism in 2008 (Hurriyet, 2008), the party managed 
to survive until the present by means of its careful war of position. It is therefore 
possible to detect the vulnerability of the Kemalist hegemony to a careful war of 
position carried out by Islamist-conservative parties. This was what made the JDP more 
successful compared with the previous Islamist parties which had prioritised a war of 
manoeuvre. A possible reason for this might have been the difficulty of marginalising a 
more moderate political party which seemed more inclined to compromise with the 
current laic regime. The Kemalist discourse which illegitimated Islamist counter-
hegemonic movements therefore became less effective for the JDP. 
Another significant point is that the Kemalist segments within society had 
proved their capacity to create a secular cultural power bloc within civil society against 
the JDP without any assistance from the state apparatus. The power of such a secular 
power bloc was seen during the Gezi protests in Istanbul’s Taksim Square on 31 May 
2013 which very quickly spread to 80 provinces (Onbasi, 2016: 273) and had the 
character of a lifestyle conflict going beyond a straightforward environmentalist protest 
(Altun, 2016: 171). This showed how deeply the Kemalist values, which were the 
outcome of a long-term culture-building process as was shown in Chapters 5 and 6, are 
embedded within society.  
On the other hand, it is not possible to argue a decisive victory or a decisive 
defeat for the JDP in terms of the struggle for cultural hegemony. Rather it might be 
better to argue that the JDP has been successful in challenging the Kemalist hegemony 
in particular areas, whereas in other areas it has continued to carry on a war of position. 




where the party challenged the structural restrictions which had paved the way for the 
maintenance of the disadvantaged position of pious Muslims in the class hierarchy. The 
JDP was successful in nullifying the structural legal restrictions on the vertical mobility 
opportunities of pious Muslims. The most significant examples of this were the 
headscarf ban which deprived pious Muslim women of an entire education life as well 
as a working life, and the disadvantageous coefficient calculation which prevented 
Imam-Hatip graduates from accessing higher education. 
The JDP has not been successful in completely shaping the fundamental 
paradigm of the state with all its institutions and organisations in line with its own 
values, cultural elements and world conception. The majority of the instruments of 
cultural hegemony, such as primary and secondary education institutions and 
universities, are still dominated by Kemalist discourse. However, this reluctance to 
challenge the fundamental paradigm might be interpreted as a very careful war of 
position with gradual steps on a variety of issues ranging from the discourse on laicism 
and Ataturk to education policies. This might be a completely different strategy from 
that of the former Islamist parties, especially the Welfare Party which had prioritised a 
war of manoeuvre over a war of position in its short term of office which ended with the 
28 February post-modern coup d’état. As can be seen in both Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, 
the JDP endeavoured to minimise the confrontations with the laicist establishment, 
since it chose not to initiate a rapid Islamisation process in the country. This process 
was more gradual when it came to transforming the fundamental paradigm of the state, 
as the legislation which characterised the ideological basis of the state remained the 
same in 2015. Moreover, the very positive discourse about the military, which was 
strengthened by references to Islamic texts, remained the same in the textbooks of the 
RCMK lessons. 
It might be beneficial here to consider the personal image of Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan in the JDP’s uninterrupted terms of office until 2015. Taking into account 
Turkey’s political history, it can be seen that a significant determinant of voter attitude 
has been leadership charisma (Erisen, 2018: 86). In this sense, Erdogan has been 
accepted as the most charismatic leader who is believed to possess distinctive leadership 
qualities (Tugal, 2009: 175-179; Erisen, 2018: 86-89). Such a charismatic leadership 




bloc, which could not find an alternative charismatic leader in active political life to 
compete with Erdogan and endeavoured to close the leadership gap by instrumentalising 
the historical leadership charisma of Ataturk. Without a strong leader figure like 
Erdogan, however, it is difficult to claim the sustainability of the JDP’s hegemonic 
project.   
 
5. Recommendations for Future Research 
The main goal of the current study was to comprehend how the instruments and 
processes of cultural hegemony on the terrain of Islam were designed by the Kemalist 
hegemonic bloc, how the discourse was produced and disseminated in society and how 
those instruments and processes, and the discourse produced in them, were challenged 
in the period of the JDP. The focus of the study was therefore formal instruments such 
as the official education system and processes such as imposing and lifting the 
headscarf ban at universities. 
Informal and unsystematic processes and unofficial and independent 
instruments, however, also need to be researched in order to cover the entire discourse 
in circulation within society. Informal speeches by party administrators and leaders or 
military and bureaucratic officials about Islam and religious/secular lifestyles are some 
examples of informal and unsystematic sources of constructing and disseminating a 
particular discourse. The discourses which those actors are able to express, however, are 
determined by the legislation, so the findings of the current study can still form the basis 
for such future studies. Although Kucukali (2014; 2015) touched on religious discourse 
within the speeches of JDP members, more detailed studies are needed which focus 
solely on the religious discourse of both the Kemalist hegemonic bloc and JDP 
members in order to understand the strategies of both sides for persuading the Muslims 
to their religious/cultural position. 
Television, cinema and theatre, on the other hand, can also be regarded as 
examples of unofficial and independent instruments of cultural hegemony which affect, 
contribute to or challenge the dominant culture, lifestyle and perception of religion. For 




television serials have a significant effect on the perception of Islam, religiosity and 
lifestyle. Furthermore, key figures who have the potential to be role models for society 
and especially for young people, such as artists, singers, football players and novelists, 
also have a significant influence on the culture of a society. Although they are not 
directed by the hegemonic blocs, they can nevertheless adopt a particular attitude on 
issues regarding Islam and Islamic lifestyle or they can unconsciously have an impact 
on society without making any effort to do so through their lifestyle. Therefore, how 
those figures affect the hegemonic struggle on the terrain of Islam also merits deeper 
study. The findings of the current study constitute the basis for such research since they 
have revealed the discursive and legal restrictions affecting those key figures in 
performing such a mission.  
Considering that the success of a cultural hegemony is evaluated according to 
the capacity of the dominant class to position its specific values, ideas, beliefs and 
discourses as universal, natural and determining the boundaries of common sense 
(Giroux, 1981: 94), a successful cultural hegemony may not always necessitate a shift in 
the lifestyle of the hegemonised group. For instance, when a secular individual accepts 
the values and discourses of a Islamist government as normal, natural, legitimate and 
even superior and gives his/her consent for Islamist rule, it does not always mean that 
the individual must necessarily have a more religious lifestyle. As Ertit (2014) argued, 
on the other hand, the religious segments of society may also become more secularised 
even though they maintain their consent for and support in favour of the JDP. The 
success of a hegemony project may therefore not be the same as the success of the 
dominant group’s capability to transform the lifestyle of the subordinate groups. 
How each group’s lifestyle evolves in the midst of the hegemonic struggle is a 
significant issue which needs to be emphasised. A significant study which emphasised 
the direction of such an evolution in the lifestyle of people in Turkey was that of 
Carkoglu and Toprak (2007) who detected a rise in the religiosity of society in Turkey. 
Ertit (2014; 2016), on the other hand, reached completely opposite results by arguing 
that society in Turkey has been in a process of secularisation. It should also be noted 
that new phenomena such as the spread of social media and the secularisation trend in 
the Western world might also influence people’s lifestyle. Therefore, research into the 




could enrich the literature in addition to hegemony-based analyses of Turkey on the 
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